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ABSTRACT
Although there have been great advances since the
Enlightenment in the understanding of the subjective dimension
of man's existence, man has attempted to make his subjectivity
the ground of his project in the world, and has thereby come to
use others merely as a means toward self-realisation. He is
for others only as a by-product of his being for himself.
Dostoevsky saw that this makes man radically guilty and that he
cannot pass sentence on himself, but it was the Scottish
theologians, Edward Irving, Thomas Erskine and McLeod Campbell
who saw that it is only in Christ's vicarious repentance that
man can judge himself and repent. In contrast to existential¬
ist theology, Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics gives a compre¬
hensive account of what conversion in Christ means, but the
formal accuracy of his work needs to be enriched with the
insights of these Scottish theologians.
Barth holds that God elects man in and with Himself,
i.e., in Christ. Because God is for His enemies with the
same ultimate seriousness as He is for Himself, loving them as
Himself, He can rescue them from the abyss of their self-
isolation. Barth, however, fails fully to develop this
liberating doctrine. He gives adequate recognition neither
to the origin of election in the Father's will to create sons
through His giving of His only Son, nor to the obedient
electing work of the Spirit in carrying through to the subject¬
ivity of other men Jesus* election of the Father. This slight
tendency to Christomonism can be overcome by allowing the
Spirit's interaction with the spirit of man to be the goal
of God's self-giving on earth.
Again, although in his Christology Barth attempts to
break through all impersonal notions of Christ's bringing
others to share in Himself, he falls short of showing that
Christ's loving His enemies as Himself consisted of the
sorrow of His heart over them. His failure fully to allow
the Spirit to be equal God with the Son leads him to under¬
value the victory Christ wrought over sin in our flesh by
the Spirit, and this deprives his Christology of an adequate
basis for a complete account of Christ's communication of
His conversion to sinners. The failure fully to regard
Pentecost as the goal of the divine economy on earth leads
to a tendency to regard men as turned to God in their being
prior to their active participation by the Spirit in Christ,
and so to a constriction of his own profound insight into
man's free turning to God as his correspondence to God's free
turning to him. He thinks of man as already given to God
apart from his own personal act and so robs God's grace of
its goal of bringing men to turn to God with a freedom
analogous to God's turning to them. Similarly, Earth's
failure to allow the Spirit His full creative role with the
Son leads to a circumscribed account both of the content of
man's participation in Christ's repentance and also of his
recreation by the Spirit in faith. He speaks of man's
small conversion rather than of Christ giving him all that is
His through His Spirit. An element of impersonality enters
his account of Christ's calling sinners to Himself, since for
him they are His apart from their response to His supremely
courteous appeal to them. Barth's fragment on baptism goes
a long way toward developing a doctrine of the Spirit as
called for in this study but His creative work in baptising
men into Christ's vicarious humanity is still not fully
recognised.
PREFACE
This study has its origin in the conviction that man
is faced with an either/or: either he accepts the truth
about himself and despairs, or he hides from himself and
lives in illusion. The only way out is for him to turn
from himself and to turn to God. Pascal's description of
the complete contrast between man without God and man with
God is thoroughly convincing.
But how are we to turn to God? In their different
ways both existentialist theology and evangelical preaching
so stress man's decision that he is thrown back on to the
very self from which he seeks release. Into this situation,
Karl Barth's teaching in his Church Dogmatics shines with
liberating power: Christ has turned to God in our humanity
and gives us a share in His response.
Yet the reader of the Dogmatics finds himself frustrated.
Barth's intellectual precision, his wisdom and his love for
the Lord of whom he writes opens up a vision of God's love
for man so deep and wide that he cannot rest until his
message has been heard by the world which has isolated
itself from God. There is a tendency for Barth to weaken
the evangelical thrust of his doctrine by not allowing the
conversion of man in Christ fully to reach the men who are
its object. It was with this problem in mind that the
evangelical message of the Scottish theologians, Edward
Irving, Thomas Erskine and McLeod Campbell became surprisingly
relevant. Their insights into the unconditional freeness of
the gospel, and especially into the Spirit in Christ's
vicarious humanity seemed to offer a way of strengthening
Barth's theology and mobilising it for evangelism. It is
my hope that this study goes some way toward bringing these
insights to bear on Barth in such a way that the message of
God*s unbounded love for man can be heard by the men who so
desperately need it.
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THE PROBLEM OF TURNING TO GOD AS IT EMERGES IN THE POST-
ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURAL SITUATION
Turning to God is something which man does. If it is
true that the Lord turns sinners to Himself it is also true
1
that man turns himself to God. This is the case for a
reason Karl Barth never tires of elucidating. True God
in His freedom has become true man, and therefore His free¬
dom is the basis of man's freedom. God's turning to man
does not cancel out man's turning to Him but establishes it.
The Church has been slow to enter into the riches and
glory of this subjective aspect of conversion. Yet, if it
is true that man is the object of God's love, the Church
need not feel embarrassed or ashamed of man's act in
conversion. On the contrary, since God's love aims at this
act of man, the Church robs God of His glory if it fails to
rejoice in the riches of man's subjectivity as opened up
for him in Christ.
It will be argued in this chapter that Christian theology
1. Cf. Lamentations 5: 21. '0 Lord, turn us back to thyself
and we shall come back• (N.E.B.). The verb in the
Hebrew in both cases is shub. God's act of turning is
the ground of man's act and for that very reason makes it
possible and guarantees it. The Reformers were very con¬
scious of God's act as the basis of man's; see, e.g.. the
Commination Service in the Anglican Book of Common Prayer.
One of the concluding prayers (to be said by all the
people) opens with the petition: 'Turn thou us, 0 good
Lord, and so we shall be turned.' For the Reformers,
sinners could be saved only if they repented and turned to
God, but they were equally certain that sinners could do
this only on the basis and in the strength of God's prior
turning to them. Indeed, they went further and saw that,
as men turn to God, God Himself is at work turning them to
Himself.
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has only gradually come to appreciate the subjective aspect
of conversion, and that it was not until the
protestant reformation that a profound understanding of it
was reached. According to the Reformers, man discovered
his true subjectivity by faith in Christ. This under¬
standing was, unfortunately, quickly lost, and although very
important advances were made in the understanding of man's
subjectivity, these advances inevitably led to self-alien¬
ation. This was because faith was rejected in favour of
immediate self-knowledge. Man would trust nothing outside
himself, nothing 'alien' to himself. In thus basing him¬
self on himself man inevitably rejected the concrete other¬
ness of other people and therefore became guilty of using
others merely as a means toward self-realisation.
Post-Enlightenment man therefore needs a new starting
point for his venture in life. This new starting point
cannot be simply a return to the reformation, but will need
to be a deepened understanding of faith in Christ, an under¬
standing which includes the enriched modern insight into
man's subjectivity. It will be argued that certain
Scottish theologians, who gained penetrating insight into
Christ's sinless humanity, are of great help in this task.
They witnessed to Christ's righteous humanity as His tried
and proved compassion for sinners. His humanity is thus
the new basis for man. In Him, the repentance for sin
which the sinner cannot make is perfected, and sinners
find the freedom to turn to God as they accept His Spirit
and participate in Him.
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This chapter will conclude with an introductory account
of Karl Barth's engagement with the modern problem of
conversion.
The discussion which follows deliberately looks not
only to the work of theologians, but also to poets and
novelists. This is felt to be important, since the
Enlightenment rejected Christian theology. It is hoped
that the breakdown of the Enlightenment venture can be
illustrated effectively by looking at the work of men who
shaped their thinking in terms of experience rather than of
doctrine. Earth's great book on nineteenth century
theology"3" is not explicitly discussed, though it is always
in the background. This has been done in order to make
an independent assessment of the achievement of the Romantic
2
Enlightenment. Besides, Barth's book is concerned almost
exclusively with German thought and yet it was not in Germany
but in Scotland that perhaps the most important idea for the
1. K. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century,
trans. J. Bowden (S.C.to., London, 19^2).
2. The title, 'Romantic Enlightenment', is taken from
G. Clive, The Romantic Enlightenment (Meridian, New York,
I960), and is intended to refer to the development of
Enlightenment thought during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, especially as it integrated into
itself the Romantic awareness of man's personal subject¬
ivity. Clive argues that the Western mind during this
period, though ostensibly characterised by unbounded
confidence in man's freedom to develop and even to create
himself, was in fact caught in ambiguity and paradox and
that it could only frustrate itself. His book is a study
in the breakdown of the very principles on which man based
his confidence. Clive's assessment is more 'tragic' than
Barth's, as he points out in his essay on Mozart (pp. 39-
65), but although the Romantic Enlightenment was more
aware of its breakdown than Barth indicates, Clive's idea
that the very energy with which its despair was perceived
was to some extent redemptive only indicates the truth of
Barth's point that modern man is unable to judge himself
to be the failure that he is.
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doctrine of repentance, that of Christ's repentance,
emerged.
The Development of the Understanding of Man's Subjectivity
According to a saying of Jesus recorded in the fourth
Gospel, the angels "both ascended and descended on the Son
of man.1 Whatever else this saying may mean, it at least
indicates that Christianity includes a twofold movement,
"both upwards and' downwards, between God and man.
It is, however, broadly true to say that the early
Church concentrated most of its doctrinal energies on winning
a clear account of only the downward movement from God to
man. In their refinement of the doctrines of Trinity
and incarnation, the early Fathers showed that God became
man for us men and for our salvation, yet (with some notable
exceptions) they did not succeed in bringing 'us men and
our salvation' into equally clear focus. This task was
taken up by the Western Church. Augustine's Confessions
broke new ground with its intensely personal exploration of
the upward movement of man toward God.
We know enough of the theology of the Dark Ages to know
that while it preserved much of the objectivity of the
Fathers it did concern itself with the victory of men.
1. 'Truly, truly, I say to you, you will see heaven opened
and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the
Son of man.' Jn. 1: 51.
2. Especially Irenaeus and Athanasius. See E. Brunner. The
Mediator, trans. 0. Wyon (Lutterworth, London, 1934),
pp. 524f. Brunner draws attention to the saying of
Irenaeus: 'Jesus Christ, in His infinite love has become
what we are, in order that He may make us entirely what
He is.'
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Though it conceived the relationship "between God and man
in epic terms, at its best its very objectivity freed it to
see man as the object of Christ's victory and so also to
see the personal human subject fighting a triumphant battle
against evil. At few times in the Church's history has
justification so clearly meant that men are more than
conquerors through Christ:
Christ hath our host surrounded
With clouds of martyrs bright,
Who wave their palms in triumph
And fire us for the fight:
For Christ the cross ascended
To save a world undone,
And, suffering for the sinful,
Our full redemption won. 1
Precisely because this hymn looks to Jesus it is free to
celebrate the victorious march of 'our host', of us men.
It was not until the twelfth century renaissance that
2
man became the unashamed focal point of theology. Bernard,
writing on the love of God, described the movement of man
from unregenerate self-love through to love of himself
only for God's sake. Bernard always thought of man as
the object of God's love, and the humanity of Jesus was
the heart-beat of his theology. For him, to concentrate
on the human side of the fellowship with God did not mean
to retreat into introspection but to press forward into the
1. Columba, Christus Redemptor genitum, trans. D. MacGregor,
in The Church Hymnarv. Third Edition (Oxford University
2. R.W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (Hutchinson,
London, 1953), see chapter 5, *From Epic to Romance'.
3. Bernard of Clairvaux, On Loving God, ed. H. Martin
(S.C.M., London, 1959), see especially chapter 15#
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riches of God's love for man. Yet even at its best
twelfth century theology never attained the maturity of
Columba's understanding of the correspondence between God
and man, between the objective and the subjective. A
terrible imbalance invaded much of its theology. Abelard
was driven by a passionate desire for justification, as
both his autobiography1 and his doctrinal works show, but
the reader is left asking whether he was not speaking of a
kind of self-justification. Because, unlike Bernard, he
did not see that God* s love unequivocally preceded and
surrounded every act of his, the subjective degenerated into
the introspective and prevailed to such a degree that the
objective was all but crowded out. Inevitably Abelard
began asking what act of man*s (what contrition, what love,
what imitation of Jesus) could secure justification. He
wished to intensify his awareness of God, but, because he
did not allow the prior, objective love of God to under-
gird his search, the heightened subjectivity for which he
strove turned in on itself and became a mixture of self-
justification and frustrated anger.
1. Like Augustine, Abelard was particularly interested in
the personal 'I1, but where Augustine thought of himself
as encompassed by the mercy of God, Abelard thought of
his life as a constant defence against adversity.
2. Abelard believed that justification is by faith (J.G.Sikes,
Peter Abailard (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1932), p.2ll), but he also believed that Christ inspired
'a new motive into our actions' (p.209) and thus made it
possible for men to perform meritorious actions. Under
the law men obeyed out of fear and lacked the love for
God which could alone make their actions meritorious, but
now Christ has inspired men v/ith the hitherto lacking
motive of love.
3. It is amazing that throughout his Historia Calamitaturn
Abelard remained confident of his essential innocence.
The prevenient love of God thus became for him not God's
love for us while we are yet sinners but the providence
of God by which He trains us to follow the saints in
virtue (see the final chapter).
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Abelard's failure indicates a fairly general failure
in mediaeval theology. Because it said that the sinner,
aided by grace, could perform certain acts which would undo
his sin and also unite him with Christ, it made man the
object of his own action and therefore objectified and
alienated the very subjectivity it hoped to intensify.1
The command to repent was interpreted (following the Vulgate)
2
as 'do penance', and the pious projected their subjectivity
into acts intended to give the experience of justification.
Acts of identification with Christ, whether of sympathy and
imitation with Christ, or of identification with the host
on the altar, were also intended to increase fellowship
with God. But the very seriousness of intention with
which these acts were performed ritualized the consciences
they were intended to liberate. It should be noted that
theology became self-stultifying in its subjectivity only
when it forgot that while men were yet sinners Christ
identified Himself with them and died to remove their sin.
Immediately God's prior love for the sinner was doubted men
were thrown back on themselves and began to search their
consciences for ways of justifying their existence.
The protestant reformation broke through this bondage.
It proclaimed that Christ has already identified Himself
with man and once and for all borne away his sin. Acts of
1. Cf. K. Kitamori, The Theology of the Pain of God (S.C.M.,
London, 1966), pp. 82-3, Also G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomen¬
ology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (rev. 2nd ed.; G. Allen
and Unwin, London, 1949), 'The Unhappy Consciousness',
esn. pp. 257-67.
2. W. Telfer, The Forgiveness of Sins (S.C.M., London, 1959),
p. 104. "
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penance and identification with Christ are therefore
utterly superfluous. The gospel calls men not to do
penance but to repent, i.e., to give up their trust in them¬
selves and their works and to trust Christ alone. By this
faith they enjoy the riches of fellowship with God which is
in Christ. The doctrine of justification by faith did not
deny men their act as human subjects in justification, but
it did deny them any meritorious role. It thus achieved
what mediaeval theology generally failed to achieve, the
freedom of the human subject in fellowship with God. As we
have seen, the Fathers did not always succeed in bringing
into focus the human aspect of fellowship with God, the
theology of the Dark Ages cast the subjective into an epic
mould and the mediaeval Church, which came closest to
f
gaining the subjective, lost it. But justification by faith
alone freed the Christian man to look away from himself to
Christ and so to possess fellowship with God in Him:
reversing the mediaeval pattern, it lost the subjective in
order to gain it.
Since the reformation there have been a number of
significant developments in the understanding of man's
subjectivity. For convenience, they may be listed in the
following four points.
1. By far the most important development has been the
distrust of anything exterior to the self as a legitimate
starting point for the self's project in the world. Where
Anselm's act of radical questioning in his Proslogium con¬
firmed his trust in the God who is other than himself,1
1. Anselm, Proslogium, in Saint Anselm, Basic Writings
(Open Court, 1966).
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Descartes in his Discourse on Method found himself doubting
everything except the immediate experience of his own
thinking.1 Nothing external could be accepted as a ground
of certainty. He could trust only what was proper to him,
his inalienable knowledge of himself. Hegel carried this
kind of thinking through to its logical conclusion.
Descartes introduced into his argument the existence of God
as the Creator of the self which he experienced, but Hegel
assumed nothing. He spoke of the presuppositionless
moment in which the self became'the sole ground of
2
certainty. One interpreter has put it this way:
1. R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, in Philosophical
Writings, trans, and ed. E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach
(Nelson, London, 1966), pp. 31ff. But note T.F.Torrance*s
observation about the extent of Descartes* questioning:
'The questions of the doubter are poised upon himself,
upon the self-certainty and proud autonomy of the doubter.
Cogito. ergo sum. Dubito, ergo sum. By their very nature
they will not allow the doubting self to be called into
question.' T.F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction
(S.C.M., London, 1965), p. 123.
2. S. Kierkegaard believed that the Hegelians could speak of
this presuppositionless moment only by virtue of a prior
act of abstraction and reflection, and therefore that it
was not presuppositionless at all. 'The System begins
with the immediate, and hence without any presuppositions,
and hence absolutely....But...how does the System begin
with the immediate? That is to say, does it begin witK it
immediately? The answer to this question must be an -un¬
conditional negative. If the System is presumed to come
after existence, by which a confusion with an existential
system may be occasioned, then the System is of course
ex post facto, and so does not begin immediately with the
immediacy with which existence began; although in another
sense it may be said that existence did not begin with the
immediate, since the immediate never is as such, but is
transcended as soon as it is. The beginning which begins
with the immediate is thus itself reached by means of a
process of reflection.' Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
trans. D.F. Swenson (Oxford University Press, London, 19^+1),
pp. 101-2. For Kierkegaard, man can begin with an
immanent Absolute only by means of self-deception. The
only legitimate starting point is the 'absurd' faith in
the Absolute who is wholly Other (Fear and Trembling).
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For Hegel, Descartes' discovery of the subjective con¬
stituted a new beginning for philosophy....Yet
Descartes never fully explained the absolute character
of the certitude (ego-cog i to-sum) at which he arrived....
Heir to the mediaeval tradition, Descartes still took
the ego to be a "creature", and he felt compelled to
ground the absoluteness of its certainty by going
through what Heidegger calls a "back door", sc. by first
proving the existence of a creating God. But was this
not effectively to abrogate the declaration of indepen¬
dence with which he had begun?
The most that can be said for the Cartesian achieve¬
ment is that, having once engaged himself in the search
for absolute knowing, Descartes succeeded in discovering
the type of presentation which admits of absolute knowing,
sc. consciousness of the self....It was left to Hegel to
probe the absoluteness of this knowing, the Absolute as
such. Heidegger sustains the Hegelian metaphor by saying
that, if Descartes sighted new land, Hegel took
possession of it.
Taking possession of the new land consists in
exploring the absolute character of knowing....Yet how
are we to understand the term "absolute"? Heidegger
returns to the word* s Latin origin (ab-solvere) to give
it the radical sense of that which has been "loosened",
therefore released from another, whose bonds of
dependence upon the other are dis-(sc. ab-)solved. In
terms of the Hegelian problematic, from what is
"absolute" Knowing released? From dependence upon
objects in assuring itself of its truth.
(Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 331-2)
It will be argued later in this chapter that this concern
for man's self-knowledge as the 'absolute* starting point for
his venture in life leads directly to self-alienation. If
mediaeval thought sought the subjective and lost it, modern
thought has even more terribly alienated itself from what it
sought to possess.
2. The second development in the understanding of
man's subjectivity is closely connected with the first. There
has been a move from conceiving the self in static, sub-
stantialist terms toward conceiving it in dynamic, actualist
terms.The self is no longer thought of as a kind of
1. Cf. N. Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit, trans. O.F.Clarke
Tg, Bles, London, 1935), Chapter 1: 'Spirit and Nature*.
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spiritual substance, e.g.. as a 'soul1, but as an activity,
a subject which posits itself. The origins of this shift
in thought no doubt go back at least as far as the Victorines
(esp. Richard), but it emerges with particular confidence
in the early Pico della Mirandola. Pico broke with the
mediaeval doctrine of the self as fixed by God with a given
status in the created order, and claimed that God gave the
self the freedom to create its own place in the hierarchy
of being according to the level of being it choses to love.1
During the Romantic and Idealist movements it became common
to think of the self as being constituted as a true self
only through its own activity, an activity usually called a
movement of the spirit. The poet Coleridge, for example,
was particularly concerned to find in man's imaginative
powers (as distinguished from mere fancy) a synthesising
activity in which man could utter 'I am* in reflection of the
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divine 11 AM*. Fichte spoke of the self positing itself,
1. Cf. C. Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness (Constable,
London, 1970), Vol. 2, p. 50b:
*The dignity of man, as is well known, was held by Pico
to consist in the condition that man was not created as
a fixed part of the structure of the universe, but was
given a role by God, after the universe was completed,
of viewing it and admiring its Maker. Man was in this
view the earthly image of God, and the being that helped
the deity maintain the subjectivity of His own being by
sharing it to some degree with a creature whose nature
was to rise above nature into subjectivity. This sub¬
jectivity comprised man1s freedom to participate in the
universe at whatever level and in whatever condition he
chose.1
In his De Ente et Uno, Pico stresses the importance of
love in man1s participation in being, and it is possible
that he is drawing on certain aspects of mediaeval
mysticism.
2. S.T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Chapter XIII.
12
Hegel regarded self-awareness as man's greatest possibility,
and poets celebrated the power of the 'I* to establish it¬
self in the face of the inanimate world. There can be
little doubt that of the many periods in history when men
have been conscious of discovering new potentialities for
man, the Romantic and Idealist movements were among the
most significant.'1'
3. This heightened awareness of man's subjectivity
developed the Enlightenment's discovery of man's history as
2
an ongoing process in which man enriches himself. Enlight¬
enment thought located man's essence in his reason, and
believed that through reason man could civilise 'rude' nature.
Through the proper exercise of reason man could develop
both himself and his environment into a harmony which would
be a this-worldly realisation of Christianity's alien and
other-worldly Kingdom of God. As man's creation it
would belong to him. This idea was developed in the nine¬
teenth century. For Hegel, as for the Enlightenment,
history was the movement of reason on its way toward its
fulfilment, but he deepened this belief by integrating it
with the Romantic thesis that this movement is that of man's
1. The word Romantic is used here to refer not to the Sturm
und Drang movement but to the more mature movement in
literature which (at least in the figures of Schelling
and Coleridge) aligned itself with Idealist philosophy.
2. G. Vico is generally recognised as being among the first
philosophers to argue for a constantly enriching move¬
ment in history. See, e.g.. G. Collingwood, The Idea of
History (Oxford University Press, London, l§6l), pp.67-S.
3. Cf. K. Barth's brilliant account of this in Protestant
fEeologv in the Nineteenth Century. 'Man in the Eighteenth
Century'.
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subjectivity. Man unfolds his subjectivity in a meaning¬
ful history in which nothing is lost and even alienation
serves a necessary role in man's self-transcendence and the
final all-embracing consummation. Man's subjectivity
assumed escnatological dimensions. It was the activity in
which man realised himself, becoming what he is. In
bringing this activity to its fulfilment man completed what
he set out to do in his initial self-absolvence from all
dependence on others: he entered into possession of all
that is other and alien. Having set out by repudiating
any alien starting point, he now, at the completion of his
task, knew himself as the basis of all things. He had
realised himself and he was his own, subject to no other and
no alienation. He had thus justified his initial step of
taking himself, and not an 'alien* God, as the ground of his
project in life.
4. This combination of subjectivity and eschatology
inevitably fell into three moments or phases. First, there
was the presupposition of the entire movement, i.e., the
apparently self-evident idea that man can and should sever
himself from every external object and make himself the
ground of his own certainty. This corresponds to point 1.
Second, there was the experience of alienation which
followed this fundamental self-positing. Together with this
1. Bultmann has drawn attention to this in his History and
Eschatology (University Press, Edinburgh, 1937), e.g..
'...the subject of /man's/ ever new decisions is the
same, namely the I_, an ever-growing and becoming, an
ever-increasing, improving or degenerating • (p. 146).
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experience of alienation there arose what might he called
the duty of overcoming alienation and thus of justifying
the original repudiation of alienation. This called for
the activity of the self, for the realisation of
subjectivity, and corresponds to point 2. Third, with
varying degrees of hope and confidence, there was the
projection of the final goal, the homecoming, the return of
the self to the self. This return would not be a return
to the original starting point, but a development and
enrichment of it.1 By means of its active engagement with
alienation it would be self-fulfilled, self-possessed.
This corresponds to point 3. The account of this three¬
fold movement could and did take many forms, but the
significant point for this study is that it gives every
appearance of being a possible and even necessary trans¬
lation into inalienable human terms of traditional, other¬
worldly Christianity. It translated the traditional pil¬
grimage from lost innocence through repentance toward
eternal righteousness into the apparently richer and more
daring journey from original innocence through alienation
toward radical innocence. The word innocence calls for
1. This idea took countless forms. Beginning with Vico's
concept of history as an ascending spiral (i.e., a move¬
ment which constantly returns to the same place but
always at a higher level of understanding) it may be seen
in Hegel's concept of the mind's journey to perfect self-
knowledge, in Marx's return to a state of absence of
external controls, in Heidegger's 'third phase' with its
idea of homecoming(cf. Hegel's Recollection in the
Phenomenology of Mind) and in many poets, e.g., T.S.Eliot's:
...the end of all our exploration
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time
(Little Giddlng).
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some comment, since it is a theological and poetic word
rather than a philosophical one. The idea of innocence
was central to the Romantic Enlightenment since it has to
do with man1s righteousness and therefore with his right
to posit and realise himself. For William Blake, who was
particularly interested in translating Christianity, man
has an original innocence which, by passing through the
fires of experience and alienation, is tested, proved and
made into radical innocence. It is only on the ground of
a belief in such an original innocence that he can justify
his creative venture. Similarly in Hegel and even in
Marx, it is only on the ground of the legitimacy of man's
self-positing that man can justify his project of self-
realisation. Only if man is justified in finding his
starting point in himself, only if he is innocent, is he
justified in proceeding from that point along the path of
self-realisation.
In these developments, the idea of conversion is not
excluded but given a new meaning. Repentance no longer
means a complete about-turn, but involves the giving up
of a superficial life for the higher life of the spirit.
It involves a renunciation of the immature life of
dependence on external objects and the establishment of man's
inner, spiritual, subjective powers. Hegel, for example,
spoke of man's dread in the face of death and of his need
to interiorise his death by means of an act of the spirit.1
1. G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit.. pp. 237-8. Cf. J. Hyppolite,
Etudes Sur Marx et Hegel (Librairie Marcel Riviere
et Cie, Paris, 1955}, p. 38.
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Similarly, in the face of the transitoriness of life, poets
felt bound to reconstitute their lives on a higher plane by
means of the awakening of their creative powers. Wordsworth
in his Prelude. perhaps the most ambitious poetic venture
of English Romanticism, opened his meditation with a with¬
drawal from all that is external and contingent and, having
attained freedom from all that is not himself, reconstituted
himself through the creative imagination."'' Understood in
this sense it could be said that the Romantic Enlightenment
understood man*s true life as one of continual repentance
and faith, i.e., a life in which, by the act of the personal
subject, the merely external is negated and transcended for
the sake of the immediate life of the spirit. As man
1. The first three hundred lines of the Prelude describe a
kind of askesis in which the mind frees itself from all
subjection to external objects, and thus is free to pro¬
ject itself solely on the basis of its inner energies.
The great burst of creative energy which follows (lines
301 to the end of Book I) is creative in a double sense.
First, the mind does not feed itself on sense objects but
only on the images it presents to itself. It sustains
itself out of its own resources. Second, the mind re¬
creates its past experiences and in so doing ♦recapitu¬
lates* itself. The poet makes these past moments his
own. As he creates his poem he rescues these experiences
from alienation and integrates them into his present
identity. In this way he reconstitutes himself through
his creative imagination. Later in this chapter it will
be argued of Blake that his assertion of innocence was an
act of audacity. It is interesting to note that one of
the major themes to emerge in the great passages of this
part of the Prelude is that of the audacity of man's mind
in the worldl The *1* becomes an 'I' only as an intruder,
even a *plunderer' (cf. Nutting) and, unlike the more
Christian Coleridge,"Hoes not find itself affirmed by the
Creator and His creation. There seems to be 110 equiva¬
lent in Wordsworth to the moment in The Ancient Mariner
when the self is reconstituted, not by its own activity,
but by grace.
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exercises this subjectivity he moves from his alienated to
his proper life, from inauthentic to authentic existence.
The idea of conversion, however, in the traditional
Christian sense, was rejected. According to the orthodox
understanding, God questions man as to his righteousness
and brings him to realise that he has no innocence but is
radically corrupt. In the presence of God, man realises
that he cannot base his life on himself but must cry out to
God and find in Him a completely new starting point for his
life. Conversion is not the transition from an external to
an internal starting point, but the turning from oneself to
God. For the Romantic Enlightenment, to admit the orthodox
understanding would be to abandon the very foundation of
man's project in the world, i.e., to abandon his trust only
in himself, in what is proper to him. Indeed, for many
writers in modern times, the orthodox Christian understanding
of God presents man with his most serious threat. He is
thought of as an intruder, as a jealous father who would
deprive men of all freely human existence.1 He enters
1. This fear goes back at least as far as Gnostic theologies,
and re-emerged in the Romantic movement. In some of
Blake's poems, for example, the idea is developed that,
just as one person is jealous of another and attempts to
enter his innermost life in order to hurt him, so a
jealous god may invade the heart of man and usurp his
freedom. Ine one place Blake speaks of God as the
'selfish Father of men.' We need only point to
Wuthering Heights and Tristan and Isolde, to La Belle
Dame Sans Merci and the figure of Roger Chillingworth
in The Scarlet Letter to realise that nineteenth century
culture was troubled by the idea of an alien power




human life only subtly to displace it and to alienate it
from itself: He is the Alien who jealously alienates.
These developments in the understanding of man's
subjectivity mean that he thinks of himself as his own
redeemer. They mean that he posits himself in what he
believes is his original innocence, that he labours to
radicalise this innocence and finally that he hopes to
realise the self-fulfilment in which the initial act of
faith in his innocence demonstrates itself to have been
justified. He has dared to take himself as the ground of
certainty, encouraged himself with the hope of achieving the
goal of self-fulfilment and confidently expects to be able
to declare the completion of his innocence. To use for a
moment the prophet, priest, king structure which the reform¬
ation applied to Christ's redeeming work, it may fairly be
said that the Romantic Enlightenment begins with an initial
act of prophecy which it believes will prove itself to be
justified. It begins with the promise, the prophecy, that,
by refusing all alien starting points and by attributing
innocence to the self-positing 'I', man can realise his self-
fulfilment. On the basis of this prophecy man may proceed
to the priestly act of putting this innocence to the test
and so proving it to be what it claims to be. This priestly
act includes both the negative, purifying process which is
akin to repentance and the positive, proving process which,
as the demonstration of man's innocence under adversity,
is akin to works of sanctification. The prophecy is ful¬
filled in man's entrance into his kingly rights, into the
fulfilled self-hood in which he takes full possession of his
innocence and in which he has overcome alienation by making
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all things his own. He has earned the right to rule the
earth. On the ground of his self-proved innocence, he is
the messiah who may bring in the milennium."^ Thus, the
initial act of prophecy proves itself justified and declares
itself as such.
The contention of this chapter is that the Romantic
Enlightenment has completely failed. Man has not succeeded
in justifying the rightness of taking himself as his
starting point. On the contrary, far from being originally
innocent, he is thoroughly corrupt; he actualises his sub-
2
jectivity in guilty works of jealousy; and far from
speaking forth the fulfilled prophecy of his self-proven
innocence, he cannot pronounce himself guilty. He is im¬
prisoned in self-alienation. It will be argued that he
needs a new starting point for his project in the world. It
is the twentieth century theologian, Karl Barth, who has
seen most comprehensively that it is in Christ, and in Him
alone, that man has this new starting point. For this
reason this study will concentrate almost exclusively on
his work.
1. About the same time as Marx was developing his under¬
standing of man's right to bring in the new age, Edward
Irving, J.N. Darby and others were preaching the second
coming of Christ. For Irving, Jesus was the only man
with the right to bring in the milennium because He was
the only wholly righteo\is man. Jesus would rule the
earth in righteousness and peace, as the one man in whom
God's will for man was realised.
2. When man takes himself as the centre of his life he in¬
evitably becomes jealous of others since he fears that
they are more fulfilled than he is.
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In order to argue for this position, the work of
William Blake will first he discussed as illustrating, in
a particularly powerful way, the Romantic Enlightenment
belief in man as his own prophet, priest and king. It is
recognised that Blake was a poet and not a theologian or
philosopher, yet his work records a very rich exploration
of experience and constitutes a serious assertion about the
nature of man's project in life. It will then be argued
in relation to Hegel's understanding of self-realisation
that, despite his own claims, Hegelian man realises himself
in what can only be called a kind of sacrifice of the other,
and that he is therefore not innocent but guilty. It will
next be argued that Nietzsche came close to abandoning himself
as the starting point of his thought and even came to the
verge of calling out to the absent God. A discussion of
Dostoevsky follows in which it is argued that there is in
his work an ambivalent recognition of man's total corruption,
a recognition compromised by the idea that man in his
confession of sin takes responsibility for his guilty, alien
self, and so 'redeems' it as his own. Nevertheless it is
in his Brothers Karamazov that the perception emerges that
man is unable to judge himself as guilty and that, unless
he can discover a new ground of innocence, he must either
lie about himself or retreat into silence. The chapter will
conclude with a brief consideration of the Scottish theolo¬
gians Edward Irving, Thomas Erskine and McLeod Campbell,
showing that they saw in the humanity of Christ a tried and
perfected innocence which pronounced judgment on man's guilt
where man can only be silent. It will be suggested that
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they saw Christ's 'alien' righteousness as so completely
given to sinners that they may participate in Him and so
share in His repentance. His subjectivity, as truly
innocent or righteous subjectivity, establishes their sub¬
jectivity. It will be suggested that their work gives the
modern theologian a rich basis on which to develop some
aspects of Earth's theology. Although Barth has defined
man's repentance in Christ comprehensively and accurately,
his work lacks some of their insights.
William Blake
Although William Blake held himself aloof from the
cultural life of his times, his purpose seems to have been
to set the spiritual venture of his contemporaries on a
purified and therefore firmer footing. His scorn for
Voltaire and the rationalists sprang mainly from his feeling
that they had not penetrated to the heart of man's struggle
to give free form to his most basic energies. In poem
after poem he celebrated the energies which are proper to
man, and directed his most passionate hatred against any
priest-craft which would impose an alien structure on them.
Man's energy must find the form which is intrinsic to it
and which therefore allows it to express and embody itself
without external constraint.
Blake understood this struggle for authentic freedom to
take place in three not necessarily successive, but
connected phases. First, there is untried innocence. This
innocence is, second, put to the test in experience, and,
third, tried in the fires of experience; it emerges as radical
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innocence.1 It is no longer fragile but has the inde-
flectible resiliance which cannot only withstand the on¬
slaught of evil but even redeem it.
Innocence has much in common with prophecy. It means
purity and so involves both openness to others and clarity,
singleness of vision. The children in his poems of
innocence see the needs of others, including those opposed
to them, and are able to respond in simple generosity toward
them. There is a positive and unhindered relationship
between child and nurse, black child and white child, even
between chimney sweep and master. In this purity, this
simplicity of being oneself, there is even the capacity to
bear hardship without retaliation. Through its suffering,
innocence can even restore broken relationships:
'Love seeketh not itself to please,
Nor for itself hath any care,
But for another gives its ease,
And builds a Heaven in Hell's despair.'
So sang a little Clod of Clay
Trodden with the cattle's feet,...
(The Clod and the Pebble)
Thus, the little black boy has a rough life, but the purity
of his heart can bring the white boy in joy before their
2
common heavenly Father. In this way innocence holds out
1. This interpretation of Blake, based on The Songs of Inno¬
cence and The Songs of Experience, was argued for in a
series of unpublished lectures given by Vincent Buckley
in the University of Melbourne in 1961. A much abbrevia¬
ted form of the argument can be found in his Poetry and
the Sacred (Chatto and Windus, London, 1968).
2. The little black boy in the poem of that name has both
openness to others and clarity of vision. He loves the
little white boy who appears to be his opposite and also
sees beneath that difference to their common purity in
the presence of God. His innocence thus has the pro¬
phetic dimension of seeing into the heart of reality and
of bringing the world of appearances into harmony with
that reality.
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the promise of reconciled humanity.
This innocence is put to the test in what Blake termed
experience. Instead of suffering for others, the self
inflicts sufferings on others, building 'a Hell in Heaven's
despite'. The natural energies are blocked and become self-
frustrating. In what is one of the most remarkable poems
in English he sees 'the mind-forged manacles' victimising
innocent people:-
In every cry of every man...
The mind-forged manacles I hear.
How the chimney-sweeper's cry
Every blackening church appalls;
And the hapless soldier* s sigh
Runs in blood down palace walls.
But most through midnight streets I hear
How the youthful harlot's curse
Blasts the newborn infant's tear,
And blights with plagues the marriage hearse.
(London)
Such clear and concentrated vision is itself the perception
of innocence. Only innocence could look so steadily into
the centre of this appalling self-victimisation; only
singleness of vision could see so clearly this self-contra¬
diction. This innocence not only sees: it also compassion¬
ates; it stands alongside the 'newborn infant' and imaginatively
identifies with his innocent suffering. It goes further. In
this act of imaginative identification, and it must be
stressed that this act has nothing to do with fancy but is an
act of penetration into the real condition of another, the
poet also speaks on behalf of the victim. The poem is a
kind of vicarious cry on behalf of the helpless infant.
Since this vicarious cry is not easily won, but depends on
the poet's generous openness to the child, on his imaginative
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identification with it,1 there is a sense in which the poet
suffers for the child. To speak vicariously for the child
means hardship for the poet. If this is the case, it must
also be said that the poet's innocence, his openness to
others and his power to identify with them, is tested,
purified and proved. The act of speaking on behalf of
suffering purifies the innocence of the speaker. In Blake's
synthesis, it is a necessary stage in his qualification to
become a prophet.
Before going on to discuss this consummation of
innocence, a comment about this 'priestly' work of the
poet is needed. In the lines quoted above, the poet does
not identify with the evil, victimising energy. The poem
is so moving precisely because it identifies with victimised
innocence. Yet this is nothing short of audacity. On
what grounds may a poet or any one else project himself
1. It must be pointed out that imaginative identification
does not mean that the distinction between the poet and
the child disappears. If that were to happen, the poet
would not be able to suffer on behalf of the child.
Compassion, in the sense of feeling for another, would be
excluded. Since the poet remains himself he is able to
speak on behalf of the child. He is able to do something
for the child which the child cannot do for itself. The
parallel with Christ's identification with sinners is
obvious, especially as interpreted by Edward Irving and
McLeod Campbell. According to these theologians, Christ
loved men and felt their evil plight as His own, and so
did for them what they could not do for themselves. The
parallel is, however, no more than formal, since for Blake
it is man's innocence which compassionates with others,
while for Irving and Campbell man does not have such an
innocence and it is solely Jesus Christ, by the power
of the Holy Spirit, who is wholly righteous and able to
bear the burden of sinners.
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above the common guilt of mankind and identify himself
with innocence? On what grounds may anyone identify with
the innocent and not with the guilty? For Blake the
answer was clear: no matter how corrupt men may actually
be in their experience, fundamentally, at root, all men
share a pristine innocence. Yet, even when this is said, it
must be answered that this belief can only be maintained in
the face of man's actual experience of his corruption. It
is a belief which can be retained only so long as it is
asserted, only so long as a man exercises his belief in an
innocence deeper than experience. For Blake it was a self-
generating assertion because, as each wave of corrupt
experience overwhelmed him, he believed that his innocence
was not vanquished but rather purified: the very strength
of his assertion of innocence generated the strength to
withstand every contradiction of it. His poem Tiger is
notoriously difficult to interpret, but one possible reading
points to just this audacious assertion of innocence in the
face of the fearful works of that supposed innocence.
The consummation of the priestly self-offering at work
in poems like London can be seen in the massive assertion
of Jerusalem. In this poem, the poet consecrates himself
for a messianic role. He summons all his energies to the
task of building Jerusalem where presently there are only
'dark Satanic mills':
Bring me my Bow of burning gold!
Bring me my Arrows of Desire!
Bring me my Spear! 0 clouds, unfold!
Bring me my Chariot of fire!
(Jerusalem)
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The imagery of fire and gold here connect with the purifi¬
cation of innocence and perhaps indicate a process of
purification which increases as the battle progresses. But
the apparent humility contained in that thought cannot
conceal the unbounded pride of '0 clouds, unfold!', an un-
mistakeable self-identification with the returning Son of
man. Indeed, this stanza thrusts upon the reader the
question of the poet's right to arrogate to himself the
apocalytic imagery of the Bible. At no point does he
question his worthiness for his messianic task. A sober
reading of the poem is compelled to conclude that the poem's
massive self-confidence rests only on assertion. Though the
poem claims to be an integration of man's basic energies into
a unified and liberating act, into an innocence so radical
that it is capable of bringing in the rule of man's truest
energies, its astonishing pride aligns it rather with
destruction and even repression. Although there is talk of
'building' Jerusalem, the poem mentions only the instruments
of warfare and is silent concerning the arts of peace.
It has to be said of Blake that he boldly put human
innocence where it does not belong. He claimed for that
innocence the purity which could see human need and offer
itself on behalf of it, thus exercising a kingly, healing
power strong enough to convert jealousy into generosity.
This would be glorious if it could be located in man as we
know him, but even in Blake's own writing it cannot be denied
that the opposite of this innocence, jealousy and the will to
harm others, occupies the centre of his vision. What is
especially disturbing is his view that experience and the
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evil that is part of it are a necessary aspect of man's
winning through to radical innocence. He could not contem¬
plate Jesus of Nazareth without seeing in Him an impulse to
harm others as well as to benefit them."*" It seems that for
Blaxe it was impossible to conceive of an actually existing
human righteousness which steadfastly fulfilled his own
vision of having no care for itself but only for the good
of others. For this reason, the theological work of
Edward Irving, who was coming to the height of his powers at
about the time of Blake's death (1827), presents itself as a
convincing rejoinder to Blake's failure to locate a human
innocence which could prove itself wholly adequate to the
human situation. According to Irving, the man Jesus, in
our fallen humanity, fulfilled all righteousness. He loved
His brethren as Himself. As He fulfilled this righteousness
He proved that God's love will go to the very depths of
p
man's depravity. In this act of love, which was far
stronger than an act of imaginative identification, He bore
the sins of His brethren. He knew their sinful plight as
His own. In this demonstration of righteousness, He
liberated His brethren, giving them a share in His right¬
eousness. More will be said below about Irving's relevance
to this problem of the recovery of man's innocence, but
enough has been said at this point to indicate that his work
is helpful in the task of locating genuine human innocence.
1. See his poem on Jesus and also The Marriage of Heaven
and Hell. ' *** *"*"*"* ~
2. E. Irving, The Orthodox and Catholic Doctrine of our




Only one aspect of Hegel's work will be discussed here,
that of his conception of man's self-realisation. In the
Phenomenology of Mind Hegel argues that the self comes to
awareness of itself by means of recognising its likeness in
an other self.1 When this happens there ensues a struggle
with the other self, a battle to the death. The self must
prove itself and discover in itself the very opposite which
it has encountered and fears. Such a movement toward self-
completion is not easily won, and, in fact, there is no way
to it except through a highway of despair. The self must
internalise its own finitude and death. It is also a
struggle with the other self in which the self internalises
the death which the other self means to it. Having won
through this painful battle, the self has proved that it is
not merely in Itself, like the rest of the world, but that
it is for itself. It is genuinely human, genuinely its own.
For Hegel, men 'prove themselves and each other through
a life and death struggle.' In a moving passage he says:
They must enter into this struggle, for they must
bring their certainty of themselves, the certainty
of being for themselves, to the level of objective
truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the
other and in their own case as well. And it is
solely by risking life that freedom is obtained;
only thus is it tried and proved that the essential
nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence,
is not the immediate form in which it first makes
1. The following account is drawn from G.W.F. Hegel, op.clt.,
esp. pp. 229-40. Also, J. Hyppolite, op.cit., pp. 31-41;
and J. Wahl, Le Malheur de la Conscience dans le
Philosophie de Hegel (Presses Universitas de France.
Paris, 1951).
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its appearance, is not its mere absorption in the
expanse of life. Rather it is thereby guaranteed
that there is nothing present but what might be taken
as a vanishing moment - that self-consciousness is
merely pure self-existence, being for itself. The
individual who has not staked his life, may, no doubt,
be recognised as a Person; but he has not attained
the truth of this recognition as an independent self-
consciousness. In the same way each must aim at the
death of the other, as it risks its own life thereby;
for that other is to it of no more worth than itself;
the other's reality to the former as an external
other, as outside itself; it must cancel that exter¬
nality. The other is purely existent consciousness
and entangled in manifold ways; it must view its
otherness as pure existence for itself or as absolute
negation. (Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 232-3)
This passage has been quoted at some length in order
to illustrate the impression which many passages of the
Phenomenology give that, despite Hegel's conviction that this
•trial by death' is both necessary and good, the one self
uses the other self as a means towards self-realisation.
Even if it is pointed out that Hegel insists that the two
selves engaged in this struggle come to self-realisation, it
still seems that each self uses the other. At the very
least it must be said that in Hegel the other self is not
an unambiguous good: it is needed, not for its own sake, but
for one's own self-realisation. Selves do not encounter
each other in free, mutual love and affirmation. The other
self is needed, not loved. The two selves do not affirm each
other but confront each other, seeing in the other the
necessary means to self-awareness. Even in the final self-
completion it does not happen that each affirms the otherness
of the other, but that each includes the other in its aware¬
ness. Yet if the self includes the other in itself, what
content can be given the concrete otherness of the other self?
In Hegel there is something very close to an antithesis
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of the Pauline saying: 'the man who loves his wife loves
himself.' (Eph. 5: 28). According to Paul, in the order of
reconciliation, the self confronts the other in love (agape)
and affirms itself only as it affirms the concrete otherness
of the other, even the body of the other. Paul compares
the self's love for the other with Christ's love for His
body, the Church, i.e., a love which gives itself even to
death for the sake of the other (ho Christos egapesen ten
ekkleslan kai paredoken heauton huper autes) (Eph. 5: 25).
In Hegel the self goes through an internalised death in
relation to the other, but this death takes place not for the
sake of the other but for its own sake. The concrete other¬
ness of the other is disposed of. Even the exalted talk
of the self's self-sacrifice, as described in the Philosophy
of Religion.1 only confirms the suspicion that something
quite selfish is going on here, since the purpose of this
self-sacrifice is not the benefit of the other but gain for
oneself.
It is important to see this complete contrast between
Hegel and Christianity, because at first glance it seems that
Hegel has grasped Christianity's understanding of the
1. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Religion. Vol. Ill, trans.
E.B. Spiers and J.B. Sanderson (Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner and Co., London, 1895), p. 95. Speaking of man's
appropriation of Christ's sacrifice, he says: 'When man
accomplishes within himself this conversion and yielding
up of the natural will, and lives in love, this represents
the essential fact, the thing in-and-for-itself. His sub¬
jective certainty, his feeling, is truth, it is the truth
and the nature of Spirit.' See also, J. Wahl, op.cit.,
pp. 76ff.
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transforming power of sacrifice. Sacrifice plays an
important role not only in his discussion of religion, but
also, in a slightly different form, in the Phenomenology.
with its talk of the highway of despair and the perilous
journey through the self's feeling incommensurate with its
desires. At almost every point Hegel speaks of death and
renewal, of the product of the dialectic, i.e., of sacrifice
and its issue. Like many nineteenth century Idealists,
Hegel found Christianity intelligible and acceptable as the
religion which transformed the external sacrifice of animals
into the sacrifice of the self. For them, Christianity was
a kind of unbloody sacrifice in which finite self-knowledge was
abandoned for the sake of the higher knowledge of the spirit.
It took lip the best insights of the Old Testament (e.g.. 'thou
delightest not in sacrifice [nor in] burnt offering.' (Ps.
51 :16).) and 'spiritualised' them.1 The external sacrifice
was abolished in favour of the sacrifice of the finite life
and the affirmation of the truly spiritual life. This, it
seemed, was repentance, conversion and enlightenment. It
took a figure the stature of Kierkegaard to show that this
is very different from Christian faith. In Fear and Trembling
he asked whether the significance of the story of the
sacrifice of Isaac was not that God calls for obedience in
spite of. and not because of, the ethical ends which may be
achieved by it. Does not God call for the utterly offensive
1. There is an interesting discussion of this in T. Mann,
Dr. Faustus. trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter (Penguin, 1968),
pp. 272f.
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obedience in which man is required to sacrifice what is
dearer to himself than his own life, even although no good,
let alone self-transcendence, can be seen to follow from it?
In Hegel, the self sacrifices its finitude in the knowledge
that it will gain by that action a higher life, but in the
Abraham story, the self gives up its attachment to finitude
without the knowledge of any benefit to itself. In Hegel,
after the self has been through its internalised death it
affirms itself as the ground of all things. In Kierkegaard,
also, the self which has lost all regains all, but in an
entirely different sense.1 For him, the self has truly lost
all things because God has taken them, and it is truly given
all things, because God returns what He took. Hegel and
Kierkegaard thus speak of two entirely different kinds of
•conversion*. Both understand that for conversion to be
conversion there must be death and rebirth: for Hegel this
death and rebirth is the ultimate testing of the self, even
to death, in order that it may realise its potentialities;
but for Kierkegaard this death and rebirth is God's bringing
the self to a complete end so that, as by a miracle analogous
to the creatio ex nlhilo of the first creation, He gives the
self forgiveness and new life.
It was Nietzsche who, in the nineteenth century, saw
most clearly the anti-Christian dimension of the Hegelian
account of man*s self-realisation. As T.W. Adorno and others
1. W. Lowrie holds this to be the meaning of Kierkegaard's
concept of 'Repetition', Kierkegaard (Oxford University
Press, London, 1938), p. 630.
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have pointed out, Nietzsche realised that there can he no
satisfactory sublimation of the fight to the death between
the self and its other.1 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra it seems
that either the self must die or the supreme Other, God, must
be killed. It will always be a matter of debate as to how
far in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche was thinking of Hegel, but there can be little
doubt that he was pleading that the Idealist conception of
the self and its other be called by its proper name, i.e..
that of Jealousy, lust and hunger for the other. He was
calling for a 'demythologisation' of Idealist concepts, and
asking that it be recognised that there is murder in the
life and death struggle by which men try and prove themselves
to be men. Instead of speaking of civilisation we should
speak of the cunning of the fox and the Jungle of animal
instincts in which each hungers for the life of the other.
The constantly reiterated presupposition of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra is the death of God. It is men who have killed
Him in order to assert their own self-overcoming, their own
self-transcendence as Obermenschen. Intoxicating though
this assertion of will to power is, it brings in its wake an
intolerable loneliness in which man is tempted to cry out to
the absent God. Guilty and utterly lonely, he cries out for
the absent God to return. But this God wills to love and
1. T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialectic, trans. E.B. Ashton
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973)» pp. 23ff:
'Idealism as Rage'. Also M. Greene, Kegel's "Unhappy
Consciousness" and Nietzsche's "Slave Morality"', in
Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, ed. E. Christensen
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970J, pp. 125-41. Greene
draws attention to the difference between Hegel and
Nietzsche.
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even although men have Murdered' Him. He remains stead¬
fastly God. He does not abdicate His absolute love. This
means that He wills to possess the self who cries to Him.
The self must therefore either capitulate to God, tortured
by His presence, or remain unbearably lonely, tortured by
His absence!
In Book IV the sorcerer cries out to the unknown God:
Ha ha J
Me - you want me?
Me - all of me?...
Ha ha!
And you torment me, fool that you are,
You rack my pride?
Offer me love - who still warms me?
Who still loves me? - offer me hot hands!
Offer me coal-warmers for the heart,
Offer me, the most solitary,
Whom ice, alas! sevenfold ice
Has taught to long for enemies,
For enemies themselves,




He himself has fled,





With all your torments!
Oh come back to the last of all solitaries!
To the last of all solitaries!
All the streams of my tears
Rim their course to you!
And the last flame of ray heart -
It burns up to you!
Oh come back,
My unknown God! My pain! My last - happiness!
(Thus Spoke Zarathustra. pp. 266-7)
Nietzsche, however, regarded such calling on God as
temptation.1 He refused the possibility of allowing God to
1. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. trans, and ed.
R.J. Hollingdale (Penguin, 1969), p. 270; cf. pp. 275-9.
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master the solitary self. Without God, he was compelled to
remythologise man's striving for self-realisation, and in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra the myth of eternal recurrence
emerges. The self cannot "be satisfied with anything less
than eternity. It must love life so intensely that it
wills its experience to return eternally. This strange and
even bizarre idea can be regarded as the extreme development
of Hegelian self-realisation. Hegel's saying that 'it is
solely by risking life that freedom is obtained'1 becomes
p
Nietzsche's 'live dangerously'; Hegel's self-transcendence
becomes Nietzsche's ecstatic, dionysiac overcoming of man;
and Hegel's absolute knowledge, with its Recollection in
■x
which all experience is conserved, becomes eternal re¬
currence. Although Nietzsche did not trace his conception
of the Ubermensch back to Hegel, it is difficult not to see
in it a radicalised assertion of Hegel's tamer idea of self-
realisation. What is more important, however, is
Nietzsche's recognition of his Obermensch as the negation of
Christ. For him, the logic of the nineteenth century led
inescapably to direct and open opposition to the man from
Nazareth. Hegel's disciplined road to absolute knowledge
becomes the most difficult and testing task of all, that of
self-overcoming, self-mastery - and what is this but the
sublimated will to power which is the contrary of Jesus'
1. See the quotation from Hegel above, pp. 28-9.
2. Quoted in F. Nietzsche, op.cit.. p. 18.
3. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 807-8.
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gracious humility?"1" Nietzsche thought of this self-
overcoming as supreme Joy, as the supreme victory of the
will to power, but one is compelled to ask is it not rather
a supreme form of contempt for others. Is it not the
negation of love for onefs neighbour, and thus is it not a
supreme form of solitariness? Zarathustra says:
I tell you: Your love of your neighbour is your
bad love of yourselves.
You flee to your neighbour away from yourselves
and would like to make a virtue of it: but I see
through your 'selflessness*.
The 'You* is older than the * I* j the 'You* has been
consecrated but not yet the * I': so man crowds to¬
wards his neighbour.
Do I exhort you to love of your neighbour? mI exhort
you rather to flight from your neighbour (Nachsten)
and to love of the most distant (Fernsten).
Higher than love of one's neighbour stands love of the
most distant man and of the man of the future; higher
still than love of man I account love of causes and
of phantoms. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra. pp. 86-7)
In such an ethic the concrete otherness of other selves is
deliberately negated, and, if this is the case, what can it
be called but aggression toward others? Nietzsche did not
regard this ethic as productive of guilt, yet the eternal
recurrence which is its purpose and goal bears a remarkable
resemblance to Dante's vision of damnation. For both
Nietzsche's eternal recurrence and Dante's hell depend on
man's refusal to repent, on his will to be himself and to
love the self he has made himself to be.
However this may be, certain contemporaries of
Nietzsche believed that repentance, radical and complete,
1. On the relationship between Nietzsche's eternal recurrence
and Lutheran Pietism, see the interesting (if somewhat
simplified) account in R.J. Hollingdale's introduction to
F. Nietzsche, op.cit.. pp. 2Sf.
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was the only course open to nineteenth century thought. Of
these, the most important for the subject of this study is
Dostoevsky. A brief discussion of his work now follows.
Dostoevskv
It is well known that in Crime and Punishment
Dostoevsky was attempting to demonstrate the anti-humanity,
the guiltiness of the idea of the great man as it emerges in
Hegel and in Nietzsche. Dostoevsky saw nothing less than
murder in their concepts of self-realisation. For him,
man's salvation could come only through repentance and
through Christ.
The central figure of Crime and Punishment. Raskolnikov,
is a proud, insecure young man with a passion for justice.
He becomes convinced that his landlady, who is an utterly
selfish and unfeeling moneylender, deserves to die. In
order to kill her, he has to overcome all the objections of
his conscience, but he finally succeeds, telling himself that
it is the duty he owes to justice. But once the deed is
done, he is pursued by dread. The novel becomes a kind of
detective story in which the hero is his own detective,
pursuing himself to discover who he is. Eventually
Raskolnikov goes to the police and confesses to his act, thus
acknowledging himself to be the person that he is. He is
L
sentenced to Sibera and there he learns to accept the New
Testament. His conscience is re-awakened, he repents and
accepts Christ.
Another interpretation of Raskolnikov's life is, how¬
ever, possible. It can be seen even more convincingly as
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Ms struggle with Mmself, the struggle in which, far from
coming to repentance, he takes full responsibility for the
deed wMch previously had seemed too alien to be his. His
life follows the three phases noted above in nineteenth
century self-realisation. First, he posits Mmself as
rational, superior man. He believes himself to be a man
with a deeper penetration into the nature of justice than
others. He then acts as if he is tMs man, doing what is
needed to prove Mmself to be tMs superior man. Both in
the Courage* he musters to kill the landlady and in the
almost unbearable anguish wMch closes in on Mm afterwards,
he puts Mmself to the test. Finally, when he kisses the
ground and freely goes to the police, he takes responsibility
for the self wMch killed the old woman. He acknowledges
who he is, making public his Mtherto hidden self. TMs is
not repentance. Indeed it is the opposite, since it is the
affirmation and acceptance of the self wMch in repentance
is judged and hated."*" RaskOlnikov even doubts that he has
done wrong. Nowhere in the novel does he become convinced
that the old hag that he killed was as truly a human being
as he. Despite the Epilogue, in wMch it is Mnted that a
new life begins for Raskolnikov, it is clear that Dostoevsky
is unable to portray what is involved in repentance. He is
unable to show that RaskolMkov is unambiguously guilty for
taking the life of the 'wortMess' miser of a landlady, and
1. Even when SoMa convinces Mm that he should confess Ms
deed to the police, he says: 'I shall not accuse myself.'
Crime and PuMshment. trans. C. Garnett (J.M. Dent,
London, 1911.), p. 351.
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thus that the self which killed her must die. As the novel
stands, the old woman is valued only as a step in the path
of Raskolnikov*s self-realisation. She has the function of
his •other*. He needs her to prove himself. In a real
sense she is the person whom he dreads to become but who,
for that reason, presents him with an essential aspect of
himself. He recognises himself in the old hag - why other¬
wise would he want to negate and overcome her? In the long
struggle he has to find the •daring*1 to kill her, he
redeems himself from the fear that he is merely mediocre, a
superfluous parasite like the old woman. He redeems himself
therefore through violence, through violating his own
conscience, i.e.. at the cost of sacrificing an other life, an
other life like his own. Yet Dostoevsky underplays the
sheer horror of this. He indicates it in the incident in
which Raskolnikov kills innocent Lizaveta, the old woman*s
retarded sister, but Raskolnikov never becomes seriously
concerned about this. More important, he does not show the
old woman*s value as a person (even if a thoroughly corrupt
one) in the presence of God. Because he fails to do this,
he also fails to give the ground for true repentance, i.e.,
the repentance in which the self which killed the old money¬
lender must die.
In confirmation of this interpretation of Dostoevsky
it may be added that for him Christianity taught redemption
through suffering. Suffering is central to Crime and
Punishment. Porfiry speaks of the strange modern disease
ibid*» P« 349.
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in which men desire suffering.1 It can easily be argued
that Raskolnikov committed his act of violence, violence
both against others and himself, in order to bring upon him¬
self that suffering in which he could put himself to the
test and prove himself.
Yet over and against this interpretation it must be
asked whether Sonia, Raskolnikov1s friend who willingly
gives herself for others, does not open up the meaning of
Christian repentance. Sonia presents Raskolnikov with the
only reality which can bring him to see the irreplaceable
value of the old woman and so to see that he has done wrong
in killing her. Sonia lives in God's presence and so
awakens him to the One who alone gives the old hag value.
With Sonia, Raskolnikov comes closest to repentance. She
embodies agape and imitates Christ's giving Himself for the
oppressed. Faced with her compassion, Raskolnikov's pride
2 —
is shown up for what it is. Agape alone is strong enough
to penetrate him, and, in a moving scene just before he
confesses to the police, he comes to the verge of the tears
of joy in repentance. Agape can do this because it alone
3
loves without seeking itself in the other, without seeking to
use the other. Whereas society consists of a vicious network
A
of selves using each other, Sonia goes out in order to be
1. ibid.. p. 380.
2. See the great Chapter 4 of Part V, in which Sonia brings
Raskolnikov to see himself in a new way.
3. Cf. Barth's description of apagf (in God) as that which
does not seek itself in the other but genuinely seeks the
other, C.D. IV/2, p. 750.
4. As represented in, e.g., Svidrigailov, Looshin.
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'used1 for the good of those who victimise her. She has no
mask, no pretensions: she loves others for their own sake
and gives herself for them. Thus, Sonia and Raskolnikov
confront each other as the embodiment of antithetical
principles: she is resolved to be hurt, Sacrificed1 for the
good of others; he is resolved to hurt, to sacrifice others
for his own self-realisation. Sonia is much stronger than
Raskolnikov (though it is doubtful that Dostoevsky succeeded
in giving this dramatic realisation): her love pursued him.
If he hunted the old moneylender, he was himself hunted by
love even as he did so: for in thus seeking to realise him¬
self, God was seeking to find him and was pursuing him to
the point where he must acknowledge himself to be utterly
guilty and must give himself up into His hands. Through
Sonia's love, God's love, agape was calling him to accept
the cross.
Even when Dostoevsky's picture of Sonia's love, and
the possibility of repentance which it opens up for
Raskolnikov, has been praised, a severe problem remains.
Dostoevsky gives a somewhat idealised dramatisation of Sonia.
It is not that she is too good to be true (in Christ there
is no limit to human goodness) but that Dostoevsky does not
define her relationship with Christ. It is not perfectly
clear that her goodness comes from Christ alone, and there
is a tendency to elide her with Christ. Her suffering
tends to replace that of Christ. True, Sonia's suffering
takes place in Christ, but the distinction between what she
1. Dostoevsky, op.cit.. p. 353. But does the cross here
symbolise the cross of Christ or the cross of punishment
and expiation?
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is in herself and what she is in Christ is blurred. This
is a very serious criticism, since, unless Sonia in herself
shares Raskolnikov1s corruption, unless in herself she
partakes of the common human guilt, she is of a different
order of humanity and cannot offer Raskolnikov the Christ
who redeems sinners out of their guilty humanity. Thus,
at a crucial moment in Raskolnikov*s life, she offers him
not Christ but the cross of suffering and atonement: *You
must make atonement so that you may be redeemed thereby!*1
Human suffering and Christ become identified, or, at least,
men participate in Christ through suffering. Insofar as
this happens in Dostoevsky sinful man finds within his sin¬
ful existence the capacity for redemption, and to this
extent repentance means not a turning from man in himself
to the Christ who is other than him but a bearing of the
suffering of one's own actions. To this extent man becomes
the one who makes atonement for himself, redeeming his sin¬
ful existence: to this exter.t repentance is self-redemption.
This problem arises in an equally acute form in The
Brothers Karamazov. Father Zossima says:-
If the evil doing of men moves you to indignation
and overwhelming distress, even to a desire for
vengeance on the evil doers, shun above all that
feeling. Go at once and seek suffering for your¬
self, as though you were yourself guilty of that
wrong. (Brothers Karamazov. p. 335)
This counsel goes right to the heart of the gospel.
Jesus Himself bore the sins of all men, accusing Himself of
their sins as though He Himself were guilty of their wrong.
1. ibid.. p. 351
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Also, Jesus taught His followers: 'Love your enemies, do
good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray
for those who abuse you....Judge not, and you will not be
judged;...forgive and you will be forgiven.' (Lk. 6: 27,
37-8). Yet Dostoevsky does not make it sufficiently clear
that Christ alone has borne the sin of the world, and that
those in Christ therefore do not bear sins, not even the
sins of others. As in Crime and Punishment, the Christians
do not give a clear witness to Christ and there is a tendency
for their sufferings to take His place and to become redemp¬
tive. One of the reasons that Ivan Karamazov never attains
repentance must surely be that Zossiraa and Alyosha do not
point away from themselves to Christ with sufficient clarity
for Ivan to realise that he can be delivered from his guilt
only in Christ, only as his life is placed on a radically new
basis.
In Dostoevsky, then, the need for repentance is
recognised but not really experienced. He has great
difficulty in describing the transition from the life based
on self to the life based on God. Even so, Father Zossima
does witness to this transition when he says:
I predict that at the very moment when you realise
with horror that, far from getting nearer your goal,
you are, in spite of all your efforts, actually
getting further from it than ever,...you will
suddenly attain your goal and behold clearly the
miraculous power of the Lord who all the time has
been loving and guiding you.
(Brothers Karamazov, Magarshak translation, p. 64)
Sadly, the woman who receives this wisdom never reaches
conversion. Though Zossima's words indicate that man has
no basis of conversion in himself (on the contrary, man's
efforts at love only alienate him further from it) Dostoevsky
44
failed adequately to point to Christ as the One who enters
into man as the basis on which he may turn to God.
There is, however, powerful evidence in The Brothers
Karamazov of this need for a basis for repentance outside
> sinful man. In the figure of Ivan Karamazov Dostoevsky
shows that man is entirely corrupt, that he has no inno¬
cence, and therefore that he is unable to judge himself to
be the unjust man he is. Though this is negative evidence,
in that it goes no further than demonstrating the disquali¬
fication of sinful man to make even the first step in
repentance, it is powerful evidence and is a kind of mute
cry for participation in Chrises repentance. A brief
consideration of some aspects of the novel will show what
is at stake here.
The central event in The Brothers Karamazov is the
murder of wicked old father Karamazov, and the novel is con¬
cerned to discover who is guilty for his death.1 Although
the eldest son, Mitya, is accused of the crime and finally
convicted of it, the second son, Ivan, becomes convinced
that he is really guilty. Ivan believes this because his
half-brother, the surly, epileptic Smerdyakov, confesses to
the actual deed but says that it is Ivan who must bear the
responsibility because it is he who argued: 'There is no God:
everything is permitted.* Under the burden of this horrible
realisation, Ivan confesses his guilt to the astonished court-
1. In the novel, this question becomes parallel to the
question concerning the death of God. Hence, it is
appropriate that Ivan, who says there is no God, should




"It was he [ Smerdyakov], not my brother who killed
our father. He murdered him and I incited him
to it....
"Who doesn't desire his father's death?...I should
think I am in my right mind...in the same nasty
mind as all of you...as all these...ugly faces."
He turned suddenly to the audience. "My father
has been murdered and they pretend they are
horrified," he snarled, with furious contempt.
"They keep up the sham with one another. Liars!
They all desire the death of their fathers. One
reptile devours another....If there hadn't been a
murder, they'd have been angry and gone home ill-
humoured. It's a spectacle they want. Panem et
circenses. Though I am one to talk! Have you
any water? Give me a drink for Christ's sake!"
He suddenly clutched his head.
(Brothers Karamazov, pp. 727-8)
These are virtually Ivan's last words in the novel, and we
are told shortly afterwards that he 'is lying at death's
door.'1 His recognition of his guilt is too great for him
to bear. As an honest man he will not conceal it or lie
about it (he confessed to it on his own initiative). He
sees himself as guilty with all men of the horrible desire
to devour others. Ivan has reached the point where either
he retains his humanity and condemns himself or he falls
back into the silence and incohate speech of madness. The
passage Just quoted shows that he does not condemn himself -
he turns the accusation back on the people in the court-room.
Instead, he retreats into the area where there is no speech
because no rationality and no Justice. He has no basis at
all on which to condemn himself and so to repent.
Ivan found no way out of his damnation because Alyosha,
1. F. Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov. trans. C. Garnett
(Heinemann, London, 1912), p. 818.
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Father Zossima's spiritual son, did not point unequivocally
to Jesus' descent into the hell of man's sin and to His
speaking out of the depths. Where Ivan (and guilty man¬
kind as symbolised by him) cannot speak, Jesus uttered the
Amen to the divine judgment on man: 'My God, my God, why
hast thou forsaken me?' If Alyosha had been able to wit¬
ness more clearly to Christ, he would have been able to
point Ivan to xhe one place where guilty man can judge Ms
sin and repent of it. Dostoevsky shows us Alyosha's
prayers for Ivan, but not Christ's prayers and Christ's
compassion, and therefore he is unable to show Ivan coming
through to speech and to repentance in Christ.
It is worth noting that a great deal of modern
literature reaches a point similar to that reached by Ivan.
One of the most sigMficant cases is that of the composer
Adrian Leverkuhn in Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus. Mann
shows that this self-absorbed genius is indirectly responsible
for the death of one of Ms friends - Leverkuhn will tolerate
no intrusion into Ms private world and retaliates when Ms
friend gains too intimate a relationsMp with Mm. At the
conclusion of the novel, Leverkuhn publishes his masterpiece,
a vision of destruction, and makes a confession of Ms guilt.
Thereafter he lapses into madness and silence. In the nine¬
teenth century, Holderlin is particularly notable as a poet
1. E. Thurneysen, Dostoevsky. trans. K.R. Krim (Epworth,
London, 1964), pp. 64ff• argues that Ivan does find re¬
demption because God's forgiveness reaches down even into
Hell. But God can redeem only if He brings the sinner
to repentance, and there are no convincing signs in the
novel that Ivan comes anywhere near repentance.
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of great power who strangely and suddenly broke off into
madness - it is almost as though he had been struck dumb.
Wordsworth in his earlier years wrote with the radiance of
the numinous until the problem of personal guilt emerged
and then he wrote volumes of insignificant poetry, as if to
conceal the fact that he could not look steadily at guilt
and still speak. In these and other writers there is the
uncanny sense that they have come into contact with the
numinous and have been horrified at the guilt they have seen.
Strangely, however, although the problem of guilt has
become almost an obsession in modern thought, there has been
very little penetrating exploration of the nature and
reality of conversion. Coleridge's Ancient Mariner is an
important exception, but it is to theology that we must look
to find the most helpful insights into the problem of the
transition from guilt to new life. It is now time to dis¬
cuss briefly the work of some theologians whose work is the
fruit of genuine engagement with these problems.
The Scottish Theologians of the First Half of the Nineteenth
Century
It may seem odd in a study of this kind to draw
attention to the three Scottish theologians, Edward Irving,
Thomas Erskine of Linlathen and John McLeod Campbell, yet
in their work there was developed a series of insights of
great importance into the problems encountered in nineteenth
century thought. Briefly, these insights have to do with
Christ's complete identification with guilty man and His
repentance on his behalf. Where man was quite unable to
4a
judge himself guilty and to repent, Christ made confession
in his place and so made Himself the basis for the conversion
of sinners. Thus, as He gives Himself to sinners by His
Spirit, they live in Him and are liberated to judge them¬
selves to be sinners and to turn to God.
These insights have their primary focus in the
humanity of Jesus Christ. In their different but related
ways, each of these theologians emphasised that Christ
identified Himself really and totally with guilty man and
that He thus made man's sin His own.1 Irving and Erskine
insisted that Christ took up fallen human nature, McLeod
Campbell that in His humanity there was a movement from
fallen man to God. But their most important contribution
2
to theology concerned Christ's holiness. For them, as,
indeed, for the Christian Church as a whole, Christ's
righteousness consisted in His fulfilling the law, but they
interpreted this to mean that Christ loved all men (His
neighbour) as Himself. They therefore stressed the active
love of Christ, and especially His feeling the sins of His
brethren as His own. Irving and McLeod Campbell argued that
it was through His holiness and righteousness that He bore
the sin of the world. That He wa s sinless means that He
knew the utter evil of sin and could say the Amen in our
humanity to the divine condemnation of it.
1. Irving stressed that Christ assumed fallen humanity,
Erskine that Christ became the Head of humanity and
Campbell that His humanity was vicarious humanity.
2. E. Irving, Christ's Holiness in Flesh (John Lindsay,
Edinburgh, 1831); J.M. Campbell. The Nature of the
Atonement (James Clarke, London, 1959), esp. pp. 114-9.
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Jesus' sinlessness, or, to use the language employed
earlier in this chapter, His innocence, thus meets the guilt
of men. Men cannot judge themselves to be sinners," but
Jesus does this in their place, vicariously judging their
sin and repenting of it. Further, as Irving in particular
emphasised, Jesus loved His brethren as Himself in such a way
that their sin really became His, and thus in His death He
did away with it. Jesus, the sinless One, is the place
where sinners find a new basis for their lives. In Him, and
in Him alone, their sins are forgiven and they are able to
judge themselves to be sinners and to repent.
One further aspect of their teaching must be mentioned
here. Not only does Jesus' innocence, His loving His
neighbour as Himself, mean that He bears His brethren's sins
as His own, but it also means that He gives them all that is
His. The repentance He accomplished is not locked up in
Himself but is given to others. This communication of the
life that is in Him is the Holy Spirit. He has the Spirit
for us (Campbell), He baptises us in the Spirit (Irving).
This doctrine of the Spirit is the necessary completion of
the doctrine of the sinlessness of Christ, since it expresses
the reality that all that Christ has He has for us.
This aspect of their teaching is of crucial importance
to the subject of this study, since it assures the guilty
man that all that is in Christ is his without reservation.
The guilty man does not first have to repent and to become
1. T. Erskine, The Brazen Serpent (David Douglas, Edinburgh,
1879), p. 60.
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holy before he shares in Christ. On the contrary, it is
a matter simply of receiving His Spirit.1 Sinful man does
not have to find, per impossible, a basis for repentance in
himself, but the Spirit gives him that new basis which is
nothing less than the repentance which took place in
Christ's sinless humanity. The teaching of Edward Irving
regarding the Spirit is particularly instructive. Irving
argued that, if it is truly the case that Christ took 'to
himself a body of our body, flesh of our flesh, and bone of
2
our bones', then His righteousness was accomplished by the
same power as other men are to attain theirs.
Christ's flesh was not holy by means of some special intrinsic
power of sinlessness, but by virtue of His faith in the
Father and His being filled with the Spirit. This means
that the holiness which He wrought in our humanity may be
communicated to us by the Spirit. The purification of our
sinful humanity and its conversion to God which He perfected
becomes ours through the Spirit. Thus, the Spirit of Jesus
is the only hope for us guilty men. Only through His Spirit
does the purification of man achieved in Jesus become ours,
but through the Spirit it is ours without reservation.
1. Pastorally, this was the central point in the teaching of
these theologians; e.g.. T. Erskine, The Unconditional
Freeness of the Gospel (David Douglas, Edinburgh, 1879).
2. Quoted from the Scots Confession, article VIII, which is
itself a quotation from Calvin, Institute. II, 12, 2.
In 1831 Irving published The Confess!ons~of Faith and the
Books of Discipline of the Church of Scotland Anterior to
the Westminster Confession (Baldwin and Cradock, London.
1831) since it was his earnest belief that his theology




Irving's work shows that any discussion of man's conversion
must pay close attention to the Holy Spirit.
The above account of these three theologians is very
brief and is intended only to indicate their relevance to
the problem of conversion as it emerged in the nineteenth
century. In later chapters of this study certain aspects
of their work will be examined more closely. These men were
greatly concerned for the spiritual welfare of the people
of their generation: even Erskine of Linlathen, who was not
a pastor, helped many troubled people to rejoice in God.
It is hoped that their rich insight into the pastoral
dimension of turning to God will be useful in assessing Karl
Barth's understanding of conversion.
For these theologians it is only man in Christ by the
Spirit who can turn from his guilt to God. No theologian
in modern times has given this doctrine so thorough and com¬
prehensive treatment as Karl Barth. It is to his work that
we must look to find a thorough-going and systematic answer
to the failure of the nineteenth century to find an adequate
basis in man for the fulfilment of his new-found dimensions
of subjectivity.
Karl Barth
It has been argued above that with the Enlightenment
and especially with nineteenth century Romantic and Idealist
thought man became aware of new dimensions in his personal,
subjective life, but that this awareness led not to self-
fulfilment but to self-alienation. Starting with himself
and refusing all 'alien' securities, man became guilty and
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realised himself in alienation.
The early Barth broke with the tradition of starting
with man and his experience.1 In his Romans (second edition,
1921) he spoke of God as wholly Other, and stressed again and
again that he must begin in faith alone. Man has no basis
of security in himself: he must trust himself to the God
2
who is wholly Other if he is to find himself. Only if he
lives by faith in the God who utterly transcends him will
he not lose himself in alienation. And this God kills in
order to make alive. The gospel of God is the KRISIS in
which man is totally judged. It could be said that Romans
is a meditation on Jesus* saying: *Whoever would save his
life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake
will find it.* (Matt. 16: 25).
1. Using insights drawn chiefly from Luther and Kierkegaard,
Barth in Romans sustained an unmitigated attack on all
forms of immediacy. Faith is not the immediacy of self-
knowledge or experience.
*The Gospel requires - faith. It can therefore be
neither directly communicated nor directly apprehended.
Christ hath been appointed to be the Son of God -
according to the Spirit (i. 4).
"Now, Spirit is the denial of direct immediacy. If
Christ be very God, He must be unknown, for to be
known directly is the characteristic mark of an idol"
(Kierkegaard)* •
K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans, from sixth
edition by E.C. Hoskyns (Oxford University Press, London,
Oxford, New York, 1968), p. 38.
2. '[Those who walk in faith] |g»ow that, when men, regardless
of the extent of their religious or other possessions, are
wholly directed towards God and towards Him alone, they
are found by Him and established by Him.* ibid.. p. 132.
3. See, e.g.. ibid.. Chap. II, 'The Righteousness of Men.*
Also, pp. 362474.
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It was not, however, until he wrote his book on
Anselm, Fides Quaerens Intellectum. that he saw that every
starting point within man himself can be wholly abandoned
only if theology lives solely by looking to God."1" God
proves Himself and faith lives from this self-demonstration.
God constitutes Himself our point of departure. Armed with
this perception, Barth's belief that there can be no pre¬
paration for Christian faith was strengthened. Sinful man
provides no 'presupposition1 (not even knowledge of his
guiltiness as a sinner) which may serve as a prolegomenon
to revelation.
The Church Dogmatics is the product of this insight.
Barth has attempted to look steadfastly at revelation and to
know all things only as illuminated by that revelation.
Where Hegel and Idealism sought to look only to man as he
proved himself to be what he is, Barth sought to allow God
2
to prove Himself to be the One He is. He is the true and
living God who has demonstrated Himself objectively in Jesus
Christ and has also made Himself the subjective reality and
possibility of revelation in the Holy Spirit.
1. 'The only intelligere which interests Anselm is that
"desired" by faith.* K. Barth, Anselm; Fides Quaerens
Intellectum, trans. I. Robertson (S.C.M.London, I960),
p. 16.
2. 'God shows and proves in His self-revelation His freedom
to begin with Himself....This is the freedom of His incar¬
nation in Jesus Christ foreshadowed in His election and
rule of Israel, the freedom of His Word, the freedom of
His Spirit, the freedom of His grace. It is from first
to last the freedom with which He proves His own existence,
the proof which every human proof of His existence can
only repeat if it is really to prove God's existence and
not something different...' C.D. II/l, p. 304.
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Stated in this way, however, it may seem that God
proves Himself to be God at man's expense.1 If this were
the case, the fears of the Enlightenment and Idealism, that
God is the Alien who alienates, would have some foundation.
But in the Dogmatics Barth broke entirely with the
2
Kierkegaardian idea that God is wholly Other. God is, of
1. Barth says of his earlier work that 'redemption was viewed
as consisting in the abolition of the creature, the
swallowing of immanence by transcendence...' K. Barth,
The Humanity of God, trans. J.N. Thomas (Collins, London,
1961). V7T5. di. C.D. IV/l, pp. 89f.
Romans (p. 337 he says: 'The Gospel speaks of God as
He is:' Tt is concerned with Him Himself and with Him
only. It speaks of the Creator who shall be our
Redeemer and of the Redeemer who is our Creator. It is
pregnant with our complete conversion; for it announces
the conversion of our creatureliness into freedom.*
Apart from the oddity of saying that the gospel has to
do only with God (does it not concern man's salvation,
Rom. 1: 16?) two problems confront us here. First,
what transition can there be from the sinner to the new
man? Barth could not effectively solve this problem
until he saw that the gospel speaks of Jesus Christ and
therefore of the Creator become the creature. In Him
there is a transition from the death of sin to the life
of righteousness. Second, if the Gospel announces 'the
conversion of our creatureliness into freedom', is there
not an overcoming of creaxureliness and therefore an
impossibility for creatures as creatures to receive
salvation (except eschatologically)? Again, it was not
until Barth saw that the gospel speaks of Jesus Christ,
the Creator become creature, that he could speak of
creatures receiving salvation in their present existence.
2. Barth came to think of this notion with horror. In the
dogmatics he likens it to idolatry since it has to do
with thinking of God apart from Christ. In the Dogmatics
he thinks Christologically. He speaks of God's together-
ness with man. Cf. The Humanity of God (p. 45): 'Who
God is and what He is in His deity He proves and reveals
not in a vacuum as a divine being-for Himself, but
precisely and authentically in the fact that He exists,
speaks and acts as the partner of man, though of course
the absolutely superior partner.'
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course, other than man and his wholly transcendent Lord,
but it is in the man Jesus Christ that He has proved Him¬
self to be God. God has revealed Himself in the incar¬
nation and cross of Jesus Christ. God has therefore shown
Himself to be the One who is other than man only at the same
time as He is wholly for man. As we see God giving Himself
on the cross, we know that God's being Himself is identical
with His being for us.
In this God, man finds all that he needs for his
fulfilment. As man trusts Him, he finds his own truest
life. In allowing Him to be his starting point he need
fear no alienation, not even self-alienation. He does not
have to search for this starting point - it is given to him
in Jesus Christ. In Him, God has entered into the human
condition in order to make an end of sinful man and to
posit the righteous man in his place. Thus, it is simply
by accepting Christ, by faith in Him, that sinners have a
new basis for their life in the world.
Barth goes further than this. It is not only that
sinners find a new basis for their lives, but that they
find all they need in Christ. In themselves they are still
guilty sinners, but in Christ they are already new men.
Because Christ has become man, converted the human situation
and brought it to God, man's whole justification, sanctifi-
cation and vocation are already perfected in Him. Sinners
have thus only to participate in Him. Their entire life
is a matter of living in Christ.
When man lives in Christ he does not cease to be him¬
self. Christ does not swallow him up. On the contrary,
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Christ communicates Himself to other men through His Spirit,
Through the Spirit Christ brings men to know Himself and
their life in Him, and therefore He awakens them to be the
men they are in Him, They become free, true men. Their
subjectivity finds its proper fulfilment in Him, For as
the Spirit orients them on Christ, they freely base them¬
selves on Him, and, as they know Him as the One who has
given Himself for them, they fulfil their lives by giving
themselves to Him in love and in hope.
This, in briefest outline is Barth's definitive
understanding of man's turning to God, The present study
will confine itself almost exclusively to the Barth of the
Church Dogmatics, because it is in this work that he treats
man's conversion as taking place solely in Christ. In the
Dogmatics he has given a systematic and exhaustive discussion
of the mature conception of man in Christ, There will be
scarcely any reference to Bultmann in this study since he
compromises the radicalness of the truth of man's turning to
God in Christ alone. In at least three respects Barth
engages more closely with the problem of man's conversion
than does Bultmann. First, according to Bultmann there is
a preparation within fallen man for the reception of the
gospel.1 Man must come to understand himself as a sinner,
1, For Bultmann, man can come to an understanding of himself
as guilty and as fallen apart from knowledge of Christ.
One of the outstanding features of his accounts of sin in
his Theology of the New Testament, trans. K. Grobel
(S.C.I!., London, 1965), is that he treats it almost
entirely in terms of man's perversion and alienation and
not in terms of loss of fellowship with God or of enmity
against God. The centre of his concept of sin is not
the cross but man's death. In a similar fashion John
Macquarrie, in his An Existentialist Theology (S.C.M.,
London, 1965) discusses man's inauthentic, fallen
existence without reference to the cross.
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as nothing, before he can receive the message of God's grace.
Self-understanding provides a presupposition for faith. Yet,
if the discussion earlier in this chapter is basically-
correct, man apart from Christ cannot know himself as
sinner. Barth is much to be preferred in his doctrine that
it is only in the light of Jesus Christ that man has true
knowledge of himself. Also, Bultmann's doctrine looks
suspiciously like the old doctrines of conditional grace in
which a man was offered the gospel only when he showed signs
of his brokenness by the law, only when he was prepared for
it. Second, for Bultmann, Christ established no more than
the possibility of life for other men. Men must realise
1
that possibility by their decision of faith. Yet, if God
1. Bultmann says: 'The union of believers into one soma now
(i.e., now that the salvation-occurrence is understood as
an occurrence directed at man and happening to him) has
its basis not in their sharing the same supernatural sub¬
stance, but in the fact that in the word of proclamation
Christ's death-and-resurrection becomes a possibility
of existence in regard to which a decision must be made,
and in the fact that faitl seizes this possibility and
appropriates it as the power that determines the existence
of the man of faith.' Vol. I, on.cit., p. 302. Three
comments can be made about this extraordinary statement.
First, 'the union of believers into one soma with Christ'
must be a reference to I Cor. 12: 13 (see p. 299) where
it is said that 'by one Spirit we were all baptised into
one body': if so, Bultmann is replacing the Spirit (some
supernatural substance!, see pp. 333-4) with man's act of
appropriation of the salvation event. Second, the pro¬
clamation of Christ's death-and-resurrection is merely
the possibility offered to man, not the self-communi¬
cation of the life which is in Christ. Third, according
to Bultmann, human existence becomes authentic by chosing
the proper possibility in a given moment. It becomes dif¬
ficult, then, to think of man's decision of faith as other
than the one possibility confronting man of chosing in
relation to his own death. Is not Christ merely the
occasion for a decision which can be made apart from Christ?
Is not the decision of faith similar to the decision in
relation to death which Is to be found in Heidegger and
existentialism generally. J.K.S. Reid, Our Life in Christ
(S.C.M., London, 1963), pp. 75-7, makes some similar
observations about Bultmann's understanding of the
impartation of life in Christianity.
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has truly given Himself in Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ is
the actuality of man's salvation and not merely its possi¬
bility. Bultmann inevitably comes dangerously near to
attributing justifying and creative power to man's decision
of faith, and thus to locating man's new starting point
within sinful man himself. Barth is much to be preferred
here since for him there is no doubt whatever that God has
given Himself in Jesus Christ and that He Himself is man's
new life. There is therefore also no doubt that man's
act of faith has no regenerating power, nor that it partici¬
pates in the salvation given by God. Third, Bultmann has
been very aware that post-Enlightenment man does not believe
in an objective God who leaves his subjective life unaltered.
A merely objective God is superfluous. God is God for us
only as He enters our existence, i.e.. our decisions and our
subjecthood. It is well known that his demythologisation
programme is an attempt to speak of God and the gospel only
in terms which touch man's existence. Yet Bultmann has no
doctrine of the Spirit1 as the Spirit of God who proceeds
from God's inner life, from God's own Subjecthood, and who
enters man's inner life and subjecthood. Unlike Barth, he
las no doctrine of the Trinity, no doctrine of God's inner
knowledge of Himself flowing outward to become the ground of
man's inner knowledge of Him. Barth speaks consistently
2
of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God is always
1. Cf. J.K.S. Reid, op.cit.. pp. 76-7.
2. F.W. Camfield has given an admirable summary of Barth's
teaching on this point: we cannot speak of a natural
and self-existing openness of man for God. Man's open¬
ness for God is wholly grounded on God's openness for
man; it is participation in that openness. But the
(Contd.
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Subject, always Lord, making Himself known to man's sub¬
jectivity. Since the Spirit is the Spirit of the giving
of the Father to the Son and the Son to the Father, He is
the Spirit of God's own knowledge of Himself. As this
Spirit of God's self-giving, He is not only the Spirit of
God's inner life but also the Spirit of God's outer life,
His life for others. He proceeds from the Father and the
Son and enters man's inner life, there to reign as the
ground of man's personal obedience to God. Further,
Bultmann finds that he must reject or at least translate
much of the New Testament language about Christ's sacrifice
for us: it has meaning for us only as it coincides with
man's decision of faith. But for Barth, the objective,
once-for-all salvation perfected in Christ is communicated
by His Spirit into our subjective life. The reality of
reconciliation in Christ is communicated to us: it is not
our faith and decision which makes it real.
Contd.)
ground of this openness of God for man lies in the
fact that He is open to Himself. To put it otherwise:
God can objectify Himself to man in order to be known to
him, because He is already and in His own being object to
Himself, the Father to the Son through the Holy Spirit.
The Trinitarian conception of God which is involved in
the Biblical witness speaks of a divine subject which, as
such, is object to itself; of an internal self-communion
and self-communication which eternally is. Knowability
therefore belongs to the very nature of God.' F.W. Camfield,
'Development and Present Stage of the Theology of Karl
Barth', in Reformation Old and New, ed., F.W. Camfield
(Lutterworth, London, 1947), p. 43. One thing needs to
be added to this account: as man receives knowledge of
God's self-revelation through the Spirit, man's subject-
hood is called into the genuine decision of obedience.
Man as subject obeys God as Subject. Cf. J. Brown,
Subject and Object in Modern Theology TS'.C.M.. London,
1955), pp. 161-3.
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The study which follows will be devoted to under¬
standing Barth's account of conversion as found in the
Dogmatics. First, the being of God for man will be dis¬
cussed (Chapters II and III). Since God has realised His
being for man in Christ, the following five chapters
(Chapters IV - VIII) will be concerned with Barth's account
of Christ for us. A chapter on Barth's understanding of
sin follows (Chapter IX) and the final four chapters will
deal with man's actual participation in Christ (Chapters X -
XIII). Throughout, what Barth says will be summarised,
often in some detail, in order to ensure that his precise
and subtle analysis has been grasped. In general, these
expositions will not include critical observations but will
be concerned to present Barth's meaning in its own terms and
strength. Assessment and criticism will follow the
expositions.
It will be argued that Barth's account of conversion
is extremely helpful and fundamentally sound, but that it
needs development at one crucial point. Barth holds that
God has given Himself for man in His Son and that in Christ
man is converted to God. As other men participate in Him
through the Spirit, they actually turn to God. Barth's
doctrine of the Spirit is strong, but it must be made stronger
still. Unless this doctrine is strengthened, conversion
will tend to remain locked up in Christ and not reach other
men. It will be argued that there is a persistent tendency
in Barth to undervalue the Spirit in the humanity of Christ
and also His work in other men. It will not for a moment
be suggested that the Spirit works independently of Christ
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(to argue that would be to endanger the unity of God the
Trinity and therefore the one and undivided self-giving of
God to man),1 but it will be argued that theology must
think of God's self-giving in thoroughly trinitarian terms,
and especially that theology must speak of God's giving
Himself, on the ground of His Son's self-giving on the
cross for sinners, in the Spirit to indwell sinners. In his
early days, Barth recognised that the doctrine of the Trinity
2
is the solution for all theological questions, and towards
the end of his life he suggested that his theology needed
development in the direction of man himself, i.e., that the
1. J.R. Williams, The Era of the Spirit (Logos International,
Plainfield, New Jersey, 1971), criticises Barth for not
speaking of an 'independent and decisive operation' of the
Spirit (p. 72), but, in the measure that the Spirit is
thought of as acting independently of Christ, the unity
of the body of Christ is divided. The Church tends to
be thought of as the body of the Spirit. Also, the
unity of God is endangered because the work of the Spirit
is not the out-pouring of what was perfected in the Son:
the Son and the Spirit are separated. Thus God performs
two acts of love toward man, one in the Son and a
different act in the Spirit. God no longer undividedly
loves man in the great act in the Son which completes
itself in the work of the Son through the Spirit.
2. H. Zahrnt, The Question of God, trans. R.A. Wilson
(Collins, London, 1969), p. 101. Zahrnt thinks that
Barth dissolves temporal reality into the eternal mono¬
logue 'conducted by God with himself in three persons'
(p. 112). But surely Barth is correct to see God as
the source of the reality of all that is not God, and
also to see the intra-trinitarian life of God as the
fellowship which is the ground of all fellowship. Does
not Zahrnt come close to blasphemy in calling the
fellowship between Father, Son and Holy Spirit a monologue?
Like Barth, Edward Irving saw that 'the doctrine of the
Trinity ought ever to be held as the great fountainhead
of all doctrine whatever,' Collected Writings, Vol. 5»
ed. G. Carlyle (Strahan, London, 1865), p. 430. As with
Barth, he saw the fellowship within God as the ground of
God's fellowship with the reality which He posits as
other than Himself: 'union in distinctness is the key to
the whole mystery.' p. 441. Irving's last theological
work, The Day of Pentecost, is a great meditation on the
Trinity as God fulfilling His will to dwell in fallen men.
G.S. Strachan, The Pentecostal Theology of Edward Irving
(Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1973), pp. 128-3:5
points to this.
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doctrine of God the Spirit needed greater prominence in his
work.1 It is just this development that this study sees
as being urgently needed.
In order to make this development of the doctrine of
the triune God and especially of the Spirit, and hence to
move toward man, the work of Irving, Erskine and Campbell
will prove extremely helpful. In particular, their
witness to the reality of the Spirit first in Jesus Christ
and then in sinners will be brought to bear on Barth. As
Irving clearly realised, to speak of the Spirit in Jesus
Christ and then in sinners, is to speak of the God who loves
man as Himself. It is to speak of the triune God,
the God who from eternity has purposed to dwell in man (the
Father), who has embodied that purpose in His Son, and who
is now fulfilling that purpose in the Spirit of His Son who
actually dwells in sinners and conforms them to the image of
His Son. Like Barth, Irving sighed after the Spirit:
Veni Creator Spiritus; but where Barth constantly speaks of
our little conversion in contrast to the great conversion
in the Son, Irving saw no limitation to the power of the
conversion in Christ -co become that of the sons of God
through the indwelling of His Spirit.
1. H. Ott, Theology and Preaching, trans. H. Knight
(Lutterworth, London, 1965), pp. 10-11. Ott notes
Barth*s concern that theology make 'a turning toward
man himself1 (p. 10) and that it be a 'Theology of the
Holy Spirit* (p. 11), but his book, though an hermeneuti-
cal interpretation of one of Barth1s favourite texts
(The Heidelburg Catechism) and though it covers some of
the same area as this study, has little to say about
the Spirit.
63
In calling for this development of Barth, together
with a call for understanding the turning of man from sin
to God as having even greater value to God*s love than
Barth allows, it is hoped that something like an
adequate account of conversion will emerge, an account that
goes some way toward giving an answer to modern manfs
failure to find a satisfying realisation of his subjectivity.
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CHAPTER II
DEUS PRO NOBIS: GOD'S ELECTION OF MAN
In modem times, especially where Calvinism has been
influential, the doctrine of predestination has often
generated the feeling that God is not entirely loving to
man. It has inspired terror and immorality.1 Terror,
because it has been believed that before men have done any¬
thing either good or evil God, according to His good
pleasure, has predestined some to salvation and the rest
2
to damnation. Immorality, because it has been believed
that nothing a man does will affect his eternal destiny,
that there is an immoveable indifference at the heart of
life which does not respond to him, and that God is not
*
turned to him and therefore he cannot turn to God. Even
1. It is probably true to say that it has also inspired
hatred of God.
2. See, e.g., Robert Bums' Holy Willie's Prayer, which is
to some extent at least a response to the doctrines of
predestination in Chapter III of the Westminster
Confession.
3. See, e.g.. James Hogg, The Confessions of a Justified
Sinner, first published in 1824. This novel is a moving
protest against the loss of personal responsibility which
is entailed in certain forms of high Calvinism. It des¬
cribes the disintegration of a young man's personal
identity, mainly due to his belief that his actual sins
are not his own doing, or, at least, that God does not
hold him responsible for them. Though Hogg is dealing
with a travesty of Calvinism, there can be little doubt
that he is pointing to a very real tendency in the
practice of Calvinism. His book is of interest to this
study in that it was published at about the same time as
Irving, Thomas Erskine and McLeod Campbell were beginning
their revision of Calvinism.
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where it has inspired confidence in God and holiness of
life it has caused men to doubt that God offers the gospel
to all men and it has helped to sow an individualistic form
of Church life where holiness means not service but the en¬
joyment of the benefits of salvation. It has encouraged
the belief that there is in God a secret reserve, a reserve
hidden behind His revealed concern for men in Christ, and
that His good pleasure is therefore at least partly and per¬
haps primarily an enjoyment of Himself and an indifference
to man. Since God is not wholly for man (at best He is
wholly for only some men), man can hardly be wholly for Him,
wholly turned to Him. It may well be that the doctrine of
predestination was intended by Calvin to serve the good news
of salvation by grace apart from works, but the doctrine
inevitably became bad news. Perhaps, as Blake said of
Milton's attempt to justify the ways of God to men, it was
of the devil's party without knowing it. (The Anglican 39
Articles shrewdly point out that the devil can use this
doctrine to 'thrust men into desperation, or into wretched¬
ness of most unclean living...' (Article XVII). The devil-
llsh use of predestination is the suggestion that God intends
less than the best for man, and thus man is thrown back into
despair and the immoral life of desperation.) Berth's
doctrine of predestination is unequivocal good news. Of
all things which can be said about God it is the best.1
1. C.D. II/2, p. 3: 'The doctrine of election is the sum of
the Gospel because of all words that can be said... .it is
the best.'
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There is no secret r eserve in Him. His good pleasure from
all eternity is His will to reveal and to give Himself for
the salvation of the world. It is good news about God and
therefore creates unreserved confidence in Him and holiness
as service to the world. As good news about God it there¬
fore creates unreserved turning to Him.1
The doctrine of election in the Dogmatics is an
essential part of the doctrine of God. This is because
2
God predestines Himself in predestining man. The doctrine
of predestination is therefore good news about God, about the
God who predestines Himself for loss that He may predestine
man for gain.
Barth knows of no other theologian who has dared to
place the doctrine of predestination necessarily in the
doctrine of God. He is surprised and saddened that
others have not found themselves constrained to do this. He
A
believes there is nothing arbitrary in this move. The
revelation of God in Jesus Christ constrains him to say that
God wills to be Himself only together with the election of
man. God will not be Himself, He will not be God, apart
5
from also and at the same time electing His people. In his
own words:
1. Because God is wholly turned to us, there is no terror
mixed with our fear of Him, and therefore we have the
courage wholly to turn to Him.
2. C.D. II/2, p. 3.
3. ibid.. p. 76.
4. ibid.. p. 77.
5. ibid., p. 76.
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••.we maintain of God that in Himself, in the
primal and basic decision in which He wills to be
and actually is God, in the mystery of what takes
place from and to all eternity within Himself,
within His triune being, God is none other than
the One who in His Son or Word elects Himself,
and in and with Himself elects His people.
(C.D. II/2, p. 76)
This position is so rich in significance for the under¬
standing of man* s turning to God that several comments may
be made at this point.
1. Although by no means the most important point to be
made in this connection, it is worth noting first of all
that in claiming this Barth has seemed to be saying more
than we are permitted to say."1" It has seemed too good to
say that God cannot be thought of as being as good as this.
To say that God has committed Himself to man with the same
ultimacy as He is committed to Himself has seemed too daring
an affirmation. There have certainly not been lacking
theologians who have given predestination a dominating and
1. According to Barth, the whole classical tradition, with
its doctrine of the decrees of election taking place in
the hidden counsel of God, said nothing of God's pre¬
destination of Himself for us men. F. Turretin, for
example, in his discussion of predestination says much
about God's decrees as they relate to men, but is silent
regarding the meaning of these decrees for God Himself
(Institutlo Theologiae Elencticae. in Reformed Dogmatics,
ed. and trans. J.wV Beardslee III (Oxford University Press,
New York, 1965). Similarly, the Westminster Confession
makes no mention of God's predestination of Himself in
Christ. The impression is created that God predestines
men rather much as an Oriental despot makes unbreakeable
decrees for his subjects. Contrast, however, the Scots
Confession, whose chapter (Art. VIII) on election deals
with Christ's incarnation and death for sinners. Barth
knew this Confession well; The Knowledge of God and the
Service of God, trans. J.L.M. Haire and I, Henderson
(Hlodder and Stoughton, London, 1938) is a commentary on it.
Barth sees hints of his position in it and mentions it
approvingly in C.D. II/2, pp. 62, 154 and 308. It is in
Athanasius that hefinds an interpretation of en Christo
which points most nearly to what he has in mind Cibid..
pp. 108ff.) but even he falls short of his conception.
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even determinating status in their theology,1 but none
have allowed God's election of men to have for God the
same seriousness as His election of Himself. Barth main¬
tains this because the election of man takes place not in
the secret counsel of the divine decrees but in Jesus Christ
(Eph. 1: 4). Man is elect in Jesus Christ, and He is the
well-beloved Son in whom God elects Himself. Further, in
electing man, God gives Himself in Christ's death on the
cross. The election of man means for God nothing less
than putting Himself at risk and giving Himself to the utter¬
most that He might save man. This doctrine converts the
2
terror which the scholastic doctrine inspires into worship.
It leads men to give themselves up to God, not in dread of
the secret decree, but in the awe of adoration of Him who
has given Himself for them. Barth's doctrine is not too
good, but precisely that marvellously good thing which the
revelation of God's election in Christ obliges us to say.
2. Barth's doctrine means that with the same seriousness
with which God maintains and guarantees His own- being, He
maintains, guarantees and rescues the being of man. This is
1. See, e.g., the dominating role which B.B. Warfield would
ascribe to the doctrine, 'Predestination in the Reformed
Confessions', Studies in Theology (Oxford University Press,
New York, 1932), pp.
2. The Calvinist form of double predestination is particularly
frightening, involving as it does the doctrine of an un¬
conditional decree of reprobation. One writer said of
it: 'it is anti-theology; and if sincerely believed in
for one moment, it would, in the estimation of the person
who believes in it, degrade God's character beneath that
of the most inhuman tyrant that ever breathed.' J. Morison,
The Extent of the Propitiation (London, 1847), p. 130.
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the main point, 'He is the One who in and with Himself
elects His people.' According to Barth, a philosophical
notion of God's self-existence cannot indicate the reality
of the living God. But in Jesus Christ we know that God
is He who, in constant faithfulness to Himself, ever posits
Himself anew.1 He does this in His being as Father, Son
and Holy Spirit. God does not maintain Himself in the
solitariness of self-existence (after the model of, for
example, the Ego of German Idealism or of Allah), but in the
ever rich and constant fellowship of Father, Son and Spirit.
This means that God is the One He is only in fellowship with
His Son. But His Son is also He who became man. Thus the
election and salvation of man is guaranteed by God with
nothing less than His own being. To put it in its strong¬
est form, it means that were God (per impossible) to lose
2
man He would also lose Himself. It is not as though God
looked to His own being and only as a generous afterthought
looked to man. If this were so, when the point came that
in helping man God's own being were endangered, He would
draw back from man. But the truth in Christ is that God
really did endanger and put Himself at risk in rescuing man.
3. In the first point it was noted that much theology
has not understood predestination as good news about God.
It needs also to be noted that this good news stands in
1. This is argued in C.D. II/l, 'The Being of God in Act',
pp. 257-72. Cf. CTP7"II/2. p. 218.
2. Although Barth never puts the matter this way, it is not
inaccurate to say that his doctrine implies this.
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opposition to the doctrines of modem culture about the
nature of being and the way in which man is held in being.
According to J.-P. Sartre, man must choose himself, elect
himself. Sartre's existentialism belongs in the realm of
anthropology and not theology, but it does bear on theology
in that according to him in no height or depth is there any
being which will so commit itself to another that it wills
its own loss for the sake of gain for the other. (Where
this does seem to happen Sartre discerns a pathological
process at work.) In relation to Barth the following
points emerge:
(a) Sartre is most concerned to find an authentic
existence, and he understands man to exist truly when he
chooses himself and is not in subservience to another.1
There is here the faintest echo of the Christian doctrine of
God, i.e..of He who is Himself in perfect freedom, without
2
restraint or constraint, He who freely elects Himself.
(b) But Sartre understands that which truly exists as
1. J.-P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme (Les
Editions Nagel, Paris, 1946), p. 22. ~~
2. Barth argues that Sartre gives man the clothing of the
conventional Western concept of God, and while this
seems to be a fair estimate of Sartre's understanding of
the 'grace' of man (in effect, his gracelessness) it is
hardly fair of his very real desire for freedom. (C.D.
III/3, pp. 338ff). It could well be argued that his
concept of freedom is a kind of ultimate development of
Pico della Mirandola's ideas about man's freedom to deter-
mine his place in the hierarchy of being (Chapter I, p.
However this may be, it is not hard to see in Sartre's
claims for man's freedom an echo of the freedom which
comes to man in Christ, i.e., the freedom which, as Barth
argues, is even an autonomy.
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that which exists for itself: it decides for itself, Stre
pour soi. In this way man projects himself from le n£ant.
Man must guarantee himself, no-one keeps him but himself.
No other is for him, he alone is for himself. Therefore
when he is seriously threatened he can look to no other,
only to himself. Thus it is inconceivable in Sartre's
world that another, let alone God, if He existed, should
bind himself to another to the extent of putting himself in
real danger for him.
(c) Sartre lays great stress on the idea that in
choosing himself a man also chooses for others. 'When we
say that a man chooses himself, we do mean that each of us
must choose for himself, but by that we also mean that in
choosing for himself he chooses for all men.'^" Again, there
is here a pale resemblance to Barth's doctrine of election,
i.e.. that in electing Himself God also elects others. But,
again, it is the antithesis of Christian doctrine which meets
us here. Because Sartre cannot conceive of a man caring for
another with the same seriousness with which he cares for
himself (since being is gtre pour soi) he does not mean that
a man in choosing himself does any more than commit himself to
the choice which others should make. In choosing himself a
man is not committed to loss because others do not choose
themselves. Sartre (because he has no notion of an unequi¬
vocal being for other) could never say of any man what Barth
does of Jesus Christ, 'In that He wills Himself...He also
p
wills them [other men]....'
1. J.-P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. P. March,
(Methuen, London, 1966), p. 29.
2. C.D. II/2, p. 117.
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4. Barth does not explicitly connect his doctrine of
election with the saying, 'Love thy neighbour as thyself',
but it seems that no passage of Holy Scripture puts more
directly what Barth wishes to affirm in his doctrine of
election. As God loves Himself so He loves man. It is
most helpful to put the doctrine in this light since it
points to the righteousness of God in election. It also
indicates that the goal of election is the free turning to
God on man's part. As God is love in His free turning to
man, He determines Himself for the free turning of man to
Himself. He so loves men that He wills for them love of
Himself in their free turning to Him. This saying further
indicates that it is in the cross that the election of man
is accomplished. God loves man as Himself, i.e.,
completely and wholly and without reservation. He executed
this love in sending His Son to death, in the complete giving
of Himself. God loves man with His entire being, just as He
loves Himself entirely. Barth's doctrine of election argues
this, since he shows that the glory which God from eternity
willed to share with man actually overflowed for man's
salvation in the event of Christ's death.
This, then, is the primary affirmation of Barth's
doctrine of election: God elects man together with Himself.
Since this is known in Jesus Christ he unfolds this affir¬
mation through a consideration of Him.
Barth first claims that 'before Him[ Jesus Christ]
and without Him and beside Him God does not...elect or will
anyxhing.*1 He is the beginning of all God's ways and
1. ibid., p. 94.
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works.1 This is so because He was in the beginning with
God and He became the God-man. He is God and man and
2
mediates between God and man. The opening of the Fourth
Gospel (vs. 1-2) is the primary Scriptural witness to this.-*
On the basis of this understanding Barth says that 'over and
against all that is really outside God, Jesus Christ is the
eternal will of God, the eternal decree of God and the
4
eternal beginning of God.' All that takes place outside
God has its basis in Jesus Christ. If this is so there is
no place for a secret counsel of God in which the absolute
decrees of Calvinist theology might be established. Barth
agrees that all that takes place ad extra has its origin in
a sphere above and before the ad extra, but, as the sphere
where God is with Himself (cf. Jn. 1: 1), the sphere of His
5
good-pleasure, it is not an 'empty and undetermined'-^ sphere
where anything like a decretum absolutum could be enacted.
Barth asks:
What choice can precede the choice by which God has
of Himself chosen to have with Himself in the begin¬
ning of all things the Word which is Jesus? What
decretum absolutum is there that secretly or openly
can over-ride or challenge this decretum absolutum?
(C.D. II/2, pp.100-1)
Thus Barth holds that all passages of Scripture referring to
the beginning of God's ways and works ad extra
1. ibid., P. 94.
2. ibid., P. 94.
3. ibid., PP . 95ff.
4. ibid.. P. 99.
5. ibid., P. 100.
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describe this beginning under the name of Jesus
Christ, whose person is that of the executor within
the universe and time of the primal decision of
divine grace, the person itself being obviously
the content of this decision. (C.D. II/2, p. 103)
In other words, God begins nothing, plans nothing and does
nothing except in Jesus Christ, who was with Him in the
beginning and is the executor and content of His will in
the world.
On this basis Barth states that 'the predestination
of God is the election of Jesus Christ.'1
The doctrine of election refers to both the God who
2
elects and to the man who is elected. In the strength of
the statement 'the predestination of God is the election of
Jesus Christ' and of the truth that He is 'both very God and
very man', two fundamental assertions may be made with
confidence. First, Jesus Christ is the electing God and,
Ll
second, Jesus Christ is the elected man.
The first assertion is primary and must be considered
5
first. Jesus Christ is the electing God. To avoid mis¬
understanding it must be stated that Barth does not deny
£
that the Father and the Spirit also elect, although he puts
almost no stress on the electing of the Father, which is so
important in much classical theology. Barth means that
Jesus Christ is fully God and that He elects as God. In
1. ibid.. p. 103.
2. ibid.. p. 103.
3. ibid.. p. 103.
4. ibid., p. 103.
5. ibid.. p. 103.
6. ibid., p. 105: 'It is...true that He [Jesus Christ] does
not elect alone, but in company with the electing of the
Father and the Holy Spirit.'
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Him the divine election is realised, executed and
achieved. This, as will be shown, He does as the obedient
One, and therefore He is not only partner to the divine
decision of election but also the One who executes this
election.
What does it mean that Jesus Christ is the electing
God? Jesus Christ was in the beginning with God not merely
in the sense that all things were in His knowledge and
direction, but especially fHe was also in the beginning with
God as "the first-born of all creation" (Col. 1: 15),.••
Himself the divine decision with respect to all creation. * "*"
Thus Jesus Christ is not only 'one object of divine good-
pleasure' among others. 'On the contrary, He is the sole
object of this good-pleasure, for in the first instance He
2
Himself is this good-pleasure, the will of God in action.'
Just as He is not merely an instrument of the divine freedom,
but 'the divine freedom itself in its operation ad extra.'
not merely the reconciler but the reconciliation, so also He
•5
is not only the Elected but He Himself is also the Elector.
4
From the first He participates in the divine election. It
is also His electing. He posits the beginning of all things
and He executes the decision which issues in the establish-
5
ment of the covenant between God and man.
1. ibid.. P. 104.
2. ibid.. P- 104.
3. ibid.. PP . 104-5.
4. ibid.. P. 105.
5. ibid.. P. 105.
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Nothing less than the certainty of our election
depends on this truth. If He were not the electing God,
in whom both the decision of election and the execution of
the election have taken place, we would have to look past
Him in asking about the certainty of our election. The
certainty of election would disappear because the knowledge
of our election would not be revealed in the One who
executed the election. It would be clear that Jesus Christ
had executed the election, but it would be dark and obscure
as to where the decision of the eLection was grounded.
Speculation as to divine decrees within the hiddenness of
the divine counsel would overwhelm the certainty that the
divine decision took place in the Son. Worst of all, it
would become impossible to resist the terrible thought that
the decision of election may have preceded the election of
grace - it would become impossible to answer the awful fear
that the divine decision of election was different in
character, in fact ungracious, from the execution of the
election of grace. It would seem at least possible, and
certainly not impossible, that God could have decided on the
election of some and the rejection of others and then commit¬
ted to Jesus the election of grace for those to whom the
prior decision of election referred. For if Jesus Christ
only executed and does not reveal the decision ofelection,
the decision in which He participated, how can we be sure
that the decision of election has the character of grace
which we see in the execution of the election? If the
whole fullness of God were not pleased to dwell in Jesus
Christ even and particularly in the decision of election,
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how can we be sure that the decision of election is wholly
gracious? It is not sufficient to assert that God is
gracious if the primal decision of God regarding man, the
primal decision of election, was not made in the One who
executed that decision, for then how can we know the
character of that decision? If Jesus Christ is not the
electing God, we are ignorant of this primal decision of
election and therefore we cannot effectively resist the
(demonic) possibility that the primal decision of God
regarding man is not gracious.
The awful abyss into which a failure to realise this
doctrine abandons men can be seen in the pastoral sphere.
When I ask the fundamental question about myself: 'Am I
elect?' I cannot answer by pointing to Jesus Christ and by
saying that in Him the decision regarding my election has
been made, and that His death is the execution of the decision
He made. I can only say that the decision has been made in
the secret counsel of God and that this decision is hidden
from me. I know my election not in Jesus Christ but in¬
directly in my awareness, whether of my experience or my
works, i.e., in the effects of His eLection. Further, in
believing in my election I would not know into whose hands
I was committing myself.1
This dreadful situation is overcome and answered when
we look to Jesus Christ. Of Him 'we know nothing more
surely and definitely than this: that in free obedience to
His Father He elected to be man, and as man, to do the will
1. ibid., p. 105.
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of God.'1 He is therefore clearly 'the concrete and
manifest form of the divine decision' and therefore it is
in Him
that the eternal election "becomes immediately and
directly the promise of our own election as it is
• enacted in time, our calling and summoning to faith,
our assent to the divine intervention on our behalf,
the revelation of ourselves as the sons of God and
of God as our Father, the communication of the Holy
Spirit who is none other the communication of this
act of obedience, the Spirit of obedience itself,
and for us the Spirit of adoption.
(C.D. II/2, pp. 105-6)
Because Jesus Christ is the electing God, because He has
freely enacted the election of God, He is the concrete form
of the divine decision and therefore it is in Him that we
know and are assured of our own election. In this way He
answers all our fears about election. He is the embodi¬
ment of election, its decision, its execution, its fulfil¬
ment, and therefore it is in Him that we are elect.
Traditional theologies of election were not prepared
to give this plenitude of meaning to 'en Christo'. Only
Athanasius, Augustine, the Scots Confession and Coccejus
approached it, but even they fell short of giving it the
fullness of meaning it needs if it is to guarantee our
election not merely by means of Christ but in Christ.
Ephesians 1: 4 - 'as He [the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ] chose us in Him [Christ] before the foundation
of the world' - must be interpreted as meaning that the
divine decision took place in Him so that the revelation of
the decision is made in the One who executed it. The whole
1. ibid.. p. 105
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of election is to be found in Him and in Him alone.
This doctrine of the fullness of meaning for the
Pauline 'en Christo', of Jesus Christ the electing God,
includes the doctrine that Jesus Christ is the electing
God as the obedient One. It is only as the obedient One
that He can embody the divine good-pleasure to all that is
not God. But as the obedient One He is the very will of
God in its operation ad extra. As the obedient One He
embodies the divine election and therefore it is in Him
that we are elect. That He is the obedient One means that
He enacts in time the eternal divine decision to which He
was partner and that He communicates to us this act of
obedience of His through the Holy Spirit, or, rather, that
the Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of this act of obedience, is
the Spirit of adoption in such a way that we are brought into
the divine good-pleasure, the sonship, which is in Christ.
Put summarily, this means that the Son embodied the divine
good-pleasure in His obedience and that we are adopted into
this good-pleasure by the Spirit of this obedience.
No diminution of the election of Jesus Christ is
implied by saying that He is the obedient One. It is
certainly true that He elects in obedience, but since it is
genuine obedience 'it is His own decision and election' and
so 'no less divinely free than the electing and decision of
the Father and the Holy Spirit.'1 Further, according to
Barth, the peculiar divine dignity of the living God, and
of the Son in particular, is His humility. In IV/l of the
1. ibid.. p. 105.
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Dogmatics Barth argues that the incarnation of the Son
does not deny His divinity but is the expression of the
divinity, which, because it is genuine divinity, is not
afraid to serve but becomes itself in serving.
Earth1s concentration on the obedience of Jesus
Christ in election has been stressed for four
reasons. First, the doctrine of election in Christ is
essential to Barth* s understanding of the turning of men to
God. In later parts of this study it will be seen that
according to Barth salvation is already complete in Christ
and that other men have their salvation as they are awakened
by His Spirit to participate in what is already theirs in
Him. Further, that salvation is complete in Christ through
His obedience gives Christ a peculiar proximity to other men
who are to live their salvation through their obedience.
Second, Earth's concentration on the obedience of Jesus
Christ shows that the divine election was fulfilled not in
heaven and before time (though it was prefigured there)
but on earth and in time in the supremely concrete event
of the obedience to the cross. The divine election there¬
fore has a glorious proximity to us men. Third, prominence
has been given to Barth's doctrine of the obedience of Christ
because in the assessment of Barth* s understanding of
election (in the next chapter) it will be argued that
what Barth maintains about Jesus Christ as the electing God
can be maintained with equal and perhaps greater force by
keeping the traditional doctrine that the Father is in the
first instance the electing God. But if it is at the same
time maintained, as traditional theology did not to its
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great loss and as Barth does to its great gain, that Jesus
Christ is also the electing God, all that Barth has so
helpfully said about election jui Christ can be maintained
(because He is the electing God as the obedient One) while
also saying (what Barth rather neglects) that the election
of God moves forward to a purpose of the Father which is
enacted in the obedience of the Son. In making this
extension of Earth1s doctrine it is hoped to draw out the
often -unsuspected proximity of the Son of the Father to those
He adopts (in the Spirit) as the sons of His Father. It is
hoped to show that the purpose of the Father needs to be
taken into account in speaking of the election of God, but
that this purpose can be explicated legitimately only by
looking solely to the Son in His obedience to this purpose.
As we study the Son in His active obedience, in His electing
as the Subject of election, we see the Father's purpose to
be even more human than Barth has shown it to be. This
goes beyond what Barth so convincingly argues (that the
divine electing of the Son, as the Subject of election,
drives toward as its completion the human being elected of
the Son, as the Object of election), and implies that even
as God, as the Subject of election, the Son entered into the
closest proximity with the human condition. And, finally,
Barth's theme of the obedience of the electing God has been
stressed for a reason already made explicit. In relation
to men's turning to God, the obedience of the Son means that
the revelation of the decision of the divine election takes
place in the One who executed it, and therefore men know the
electing God. They know the God to whom they entrust them-
82
selves, as they do not if the election is decided in a
beginning of God's ways and acts apart from Jesus Christ.
The first assertion drives toward the second
assertion as its completion. That Jesus Christ is the
electing God needs to be completed with the assertion:
•Jesus Christ is the elected man*. This second and dependent
assertion means more than that Jesus Christ is the prime
example and mirror of what election always and everywhere
means.1 It means that He is the Elect One. This unique¬
ness does not exclude others: it includes them. This can¬
not be said in virtue of His humanity as such - we could
2
never say of a man that other men are elect in Him. It
can be said only in virtue of His being also the Creator.
It Is because as the obedient One He willed to become man
that we can say of His humanity that it is unique and yet
in its uniqueness others are elect in Him. Thus Barth*s
first assertion stands as the presupposition of the second
and makes it necessary.
If the testimony of Holy Scripture concerning this
man is true, that this man does stand before God
above and on behalf of others, then this man is no
mere creature but He is also the Creator, and His
own electing as Creator must have preceded His own
election as creature. (C.D. II/2, p. 116)
Far from making the humanity of Jesus Christ secondary and,
as it were, a mere adjunct of the divinity, it means that
the humanity is essential and enhanced in importance. It
means that
before all created reality,.,.the eternal divine
decision as such had as its object and content the
existence of this one created being, the man Jesus
of Nazareth,....[and] further that in. and with the
1. ibid., p. 118.
2. ibid.. p. 116.
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existence of this man the eternal divine decision
has as its object and content the execution of the
divine covenant with men, the salvation of all men.
(C.D. II/2, p. 116)
From the beginning the eternal divine decision has had in
view the humanity of Christ, the humanity of this one
Elect man in whom the covenent with all others would be
established.
It was in His humanity that He brought election to
other men. In the execution of divine election He wills
not only Himself but also us men. 'In that He (as God)
wills Himself (as man), He also wills them [i.e., us men].'x
It is therefore true that He elects in His humanity (though
only because He is God, the God-man) and that we are elect
in His elect humanity.
What singles Him out from the rest of the elect, and
yet also, for the first time, unites Him with them,
is the fact that as elected man He is also the
electing God, electing them in His own humanity.
(C.D. II/2t p. 117)
It is therefore the humanity of Jesus Christ which
carries the burden of election. This is true only because
it is also the humanity of the Creator but it is precisely
as this humanity that it bears the divine election. To
summarise: He elects as God, but in His obedience as God
2
He became man. He is therefore not merely one of the
elect (though He is this), but also the Elect One in whom
all others are elect.
1. ibid., p. 117.
2. This does not imply subordination!sm. See Chapter V,
p. 222.
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Having elucidated the connection between Jesus Christ
as the electing God and as the Elect One, and seen that Hie
humanity bears the election, we must look carefully at what
Barth means by calling Jesus Christ the Elect man.
Too meagre an account of our election in the humanity
of Christ has been given in traditional theology. It has
certainly managed to say things of great importance and
Barth gladly affirms these. But in affirming them he finds
that they demand a wider significance than ever the tradition¬
al account gave them. (Just as traditional theology gave
too narrow an account of the divinity of Christ in election,
overlooking its active part in election, so it gave too
narrow an account of His elect humanity, overlooking it as
the basis of the election of others.)
In relation to the passive election of Jesus Christ
the great exponents of the traditional doctrine of
predestination developed an insight which we, too,
must take as our starting-point, because, rightly
understood, it contains within itself everything else
which must be noted and said in this connection. The
insight is this: that in the predestination of the
man Jesus we see what predestination is always and
everywhere - the acceptance and reception of man only
by the free grace of God. Even in the man Jesus
there is...no self-sufficient goodness, which can
precede His election to divine sonship.,..It is by
the work of the Word of God, by the Holy Spirit, that
He is conceived and born without sin, that He is what
He is, the Son of God; by grace alone. As He became
Christ, so we become Christians....What we have to
consider in the elected man Jesus is, then, the
destiny of human nature, its exaltation....But more,
it is in this man that the exaltation itself is
revealed and proclaimed. For with His decree con¬
cerning this man, God decreed too that this man should
be the cause and instrument of our exaltation.
(C.D. II/2, p. 118)
Jesus Christ is not only the example of a man elected by
grace, but it is in Him that all others are called and
exalted by grace.
a5
Thus it is not merely that Jesus Christ is who He is
by grace alone. In His humanity it came about that grace
overflowed for other men and their election of grace
happens in Him. Barth unfolds this in three stages.
First, 'even as the object of predestination, even as
elected man, Jesus Christ must still be understood as truly
the beginning of all God's ways and works.' The man Jesus
had absolutely nothing to bring before God to make Him
2
worthy of divine election. That the man Jesus is the
beginning of all God's ways and works, the first-born of all
•x
creation, is grace. It is grace that the creation is
posited in Him. It is grace in a yet more marvellous way
4
that God gave Himself in union with the man Jesus Christ.
This is how 'the inner glory of God overflows. From all
eternity it purports and wills its own impartation to the crea¬
ture, the closest possible union with it, a fellowship which
is not to its own advantage but to that of the creature.'-*
Thus the election of the creature is pure grace, and it is
an election not simply b^r Christ, but in Him, i.e., in union
with Him, with the grace of God which overflowed to men in
Him. Election is participation in Jesus' creatureliness
and sonship. 'From its very source the election derives
7
from the man Jesus.'
1. ibid. P- 120.
2. ibid. P. 121.
3. ibid. P» 121.
4. ibid. P« 121.
5. ibid. P* 121.
6. ibid. P» 121.
7. ibid. PP . 121-2.
86
Second, Barth says that the elected man Jesus was
elected to suffer,1 to be obedient to death. He fulfilled
His election of grace in our humanity in space and time
(and not in heaven!). It was ordained that He become flesh.
But flesh is as grass and under divine condemnation. There¬
fore Jesus was elected to bear the divine rejection of sin
and Satan. At the head and in place of all others He bore
2
the rejection which should have been theirs. Thus, in His
death, in His willingness to obey to the end divine grace,
He 'actualised the overflowing of the inner glory of God.
In this way, the inner glory of God accomplished the
decisive act of history. This act won the freedom of men.
For in allowing the wrath of God to proceed against Him
instead of against them, in checking the rule of Satan in His
own person, the free course of divine Justice brought them to
freedom.^ And, further, in His death for them, the Son of
God brought about their death as sinners, and therefore
their radical sanctification, separation and purifi¬
cation for participation in a true creaturely inde¬
pendence, and more than that, for the divine sonship
of the creature which is the grace for which from all
eternity they are elected in the election of the man
Jesus. (C.D. II/2, p. 125)
This second point may be summarised by saying that in the
foreordination of the man Jesus to suffer, and in living
out of that ordination to its end, He actualised in history
the overflowing grace of God and so freed man from Satan
1. ibid., p. 122.
2. ibid., p. 123.
3. ibid.. pp. 125-6.
4. ibid,, p. 123 and p. 125.
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for participation in His sonship.
But, third, the divine purpose at the beginning of
God's ways and acts reaches its completion - it accompli¬
shes its purpose, its goal. In the first stage of un¬
folding the meaning of the election of the man Jesus, Barth
said that from the beginning Jesus is the man He is by
grace alone. In the second stage he said that in the man
Jesus the glory of God overflowed in supreme grace to
achieve the decisive act of history, i.e., the liberation of
man from sin to participate in the sonship of Christ. This
participation in Christ - and this is the main point of the
third stage - is the 'goal', the 'end1, the 'purpose' of the
1
self-giving of the divine glory in the man Jesus; it con¬
sists of the act of faith of men, of their concrete act of
2
faith. It means that since Jesus has put all rejection
behind them 'they can have their own life.'^ But the
concrete act of faith and the life of theeLect, precisely
because they are a participation in Him, were first and
primarily in Christ Himself. At this point it may seem
that Barth is detracting from the point he has made about the
concreteness and independence of the act of faith on the part
of men other than Christ, but when it is seen what he means
by this it will be seen that this is not so. In the second
stage Barth pointed to the steadfast faithfulness of Jesus
to the divine will, and now in this third stage he points
to the mutual steadfastness of God and man in Jesus Christ:
1. ibid., pp. 125-7: 'aim*, p. 125; *consummatiorf, p. 126;
"' end', p. 126.
2. ibid., p. 126.
3. ibid.. p. 127.
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•...in His mercy God remains just as faithful to Him as
He in His readiness to do God's will remains faithful to
God.'1 In this 'twofold steadfastness1 there is the
being together of God and man, the setting up of the
Kingdom of God 'as the consummation toward which all God's
2
ways and acts are moving.* On the human side, on the side
of the Elect, this steadfastness meant prayer - obedience,
calling on God in confidence in the righteousness of His
will. Jesus counted on the steadfast faithfulness of the
divine will toward Him and so obeyed God in prayerful trust
in Him. In this trust and prayer and obedience He gave
Himself up on the cross. He offered Himself in inter¬
cession as priest and victim for man. On God's part His
steadfastness consisted in hearing the prayer of Jesus, in
raising Him from the dead, and so vindicating Jesus' inter¬
cession for men and His own right to demand such obedience
from Jesus. In His steadfast faithfulness to Jesus, God
vindicated the righteousness of His assault against Satan,
making 'manifest the vindication of His positive will as
Creator against the assault of Satan, a vindication which
He made by offering up His elect.' Barth says 'this
divine and human steadfastness (reflected in the prayer and
resurrection of Jesus) constitutes the meaning and purpose
of the election of Jesus.I£, then, the election of
Jesus consisted concretely in His steadfast prayer to God,
the prayer which God answered in a corresponding faithfulness
1. ibid.,,p. 125.
2. ibid., p. 126.
3. ibid.. p. 126.
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to Him and so in vindicating His prayer in the sheer
grace of raising Him from the dead, our election consists
concretely of our faith (our prayer) in Him.1 To put
this comprehensively: if it is true that from the beginning
Jesus is the One He is by grace alone, and if He realised
that grace in history through His steadfast obedience,
culminating in the prayer of priestly intercession for man
on the cross, and if God for His part answered His prayer
with the grace of raising Him from the dead, then our
election of grace consists in a definite faith in Jesus on
our part: it consists in having 'His resurrection and
2
prayer both in the mind and in the heart.1 It consists in
participation in Him, a genuine participation which does not
detract from our faith and prayer but which claims nothing
for itself and so in prayer looks only to the grace of God
which is in the prayer and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
This is only a brief outline of what Barth means by
the grace of God in the humanity of Jesus Christ. Much
more could have been noted, but the main thrust of his dis¬
cussion as it has relevance for man's turning to God has
been summarised. As always in the Dogmatics. Barth moves
his solution of a theological problem towards its resolution
in the being together of God and man. Here it is the
being together of God and man in the mutual responsiveness
and steadfastness of God and man each to each. This happens
1. ibid.. p. 126.
2. ibid.. p. 127.
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in Jesus Christ, but it happens in such a gracious way
that it establishes the being together of God and the
elect, God and men other than Jesus Christ. They are to¬
gether in the Kingdom of God set up in Jesus Christ and
which is Himself but which for that reason includes men who
entrust themselves to God as freely and indeed independently
for their own part as does Jesus Christ for His. Barth*s
sub-section on the eternal will of God deepens this theme.
Before proceeding with this task, it will be helpful
to list some points which emerge from our summary of Barthis
doctrine of Jesus Christ as both electing and elected, as
they relate to the question of turning to God. 1. The goal
of the eternal divine election is the act of man, his
decision of faith. 2. Divine grace does not act on man
irresistibly but calls forth prayer. In the human nature
of Jesus Christ there is no question of an irresistible
grace which causes obedience. He obeys in prayer. He can
do nothing apart from the prayer which receives grace and in
receiving obeys. 3. We are elect not by means of Christ,
but in Christ. We are elect as we participate in Christ.
This means that our election consists in having Jesus1
prayer and resurrection in our heads and hearts, i.e., our
election is not an automatic inclusion of ourselves in Him,
but a genuine participation in Him. We need also to note
that it is a participation in His humanity. As He lived
His human life - by grace alone and therefore by the prayer
which is called forth by, receives and obeys grace - so we
live ours. 4. It was through the cross that Jesus
effected the decisive act of history and so freed men to
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participate in the overflowing of the divine glory, for
which God determined Himself from the beginning and for
which He also determined man. This means that at least
in the logic of his theological position Barth is committed
to the historical, even fleshly, achievement of election
jua not in heaving but on earth and in our humanity. How faith¬
ful Barth remains to this position is another matter, but
there can be no doubt that the logic of his doctrine of
election demands thi3 concrete historical centre.
Barth*s doctrine of the election of Jesus Christ
establishes the ground for a thoroughgoing doctrine of the
response of man to God. As we have seen, Barth insists
that the steadfast obedience of Jesus Christ is essential
to the election of man. At least in relation to the
humanity of Jesus Christ, Barth gives us a strong
Christian humanity. This humanity is no automaton but is
freely and genuinely responsive to God and even has an
autonomy. He lived out an obedience which was fulfilled
in His self-offering on the cross and so also in prayer. As
He was steadfastly obedient to the grace of God, so God
was steadfastly faithful to Him. God responded to His
prayer, raising Him from the dead. Thus Jesus* obedience
was achieved entirely by grace (it was lived out in the
prayer which, being completed on the cross, claimed nothing
for itself and everything for the gracious God) yet it was
His obedience and an obedience which God honoured and
answered. It was this free, genuine obedience which God
answered.
We meet at this point a pattern which we often find
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in the Dogmatics, e.g.. in the fragment on baptism."*"
Divine grace calls forth (but does not compel) a corres¬
ponding obedience in man. It is a genuine obedience,
carried through by the human subject, for as Barth says in
his account of 'real man', man posited by God in His grace
is a subject who, as he is responsible to God, posits him-
2
self and does so in free activity. His obedience is his
own free act. But it is this only as it responds to God,
as it is prayer. It can thus make no claim on God, yet it
is a genuine human achievement which God graciously answers.
For Jesus it meant the obedience to the cross, corresponding
to the divine grace which called it forth, and the prayer
which God answered by raising Him. For His followers it
means obeying Jesus, corresponding to Him in baptism, and
the prayer which baptism properly is and which God answers
by saving us. It may be that here Barth has come close to
an insight valued by Roman Catholic theology, though often
expressed in an unacceptable form (e.g.. doctrines of merit),
i.e., the insight that the obedience which is prayer, and the
prayer which is obedience, is a full, unconstnLcted human
achievement which, while it makes no claim on God, God
1. This is discussed briefly in Chapter XIII of this study.
2. 'Man is the creature of God, and therefore posited by
God....Hence man is also object. But he is subject too.
A subject is something which freely posits itself in its
own being. Man is, as he is responsible before God, as
he knows and obeys and seeks after Him, and thus posits
himself. Hence he is also subject.' C.D. III/2, p. 194.
See also: '...whatever we may say about man for good or
ill, we allude to man in his freedom, to man who is
active subject in responsibility before God.' C.D. III/2,
p. 195#
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delights to honour and even to reward."1"
The Eternal Will of God
Barth's account of Jesus Christ as the electing God
and as the Elected one, affirmed the essential role of the
humanity of Christ in the election of other men. This is
also true of his understanding of 'the eternal will of God
2
in the election of Jesus Christ.' Barth here gives an
account of what in traditional theology is called the
sovereignty of grace, but we shall note that the problem
which so deeply troubled the earlier dogmatics, that of the
relationship between the utter priority of grace and the
freedom of men, is no longer a problem for Barth, since he
shows that it is just this sovereignty of grace which makes
men free.
The eternal will of God is revealed in Jesus Christ.
It is a great mistake to look elsewhere, e.g., to a will of
God preceding the election of grace in Jesus Christ. And
yet this is just what traditional predestination theology
did when it spoke of the eternal decrees hidden from man.
Thus, in the traditional theories, the God who elects and
the man elected are hidden in darkness. But, if Jesus Christ
is both the electing God and the Elected man, we need no
1. Cf... the remark of H.U. von Balthasar: 'I can under-
stand how a Christian might not wish to consider the
meritoriousness of his deeds before God, and yet, at
the same time, I can believe that my worthless acts do
merit a reward.' H.tf. von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl
Barth. trans. J. Drury (Doubleday, New York, 1972;, p. 9«
2. The title of the subsection now to be discussed, C.D.
II/2, pp. 145-194.
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longer be terrified by the idea that the God who elects
and the man elected are in principle hidden from us. In
Jesus Christ we are confronted by a mystery, not of dark-
ness, but of light and of revelation. In the face of
Jesus Christ we know that the God who elects has revealed
Himself as the One who has given Himself for man. We
therefore know into whose hands we commit ourselves when
we believe in election. Similarly, in the face of Jesus
Christ we know who is elected - we know that he is the one
for whom He has given Himself. Thus there is no need to
2
look for evidence of election, since in Jesus Christ we
know the elected man and find our election directly in Him.
The eternal will of God is revealed in Jesus Christ.
We therefore know that it is not a static or mechanical will,
but a dynamically willed will which enters into encounter
with human wills in time. It is not thereby a capricious
will; it is not either undetermined or merely making a
play-thing of men. This is so because God is constantly
faithful with Himself and therefore faithful with man, and
also because from the beginning, in His predestination, He
has determined Himself for man. Barth here makes an
enormous advance on traditional predestination theology, for
he has maintained a dynamic, personal, unceasingly responsive
divine will, a will which enters into encounter with human
wills in their present, without abandoning what the classical
1. ibid.. p. 146.
2. ibid.. pp. 333-40.
3. ibid.. p. 157.
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theory held so precious, i.e., that God is not capricious
because from the beginning He has had in mind the events
of time. Predestination precedes all the contents of time.1
But the predestination of God is the election of Jesus
Christ, and therefore it is not a static plan that God
executes in time, but the unfolding of the purpose in
time which He resolved on before time in Jesus Christ, and
which He realised in His person.
The eternal will of God revealed in Jesus Christ is
His will to be wholly and utterly for men, even at the cost
of giving Himself in His Son for the world. !The eternal
will of God in the election of Jesus Christ is His will to
give Himself for the sake of man as created by Him and
2
fallen from Him.' This eternal will necessarily takes two
forms, first Godfs determinationcf Himself, i.e., that God
elected fellowship with man for Himself, and, second, His
determination of man, i.e., that God elected fellowship
with Himself for man. The first form involved God in
electing rejection for Himself. The unbelievably good
thing happens that God elected danger, suffering and loss
for Himself that He might have fellowship with man. In
electing fellowship with man for Himself He must take on
Himself the rejection of fallen man. By putting the matter
this Wcgjj as he must in the face of the revelation cf the
eternal will of God in Jesus Christ, Barth gives the lie
1. ibid.. p. 155.
2. ibid.. p. 161.
3. ibid., p. 162.
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to those ideas of predestination which describe God's
good-pleasure as His will to chooss some men and reject
others.1 In Jesus Christ we know that God's will is wholly
good toward men because He has given Himself for them.
The notion that there is an equilibrium in God whereby He
takes pleasure in balancing the elect and the reprobate
makes God uncompassionate and indifferent. It is to be
2
resisted with all the might of which we are capable. In
Jesus Christ it is clear that God's will is not both
election and rejection (not both Yes and No), but wholly
election. There must be and is rejection, but this rejection
*
falls wholly on Himself. Thus, God's good-pleasure in
election is not a complacent decision, but His good-pleasure
from the beginning to determine Himself for and actually to
bear man's rejection. There is indeed double predestination,
election and rejection, but it is not the fearful apportion¬
ing of blessing and reprobation among men, but the joyful
truth that God bears the rejection and man receives
blessedness.
Double predestination is a matter for unbounded re¬
joicing. God does not will good and bad for man; He
wills only good. There is a sense in which evil has to be,
but we cannot properly say that God wills evil, for how can
we say of the God revealed in Jesus Christ that He wills
what is not good? God gives evil its place only for man's
1. ibid.. pp. 171-4.
2. ibid.. p. 171.
3. ibid., pp. 165-8.
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good, only that He might overcome it in His own person
and so secure for man the blessedness He has from the
beginning willed for man. Indeed, evil exists only in
order that the divine glory may overflow to man:
God wills evil only because He wi^ls not to keep
to Himself the light of His glory but to let it
shine outside Himself, because He wills to
ordain man the witness of His glory.
(C.D. II/2, p. 170).
It is in the Son of God that this glory overflows to man,
that evil is checked and that man is established a witness
to this glory. This means ♦sacrificial love', the humilia¬
tion of the Son of God,1 the overflowing of the divine
glory in supreme and costly love. In this way the evil
which has to be serves the divine glory and man's salvation.
The judgment falls on Christ in order that man may share His
glory. This 'is clearly the decisive element in the work of
God accomplished in Jesus Christ and therefore in God's
2
eternal decree.' The negative side of predestination
falls on Jesus Christ; it has its place only that man might
be exalted by God. Double predestination thus need no
"5
longer inspire both terror and joy, but, as we see its
revelation in Jesus Christ, 'we can only rejoice at the
/1
double predestination of God.'
In Jesus Christ, this eternal will of God enters into
relationship with men in history. This is of considerable
importance for the question of man's turning to God, since
it means that there is mutual responsiveness betxveen the
1. ibid.. p. 173.
2. ibid.. p. 173.
3. ibid.. p. 174.
4. ibid.. p. 174.
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divine and human wills. It means that the double pre¬
destination which affects all men also has its working
out in the personal encounter between Jesus Christ and
all men. (Barth is careful to avoid anything which in any
sense suggests synergism or that there are two sources of
election, the divine and the human will. Rather, he shows
that there is a divine precedence, an absolute sovereignty,
which frees the human will for encounter with it). Because
the eternal will of God is identical with the election of
Jesus Christ, 'it is a divine activity in the form of the
history, encounter and decision between man and God.
This must be said because, first of all, God has His being
in Himself in decision. ('In Himself God is rest, but this
does not exclude but rather includes the fact that His being
is decision.• ) This is the decision in which He is who
He is. But, second, this means His decision to be the God
and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and ,therefore that
'from all eternity God posits His whole majesty...in this
particular relationship to this particular being over
against Himself. God pledges and commits Himself to be
-X.
the God of man.'This is the activity of God in pre-
L
destination insofar as He is its Subject.' But there is
also a fulfilment (Vollzug)^ of this predestination. It is
1. ibid.. p. 175. ('Geschichte, Begegunung und Entscheidung',
k3T II/2, p. 192).
2. ibid.. p. 175.
3. ibid., p. 177.
4. ibid.. p. 177.
5. K^D. II/2, p. 194.
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begun in 'the history, encounter, decision'1 between God
and man in Jesus Christ and fulfilled in 'the affirmation
of the existence of elected man and its counterpart in
man's election, in which God's election evokes and awakens
2
faith, and meets and answers that faith as human decision.'
is really true that 'for his part man can and actually does
elect God, thus attesting and activating Himself as elected
man.'v In accepting the self-giving of God in this two¬
fold sense (i.e.^as the evocation of faith and as God's
answer to this faith) man has the basis for his own life.
In this sense Barth speaks of 'a simple but comprehensive
l±
autonomy of the creature.' It is precisely because of
the sovereignty of the divine initiative ('the One who
3
elects has absolute autonomy over the one elected';-^ 'All
zr
that man can do is to pray, to follow, and to obey.' )
that man has an autonomy of his own:
[God] wills and fulfils and reveals Himself not only
in Himself but in giving Himself, in willing and
recognising the distinct reality of the creature,
granting and conceding to it an individual and
autonomous place side by side with Himself.
(C.D. II/2, p. 178).
This does not mean, of course, that the creature has an
'independent' individuality - that could only be devilish
and a caricature. But from all eternity God has willed
1. C.D. II/2, p. 177.
2. ibid.. p. 177. H. Ktlng, Justification, trans. T. Collins
E.E. Tolk and D. Grandskou (Burns and Oates, London, 1964)
p. 18, draws attention to the human decision as the goal
of the divine decision in Barth.
3. ibid., p. 177.
4. ibid.. p. 177.
5. ibid., p. 177.
6. ibid.. p. 177.
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to give Himself for man and therefore to give the creature
an autonomy and an individuality which, far from rivalling
His sovereignty, confirms and glorifies it.1
That the sovereignty of God means no threat to man's
autonomy has all too rarely been understood in the history
of theology and it has been particularly obscured in modern
Western culture where man's autonomy has been imagined to
consist in his independence from God. It has been thought
that man has autonomy either apart from God or in his innate
strength to turn to God - in both cases man's autonomy and
God's sovereignty have been conceived of as being in
conflict. It is worth hearing Barth at some length on
this sovereignty of God which establishes man's autonomy:
...the sovereignty [of God] which was to be con¬
firmed and glorified [by man] was the sovereignty
of His love, which did not will to exercise
mechanical force,...but willed rather to triumph
in faithful servants and friends, not in their over¬
throw but in their obedience, in their own free
decision for Him. The purpose and meaning of the
eternal divine election of grace consists in the
fact that the one who is elected from all eternity
can and does elect God in return.
(C.D. II/2, p. 178).
Since the sovereignty of God, as the sovereignty of love,
does not seek to manipulate man but to do him good, the
prayer of man corresponds to it.
The man Jesus, is not a mere puppet moved this way
and that by God. He is not a mere reed used by
God as the instrument of His Word. The man Jesus
prays. He speaks and acts. (C.D. II/2, p. 178)
1. ibid.. p. 178
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It is to "be noted that prayer is in its very nature
obedience to God - it corresponds to Him - and it is
therefore also speech and action. It is the receiving
of grace and therefore obedient action in which man attains
his maturity as an acting subject. This is true because
•the perfection of God's giving Himself to man', which is
received in prayer:
consists in the fact that far from merely playing
with man, far from merely moving him or using him,
far from merely dealing with him as an object, this
self-giving sets man up as a subject, awakens him
to individuality and autonomy, frees him, makes him
a king, so that in his rule the kingly rule of God
Himself attains form and revelation.
(C.D. II/2, p. 179)
This is the Kingdom of God, the Kingdom realised in Jesus
Christ and so also the Kingdom in which we are, in Him,
established as kings. The goal of this divine sovereignty
is the autonomy of man.
God's eternal will is man: man who is the whole¬
hearted witness to God's kingdom and enjoys as such
a kingly freedom...man in the state of utter and
most abject responsibility over against God, who
even in this responsibility, even in this acknowledg¬
ment of the absolute pre-eminence of God Himself,
is and becomes an individual, and autonomous, and in
the sphere of creation a sovereign being, and as such
the image of God. God's eternal will is the act of
prayer (in which confidence in self gives way before
confidence in God). (C.D. II/2, pp. 179-80.)
The problem of God's sovereignty and man's autonomy is
solved by Barth in seeing the encounter between God and man
for what it is: prayer, the fellowship of man with God
which God from the beginning has willed for man and for
which He gave Himself in Christ. The eternal will of God
thus finds its goal in man's act of prayer. Barth can
thus say quite simply that man's election of God is the
goal of election:
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...the decision of the sovereign God, His election
of grace (in the understanding of which we cannot be
allowed to reverse or even compare the two partners),
has as its sole content the fact that God elects
man in order that man may be awakened and summoned
to elect God, and to pray that he may give himself
to Him, and that in this act of electing and prayer
he may exist in freedom before God.•.
(C.D. II/2, p. 180).
Traditional accounts of predestination were unable to
affirm that the goal of divine election is man's corres¬
ponding election of God. Barth's position is an immense
gain also for modern thought since, as was argued in
Chapter I of this study, modern man wants to believe that
he can chose God in his own strength and live on his own feet
before Him. Barth concedes nothing to the Pelagianism of
this desire, but he does give man a freedom and a respons¬
ibility, an authentic maturity, which traditional pre¬
destination theology could not. Even Calvin, with his deep
interest in man (as evidenced especially in his Christology),
gave little emphasis to man's election of God."1" Barth has
shown that to live by grace alone is to become of age, to
become autonomous. He is quite an anti-Pelagian as Calvin,
but he finds he must speak of man electing God. This is
because the sovereign will of God, His grace, is Jesus Christ.
Jesus Christ was fully obedient to the divine will and was
fully recipient of divine grace. He was a man of prayer.
1. Calvin does say that man's faith 'confirms' divine
election (Institute. Ill, 24, 3), but he does not stress
man's decision as the goal of God's decision. In this
respect, Barth strengthens and develops Calvin.
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His humanity was in no sense circumscribed by God's will
and grace, but rather opened up and established by them.
In this way, He was the realisation of the Kingdom of God,
Other men enter this full humanity of Christ as they live
in Him, as they live in prayer, and participate in His
prayer. It is in this prayer that men acknowledge the
sovereignty of God's grace and that they are free to elect
and actually do elect God, As they live in the Kingdom
of God realised in Jesus Christ, they also are kings.
It is clear that at least in the logic of his theology
Barth gives a necessary and adequate place to the turning
of men to God. We will have to ask in the following dis¬
cussions of his development of the doctrine of election
whether he has adequately understood the connection between
the turning of man to God in Christ and the participation
of other men in that turning.
The Election of Men Other than Jesus Christ
We now come to Barth's understanding of the election
of men other than Jesus Christ. Barth does not immediately
speak of other individuals who are elect because he notes
that Holy Scripture is in no hurry to reach them."3" This
does not mean that God by-passes the election of
2
individuals, but that the Bible first thinks of 'the human
fellowship which in a particular way provisionally forms the
■5
natural and historical environment of the man Jesus Christ'.
1. C.D. II/2, p. 195; cfj, p. 306.
2. ibid., p. 310.
3. ibid.. p. 196.
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As this human environment, the community mediates the
1
election of Jesus Christ to the individual. We shall
follow Barth, and discuss the election of the community
before the election of the individual. We will not
examine the section 'The Election of the Community* in
detail, but will show the way in which Barth understands
the community to mediate the election of God to the
individual.
The Christian community is not a Mediator: Jesus
Christ is the only Mediator between man .and God. Yet the
mediation of the community has an essential part in the
election by God of men. The community is not itself the
2
object of divine election: individual men are. Yet it
■3
is not as private persons that they are elect but * as a
fellowship elected by God in Jesus Christ...for a peculiar
service, to be made capable of this service and to discharge
it*.^ As private individuals men serve themselves, but as
the elect of God they serve others. The eLect individual
lives for himself no more than does the elect community live
for itself. The individual is elected by God into the
fellowship of the community, and it is by the witness of
the community that He calls the individual. Thus, the
individual is called to abandon his private life and live
1. ibid.. p. 196; cf, pp. 323-5.
2. ibid.. p. 313.
3. ibid.. p. 196.
4. ibid., p. 196.
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as an elect person, as a witness to the truth which the
community mediated to him. The individual serves the
truth, just as the community serves the truth and as did
Jesus Christ also. Election in God, in Jesus Christ, in
the community and in the individual is service.
Berth's understanding of the service of the community
must be examined carefully since it is this notion which
leads many readers of the Dogmatics to believe that Barth is
committed, in the logic of his theology, to the salvation of
all men.1 This problem is important for this study as it
may be that the logic of Barth's position means that men are
turned to God whether they will or not, without their
willing participation.
The problem may be located in this way. Barth
accompanies his theological account of the election cf the
community with an exegesis of Romans 9-11» the passage which
climaxes its argument with the words: 'For God has consigned
all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy on all'.
(11, 32). Whatever rejection there is serves only election,
1. Though Barth explicitly repudiates the doctrine of
apokatastasis ('to the man who persistently tries tochange the truth into untruth, God does not owe eternal
patience...' (C.D. IV/3, p. 477)), he is clearly tempted
by it. See, e.g., ibid., pp. 477-8; The Humanity of
God trans. J.N. Thomas (Collins, London, 1961), pp. 6l-2.
See also the carefully formulated opinion of H. Hartwell,
The Theology of Karl Barth (Duckworth, London, 1964),
pp. 110-2. Hartwell thinks that the movement of Barth's
theology is toward universalism, though he recognises
that he denies that theology may teach it. The article
of J.N. Bettis, 'Is Barth a Universalist?', Scottish
Journal of Theology, XV (1967), pp. 423-36 argues that
Earth's understanding of God's freedom prevents him,
even in the logic of his theology, from holding a
universalist position.
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serves only mercy on all. This universal mercy is worked
out among men in the history of the community. God has
acted in the very disobedience of men so that He may have
mercy on all men. Parallel with this Barth concludes the
theological argument by saying:
Though waiting for Israel's conversion, [the Church]
cannot and will not hesitate to precede Israel with
the confession of the unity of God's community, the
unity of the man who, according to the will of the
divine mercy, both passes and comes in the person
of Him who has suffered death for all and brought
life to light for all. (CjD. II/2, p. 276)
This does not as such mean universal salvation but the logic
is clear: through the act of God in the One who has died
and been raised for all, there can be no passing of man
which does not finally serve the coming of man. This is
said of the community, but does not the same hold for the
individual? Does it not mean that there is no passing of
the individual which does not mean his coming, and therefore
the salvation of all individuals?
In fact, the entire argument of the chapter 'The
Election of God' makes this question inevitable. A brief
recapitulation of the movement of this chapter will show
both the glory and the problem of its argument.
The election of God is His will from all eternity not
to be Himself without also electing man. This involves
double predestination. The rejection which men deserved
fell on Jesus Christ so that they may have fellowship
with God and share His glory.
The entire will of God for man is His will to send
forth His glory so that men may share in it. Even evil
has its place only for this purpose, only that the light of
God's glory may shine in all its glory and bring man to share
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in it as its witness. In this eternal will of God there is
therefore a judgment of evil, and men are determined by God
to witness to this judgment. Men are caught up in the
shadow side of reality, and there is a sense in which they
are destined to become its victims. God certainly does not
will men to evil and to judgment, but in the overflow of His
glory for the good of man there is also this shadow which
exists only that man might be rescued from it and become
witnesses to His judgment of it. In other words, the
eternal will of God to send forth His glory for the
salvation of man means also that man must be involved in the
shadow side of reality, must witness to God's judgment of it
and must also be determined for judgment in order that he may
be determined for salvation.
The central point here is the divine will to display
the riches of the divine glory to man for man's good. Evil
and the judgment of evil therefore have to have a place, for
only in this way can the full riches of the divine glory be
displayed for man. (This does not mean that the fall of man
was willed by God - human evil is man's responsibility.
Man's self-involvement in the shadow cast by the divine glory
in his own utterly inexcusable doing.) But this 'place' of
evil exists only in order that the divine self-giving may
overcome it. Man's self-involvement in evil, and therefore
his determination to serve the judgment of God, his hearing
but not obeying the Word and his passing form as sinner - all
this has its place only that it may serve the eternal divine
will to overflow in glory for man. That evil and God's
judgment of it has this 'place' is clearly seen in Jesus Christ.
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From all eternity God has willed to give
impart Himself in 'a fellowship which is
2
advantage but to that of the creature.'
meant that
from all eternity judgment had been forseen - even
in the overflowing of God's inner glory, even in the
ineffable condescension of God's embracing of the
creature, even in the fulness of self-giving by which
God Himself wills to become a creature. For
teleologically the election of the man Jesus carries
within itself the election of a creation which is
good according to the positive will of God....But
this involves necessarily the rejection of Satan,
the rebel angel who is the very sum and substance of
the possibility which is not chosen by God....Satan
...is the shadow which accompanies the light of the
election of Jesus Christ....And in the divine counsel
the shadow itself is necessarily the object of
rejection....The rejection which all men incurred....
God in His love for men transfers from all eternity
to Him in whom He loves and elects them.
(C.D. II/2, pp. 122-3)
Rejection therefore has a necessary place, but the necessity
of its place is that of serving the election.
The eternal will of God to give Himself for man's
good had its realisation in history. It meant above all
the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesu3 Christ. As this
historical event, in which the utter self-giving of God
coincided with the perfect self-involvement of men in evil,
it was the event in which God displayed the riches of His
mercy, in which He made His judgment serve His mercy. In
the flesh of the Son of God He overruled man's unbelief,
represented in Israel, and established the believing commun¬
ity, the Church. Jesus made unbelief and the divine
1. C.D. II/2, p. 121.
2. ibid.. p. 121.
Himself,1 to
not to [His] own
But this also
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rejection of unbelief serve belief and the divine election.
These two communities (Israel and the Church) witness
to the purpose, the teleology, of the divine judgment of
grace. They are distinguished by the death and resurrection
of Jesus Christ. Israel handed Him over and the Church
accepted Him, But although in this unbelief of Israel
and this belief of the Church we have the attitude and action
of men, we have also the determination of God. For in His
election (as we have seen) God willed that there should be
an overcoming of the rejected evil in order that there
should be a sharing by man in the superabounding grace of
God. There is therefore a determination of the first form
of the community (Israel) to represent this judgment of
evil, to attest this judgment by handing over the Messiah.
But through the resurrection of the Son there is a determin¬
ation of the second form of the community (the Church) to
represent the mercy of God, to attest this mercy by accepting
the Son. In the purpose of God it thus came about that
the election of Israel was fulfilled in the new Israel, the
Church. The determination of Israel to represent the
divine judgment served to bring about the determination of
the Church to represent the mercy of God. In this way the
teleology of the divine judgment of grace was achieved,
since even the sin of man represented in the apostacy of
Israel served, through the act of God in Christ, the
salvation of man as represented in the Church.
In this sense the distinction between Israel and the
Church is seen as a kind of dialectical distinction within
the one elect community of God. Through the cross and
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resurrection of Christ, unbelieving Israel becomes believing
Israel and the passing form of man becomes the coming form.
Unbelieving Israel is completely passed over: this is no
Hegelian self-sacrifice in view of a self-transformation, a
self-refinement of an essentially good and only apparently
bad community, but Israel is passed over in such a way that
the coming form waits to include converted Israel in the
new community, the new Israel (cf. Rom. 11). Thus even the
separation of Israel and Church serves the inclusion of both
in the one new community.
This recapitulation of Barth's chapter on the 'Election
of God', up to the section on the 'Election of the
Individual', shows that in Barth all rejection serves the
purpose of election. In relation to the whole movement
of election within history and within the community there
can be little doubt that Barth is correct,1 but it is very
doubtful whether this is true in relation to the individual,
i.e.. whether all unbelief in individuals is made to serve
the salvation of those individuals. Barth, it is true,
does not base his understanding of individual election on the
abstract principle that all unbelief serves election. But
he believes that in the concrete life of Jesus Christ all
rejection must serve election. Does not this then mean
that he comes very close to believing that all men are to
2
be saved, irrespective of their own election of God?
1. Cf. the judgment of C. 0'Grady, The Church in Catholic
fKeology (G. Chapman, London, 1969), p. 30.
2. This problem is raised in a particularly acute form by
Barth's treatment of Judas. C.D. II/2, pp. 458ff.
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We must now turn to Barth's account of the election
of the individual with this question in mind.
The Election of the Individual
In this last stage of our discussion of Barth*s account
of election, we will find ourselves diverging from him, not
in relation to his (biblical) idea that, through the crucifi¬
xion of Christ, man's rebellion is made to serve salvation,
but that there is a rebellion which, while it witnesses to
the election which it rejects, is not unsaved. We will
find ourselves maintaining against Barth that there is a
damnation which, as damnation and continuing as damnation,
witnesses to the victory of divine election. If the love of
God shed abroad in the election of God is as complete as
Barth (correctly) maintains, surely a rejection of that love,
because it is a rejection of perfect love, is utter
dereliction.
Barth is well aware of this kind of objection to his
argument. In fact, what we have Just noted in the preceding
paragraph about the nature of the dereliction forms the
backbone of his thesis about the rejected.1 Against tra¬
ditional predestination theory he points out that the sting
of rejection is not that God has not elected a person, but
precisely that God has elected him. The intolerable
1. C.D. II/2, pp.449-458.
2. 'A "rejected" man is one who isolates himself from God
by resisting his election....God is for him; but he is
against God.' (my italics), ibid.. p. 449. Cf. 'The
man who is isolated over and against God is as such
rejected by God. But to be this man can only be by the
godless man's own choice.' ibid.. p. 306.
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nature of the rejection comes from its being the rejection
of love freely given to it. In this respect Barth's
account of reprobation is far more perceptive than that of
the traditional teachers. Traditional predestination
theology, for all its correctness in seeing the terror of
reprobation in its being a rejection by God, took the sting
out of reprobation by not seeing that what God reprobated is
the isolation from His burning love, His all-embracing
election.1 Barth has seen the real sting of reprobation.
2
It is the unaccountable, personal self-isolation of a man
from the fellowship with God for which God has determined
him ana for which God has determined Himself, and therefore
also a man's rejection by God. (This by no means implies
that man takes the initiative in election; rather it means
that the sting of reprobation consists in the rejection of
the preventing love of God, the love in which God elects
even the man who rejects it.)
Where, then, is our problem with Barth? It is that
he holds that divine grace is stronger than man (as it
certainly is) in such a way that there can be no final
resistance to it.-^ There is a sense in which we must agree
1. Two things need to be noted here. 1. Traditionalpredes-
tination theory was correct in seeing the sting of repro¬
bation in its being a rejection by God. God rejects
sinners, His face is against them; "but 2. traditional
predestination doctrine robbed rpprobation of its worst
sting by saying that God never elected these men, and thus
that it was not by their own most grievous fault that
they are rejected. The infinite regret and self-reproach
of damnation was thus lost.
2. 'Without the Hply Spirit, and therefore without their
calling, they [ the elect] would necessarily be the same
as the others in all respects in which they are distin¬
guished from them.' ibid., p. 348.
3. ibid.. p. 453.
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with Barth on even this point: the rejected, as Barth
points out, witness to the victory of divine grace in that
it is the victory of divine grace that they are rejecting.
Further, we must hold with Barth that it is exactly as true
of the elect as of the rejected that they resist and isolate
themselves from divine grace. It is precisely this
rejection of the victory of divine grace which God overcomes
in theeLect."1" The same gracelessness which damns
the rejected is overcome by grace in the elect. Barth
must surely be correct in arguing that God's grace over¬
comes man's gracelessness, and that man's self-isolation from
God is not victorious over against God's gracious decision
for man. But Barth holds that there can be no final
2
rejection of the divine election. It is this which is so
disturbing - because grace would no longer be grace if there
were not that in it which did not require the response of
man, the response which he can withhold, although by with¬
holding it he remains utterly unfree, a slave. Has not
Barth done with the understanding of grace what the
traditional teachers did? - i.e., where they thought of an
infallible turning to God of the limited number of the elect
(and of the infallible and irresistible turning of all the
1. ibid., p. 452.
2. 'The fact that, in all its wickedness and deadliness, the
attempt [of the godless to oppose the divine election of
grace] is powerless in the face of God's will and decree
means that it is only conditionally and not unconditionally
that it can lack this distinction [i.e., election]. or,
stated positively, that they can be 'rejected'. A limit
is set by the fact that the rejected man, who alone and
truly takes and bears and bears away the wrath of God, is
called Jesus Christ. They can be only potentially
rejected.' ibid., p. 349*
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elect), Barth now thinks of an infallible turning of all
the elect, who in his theology are not a limited number but
the open number which may well be all men (although Barth
denies that it is all men)?"1" Despite Barth's excellent
and much needed refinement and precision of perception into
the doctrine of the power of grace, has he not retained a
residue of the old notion of irresistible grace? He has
pointed out that his theology does not speak of a triumph
2
of grace but with the personal presence of Jesus the Victor.
This is an immense gain for theology, but it may be doubted
whether he uses his insight here as richly as he might. If
grace is the personal presence of Jesus, who says: *You
have not chosen me, I have chosen you1, are we not obliged
to say that the personal response of the ones chosen (and
we may very well agree that this is every man) is essential?
For if grace by-passed the personal response of men, how
could it be the personal call of Jesus?
Let us now see what Barth understands by the election
of the individual. As we proceed it will be clear that at
no point does Barth lose sight of the fact that it is the
grace of Jesus with which we have to do, nor does he forget
that grace is stronger than man's gracelessness (because it
is entirely directed to man for his good, i.e.. it is entirely
gracious). If we dissent from Barth in the final count, it
will not be because we are returning to the traditional
position, but because we believe that his theology needs to
1. see ibid., p. 417; esp. pp. 421-2 and p. 476.
2. CjD. IV/3, pp. 174-5.
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complete its insight into the graciousness of our Lord
Jesus Christ.
What is the message which the elect community addresses
to the individual? It is good news, addressed to the
individual who isolates himself over against God and is god-
1
less. This individual has made an utterly graceless choice.
Having made this decision the individual has ruined his
2
authentic individuality. His life is futile and under
the divine condemnation, destined for perdition. To this
individual the community addresses the good news that Jesus
Christ has borne his rejection and that therefore he can no
longer bear it. To this individual, ruined by his own
decision, the community witnesses to the superior divine
decision of grace executed in Jesus Christ. As this divine
decision, his decision is nullified, cancelled. (His
decision was in any case futile. This does not mean that
it was not desperately serious and in fact deserved damnation,
but that it was impotent to destroy God's good-will toward
the sinner.) He can persist in his rebellion, but he cannot
reverse the divine decision which stands above him and surrounds
him. If he persists in sin, he can only repeat sins already
forgiven. He cannot undo the divine decision regarding
him.^ But he can accept it. He can allow the divine
1. C.D. II/2, p. 346.
2. ibid.. pp. 315-8. Since man's individuality consists in
his being loved wholly, undividedly, by God (p.314), to
reject God is to gamble away his true individuality for
mere individualism.
3. ibid.. p. 319.
4. 'He cannot change or reverse the eternal decision of
God...', ibid.. p. 317.
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decision which has made him elect in his being become also
the grace by which he lives. He now lives his election,
lives his election which is not in himself but in Jesus
Christ. This transition - i.e., from being elect merely
in his being to living his election - takes place in his
decision.1 It is not, of course, his decision which
cancels out his previous disastrous decision: only Jesus
Christ can do that. It is the decision to live by the
decision of God which has cancelled out his evil decision.
It is thus clear that Earth's understanding of the
2
election of the individual includes evangelism. The elect
community proclaims the good-news of the divine decision in
favour of the individual, and urgently addresses him
personally and directly to decide on the basis of this
divine decision.
Earth does not neglect the transition from the un¬
gracious individual to the elect individual. It is a move¬
ment which, while it does not depend on his decision, does
not take place without it. Earth speaks eloquently of the
preaching of election to the individual. Election is
properly preached only when it is an address and a summons
to each particular man -thou- to live his own life by the
1. 'Between the being of the elect and his life as such
there lies the event and the decision of the reception
of the promise.' ibid.. p. 321.
2* ibid.« PP# 323-5# H.U. von Balthasar, op.cit.. p. 150,
stresses the mission of the Church in Ba'rth• s doctrine
of election.
3. 'Jesus Christ died and rose for thee. It is thou who
art elect with Him and through Him. And now that all
this has been said to the?, it is the event of what thou
for any part shall say and do (or not say and not do), which
decides whether the ancient curse will again be laid on
thee with what is said, orvhether the eternal blessing
will come upon thee with utter newness.' (C.D. II/2, p. 324).
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divine decision.
Yet it must be asked of even this section whether
there is not a mitigation of the seriousness of the human
decision. This individual is certainly according to
Barth the object of the whole eternal divine predestination:
because God is One; because His eternal Son, the
only-begotten, the beginning of all His ways and
works, is the One on whom God wholly (individua)
bestows His love; because in this One He lias made
Himself the God of mankind; because in this One He
has called man His son - therefore it is the
individual (that is, this or that single man) to
whom God's deity for men and God's condescension to
men (in time and for all eternity) refer.
(C.D. II/2, p. 314)
Nor is there any doubt that it is the decision of this
individual to whom predestination refers:
The purpose and meaning of the eternal divine
election of grace consists in the fact that the
one who is elected from all eternity can and does
elect God in return. (C.D. II/2, p. 178)
But the seriousness of this decision is mitigated by the
fact that he is already elect in his being before he lives
as an elect man. His salvation does not therefore need
his decision.^"
Barth holds this because he is concerned to uphold
the perfection of the divine decision. It is superior to
man's graceless decision and the only choice open to man
is that of repeating God's gracious choice for him.
1. cf. C. O'Grady, op.cit.. p. 32; C.S. Buthie, 'Ultimate
friumph', Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. 14, No. 2
(1961):
'The failure of Barth to acknowledge that the human self
is genuinely involved, without thereby acquiring merit,
in its own salvation by virtue of its God-given, responsible
freedom, makes it easier for him...to speak of this great
decision as having already been taken by God in that self-
revelation in Christ which is both election and
reconciliation.'
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Further, it means that a man is already elect in his "being
before he lives as an elect man,1 since Jesus Christ has
made this decision for all men. Yet surely the perfection
and the power of the divine decision do not save a man
without his response to it, without his willing participation.
With Barth we must agree that the divine decision is superior
to man, that it does take place without any co-operation what¬
ever on his part and that man can only repeat the decision
made on his behalf, but against Barth we must say that,
precisely because this divine decision is perfectly for man
it does not save him until he allows it to have effect in
him, until he confirms it and participates in it. To put
this more positively: the divine decision is so graceful, so
courteous, that its perfection does not reach its goal and
so save man until it has brought man to answer to it, to
respond to it with his own decision. We dissent from Barth
only because the divine decision is more perfect, more power¬
ful in its grace, than Barth describes.
We must leave further consideration of this superior
divine decision to the next chapter, and for the present
pursue Barth's account of the election of the individual
and his decision.
What is it that makes individuals elected? Barth
holds that they are elect not because of anything in them¬
selves, nor is their election a matter of necessity or chance.
That they are who they are depends solely on the freedom of
God to be the One He is. (Cf. Paul's: 'by the grace of God
1. 'The community recognises and attests the being of man -
every man - in Jesus Christ.' (C.D. II/2, p. 321).
2. ibid.. p. 343.
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I am what I am.' (I Cor. 15: 10). It is 'the individuality
and solitude of God which constitutes the elect individual.'"1"
Earth then argues that 'to this distinction, peculiar to the
elect, of God's relationship to them and their relationship
to Him, there corresponds objectively their difference from
2
other men.' This calling is not an end in itself, since
it involves their faith and their proclamation of the good
news to others, their witness to the truth of election. Of
other men it cannot be said that they are the men they are
by a particular determinatinn of God toward them.-* They
refuse with hostility the goodness of God offered to them;^
they refuse the goodness of God and lack faith in Him, and
they refuse the truth of their election and therefore are
false witnesses. They reach back to a life which God has
made 'objectively impossible', since Jesus Christ has
cancelled out the life of unbelief. But though it is
objectively impossible, their rejection is 'evil',
'dangerous' and 'futile'. It Exists only as a lie against
£
the truth, as a lie against the truth that 'there is only
one Rejected, the Bearer of all man's sin and guilt.' and
fZ
their ensuing punishment, and this One is Jesus Christ.'
The difference between the elect and others is this:
the elect witness to the truth of the election of all men in
1. ibid. 343.
2. ibid. P. 345.
3. ibid. P« 346.
4. ibid. P. 346.
5. ibid. P. 346.
6. ibid. P- 346.
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Jesus Christ whereas the others lie against it.^" The
difference does not reside in the eternal decrees but springs
from the eternal will of God to elect all men in Jesus Christ.
2
If this is so, there is a 'solidarity* between the elect
and others, i.e., the election of all in Jesus Christ. This
means that there is for the elect a 'definite recollection'
that their rejection has been passed over in Jesus Christ
and therefore a freedom to witness to the election of the
others in Him, and that there is for the rejected a very
definite expectation that Jesus Christ has borne their
rejection also.
It is only in relation to the humanity of Jesus Christ
that we see what this distinction and solidarity is. He
is the 'Elect individual', and it is 'in virtue of this fact'
that the others are elect, i.e.. elect in Him, 'included in
4 *5
His election.* The elect are 'His community'Every
individual would be rejected if it were not that Jesus Christ
has taken this rejection upon Himself, and thereby removed
it. The eLect are elect only because of the election of
Jesus Christ and His calling them into the fellowship of the
Holy Spirit. It is in this sense that He is 'the Elect,
7
apart from whom there are no others but only the rejected.'
1. ibid. P« 346.
2. ibid. p. 347.
3. ibid. P. 351.
4. ibid. P. 351.
5. ibid. P. 351.
6. ibid. P. 351.
7. ibid. P. 352.
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Therefore the elect are seen, recognised as elect, only in
relation to the Elect One; and they are recognised as those
who were rejected but whose rejection has been rejected in
the rejection of Jesus Christ. Indeed, in themselves they
are rejected, but in Jesus Christ, the Elect One, they are
elect. Similarly, it is only in the 'portrait'1 of Jesus
Christ that we see who a rejected man is. It is 'Jesus
Christ who is cast out of the presence of God' and 'delivered
2
to eternal death.' If there are other men who are rejected
x
it is only by 'misunderstanding and disregard'^ of the fact
that He alone is truly rejected. But He is the Rejected
only because He is the Elect.^ This gives the rejected and
the elect an extraordinary proximity in their distinction.
5
Their mutual opposition finds its necessity in Him"' as does
also their unity in their opposition. Both testify to Him,
the one negatively, the other positively. There is - even a
sense in which the elect and the reject 'exchange their
functions.'^ 'Where God exalts there is also humiliation.
7
And where He still strikes He has not yet cast aside.' This
is the way God loves us in His Son.
If the proper object of His love is no other 'individual'
than this One, then apart from this One there can be no
other who can be consumed by the fire of His love which
is the wrath of God. It is the function of the many
1. ibid., P« 352.
2. ibid., P. 352.
3. ibid.. P. 352.
4. ibid., P. 352.
5. ibid., P. 353.
6. ibid., P. 354.
7. ibid.. P« 354.
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elect and the many rejected to indicate this love of
God in its twofold nature. And the authorisation
under which the latter stand as well as the former
is to live - in their differing functions - by the
fact that God has loved and loves and will love this
One, and them also in Him. (C.D. II/2, p. 354)
This is the meaning of the election and reprobation of
men as revealed in Jesus Christ. It is as if, to use an
analogy Barth does not use, the whole universe of men is like
a diamond reflecting the true light Jesus Christ - the elect
refracting His election, the rejected refracting His repro¬
bation. In hymning this perfection of divine love, Barth
stands very close to the Christian mystics. Central to the
argument of the passage quoted at the end of the preceding
paragraph is the perception that even the wrath of God is the
fire of His love. All men are held by and are responsible
to the love of God, and for all men His love is the fire of
wrath against sin and the fire of purification. Unlike the
mystics, Barth argues this not from experience as such but
from Jesus Christ. He grounds it solely on Jesus Christ, the
Elect One. With them Barth sees the distinction between the
elect and rejected in their acceptance of the truth or their
lying against it: the elect and rejected become, as it were,
antitheses of each other. Barth interprets this to mean
that the elect and rejected have a kind of solidarity, while
the mystics see the rejected as existing in a most dreadful
plight precisely because of their relationship to God, and it
greatly increases the urgency of their intercession for the
world.1 This is mentioned at this point because we will
later ask why Barth and the Christian mystics use a similar,
1. see, e.g. Catherine of Siena, Dialogue. trans. A. Thorold,
(Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1907)* pp. 70-3.
123
even identical, insight and yet reach a different attitude
toward the conversion of men.
We have seen that it is only in the light of Jesus
Christ that we see the distinction (and the solidarity) of
the elect and the rejected. We will now see that the
meaning of being elect is found in Him.
A man is elect with a purpose1 and for service. To
be elect means to be a member of the Christian community.
2
An eLect man is loved by God and determined for blessedness,
but this blessedness, precisely because it is the over¬
flowing of God toward man, is not only a receiving but
especially an opening up for use in the service of God's
self-glorification.^ God elects man and gives Himself for
him in order that he may give himself in gratitude to God.
Specifically this gratitude means the service of a life
4
which 'corresponds' to the kindness of God which calls it
forth.
Gratitude is the response to a kindness which cannot
itself be repeated or returned, which therefore can
only be recognised and confirmed as such an answer
which corresponds to it and reflects it....The elect
man is chosen in order to respond to the gracious
God, to be His creaturely image, His imitator.
(C.D. II/2, p. 413)
That election means this is a most extraordinary claim and yet
it is thoroughly Biblical (Bph. 5: 1 '...be imitators of God';
Cf. I Cor. 11: 1; Rom.8: 29). Traditional predestination
theology did not stress the goal of election as man's election
of God, corresponding to His election of them. Barth goes
1. C.D. II/2, p. 410.
2. ibid.. p. 412.
3. ibid.. p. 413.
4. ibid.. p. 413: 'gratitude is the establishment of this
correspondence.'
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so far as to say that the goal of election is that man
becomes the imitator of God. He is the imitator of God
because he cannot pay back or repeat the grace of God: he
can only be gracious in response to God's graciousness,
giving Himself to God (the meaning of election for man)
in response to God's giving Himself for him (the meaning of
election for God)• It is the fulness of God's self-giving
which brings men to offer themselves in gratitude to Him.
Elect man does not therefore become another Christ; he
becomes, in Christ, an imitator of the grace of God in Christ.
He responds to God and, in his gratitude, corresponds to Him
thus becoming His image and imitator. It is important to
see that Barth so gladly and unequivocally ascribes this
honour to man since in some other aspects of predestination
theology he gives to Jesus Christ an individuality which
seems to swallow up the individuality of other men. In this
magnificent passage he clearly shows that men have an
individuality which imitates God, and that this individuality
is the purpose of the election of grace.
Since the elect man is not only the object of election
(loved by God) but is also a personal subject (responding in
gratitude), he lives out his election as he represents the
election of God to other men. Elect men 'represent and
portray the glory of the grace of God.11 They serve, and
serve as active subjects, the ministry of the reconciliation
of the world in Jesus Christ. The elect live out their
election as the servants of God, His messengers and apostles.
1. ibid., p. 415.
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For Barth, then, to live one's election means a very-
definite action on man's part: a response, which, while
it maintains the distinction between God and man, corresponds
to God and even imitates Him. As God has served man in
Jesus Christ, and as Christ corresponded to the grace of God,
man now serves Him in grateful correspondence to Him.
The rejected man is the antithesis of the elect. He
is ungrateful.1 Instead of representing the self-offering
2
of God, he repeats sins already forgiven. God has deter¬
mined him for blessedness but he choses joylessness, and so,
where the elect serve God willingly, he serves God despite
himself, his very gracelessness witnessing to the grace he
despises.
The rejected man is the man not willed by God, the
man whose rejection has been rejected in Jesus Christ. He
bases Ms life on a refusal, Ms own refusal. But this does
not alter the fact that he is surrounded and confronted on
every side by the superiority of the love of God. Barth
thinks of Mm as an usurper, a man trying to occupy the place
taken by Jesus Christ and to repeat sins already forgiven.
The life of the rejected is therefore based on an impossib¬
ility and is absurd.
The rejected man is, then, quite sinister in his own
way, but he exists only as a shadow within divinely imposed
limits.
1. ibid.. p. 449.
2. ibid., p. 450.
3. ibid.. p. 450.
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Because Jesus Christ takes his place, He takes from
him the right and possibility of his own independent
being and gives him His own being. With Jesus
Christ he can only have been rejected. He cannot
possibly be rejected any more. (C.D. II/2, p. 453)
The life he attempts to live is a possibility contradicted and
taken from him by the gospel. Between himself and an
independent existence of his own there stands the death of
Christ for him in his place and the resurrection of Christ
opening up 'for him his place as elect.'1 But he fights
against this grace and refuses to occupy this place opened
up for him. He is in an impossible situation. He cannot
even suffer the rejection which he deserves as sinner:
He can reproduce but he cannot again perpetrate
the sins for which Jesus Christ died. He can
endure a likeness of the punishment of death which
Jesus Christ has suffered in his place, but he
cannot - even remotely - endure death itself.
(C.D. II/2, p. 454)
He thus lives only as a shadow - a shadow of the reality
he rejects and caricatures. He is without substance or the
right to an existence of its own. He 'is a shadow which
2
yields, dissolves and dissipates.'
This, then, is the meaning of the election of the
individual. It depends entirely on the eLection and
rejection of Jesus Christ: the rejection of the Elect One.
In the following chapter we shall have to ask whether Barth
has correctly understood the relationship between the Elect
One, the Individual in whom all others are elect, and other
individuals, i.e., whether he has understood it in such a way
that other individuals are fully established in their
individual election in the Elect One.
1. ibid., p. 453.
2. ibid., p. 454.
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CHAPTER III
ASSESSMENT OF BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF ELECTION
At the end of the last chapter it was noted that Barth
holds that, through the rejection of the Elect One, all men
have been placed in a new situation. There is now only
one possible place for men to occupy, the place opened up for
them in Jesus Christ. He has taken the place of sinful men
and borne away in His own person the condemnation which all
men deserve: there is therefore no condemnation which can
fall on men. There is only one place for men to occupy and
to attempt to occupy any other place is •impossibility'.1
Those who do occupy the one place open to them have a full
status of being and existence, even an autonomy of their own.
They are not •other Christs* but they do participate in His
humanity and follow in His footsteps. Things are quite
different with those who refuse to occupy this position.
These men are impossible, impossible ontologically. They
have no independent existence of their own. It is worth
noting how serious Barth is in arguing this, and how almost
unassailable (even on the grounds of the most orthodox
theology) his thesis is.
[The community] knows that God, by the decree He made
in the beginning of all His works and ways, has taken
upon Himself the rejection merited by the man isolated
in relation to Him; that on the basis of this decree
of His the only truly rejected man is His own Son;
1. 'By permitting the life of a rejected man to be the life
of His own Son, God has made such a life objectively
impossible for all others.1 C.D. II/2, p. 346.
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that God's rejection has taken its course and reached
its goal, with all that that involves, against this
One, so that it can no longer fall on other men or
be their concern, (C.D. II/2, p. 319),
Earth can even say that 'because Jesus Christ takes his [the
sinner's] place, He takes from him the right and possibility
of his own independent being and gives him His own being,'1
Further, 'between him and an independent existence of his
own as rejected, there stands the death which Jesus Christ
has suffered in his place, and the resurrection by which Jesus
Christ has opened up for him His place as elect.*
The reader is compelled to ask whether Jesus Christ has
not obliterated the individuality of the rejected. Granted
that they have an illegitimate individuality which may
legitimately be cancelled out by Christ, what has happened to
their individuality as the creatures of God?
This is an important problem for the question of man's
turning to God, since it seems that Barth has undervalued the
decision of the individual for or against God.
Barth's position may be stated in the following six
points:
1. Jesus Christ has taken on Himself the rejection which all
men merited.
2. He is the only rejected One.
3. Rejection can therefore never again fall on men. Although
not all men live as elect men, all men are elect in their
being.
4. These three points constitute the good news to be
1. ibid.. p. 453.
2* ibid. * P* 4-53.
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proclaimed to all men. The elect believe this message
and live by it. The others do not believe it. Thus all
men, whether believers or unbelievers,exist only in relation
to this superior divine decision.
5. Those who believe move from being elect merely in their
being to being elect in their living. They realise and
accept that the superior divine decision has contradicted
their godless individuality (i.e.. their attempt to live in
the strength of their own particular endowments). They now
live as those who confirm this superior divine decision.
They live in the individuality which is theirs as those who
are wholly (lndlvidua) loved by the Elect individual, Jesus
Christ.
6. Those who isolate themselves from this superior divine
decision are isolated in their false individuality. They
deny Christ's contradiction of their false life and so live
an impossible existence. They are absurd, self-contradictory.
Even so, they cannot alter the fact that they are elect in
their being and that rejection cannot fall on them.
Two fundamental questions- prompt themselves. First,
what is the nature of the superior divine decision enacted in
the Elect individual, Jesus Christ? And, second, what is the
nature and scope of the decision of the men (i.e., all men)
who are the objects of this divine decision?
In order to penetrate these questions, it will be help¬
ful to assess Barth's position in the following manner:
1. To begin, it will be observed that according to both
tradition and Scripture there is a continuing independent
existence of those who reject Christ. The act of God in
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Jesus Christ does not cancel out their individuality as
creatures of God. If this is so, two questions arise:
2. First, has not Barth misunderstood the individuality not
only of the reprobate but also of the elect, i.e., has he not
misunderstood the responsibility of men, as the creatures of
God, for the gift of eternal life? Against Barth it must be
said that man is responsible for his decision to live in
Christ or to live outside Him.
3. Second, has not Barth misunderstood the superior divine
decision enacted in the eLect Individual? What is the nature
of this divine decision such that it allows for and indeed
establishes man in the responsibility noted in points 1 and
21 In pursuing this question it will emerge that Christ did
not bear the same rejection which sinners have merited (as
Barth seems to say) and that it is more correct to say that
He bore that rejection which places all men under grace and
which means that all men will be judged by the grace of our
Lord Jesus Christ.
4. Thus all men are responsible for their eternal destinies,
not indeed by virtue of the power of their human decision,
but by virtue of the responsibility which is theirs as they
are encountered by the One who has cancelled out their evil
decision and responded to God in their humanity. This
individual has enacted the decision which establishes other
men in their genuine individuality and decision.
5. In accounting for this responsibility for the gift of
eternal life, Barth1s doctrine of the superior divine decision
needs to be developed in two ways: (a) in the direction of
the election not only of the Son but also of the Father and
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of the Spirit, and (b) in the direction of establishing the
connection between the response of the human nature of
Christ and that of those elect in Him, i.e., a doctrine of
the interaction between the Holy Spirit and our spirits.
This manner of proceeding reverses the order of the
questions which present themselves in view of the summary of
Barth*s position. Where Barth first establishes the nature
of the divine decision and only then the nature of the human
decision, this procedure begins with a consideration of the
human decision. It has been adopted not because it is
thought that theology should begin with man, but because
Barth's conclusion about the human decision seems so
vulnerable that it is helpful to ask to what extent Scripture
and tradition agree with it.1 Many theologians have seen
what Barth sees about the all-embracing power of God's love
and yet have been constrained to understand the human
decision rather differently from him. Barth is more accur¬
ate than most theologians concerning the centrality of
Christ in theology and so it may at first seem that he is on
better grounds than these others. As this discrepancy is
explored it will appear that Barth has misunderstood the
character of the decision enacted in Christ. He has, in
fact, circumscribed the perfection of the for us in Christ -
1. E. Brunner takes great offence at Barth's tendency to
relativise man's decision of faith, and thinks of it as
thoroughly un-Biblical. He thinks that Barth goes
further than Origen and other teachers of apokatastasis:
E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics,
Vol. I, trans. 6. Wyon (Lutterworth, London, 19^9),
p. 348.
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he has allowed an element of the traditional 'impersonality'
of the grace of Christ to enter the very heart-beat of his
theology. There is a sense in which Barth thinks of grace
as working without the response of the men who are its
object. Grace did, of course, work without any effort of
man's in the death and resurrection of Christ, but it does
not reach its goal without creating the response of man.
Grace is so gracious that it does not save man without his
own consent. Or, to express the same thing another way,
Jesus Christ comes to men as their Saviour: He, in His own
person has borne away their sins and has in Himself all that
they need for responding to God, but they do not participate
in His salvation without actively sharing in His response
which He shares with them.
1. The existence of those who reject Christ.
In the previous chapter it was noted that Barth said:
'If the proper object of His [God's] love is no other
"individual" than this One, then apart from this One there
is none who is consumed by the fire of His love which is the
wrath of God.'1 Many theologians understand this truth
quite differently. Those who stay outside Christ are con¬
sumed by this love which is wrath for the evil. Catherine
of Siena observed that there is no doubt of God's love for
all His creatures and it was this very fact which deeply
disturbed her when she saw the great offence against God in
2
which most creatures lay. God's love is an intense, holy
1. C.D. II/2, p. 354.
2. 'This soul thai, being purified by the fire of divine love,
which she found in the knowledge of herself and of God,
and her hunger for the salvation of the whole world, and
for the reformation of the holy Church,...rose with con¬
fidence before the Supreme Father,...showing Him the
leprosy of the Holy Church, and the misery of the world,
(Contd.
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fire. It consumes all that is evil. For those who love
God, this fire is chastening and purifying, but for those
who resist it, it is the fire of destruction. According
to Catherine, the damned have exercised false judgment,
continually counting their sins and sufferings as greater
than God's mercy. 'They [the ungodly] are reproved by
this false judgment, which is to hold their sin to be greater
than My mercy.'"1' On the other hand, the saved exercise good
judgment and true discretion in holding to the exhaustless
divine mercy. Thus it is clear that God surrounds every
man with the fire of love and mercy, and a man is judged by
the 'judgment' he makes in relation to this mercy. A man
who judges his pains greater than God's mercy makes himself
completely devoid of love and so worthy of damnation: he
2
cannot desire or will any good.
Catherine of Siena agrees with Barth in that God's
love is a fire which consumes evil, but disagrees in that
Christ is not the only individual consumed by it. There are
men who persist in their hardness of heart and therefore are
3
forever consumed by this fire. Catherine is moved to urgent
4
intercession for those who despise the love of God.
Contd. saying: "My Lord, turn the eyes of Thy mercy upon Thy
people."1 Catherine of Siena, Dialogue, trans. A. Thorold
(Paul, Trench, Trftbner and Co., London, 1907), p. 63.
1. ibid., p. 104.
2. ibid.. p. 108.
3. 'This fire burns and does not consume, for the being of the
soul cannot be consumed...' ibid., p. 106.
4. Barth is, of course, deeply concerned to intercede for the
world, but his concern is far less urgent than that of
Catherine and those like her because he does not see the
danger as they do of men becoming for ever locked in their
resistance to God's love. He is not so disturbed by men's
hardness of heart as are the mystics. Cf. C. O'Grady,
The Church in Catholic Theology (G. Chapman, London, 1969)t
(Contd.
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Barth has a penetrating understanding of God's
wrath. Unlike Ritschl he understands it to be a reality
and not the way in which the sinner sees the love of God
toward him."1* Because God's wrath is His wrath against sin
and is the fire of His love, Barth can say that in a certain
sense our redemption was won by the fulfilment of the divine
wrath, i.e., by the execution of that wrath in Christ in
2
which He did away with sin and the man who commits sin. In
this respect Barth's account of divine wrath is superior to
that of almost all modern theology.^ Yet, as is clear from
his doctrine of God, Barth holds that this wrath has been
fulfilled and exhausted in the intercession of Christ and so
cannot fall on other men. Christ bore the divine wrath
against sin as our substitute and thus wrath is no longer
4
able to fall on us but on Him alone. This must be mistaken
since the Apocalypse describes the completion of the wrath
of God in the seven plagues leading to the judgment of
5
Babylon, preceding the reign of Christ. Thus, although
Christ satisfied the wrath of God, He will execute the wrath
Contd.) p. 31. 0'Grady notes that the Pauline doctrine
of man being broken off the trunk of Israel (i.e.,
election) has little meaning for Barth. What tnen is the
danger of unbelief and the urgency of faith? (p. 33).
1. ChD. II/l, pp. 365-6.
2. This is implied in C.D. IV/1, p. 221. Cf. G.S. Hendry,
The Gospel of the Incarnation (S.C.M., tiohdon, 1959),
p. 125. *
3. Even K. Kitamori's penetrating analysis in The Theology of
the Pain of God (S.C.M., London, 19b6) does not see this.
The account of God's wrath in A.T. Hanson, The Wrath of the
Lamb, (S.E.C.K., London, 1957) impersonalises this dimension
of God's activity and hence completely misses Barth's
perception.
4. C.D. II/l, p. 403.
5. Rev. 15: 1-16: 21, esp. 15: 1 and 16: 17.
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of God against all those who hold the truth in unrighteousness
(Babylon and the world).1 He has satisfied the wrath of
God in His death in order to complete it on those who stay
outside Him.
It is amazing that Barth did not find Dante helpful
at this point. Dante held that Hell was created by divine
2
love. Damnation is in essence determined by divine love
as it meets human perversity.
Justice the founder of my fabric moved:
To rear me was the task of Power divine,
Supremest Wisdom, and primeval Love. 3
Precisely because God is love and has created men in love
and for love, when they fall away from love they enter its
opposite: they hate their neighbours as themselves and hate
the God who loves them. This hatred they carry into the
eternal world and, locked in it, they can only be the objects
1. Christ satisfied the wrath of God in the sense that in His
own person He executed the wrath against sin, thus bearing
away the sin of the world. This made Him supremely quali¬
fied to execute the divine wrath against all those who
resist His grace. It is instructive that the New Testa¬
ment nowhere explicitly speaks of Christ bearing the wrath
of God (though it is not unreasonable to see this implied
in the cry ofdereliction from the cross, Matt. 27: 47;
Mk. 15: 34; also Rom. 3: 25),whereas the Apocalypse speaks
HTrectly of the wrath of the Lamb, and it is the Lamb who
breaks the seals of the scroll which are the signals for
the pouring forth of wrath.
2. A similar point is made in this connection by J.D. Bettis,
*A Critique of the Doctrine of Universal Salvation1,
Religious Studies 6 (1970), pp. 329-44; p. 341: 'Hell
is a creation of God's love.'
3. Dante, La Divina Comedia, Inferno, Canto III, lines 4—6
(Carey trans.).
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of divine rejection. Their punishment is perfectly just,
as it is proportioned by their perversion of the love of
God.1
Barth may have ignored Dante because Dante's under¬
standing of reality was not always grounded in Christ. This
could not be said of John McLeod Campbell. In a manner
similar to Barth he held that Christ has given Himself for
all men, but, unlike Barth, he stressed that this means that
2
Christ is and will be the judge of all men. He will
judge all men according to their judgment of Him. To reject
Christ is to reject love and is therefore to lay oneself
open to the wrath of the Lamb. The man who does not
believe is not somehow immune from judgment: he is judged
by his unbelief and will not escape the consequences of his
1. Cf. Catherine of Siena, op.cit.. p. 106.
2. A passage from Ms early sermons illustrates this:
'Could a man but apprehend, even in a small measure,
what the gift is that is rejected; could he apprehend
that God has given to his enemies all that was needful
to these enemies sharing in God's own joys, and what is
implied in rejecting this gift,choosing death rather
than this life of God; did he see the horrid enmity to
God implied in the resistance made to his record, then
he would have some understanding of what an awful thing
the worm is that dieth not, and the fire that is not
quenched.'
J.M. Campbell, Sermons and Lectures (R.B. Lusk, Greenock,
1832), pp. 21-2. Cf.: 'We are to stand before the
judgment-seat of Jesus Christ. We are to be judged by the
gogpel'. (p. 180).
3# Cta H.F. Henderson, The Religious Controversies of
Scotland (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1905), p. 162.
'When Scripture says, The Father judgeth no man, but hath
committed all judgment lo the Son, the reason is because
Christ hath done something for all men, even died for them.
Christ's right to judge them, according to Campbell, springs
from His having bought them with a price. Take away His
love for all manifested in His sufferings for all, and you
take away all reason for His being exalted as their judge.
At the Day of Judgment the only sin that will condemn men
will be their continued rejection of Christ. The condemn¬
ation of the Father will no man incur, but only the wrath
of the Lamb.
See also the last chapter of T. Ersklne's Unconditional
Freeness of the Gospel (David Douglas, Edinburgh, 1879),
entitled: 'The Consistency between Present Forgiveness
and Future Judgment'.
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lying judgment. With Catherine of Siena, the knowledge of
the love of God for all men leads to urgent intercession for
those who reject Christ.
But doctrine is to be tested above all by Holy
Scripture. Again and again in the New Testament it is
implied that the appearance of salvation in Christ means
condemnation for those who do not accept Him. The logic
seems to be this: light has appeared, and those who prefer
darkness to light will be exposed by the light and shown up
for the evil men they are. 'This is the judgment, that
light has come into the world and men loved darkness rather
than light...' (Jn. 3: 19)« 'He who does not believe God
has made him a liar, because he has not believed the testimony
that God has borne to his Son. And this is the testimony,
that God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son....
he who has not the Son has not life. (I Jn. 5: 10-12). The
Epistle to the Hebrews insists on the great danger of
refusing so great a salvation: the greatness of the salvation
makes the damnation of refusing correspondingly great.1
Since Christ's sacrifice is perfect, complete in every way,
•there no longer remains sacrifice for sins' if a person
refused it. This argument is repeated in forms of increasing
urgency. The argument of the Apocalypse is similar. The
Lamb has shed His blood in love for all, and therefore those
1. Heb. 2: 3; 10: 29; 12: 25• Each of these verses depends
on the idea: if the salvation which has now appeared is
much greater than what was formerly revealed, the conse¬
quences of rejecting it will be correspondingly greater.
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who reject Him will become objects of His wrath. Those who
have lived without God remain forever without Him, the anti¬
thesis of those who have lived with Him and forever enjoy
the dwelling of God with men.1
It is thus clear that according to Scripture and
tradition, the act of God in Jesus Christ does not cancel
out or make impossible the independent existence of the
2
reprobate. The grace of Christ renders their act of
rejection even more terrible. Precisely because it is a
judgment of grace which Christ will reveal in His coming
again, it will mean the utter dereliction of the graceless.
If Barth had misunderstood the continuing existence
of the reprobate, two questions arise. First, has not he
also misunderstood man's being in Himself, his hupostasis
1. Contrast the fate of those who do not know God as
described in I Thess. 1: 9 ('they shall suffer...exclusion
from the presence of the Lord') with that of the faithful
according to Rev. 21: 3 ('the dwelling of God is with
men...').
2. By 'independent' is not meant that the godless do not owe
their existence to God and to Christ, nor that they
derive their existence from themselves (however much they
may wish to do this and delude themselves into thinking
that they in fact do). Rather, it is intended to combat
Barth's extraordinary statement, quoted above (p. 128 ):
'Because Jesus Christ takes [the sinner's] place, He takes
from him the right and possibility of his own independent
being and gives him His own being.' If it is the case
that the godless do not cease to exist throughout eternity,
it must also be the case that, though they still owe their
being to Christ, they are separated from Him and are in
this sense independent.
139
as God's creature,1 whether as participant in Christ or
as estranged from Him? It is not implied in this
question that man (even as damned) exists apart from his
being upheld by the Word of Christ's power (Heb. 1: 3), but
it is asked whether there is not a being of man as God's
creature such that he is inalienably responsible for his
confirmation or rejection of the decision made in Christ
concerning him. If man is created by the Father through
His Word (through whom He posits man as other than Himself
and so responsible to Him) and in the power of His life-
giving Spirit (in whom He establishes the union between
1. In arguing for an understanding of man's being in him¬
self it is not being claimed that man owes his being
to himself or that he is a kind of god alongside God
with an aseity of his own. It is rather being claimed
that God created man ex nihilo, not as an emanation of
Himself but as the creature of His grace. He is con¬
tingent and dependent on God and yet he is other than
God with a genuine responsibility to God. He is
answerable for his decisions because they are his
decisions. Nothing less than this is the miracle of
creation: God has created men other than Himself in
order that they may for their own part choose and love
God, that they may say yes to His Yes. Hence, God
would frustrate His own purpose in election if He
were to include men in Christ apart from their yes.
More, however, must be said about the meaning of
being in Christ. First, all men are created through
Christ. They have their hupostasis only through Him.
•All things were made through him, and without him
was not made anything that was made....He was in the
world, and the world was made through him, yet the
world knew him not.* (Jn. 1: 3, 10); 'in him all
things were created...all things were created through
him and for him...in him all things hold together.'
(Col. 1: 16, 18); also Heb. 1: 2, 3. Second, sinners
do not fall into the second death but continue to
exist because Christ has borne the sin of the whole
world (I Jn. 2: 2). To this extent all men are in
(Contd.
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man and Himself without mitigating his glorious
dependent otherness and therefore his responsibility),
then, through the Spirit, man is inescapeably responsible
for his obedience or refusal of His Father's Word:
Contd.) Christ, but the New Testament speaks of men
being in Christ only as they actually participate in
the life that is in Him. According to Jn. 15: 6: 'if
a man does not abide in me, he is cast forth as a branch
and withers; and the branches are gathered, thrown into
the fire and burned.' A man is not 'in Christ' in the
sense used by the New Testament without his active
participation in Him.
The position being argued for here is somewhat
similar to that of T.F. Torrance, The School of Faith
(J. Clarke, London, 1959), pp. cvi-cxvii. Torrance
argues that 'human beings have no being apart from
Christ as man' (p. cxiii) and connects this affirmation
with the 'carnal union' which Christ established with
all men by His incarnation. But Torrance also discusses
the being of man in relation to the Spirit of Christ, and
thus he can affirm with a clarity which Barth cannot
that men may indeed suffer damnation (p. cxiv). With
Barth, Torrance will not countenance any thought that
men can become independent of Christ in the sense that
they are no longer sustained in being by Him, and he
says that even in Hell men cannot escape or contradict
God's love for them, but he approves the following passage
of Calvin with which Barth would find himself in disagree¬
ment: '"that very relationship of the flesh, by which
[Christ] has allied us to Himself, the ungodly break off
and dissolve by their unbelief, so that it is by their
own fault that they are rendered utter strangers to Him"
(Comm. on Ps. 22: 25)' (p. cxvii). Because Torrance
does not include men in Christ on the ground of the
incarnation alone, but speaks of union with Christ through
the communion of the Spirit (p. cvi), he allows man's
being and the decisions he makes greater significance
than does Barth. This study, however, lays even greater
emphasis than does Torrance on the interaction between
Creator Spirit and created spirit. If the work of the
Spirit is given full honour, it is possible to give the
human hupostasis great dignity vis a vis Christ without
endangering thetruth that man has no Hupostasis apart
from Him. V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern
Church, trans, the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Serguis
(J. Clarke, London, 1957), p. 183, says that in the Church
we are 'one in Christ, multiple through the Spirit, a
single human nature in the hypostasis of Christ, many human
hypostases in the grace of the Holy Spirit.' It is thiskind of understanding of man's hupostasis which is argued
for here. """" ~
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the unbeliever (though created by Christ and though He has
died for him and does not impute his sins to him)1 is not
2
in Christ and that it is only together with his decision
of faith that he is in Him. It is not that the sinner's
act of faith effects this transference from separation to
Contd.) non-Christians, are asleep. Eph. 5: 14 probably
also contains a contrast between Christians and non-
Christians, and not between wakeful and sleepy Christians,
in view of the connection of waking up with the passing
from death to life. The transition from death to life
is so radical that it can only be the beginning of the
new life as a Christian, and not an event within it,
Cf. Jn. 5: 25. It thus seems reasonable to hold that
^TTese two texts refer to the awakening that occurs when a
man is incorporated into Christ. On the other hand, Rom
13: 11 and the frequent exhortations to stay awake and to
watch (e.g. Mk. 13: 36-7; Matt. 25: 1-13) refer to the
need for those already awake in Christ to stay awake and
not to lose what they have by falling asleep.
Thus, the imagery of waking from sleep in the New
Testament sometimes means the event of becoming a Christian
and sometimes (more often) an event within the life of a
person already a Christian. Barth elides these two senses
of awakening and thus thinks of the awakening in which a
person becomes a Christian as a transition from being
asleep in Christ to being awake in Him. The person who
becomes a Christian passes from being in Christ in a
broader sense to being in Christ in a narrower sense
(C.D. IV/2, p. 555). He wakens to what he already is.
But if it is the case that non-Christians are separated
from Christ (Bph. 2: 12). there is both an awakening to
Christ (i.e. / conversion), and an awakening in Christ.
1. Jn. 3: 16-21. God loved the world and sent the Son to
save the world. The Son gave His life a ransom for all
(I Tim. 2: 1-6; I Jn. 2: 2). The life of God is
available for all men in the Son, but only those who
receive the Son have this life (I Jn. 5: 12).
2. Eph. 2: 12; Col. 1: 21; Rom. 8: 9.
3. Eph. 2: 8-10. This passage states 1. that we were once
dead, by nature children of wrath, like the rest of man¬
kind; 2. that God raised us up to life with Christ; and,
therefore, 3. that we are saved by God through grace, and
if by grace, then through faith (2: 8a is an expansion of
2: 5c). It is thus safe to say that a man is raised to
life in Christ only together with his act of faith.
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union with Christ: that is the work of the Father"1" and the
2
Spirit; but a man does not find himself in Christ apart
from faith in Him.
It would seem, therefore, that man is in an impossible
situation. It is only as He is in Christ that he can turn to
God and yet apart from such repentance he is separated from
Christ. The solution must lie in this direction. Sinners
are created in Christ and He has united Himself with them:
He died for our sins and is raised for our justification. He
Himself is the transition from our death to life. He Himself
is the Way to Himself. But He Himself is the living Way
and therefore men are in Him only as they share His life.
To be in Him is to live in Him. As He was baptised into
repentance, so men are in Him only as He brings them to
share His repentance.
It is through His Spirit that Christ is this living
Way for alienated sinners to Himself. Since He comes in
the Spirit, He does not automatically include sinners in
Himself, but awakens them from death to share in Himself.
Christ is the Truth who has taken responsibility for those
created through Him, and therefore His Spirit leads them
into His truth, awakening their conscience to the truth and
leading them along the living way from death to life. Their
created being is awakened to true life. This happens only
through the power of His Spirit, only through Christ*s
sharing what is His with sinners, but it happens in such a
1. Col. 1: 12-14.
2. I Cor. 12: 13.
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way that man's created spirit witnes^s with the Spirit of
truth.
If this account of man's acknowledgement of Christ
holds, man's being as the creature of God is such that
(through the Spirit of Christ alone) he can acknowledge
Christ as his Creator's gift to him. This acknowledgement
is his own act and it takes place in accordance with his
conscience. He does what he was created to do and it is
he who does it.
Unless we operate with this kind of understanding of
the hupostasis of man we will be unable to account for 1. the
continuing existence of the rejectors of Christ as the damned,
2. the transition from separation from Christ to union with
Him and 3. the continuing existence of the elect as the
blessed.
1. If we understand man as the fallen creature of
God, with an hupostasis of his own, we can understand that
those who isolate themselves from Christ have no place (as
Earth says) but that they continue to exist in their
hupostasis as those who deny the truth and refuse the place
bought for them by Christ. Elected and created for life,
they deny it and continue to exist as those whose consciences
condemn them (Rom. 2: 15). They continue to exist in the
'no place* to which they have condemned themselves and are
the self-alienated victims of the outer darkness which they
prefer to light. Their existence is, as such, impossible;
God prepared no place for them and they can only go to the
rejection prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt. 25: 41).
It is as absurd and as impossible as the setting up of the
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•desolating sacrilege1 in the place where it ought not to be.1
Barth's description of them as 'ontologically impossible' is
no exaggeration if this is taken to mean, not that they
cannot remain reprobate, but that they have no place in
being at all, and that they are rejected, merely fleeing
shadows. The correction which is needed to Barth is that,
since the sinner is ineradicably the creature of God, he
does not cease to have an eternal existence even as this
2
impossible being.
2. It is possible to account for the transition from
separation from Christ to union with Him only if we operate
with the idea of man as being the creature of God with an
hupostasis of his own. Man fallen from God and in sin is
unable to respond to the call of God. He can respond only
as he is enlightened by the Holy Spirit. He is the creature
of God and there is that in him which witnesses with the Holy
Spirit. The witness of men and the Spirit agree and join
together (Rom. 8: 16; Acts 5: 32; Jn. 15: 26-7; I Jn. 5: 6).
These passages apply to men who are already Christians, but
the notion of conscience applies to all men, whether
believers or not, and has much to do with the transition to
belief (or the failure to make this step). The idea of
conscience in the New Testament relates to a person's know¬
ledge of good. It can therefore witness with the Spirit
1. Mk. 13: 14.
2. This is well described in S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness
Unto Death, trans. W. Lowrie (Oxford University Press,
London, 1941), e.g. p. 25: 'the torment of despair is
precisely this, not to be able to die.' This despair is
a sickness of the created spirit.
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of the Creator and recognise the good in Christ. Paul
speaks of his conscience bearing witness with the Holy Spirit
(Rom. 9: 1) and of the conscience of the Gentiles bearing
witness with the law of God written on their hearts (Rom 2:
15f.)• There is such a thing as a blinded, corrupted or
seared conscience, but this only demonstrates that conscience
has been perverted from its proper role of discerning the
truth. Since conscience is this kind of reality in man, the
Holy Spirit enlightens man's conscience to its true status
when He brings man to recognise and acknowledge the gospel
as that which is true and good for him. Paul says: 'by
the open statement of the truth we commend ourselves to the
conscience of every man in the sight of God.' (II Cor. 4: 2).
He is here speaking especially of the straightforwardness of
his conduct, but he also means that the open statement of
the truth commends itself to the conscience. Only those
whose conscience is blinded do not recognise the gospel as
good news. The Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the
transition from death to life in relation to conscience -
the blood of Christ purifies the conscience from dead works
to serve the living God (Heb. 9: 14). Both believer and un¬
believer have a conscience, but in becoming a Christian the
conscience is purified.
The transition from unbelief to belief does not happen
without the conscience recognising the truth. As a man
comes to recognise the truth about Jesus and acknowledge Him
to be Lord (I Cor. 12: 3) he is baptised by the Spirit into
the body of Christ (I Cor. 12: 13). He is united with Christ,
and all that is Christ's is his through the Spirit. Thus, his
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recognition of the truth does not itself effect the
transference from separation to union with Christ - this
happens as Christ baptises with His Spirit - hut this
recognition is his own act of acknowledgement made by his
conscience as it purified and as his hupostasis responds to
the proclamation of Christ.
The importance of conscience and the response of man
in relation to the individual's election was well expressed
by Thomas Erskine. Erskine pointed out that a man is free
only when he does what he knows to be for his good.1 Like
Barth, he believed that freedom is not a neutral capacity for
good or evil but an obedience to the good alone. In this
light Jonathan Edwards' definition of freedom as the power a
man has to do what pleases him is quite unsatisfactory,
2
since it does not include knowledge of the good. On such a
definition a tyrant could practise a deception on a man,
inducing him to do what he (the man) wanted to do, and yet
be using this 'freedom' to destroy him. This 'freedom' is
actually bondage. Erskine argues that in relation to some¬
one who has authority over us, we can be free in obedience
only if his purpose for us is for our good and we enter into
that purpose. Thus, we are perfectly free in the service of
God because His purpose is for our good and He brings us to
'sympathise' with that purpose. This happens as the Holy
Spirit meets our spirit, our conscience.
1. T. Erskine, The Doctrine of Election (David Douglas,
Edinburgh, 1878), p. 342: 'as it isin the Spirit alone
that we can apprehend righteousness as distinct from all
selfish ends...so it is only whilst we live in the
Spirit that we have true liberty.'
2. ibid.. pp. 335f.
3. ibid.. p. 338.
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Are we then capable of freedom under God's government?
It is evident.•.that we cannot be so except on two
conditions, first, that God's Spirit be communicated
to us, enabling us to enter into God's purpose; and
secondly, that this purpose be one that embraces our
good, thus enabling us to sympathise with him in it.
If true liberty consists in our full sympathy with
God in his purpose, then the capacity of liberty
consists in the meeting of these two conditions. For
as no man knoweth the things of a man but by the human
spirit in him, so no man knoweth the things of God, but
by the divine Spirit (I Cor. 2: 11), and no man can
willingly co-operate in a purpose unless he knows that
it embraces his good. I must, therefore have the
Spirit of God in order to fit me to enter God's
purpose; and that purpose must be truly and decidedly
for my good that I should be capable of sympathising
with it. (Doctrine of Election, pp. 339-40)
Erskine here rightly draws attention to man's recognition of
God's purpose, and to man's own freedom to 'sympathise' with
God. In this way he guards against any suggestion that God
includes man in Christ without his own assent to Christ.
God's purpose for man is so good that he will not over-ride
created being. Barth endangers this being of man by main¬
taining that man's being is in Christ apart from his assent
in the Spirit to Christ. Indeed, it is surprising that Barth
has so little to say about the response of man in his doctrine
of election, Barth says much that is helpful and even
breaks new ground in his discussion of the response of Christ,
but he has short-circuited the problem of how a man comes to
participate in His response by speaking of the being of all
men in Christ irrespective of their response to Him. Erskine
points to an essential aspect of the doctrine of election,
the meeting of His Spirit with ours. In this context it is
worth mentioning that Barth's anthropology gives too little
scope for the distinction and therefore interaction between
God's Spirit and ours. There is a tendency for Barth to say
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that the spirit which man has is the Spirit of God, and
thus to threaten the interaction between Creator Spirit
and created spirit.
3. If we understand man as the creature of God with
an hupostasis of his own, we can clearly account for the
continuing existence of the elect as those whose hupostasis
confirms their election in Christ. They utter their 'Amen*
to the election, through Jesus Christ (II Cor. 1: 20). Their
spirits are not swallowed up in His, but bear witness with
Him (Rom. 8: 16). Participation in Christ does not obliter¬
ate the distinction between Christ and those who are in Him
because it is participation through His Spirit.
3. The nature of the superior divine decision
concerning man, enacted in the rejection of Christ.
To this point in the assessment of Barth's doctrine of
election it has been shown that Jesus Christ is not the only
1. C.D. III/2, pp. 344-66. According to Barth, man exists
because he has Spirit, and this Spirit is to be understood
as the Holy Spirit (p. 356). The Spirit comes from God
and is God (pp. 355-6). It must be asked, however, whether
the Spirit which is the basis of man's existence as
creature is in fact identical with the Holy Spirit. Accord¬
ing to Gn. 2: 7 'the Lord God formed man of the dust of the
ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life;
and man became a living being.' There can be no doubt
that this spirit comes from God nor that it constitutes man
a living being with an essential relationship with his
Creator; but it is another thing to identify this spirit
with the Spirit of God (Gn. 1: 1). For if this spirit
is the Spirit of God, how can man's spirit enter into
relationship with God's Spirit? How can there be a wit¬
nessing of man's spirit with God's Spirit? If man's
spirit is the Spirit of God, our witnessing with the Spirit
can only mean that God witnesses to Himself in us. Further,
if man's spirit is the Spirit of God, does this not mean
that man is man only by virtue of being also God? Does
not this imply a kind of Appolinarianism in anthropology?
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individual consumed in the fire of God's love and that man
has an indestructible hupostasis which acknowledges, or
fails to acknowledge, Christ. It must now be asked:
what is the nature of the superior divine decision such
that it establishes man in this responsibility0
The divine decision of election as enacted in Christ
is superior to man. Christ has borne the curse of the law,^"
and all men are now under grace and not law. Christ is the
end of the law (Rom. 10: 4; cf. Eph. 2: 15)• Christ has been
rejected in man's place and there is therefore now no
condemnation to those that are in Him (Rom. 8: 1).
According to Earth, Christ bore the rejection which
sinners should have borne. Because he connects this so
closely with election, and with Christ's rejection for all
men, it is almost impossible for him to avoid universalism.
If Christ has suffered the rejection which all men deserved,
rejection can never again fall on any man. Older protestant
orthodoxy was not troubled by universalism because it
restricted the death of Christ to the elect alone. Barth
refuses to allow this narrowing of the work of Christ, and
he does so with Biblical evidence. It is the sin of the
2
world which the Lamb of God has borne, Christ is the
3
Saviour of the world and especially of those who believe
L
and He has given Himself a ransom for all. If this means
that Christ bore the same rejection that all men
1. Gal. 3: 10-14.
2. Jn. 1: 29.
3. I Tim. 4: 10; cf. I Jn. 2: 2.
4. I Tim. 2: 6.
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deserve,1 all men are saved from rejection. But, as has
been shown above in section 1, only those who believe are
saved. Therefore, Christ's rejection for all men must be
reinterpreted to mean not His bearing the same rejection as
all men deserve (though it may very well be an equivalent
rejection), but the rejection which saves all men who by
faith are united with the Rejected One. If this reinter-
pretation is made, Barth's doctrine will be delivered from
the vestiges of the older orthodoxy and brought into closer
harmony with the early protestant Reformers, especially Luther.
It is not unfair to Earth to say that, at least in
Volume II of the Dogmatics, he has understood the rejection of
1. This was held by the older orthoxody. H. Heppe, Reformed
Dogmatics, trans. G.T. Thomson (G. Allen and Unwin, London,
1950), p. 465: Christ's suffering was 'not indeed an
eternal suffering; but still it was suffering aroused by
the same feeling as the eternal penal suffering of the
damned; i.e. by the full feeling of the punitive wrath
of God, so that in intensity and reality it was the same
as the suffering of the damned.' J.K. Mozley, The Doctrine
of the Atonement (Duckworth, London, 1915)» p. 156 says:
*...seventeenthcentury controversies between Arminians and
Calvinists were directed...to the alternatives of a 'universal'
or a 'limited' atonement, as to which one must say that
granted the belief that Christ endured the amount of punish¬
ment due to men, and granted further that all men would not
be saved, the Calvinistic restriction of 'men' to 'some men'
was strictly logical and just. An atonement made for all
men is quite inconsistent with a doctrine of reprobation,
and a mathematically penal view of the value of Christ's
death.' J. Walker, The Theology and Theologians of
Scotland (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1872), p. 46 says:
'...the old Scotch divines clung to the view that Christ
not merely suffered, but bore the same sufferings in kind
as were due to His people.' See also A. Ritschl,
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation
(Edmonston and Douglas, Edinburgh, 1872), pp. 280-4.
J. Wollebius held that Christ's 'undergoing punishment is
the act whereby he took on himself the punishment due to
us,' J.W. Beardslee III, Reformed Dogmatics (Oxford
University Press, New York, 1965), p. 99.
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Christ to some extent along the lines of the older protestant
orthodoxy. Both Barth and the older orthodoxy think of
Christ bearing the same rejection as sinners deserve.
Though Barth does not say this in so many words, it is clear
that he has this in mind, as it is the only way of making
sense of his claim that if rejection has fallen on Christ it
can never again fall on other men."1" Barth and orthodoxy
1. Barth holds that Jesus Christ suffered 'eternal damnation'
(C.D. II/2, p. 421) and that He was 'delivered up to
eternal death' (ibid., p. 352). Cf. 'Only God, our Lord
and Creator,.•.could suffer eternaT death in our stead as
the consequence of our sin in such a way that it was
finally suffered and overcome and therefore did not need
any more to be suffered by us,' C.D. II/l, p. 403. Also,
Credo, trans. J.S. McNab (Hodder and Stoughton, London,
1936), pp. 83-94 where Barth stresses Christ's bearing our
punishment in order that we should not have to bear what
we deserve. (In C.D. IV/1, this conception of Christ's
sufferings is not so prominent, see, e.g.. p. 253).
Barth is not operating with the mechanistic and causative
notions which were important in the older protestant
orthodoxy. Even so, he has not entirely escaped this way
of thinking if he can say that Christ has borne the rejection
that men deserve and therefore it will never again fall on
others. This statement seems to mean that if Christ has
suffered punishment for the sin of all men there is no more
punishment left. The total amount of punishment has been
borne. If any man were to be punished for his sins it
would mean that his sins have been punished twice (i.e.,
once on the cross and again in eternity). Barth eschews
the scholastic questions of how 'eternal' death can be
endured in the finite time of three days, but it seems that
he is saying that the same, literal, eternal punishment
which we deserve was borne by Christ on the cross. It is
amazing that Barth does not devote much attention to the
question of the quality of suffering in Christ's rejection,
and hence also to the question of how it can be that
Christ did indeed suffer fully for the sins of the whole
world, and yet there will still be those who will eternally
suffer for their sins. It could well be argued that
McLeod Campbell's great book, The Nature of the Atonement,
grew out of just this problem. Being convinced that*
Christ died for all men, and not being a universalist, he
saw that the atonement could not be conceived in the
manner of either the old (Chapter III) or the modified
(Chapter IV) Calvinists. The atonement was not so much
suffering for so much sin, but a quality of righteous sorrow
for sin such that all who share in Christ by faith are
adopted as sons in Him. Cf. E. Irving, Doctrine of the
Incarnation Opened, in Collected Writings, Vol. 5, ed.
G. Carlyle (Strahan, London, 1865), pp. 146-202.
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differ in that he thinks of Christ bearing the same rejection
as all men whereas orthodoxy, contradicting Scripture, says
that Christ bore the same rejection as the elect only.1 So
long as theology operates with the notion of Christ suffering
the same rejection as men deserved, it will be unable to give
faith its essential place: Christ has borne the punishment
of the saved whether or not they believe. In practice, of
course, theology has never said this (though there is a
sense in which Barth implies it). The older orthodoxy
insisted on faith, though in terms of strict coherence it need
not have done so. Indeed, faith was held to be necessary,
not because it was intrinsically necessary to salvation, but
2
because God required It. If it was asked why God required
it, the best answer that could be given was that faith
excluded any human merit, an answer which made it impossible
to see why God reckons faith as righteousness. Barth, at
least in Volume II, does not need to insist on faith, since
he holds that a man is saved in his being without faith, and
needs faith only to live the election of his being. Even
at this point, however, Barth is to be preferred to orthodoxy,
since he shows the necessary connection between election and
union with Christ, although he still fails to show the
1. Calvinist orthodoxy insisted on this limitation of
Christ's sufferings to that merited by the elect one,
see Ritschl, op.cit.. p. 280. J. Wollebius (in
J.W. Beardslee III. op.cit.. pp. 105-6) and F. Turretin
(ibid.. pp. 418-43; among many others denied that Christ
died for all men.
2. Cf. J.M. Campbell, Nature of the Atonement (J. Clarke &
Co., London, J.959), pp. 97-101. Campbell points out that
certain theologians made the connection between faith and
justification arbitrary (p. 100) and that this can be
avoided only by insisting, as does J. Edwards, that faith
is connected with justification because it connects the
individual with Christ (pp. 97 and 99).
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necessity of faith because he separates union with Christ
from faith in Him.
The reinterpretation of the rejection of Christ which
is needed, then, will have to fulfil the following two
conditions:
1. That Christ's rejection was a rejection commensurate with
the sin of the whole world. Against orthodoxy and in agree¬
ment with Barth (and Luther) it will allow no diminution of
the Scriptural doctrine of Christ bearing the sin of all men.
Against both orthodoxy and Barth it will interpret the
commensurate nature of Christ's sufferings not in terms of
the same punishment, but in terms of a real bearing of the
sin of the world, i.e., a dealing with sin and only in this
sense a punishment.
2. That Christ's rejection saves only when a man is
(a) -united with Christ and,
(b) united with Him by faith.
Such a reinterpretation of the rejection of Christ has
in fact taken place within the protestant Church. In the
midst of the older orthodoxy, certain Calvinist theologians
were disturbed by the fact that many Church people counted
on their election without faith. If Christ was the
substitute of the elect, how could they be rejected, no
matter how sinful their livee?1 Against this, Erskine of
Linlathen pointed out that such a doctrine of substitution
1. This idea is the subject of James Hogg's The Confessions
of a Justified Sinner, although his treatment has
elements of distortion and caricature because he
suggests that high Calvinists held that the elect are
incapable of sin.
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and election was immoral.1 It could not be just of God to
elect sinners unless, through the death of Christ, they died
to sin. Unless the sinner died to sin in union with the
death of Christ - unless, that is, the sinner suffered the
punishment of his sin in the death of Christ - the election
2
of sinners was an immoral fiction. Thus, he insisted that
Christ did not die as the substitute of the sinner, in the
sense that the sinner does not die, but as the Head of the
sinner, so that the sinner suffers the punishment of his sin
through Christ*s death. Erskine*s way of expressing this
was far from satisfactory, since he tended to say that the
sinner suffers the punishment of his sin in his death to
self and did not stress sufficiently clearly that this death
to self takes place only in union with Christ on the cross.
Yet he was moving in a helpful direction. He showed that
Christ did not bear a punishment in stead of sinners, but a
punishment such that sinners die to their sin in Him. It is
thus only through the union of faith with Christ, the Head
of the new humanity, that election reaches sinners.
McLeod Campbell accomplished a deeper reinterpretation
of the older orthodoxy. He, too, was worried by the habit
in the Church of counting on salvation without genuine faith.
His concern for the Church led him to see that Christ gave
■7.
Himself for all men without exception-^ and that therefore all
1. T. Erskine, The Doctrine of Election, pp. 154-6.
2. T. Erskine, The Brazen Serpent (David Douglas, Edinburgh.
1879), pp. 41
3. J.M. Campbell, Sermons, p. 101:
Christ the Son of God, God in our nature.•.this Lord Jesus
Christ, did, as the head and representative of the family
of mankind, offer himself without spot to God,as a living
sacrifice, wherewith God was well pleased; and God, in
acceptance of this sacrifice,...did remove absolutely,
(Contd.
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men are categorically summoned to faith. Faith is faith in
Christ Himself, and all the benefits of faith, including
escape from wrath, are in Christ. Faith is the only
appropriate response to Christ, since it alone trusts Him
and receives Him. Thus, although Christ has died for all
men, only those who receive Him by faith are saved. In
preaching this, Campbell found that he had also to question
the belief that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins.
If it were punishment that Christ suffered, would not all
men be free of punishment without faith?; but if He suffered
for sins, putting them to death in His death, only those who
were united with Him by faith would be free of sin and hence
free of punishment. Following out these thoughts, Campbell
concluded that it is better not to call Christ's death a
punishment for sin but rather a condemning of sin in His own
person, a sorrowing over sin.1
The fundamental shift in Campbell's thinking was the
shift to a thoroughly personal understanding of righteousness.
In the older orthodoxy, faith was connected with righteousness
because God was pleased to impute the righteousness of Christ
to believers, but with Campbell faith was a real union with
the personal righteousness of Christ. It was trust in Him
which received Him. This righteousness of Christ was not
Contd.) unconditionally, without waiting for us to say
whether we desired it or not, the barrier between Himself
and us; and gave to us Christ, on the ground of whose
work the barrier was removed, to be to us a living way of
access, having the Holy Spirit for us, for that end; so
that he is revealed to us, as the one in whose strength
we are to draw near to that God to whom we are free to
come. These are the facts concerning the work of Christ
for all and every human being.
1. J.M. Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement.pp. 140-1.
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merely the perfect keeping of the law, "but it was that
righteousness which proved itself in taking on itself the
sins of His brethren and judging them in His person,
executing God's righteous judgment on them in His death.
Thus, Christ became the place, the person, in whom sin was
overcome and righteousness was victorious. Hence, it is
true to say that Christ bore away the sin of the world
(because in His body and spirit alone was sin known as sin
and judged as such) and yet only those who are in Him, in
His body, by faith, are free of sin.
In Campbell's thinking all suggestion of righteousness,
sin and punishment as a quantity, as a kind of substance,
has been transformed into the quality of personal relationships.
It is not that the quantity of punishment demanded for the
righteous punishment for sin has been transferred (almost mech¬
anically) to Christ, and so borne away by Him. Rather,
Christ as the righteous One, loves His brethren as Himself
and therefore knows the full gravity of their sin,1 and
judges it as sin. Righteousness as love meets sin, confesses
it as the sin it is, and so expiates it. In this way Christ
bears sin, not as a transferred substance, but as sorrow over
the sins of His brethren. Similarly, men participate in His
righteousness, not by the transference of righteousness to
them, like a garment, but by receiving Him through faith and
so by sharing in the righteousness of His body.
McLeod Campbell was reluctant to say that Christ was
1. ibid., pp. 230-1.
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rejected by the Father on the cross.1 In his interpretation
of psalm 22 he stressed the words 'My God, My God* as
indicating that the Son exercised here His most profound
faith in God, pleading with Him as His beloved Father. He
pointed out that the whole psalm is redolent with faith in
God in the most extreme situation. Yet it must be said
that it witnesses to an even more perfect faith if the Son
suffered abandonment by His Father and yet remained steadfast
in His faith. If Christ did in fact bear in Himself the sin
of the world, and judged it in His person, He must have borne
the rejection which is implied in that judgment. As Irving
2
constantly said, Christ in His love gave Himself to the
uttermost, giving Himself up to the dereliction, desolation
and rejection of the judgment of sin. God gave Himself in
Christ, giving Himself up to rejection, yet it was not the
same rejection as that of sinners but the rejection suffered
by the holy and sinless One as He confessed sin for what it
is and judged it in Himself. In this way Christ endured a
rejection for the sin of the whole world. He put sin away
on the cross by His faith in His Father. His rejection was
thus not one which delivers impersonally from sin, but one
1. Campbell doubted that Christ actually experienced forsake-
ness on the cross (Nature of the Atonement, pp. 276-281).
.Irving saw that if Christ were really to confess our sin
He would experience the desolation of the hiding of the
Father's face.
2. E. Irving, The Doctrine of the Incarnation Opened, pp. 147,
288-9, 295. Also, The Orthodox and Catholic' Doctrine of
our Lord's Human Nature '(Baldwin & Cradock, London, 1830),
p. 97: 'I believe that his [Christ's] perfect holiness did
not prevent him one jot from being treated as the greatest
sinner by his Father; hid his countenance from him; for¬
sook him, stood afar off, and heard him not (Psal. xxii.);
bruised him, and put him to grief....Wherefore? for any sin
he had done? Verily, verily, No. Because the Father
loved to see his Son suffer, and was satisfied therewith?
(Contd.
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which delivers only as a man shares in the faith of the
Rejected One, or, more precisely, as the Rejected One shares
His faith with him through His Spirit. On this interpre¬
tation it could never be said that because Christ has been
rejected, rejection will never again fall on any man: it
is only as the Rejected One shares His life of faith in the
Father, and shares it through His Spirit, that a man escapes
his sin and therefore his rejection. The fact of Christ*s
rejection for all men is taken quite as seriously as in
Barth, but, because Christ perfected faith in God while
suffering the rejection, it is only as a man shares in His
faith that he is elect. As was noted above, Barth holds
that the election of men * consists concretely of their
faith in Him*, and that this faith is a participation in His
prayer on the cross and His resurrection, yet he compromises
this perception (which is almost identical with the one just
outlined) by saying that men are elect in their being and
share in Christ independently of their faith in Him."1"
Contd.) Oh! verily No. Why then? Because the Father would
prove how far down the grace of God can go...* In Christ*s
Holiness in Flesh (John Lindsay, Edinburgh, 1831) Irving
drew attention to Christ's perfect faith 'in all conflicts
and extremities' and especially on the cross (pp. 16-7).
1. H. Bouillard, in his Karl Barth (Aubier, Paris, 1957),
PremierePartie, pp. 157-8, notes this difficulty. As he
puts it, Barth does say that it is only in faith that a
man has eternal life, but he adds that a man is elect in
his being apart from his faith. Thus, there is *une
ambiguity dans la doctrine barthienne de la predestination'
(p. 158). Bouillard argues, as is done here, that '§tre
dans le Christ et exister dans la fois, c'est tout un'
(p. 158), but, because he does not speak of this faith
as the faith which Christ shares with men, he thinks of
it as a 'condition* of justification.
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The reinterpretation of the sufferings of Christ
achieved, by Erskine, Campbell and Irving fulfils the
conditions which were noted as being needed for an adequate
doctrine of the rejection of Christ as it relates to the
election of men. 1. Christ's rejection is commensurate
with the sins of the world. He sorrowed over His brethren,
judged their sins in His person and gave Himself up to
rejection in order to fulfil this judgment. It is only in
His person that sin is dead and therefore that the rejection
of sinners is overcome. 2. It is, therefore, (a) only as
a man participates in Christ that he is free from sin and
from.condemnation. But (b) it is also true (pace Barth)
that it is only as he shares in Christ's faith that he shares
in the judgment of sin that took place in Him. This last
point, 2(b), requires some elucidation. Let it be said that
it is not being argued that faith is a kind of work of man's
which is added to Christ, nor that Christ has not died for
man's sins apart from his faith in Him. Rather, it is being
argued that the being of Christ, the being of the One in whom
others are elect, is the being of the One who judged sin and
endured its rejection by faith. It was by faith in God's
very righteousness, which rejected Him as He confessed the
sin of His brethren, that He trusted God to redeem Him and
with Him those who share in Him. By faith He cried to God
out of the depths, pleading the forgiveness of God for which
God is to be feared, and was heard for His godly fear; by
faith He waited for the Lord and received the plenteous
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redemption of the Lord, the Lord who redeems Israel from
all his iniquities (Ps. 130). It was thus by faith that
the Rejected One is also the Redeemer. If, then, a man is
to share in His being, it can only be by sharing His faith.
This happens as Christ shares His faith with the faithless
and so brings them to share in Him. Thus, man*s faith is
not a condition of election in the sense that he must bring
it to God, but is rather that which Christ creates in him
by sharing it with him.
In the light of this reinterpretation of the rejection
of Christ, two modifications of Earth's understanding of the
superior divine decision enacted in Christ may be made.
First, Christ's rejection was not a rejection such that, having
fallen on Him, rejection can never again fall on others. It
was the rejection in which, by faith, He dealt with the sins
of the world. Second, men escape rejection and participate
in election only as He shares His faith with them. If these
two modifications are made, the superior divine decision does
not mean that a man is elect apart from his own election of
God. The human decision, as the goal of the divine
decision, is in no way threatened. Earth's own thesis,
that God's decision is the basis of man's decision, is
strengthened.
One further point must be made in this connection.
It is by the Spirit that Christ shares His faith with others.
Earth says little about the work of the Spirit in his
doctrine of election. Indeed, the work of the Spirit as He
who brings men to share in the being of Christ is crowded
out by his doctrine that men are in Christ independently of
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their faith in Him. Earth seems to be saying that because
Christ has elected God, all other men in their being have
also elected Him. He seems (despite his intention) to
elide the being of Christ and the being of men. Christ
and men do come together, but it is through the Spirit that
this happens. The Spirit brings the whole Christ to the
whole man so that man, in his being as well as in his act of
faith, is brought to participate in Christ. In this way
God's decision enacted in Christ does not automatically save
man's being, but saves him only together with his decision
of faith. So great is God's love, His delection, that He
elects and saves man only as He creates in him genuine
response on his part.
4. The responsibility of men for their eternal
destinies.
If Christ's rejection is understood not as punishment
for sin, but as the confession and hence the bearing away of
sin, He has placed all men in a supremely responsible
position. Christ will return and judge all men according
to their response to Him. Those who accept Him and His
bearing away of sin will have no rejection, but those who
refuse Him will remain in their sins and be rejected
1
accordingly. In other words, Christ's rejection does
affect all men, but not in the way Earth implies, i.e.. that
rejection can never again be the lot of man. Rather, the
rejection of Christ has given all men a heightened dignity
of responsibility. As will be argued below, this in no
1. Cf. E. Brunner, op.cit.. p. 349.
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sense means a return to those notions of responsibility
which Earth abhors, the notions in which man's decision as
such determines his destiny, notions which are inherently
Pelagian. It does mean, however, that man's response to
the superior divine decision - his confirmation or denial of
it - is of inescapeable importance for his own destiny. It
means that the superior divine decision is such that man is
exalted to adult responsibility, that he is responsible for
his destiny vis £ vis God's decision regarding Him.
This enhanced responsibility depends entirely on the
character of the superior divine decision. In this superior
decision, Christ has rejected man's evil decision and has
responded to God, electing Him in humanity. Thus, Christ
has eternal life for men. He is wholly for men. Therefore,
to accept Him is to accept one's own eternal life; to reject
Him is to reject one's own eternal life. Each man's destiny
is in his own hands, but only because man has already been
determined for life by Christ.
This enhanced responsibility does not thrust a burden
onto the shoulders of man. It is not a matter of summoning
all his available energies to exercise this responsibility.
As Earth says, when faced with Christ, man is not Hercules
at the cross-roads, the hero wbo valiantly chooses the good.1
This enhanced responsibility depends entirely on the One who
encounters man. He is not only eternal life: He is also
1. K. Barth, Table Talk, ed., J.D. Godsey, 'Scottish Journal
of Theology Occasional Papers', No. 10 (Oliver and Boyd,
Edinburgh, 1963), p. 37; C.D. IV/2, p. 495.
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the One who makes men free to respond. He has rejected
(in His own rejection) their evil decision and also elected
God in their humanity. In Him, a man is freed from his
evil decision against God and freed to elect God. Thus,
when a man accepts Christ, he does so in the freedom which
Christ has for Him. He makes use of the freedom which
Christ gives Him. When a man rejects Christ, he fails to
make use of the freedom which Christ has for him. There is
no human merit in accepting Christ, and equally a man is
without excuse when he refuses Him. Since the freedom to
accept comes entirely from Christ and is offered without
reservation to all men, it is not as if the ore who accepts
makes a valiant and difficult decision, and the one who refuses
is not valiant and perhaps prevented by circumstances from
accepting Him. Christ can thus justly judge all men on
their acceptance or refusal of Him, and can do so out of the
mouths of the men he judges. Those who accept him acknowledge
Him to be the One He is. They have allowed Him to be eternal
life for them, and thus in accepting them at the final
judgment Christ judges them on their own words and actions.
Those who reject Christ refuse to acknowledge Christ as the
One He is. They refuse to take hold of the freedom which
is theirs in Him and therefore they also will be judged out
of thfciip own mouths. They have judged themselves unworthy
of eternal life. They are without excuse, just as the elect
are without merit. It is thus true to say that because Christ
has made a perfect response in His humanity, He will be the
judge of the response of men. His perfect response has made
the response of man both real and possible - has made it
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inexcuseable for man not to make it - and therefore He makes
men supremely responsible for their destiny as He encounters
them.
The significance of these observations for the assess¬
ment of Earth*s understanding of the superior divine decision
in relation to man's decision may be summarised in these four
points:
1. Earth is correct to say that the divine decision is
superior to the human decision and that men can only confirm it
or deny it. He is also correct to say that men cannot undo
that decision or in any way affect its superior power over
them. But he is hardly correct to imply that men do not
thereby have responsibility for their own destinies.
Precisely because the divine decision is superior to man and
for his good, this divine decision becomes the ground on
which men are judged.
2. That the superior divine decision means for men
that they are responsible for their destinies means (a) that
the human decision as such does not become that which
determines a man*s destiny and (b) that this responsibility is
exercised entirely in the strength of Christ. In this sense
Earth is correct. It is not man's decision as such which
brings about his salvation, as is implied in much existential¬
ist theology. God has elected man's salvation, and it is as
a man accepts or rejects that salvation that God's decision
proceeds for or against him.
3. Since the superior divine decision is wholly for
man and his salvation, and since this salvation comes to man
in Christ, there is only one responsible decision for man
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to make as he is encountered by Him - to accept Him.
(a) If a responsible decision is understood as one in which
a man makes careful cognisance of the consequences of his
decision, then, when Christ meets him, the only responsible
decision is to accept the One who is wholly for him. To
refuse Him is to refuse one's own good and, on this definition
of responsibility, it is an irresponsible decision. (b) Again,
when Christ encounters a man, there is only one free decision,
the decision for Christ who is his freedom. It is not as
though the decisions for and against Him were equally
possible or legitimate, as if there were a certain neutrality
in the face of Christ which gives equal possibility to either
decision. Since Christ carries with Him the very freedom
in which men respond to Him, it is a free decision to accept
Him, an unfree decision to refuse Him. The negative decision
is not, of course, literally impossible, but it is in fact
a failure to respond and so involves no freedom but only
bondage.
In relation to this point, Barth deserves high praise.
Almost alone among theologians he has seen that the superior
divine decision gives men a genuine freedom, a freedom which
it not the empty neutrality of freedom of choice but the
freedom for freedom.
4. Yet what Barth says about the encounter with
Christ needs to be expanded. There is a sense in which
Barth dissolves the encounter with Christ into participation
in Christ, It is true that the freedom to respond to Christ
is contained in Christ and is used only as men participate
in Him. This underlies what-was affirmed in point 3 above,
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but this point needs to be enlarged to show what happens in
the encounter with Christ. It needs to be shown that the
superior divine decision enacted in Christ, the decision
which includes the strength in which men respond to
Christ, comes to them in His person in such a way that they
are and become themselves in this encounter. Rather than
ceasing to be themselves, for the first time they become
themselves. This depends entirely on Christ Himself. As
Christ encounters a sinner, He offers Himself as the One who
was delivered into the hands of sinners and crucified by
them. He offers Himself, therefore, as One who makes no
resistance to their handling of Him: there is no coercion
in Him, only the strength of perfect gentleness. But he
offers Himself as the One who, while in the hands of sinners,
resolutely set His face toward the cross. He did not lose
Himself, but affirmed Himself, acting resolutely for the good
of the men who had Him in their hands. He loved the men who
handled Him violently, returning their evil will with His
good-will. He thus demonstrated His supreme power over them,
the superiority of His decision over theirs. This means that
He now comes to men (in His word) as the One who is both in
their hands and yet supremely powerful for their good. He
does not compel their response, but evokes it: it is their
own, spontaneously their own. In this response they become
themselves. He brings them to respond to Him with a measure
of the freedom with which He responded to God. In other
words, in the encounter with Him they are brought to partici¬
pate in Him. This encounter must not be dissolved into
participation only, since we cannot understand a man*s response
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to Christ unless we speak of the royal gentleness with which
He encounters sinners and evokes their response.
In order to give a firm dogmatic basis to this respon¬
sibility of men as it relates to the superior divine decision,
eschatology must be given a place in the doctrine of election."*"
It is necessary to give a place to the time during which men
are encountered by Christ and called by Him to make use of
the gift of eternal life. This is the time during which men
either confirm or reject the divine decision concerning them.
At the fulfilment of this time, Christ will return as Judge,
judging men on the ground of their responsibility for His
2
gift of eternal life. The parables of the Kingdom demon¬
strate this. In the parable of the talents, for example,
Christ gives gifts to men, gifts for which they are responsible.
At His return He judges them according to their use of these
gifts. Christ puts a gift in men's hands: as they use it
responsibly they bring forth a rich harvest of eternal life,
as they fail to use it they confirm themselves in death.
The finished work of Christ does not make the final judgment
unnecessary, but rather establishes it as the revelation of
His value for men.
This responsibility placed in man's hands by Christ,
and His return to judge that responsibility, points to the
working out of divine election in man's decisions and life.
There is an element in the parable of the separation of the
1. Cf. E. Brunner, op.cit.. p. 349.
2. McLeod Campbell's early sermons were collected under the
appropriate title Responsibility for the Gift of Eternal
Life (Macmillan and Co., London, 1873).
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sheep and the goats in which predestination refers not to
predestined persons but a predestined blessing on love to
Christ and a predestined curse on isolation from Him. The
love to Christ and the isolation from Him are not predestined
but are the decision made by men. The 'blessed of my Father*
(Matt. 25: 34) enter the inheritance prepared for them from
the foundation of the world. But for whom is it prepared?
Not for the elect but for those who have served Christ in
His brethren. Who are the reprobate? The parable does
not call them predestined men, but those men who isolate
themselves from Christ by not serving Him. It is the refusal
to serve Christ which is cursed. This kind of observation
led Erskine of Linlathen to hold that the primary truth in
election as it refers to man's destiny was not that there
are predestined persons, but that there is a predestined
blessing on serving Christ and a predestined curse on refusing
Him.1 While this cannot be all that needs to be said on this
matter, this doctrine forms a healthy corrective to the
theories of predestination which speak of predestined persons
in such a way as to make the responsibility of men a mere
formal assertion and not a deliberate self-alignment wi#i the
good, or an equally deliberate refusal of the good. Erskine's
insight may be refined by pointing out that in the Matthean
1. T. Erskine, The Doctrine of Election, pp. 30f. The crux
of his argument is:
'This is the election, not that God hath appointed one man
to be holy, and another man to be unholy, - one man to be
saved and another to be lost; but that he hath declared
that flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God;
that if any man will die with Christ he shall live with
him, if any man will suffer with him he shall reign with
him; he shall be a vessel fit to honour, meet for the
Master's use.'
171
parable of the final judgment those who are accepted by the
Father are those who live out their predestination while
those who are rejected are those who refuse their predesti¬
nation. This is not to say that all men are predestined
in the sense of having a fixed destiny, but that Christ
presents Himself to all men and calls them all through the
circumambient conditions of their life (i.e., through the
hungry, the thirsty, the sick, etc.). Men are surrounded
by Christ and God makes provision for only one response of
man, that of accepting Christ who is their life. Those who
accept and those who refuse are confronted by the same
•drawing of love', by the same predestination of God to life;
those who accept confirm their calling, those who refuse deny
it. When Christ returns He reveals the use men have made of
this predestination to life.
This eschatological judgment of the responsibility of
men forms an essential part of the doctrine of election. It
is a weakness in Barth's doctrine that he does not give this
responsibility of men the place which it has.
5. The goal of the superior divine election.
The lack noted in Barth* s doctrine of election in
section 4 above is a failure to allow the superior divine
election to drive forward to its goal. His doctrine needs
to show more clearly that the divine decision aims at the
full maturity of men, at their responsible participation
in the election by Christ of God. He has spoken very clearly
about the fact that the goal of all God's ways and works is
man,1 but his insight needs to be developed.
1. See previous chapter, p. 101. C.D. II/2, pp. 125-7 and
177-180.
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In the doctrine of election and predestination a
theologian is necessarily more concerned with beginnings than
with ends, but ends cannot be ignored since predestination
does, after all, imply the determination of an end, a
destination, from the beginning. The New Testament leaves
little doubt about the goal toward which election aims, e.g.
For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be
conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he
might be the first-born of many brethren. And those
whom he predestined he also called; and those whom
he called he also justified; and those whom he
justified he also glorified. (Rom. 8: 29-30)
Here it is perfectly clear that the purpose of God (cf. Rom.
8: 28: 'called according to his purpose.') is the conforming
of the elect to the image of the Elect man. Barth is
Pauline in his faithfulness to the centrality of Christ
and to the fact that election is entirely in Christ (Paul
uses the aorist for all the verbs relating to the elect
(foreknew, predestined, called, justified, glorified), thus
indicating that all these things have taken place absolutely,
and if absolutely, where else but in Christ, to whose image
the elect are to be conformed?). Yet Barth has too little to
say about the working out of this purpose of God through the
Christian's obedience in the Spirit, the obedience in which
they are conformed to the image of the Son."*" Also, Barth
neglects the purpose of the Father: it is He who purposes
theeLection in which the Spirit of sonship is sent forth
1. Rom. 8. According to II Cor. 3: 18, Christians are
being changed into the likeness (eikona) of the Lord
and, according to the previous verse, the Lord is the
Spirit: being conformed to Christ takes place through
the activity of the Spirit.
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into our spirits to bear witness with us that we are the
children of God (Rom. Q: 15-16). What is needed is a
development of Barth's own trinitarian theology in which he
says: *As Jesus Christ calls us and is heard by us He
gives us His Holy Spirit in order that His own relationship
with His Father may be repeated in us.*1 Two developments
of his doctrine of election are needed. The first is that
his doctrine needs to be given a more thoroughly trinitarian
form. It must not be denied that the Son is the electing
God, but this doctrine itself must be given even stronger
grounding by showing that He is the electing God together
with the Father and the Holy Spirit. In this dynamic
economy of God it becomes clear that the goal of all God*s
ways and works is the conforming of men by the Father to the
image of the Son through the Spirit. Second, the doctrine
of the humanity of the elder brother, of the first-born among
many bretliren, needs to be more thoroughly connected with the
doctrine of the Spirit. Only then will it be clear that
the election of God by the first-born is communicated to His
brethren. If these two developments of Barth are carried
through, it will become both intelligible and certain that
the superior decision of God regarding man enables man to
decide for God on his own part and so be conformed to the
image of the Son.
The first of these developments calls for a development
of the doctrine that Jesus Christ is the electing God. In
the previous chapter it was argued that Barth holds that
1. C.D. II/2, p. 780.
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Christ is the electing God only as He is the obedient One."1"
This implies no diminution of His electing as the Subject
of election, since Christ's obedience is genuine obedience
2
and therefore genuinely His own act. But the doctrine
that Christ is obedient carries with it the doctrine of the
election of the One to whom Christ is obedient, i.e., the
Father. And if Christ as the One obedient to the Father
fulfilled the divine election in the flesh, the Spirit now
communicates this election to the flesh of other men, communi¬
cating it as the Spirit of obedience to both the Father who
purposed the election and the Son who executed it. If the
doctrine of Christ as the electing God is developed in this
direction, His electing has more and not less meaning than
Barth gives it. Christ, as the Subject of election,
executed the Father's purpose in the first-born, and now
sends forth the Spirit in His election of the many brethren.
That Christ is the Subject of election within this divine
economy of Father, Son and Holy Spirit means that election
was executed in and through the first-born in order that it
may reach and reside in the many brethren.
1. See previous chapter, pp. I'Hk
2. Any weakening of Barth at this point would be a disaster.
As the obedient One, Christ embodies in Himself the
entire divine good-pleasure to all that is not God.
Men are therefore elect in Him, not merely by means of
Him. If this were compromised theology would be plunged
back into the abyss of a divine will preceding the
election of grace and into the despair of seeking the
evidence of personal election either in an inscrutable
divine will or in personal experience (and not in Christ).
Cf. J.K.S. Reid, 'The Office of Christ in Predestination',
Scottish Journal of Theology. I (1948), pp. 173j£
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Barth's doctrine of the electing God must be
developed to the point that it is clear that it is the God
and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ who has chosen us:1
♦Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,
who has blessed us in Christ...even as he chose us in him...
(Eph. 1: 3-4). It seems that Eph. 1: 3-4 is saying that
God is the electing God in (at least) two modes: as God
and the Father He originated the election of sinners, though,
let it be stressed, He originated it only in counsel with
God the Son; and as God the Son He embodied this election
of the Father. God elected in these two modes in order that
He may truly elect sinners to full sonship of Himself. Thus
(l) God originated the election of sinners in His mode as
Father and not as the Son in order that He might be the
Father of His elect sons through His only-begotten Son. He
did not originate the election of man as the Son because then
He could not have been their Father. (2) God executed and
embodied the Father's election in His being as the Son so
that (a) even as the electing God He might be the Son of the
Father and thus He might be what the elect men are, i.e., sons
of the Father. And God executed the Father's election as
the Son so that (b) He might embody God's electing in man,
in human flesh and human sonship.
Before proceding to an elucidation of this account of
the electing God, two points need to be made.
1. The Holy Spirit is also the electing God, but it
1. Cf. E. Buess, op.cit.. pp. 48-52.
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is not possible to speak of His electing until that of the
Father and the Son have been indicated. The inner •economy1
of God Himself is such that He first gives Himself in the
electing of Father and Son, and then, on the basis of this
mutual giving in Father and Son (in which the Spirit gives
Himself to Both), He gives Himself actually to indwell men,
freely electing them in fulfilment of the electing of Father
and Son. He is not also elected man as is the Son, but is
electing God in such a way that He elects only together with
bringing men to participate in the Son's election of the Father.
2. It may seem that this way of speaking is modalistic.
This is not intended, although certain of the preceding
formulations may seem to approach it. Modalism is anathema
in this doctrine of the electing God because if, in the
electing of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, we have only modes
of God's being, and not God Himself in His act as God, we
do not truly encounter God in the electing of the Trinity.
What is intended is that the one divine Subject acts in three
modes, that of Father, Son and Spirit and that the one God
acts in each mode, acting according to God's power to dis¬
tinguish Himself from Himself1 for the purpose He elects.
In short, the one God distinguishes Himself from Himself
while remaining identical with Himself for the purpose of
accomplishing His good-will for man and in fact that the
dwelling of God may be with man.
It will be noted that this brief account of the Trinity
is very close to Barth's understanding. This makes it
1. C.D. 1/1, p. 363.
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puzzling that Barth did not make the kind of development of
his own doctrine of the electing God which has been suggested
here. At the end of this chapter a couple of possible
reasons for his not doing so are tentatively put forward.
It is now necessary to proceed to an elucidation of
why this account of the electing God gives the humanity of
Christ - and through His humanity, our humanity - its full
place.
This may best be done by first noting a danger inherent
in Barth's treatment of Jesus Christ as the electing God. To
put it in its most extreme form, and in a manner unfair to
Barth, though helpful for the purpose of making this point
clear, Barth*s doctrine seems to give the electing of the
Son an element of self-origination. Because he does not
clearly and firmly ground the electing of the Son in the
electing of the Father - because the obedience of the Son*s
electing is not wholly the ground of His electing - the Son
seems to be the Father of the election. To the extent that
this danger is present, to that extent Jesus Christ ceases
to be the Son, and to that extent He ceases to be the
obedient One and to that extent also it becomes impossible
for Him to be the obedient creature of God. To the extent
that the electing of the Son originates with Himself and is
not obedient to the Father, to that extent He cannot be at
once the obedient Son of God and the obedient Son of man.
He cannot be the one obedient Son of the Father since His
electing as God of man takes place in a sphere removed from
His electing as man of God - it takes place in a high
exalted realm which does not coincide with the low, humble
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realm of the obedient Son of man in His election of God. Put
briefly, the danger is that the Son of God (who elects man)
exists in a different sphere from that of the Son of man (who
elects God): the unity of the Son of the Father is threatened,
and thus also the being together of God with His children.
Not only is the unity of the Son of God threatened, but His
humanity comes to be thought of as different from ours - for,
to the extent that humanity is joined with divinity that is
not obedient, to that extent it is not humanity that is it¬
self in obedience, and to that extent it is not our humanity.
Of course, Barth is careful to say nothing of this
kind. As was noted in the previous chapter, the obedience
of the Son, as electing God, to the Father, is important to
him. Yet the danger just noted is by no means merely an
idle speculation. Later in this study, in Chapter VII, it
will be noted that there is in Barth's Christology a definite
tendency to say that Christ's human nature was sinless and
obedient due to its being the humanity of the Lord. While
this is correct so far as it goes, Barth does not go on to
show how the connection of the divine nature with the human
nature was such that the human nature was in no way relieved
of achieving its righteousness as human nature. In the
previous chapter Barth was praised for his excellent account
of the response of the humanity of Christ to God, but it
must now be asked whether he has not left that account (for
all its insight) hanging in the air. How did Christ's
humanity carry through that perfect response? Barth does
not say. He leaves the impression that Jesus perfected His
response because He was also God, and does not indicate that
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He did so in the power of the Holy Spirit, i.e., that He
did so in the power by which other men may (but do not)
perfectly respond to God. There is, then, a measure of
truth in the suggestion that for Earth the Son of man
elected God in a humanity not altogether the same as ours,
i.e., in a humanity joined with the divinity of the Son not
entirely conceived of as the divinity of the obedient Son
of the Father.
It is now time to confront directly our difficulty
with Earth*s doctrine of the electing God. It is simply
this: is not God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit
the electing God? And is there not, originating with the
Father, a specific function of electing performed by each
person of the Trinity in order that God's electing of man
may become man's electing of God? Does not Barth tend to
close up the divine electing in the Son and hence tend to
close up man's electing of God in the Son, not really allowing
1
it to become the electing of God by other men?
In the New Testament it is the God and Father of our
Lord Jesus Christ who is in the first instance the electing
God. It is God the Father who fathers the election in order
that He may destine men to be His sons through His beloved
Son Jesus Christ. Election originates in the Father since
God wills to have sons: in this way God may be the Father of
many sons through His only begotten Son. The Father's
election is executed and embodied in the Son in order that
God's election may be embodied in sonship. but what is in the
1. Cf. H. Bouillard, op.cit.. pp. 153-4.
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Son does not reach sinners until God the Spirit communicates
Christ to them. The Father*s purpose does not reach its
goal until the Spirit brings sinners to be adopted into His
Son and in Him to share His electing of God. If theology-
speaks only of Jesus Christ and the union of God*s election
of man and man's election of God in Him, the impression is
created that other men as it were share automatically in Him.
Theology can give no convincing proof that God creates children
who freely elect Him in love, that God has sons who freely
imitate Him as Father. Barth is surely on good Biblical
grounds to say that it is in Christ, the Son of God, that
God posits the possibility of beings other than Himself who
may love and chobse Him, and he is surely also correct to say
that every man is created in Him. The prologue to the Fourth
Gospel witnesses to this (to say nothing of other passages of
the New Testament). But if this means that men automatically,
by virtue of their creation, share in Christ's election of
God, then the very purpose of positing men as other than
Himself is defeated. For God's purpose in electing men is
that they elect Him, electing Him in a freedom and love
corresponding to His election of them. They can imitate the
free grace of God only if they do so freely. If theology is
intelligently to witness to this, it must speak of the Spirit -
the Spirit who brings men into Christ and does so not because
men are automatically in Him by virtue of their creation by
Him but because He takes the freedom which is in Him and
brings men freely to love and chooas the Father. Only if
theology speaks of the Spirit will it be able to overcome the
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suggestion that men somehow either automatically share in
Christ1s election of the Father, or (per impossible) have
to choose God in their own freedom and strength.
It is now appropriate to consider the electing of the
Spirit. It is only in His electing that God's electing
reaches the individual, for, in the Spirit, the electing
of the Father which was embodied in the eLecting of His
obedient and only-begotten Son, now indwells many sons.
Through the Spirit, the whole and undivided Trinity now in¬
dwells the individuals of the undivided body of Christ. The
Spirit is competent to do this because, as the union of the
Father and the Son even in the giving to dereliction of the
cross, He is One in diversity, One in undivided self-giving
to the many who are yet one in the body of the Father's Son.
Further, since He is the Creator Spirit who proceeds from
the resurrection of the Crucified, He baptises individuals
into the death of their self-chosen individuality and
recreates them into the true reciprocal individuality of the
image of Christ, multiplying in them the life of Christ.
Proceeding from both the Father and the Son, He is God
giving Himself wholly and undividedly, delighting in their
individuality as He brings them to participate in the Son's
election of God. God the Spirit loves this particular man:
He elects. 'The Holy Spirit communicates Himself to persons,
marking each member of the Church with the seal of personal and
unique relationship with the Trinity, becoming present in each
,1person.'
1. V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church,
trans. Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius (James
Clarke, London, 1957), p. 168.
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Through the Spirit, the unconditional election of
grace, as embodied in the Son, breaks through into the
inner centre of individuals who, indwelt with this love,
find the courage for their own part to elect God.
As equal God with the Father and the Son, the Spirit
is electing God. But He elects in obedience. As Acts 2
indicates, He elects under the Lordship of the One at the
right hand of the Father. That is, He is under the Lordship
of the Man Christ Jesus, the Man who, anointed with the
Spirit, subdued all temptation and elected God in our
humanity. He is therefore supremely gentle but also
sovereign in His electing. His Lordship is supremely that
of encounter, persuasion, courtesy and, even, service. His
Lordship is equally divine with the Father and the Son, yet
it is the service of God to man and can therefore courteously
enter man's inner being, there to master him so that he for
his part elects and serves God. As the Spirit exercises
this Lordship, as God is subject in this mode, the inner
riches of God are externalised (without ceasing to be His
inner riches, i.e.. without alienation) and God has fellow¬
ship with men and men have fellowship with God. The
electing in obedience of the Son of the Father reaches its
goal in the electing in obedience of the Spirit, for in the
encounter of the Spirit with men, individuals other than
Christ participate in Christ's election of the Father.
If this development of Barth's doctrine of the electing
God is made, it becomes very clear that the whole triune God
elects men and brings them to elect Him. What Barth states
about man's participation in Christ is filled out to include
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the electing of the Father and of the Spirit. By insisting
on the trinitarian nature of divine election it is possible
to give adequate basis to man's own election of God,
A second development of Earth's doctrine is needed,
that of showing more clearly how the election of God accompli¬
shed in the human nature of Jesus Christ is communicated to
other men, Barth is to be praised for giving an essential
place in the doctrine of election to the response to God in
the human nature of Christ, but it is not equally clear how
this response can become that of other men. Barth says
that men participate in Christ's prayer and resurrection, and
that their election consists concretely of this participation.1
But how is this possible for sinners? Only through the Holy
Spirit. Barth has always argued that the Holy Spirit is the
2
Spirit of Christ, the Spirit of His self-communication, but
unless he also shows that it was by the Spirit that Christ
responded to the Father, he is unable convincingly to show
how it is that the Spirit enables men to respond to the Father.
There is no doubt that Barth holds that it is by the Spirit
that sinners respond to God, yet this has the status only of
an asserted doctrine and not of a proven truth unless it is
shown that the Spirit first achieved this response in the
humanity of Christ. Without this understanding of the
Spirit's work in Christ, we are obliged to say both that
Christ's human nature was in some sense different from ours
and that the Spirit originates a work in the sinner which was
1. C.D. II/2, p. 162; see Chapter II, pp. ^-9.
2. C.D. IV/2, 'The Direction of the Son', pp. 264-377.
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not present in Christ. The first of these things denies
the vere homo of Chalcedon and of orthodox Christology, the
second denies the perfection of Christ's finished work,
narth would regard both of these positions with horror. He
would reply to the first by saying that he does not deny
Christ's full humanity, and that Christ's humanity differs
from ours only in that His was sinless. True: but was He
sinless by virtue of having any resources not available to
other men? If He was sinless by virtue of drawing on
resources not available to other men, He cannot be helpful to
them. Hut if, on the other hand, He was sinless by virtue of
the same powers in which other men may overcome sin, He is
helpful to them, compassionate to them in their needy
condition. Unfortunately Barth is not nearly as clear at
this point as is necessary: he tends to attribute Christ's
perfection to the fact that His humanity was the humanity
cf the Lord,"1" and he has very little to say about the work of
the Holy Spirit in it. In reply to the second position
(that the Spirit originates a work in the sinner not already
complete in Christ) Barth would reply that he does not in
fact regard Christ's work as incomplete and as needing
completion by man's response. But Barth must still answer
the question of how it is that Christ responds to God with
a response that is available and helpful to sinners, i.e..
a response which is both complete, perfect, and in which
others can participate without bringing anything to add to
it. In the final analysis Barth can give only a partial
1. See Chapters VI and VII.
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answer to this question, because he does not allow the Spirit
to have an integral and essential place in the response of
Christ to the Father. The doctrine of the Spirit as the
self-communication of Christ lacks its roots in the work
Christ completed in the strength of the Spirit. But if
Barth had shown that Christ perfected His response to the
Father through openness to the Spirit, the perfection of His
response would be available to sinners, both because it' was
achieved in the same humanity and by the same resources as
that of other men, and also because the Spirit who communi¬
cates this response has already completed this response in
human nature. The Spirit would initiate no new work in
the sinner, but would bring to its goal the work completed
in Christ.
It is worth asking why Barth is unsatisfactory at this
point. It may be due to a tendency to circumscribe the
humanity of Christ - for all the profundity of his account of
His response to God, he tends to regard this response as
flowing from His being also the Lord rather than from His
being filled with the Spirit. But it may also be due to his
not having completely solved his doctrine of Deus- pro nobis.
While he is extremely illuminating about God's becoming man
he is not nearly so penetrating about His self-giving as the
Spirit. He does not show that the righteousness of God in
which the Father gave His Son and the Son gave Himself com¬
pletes itself in His self-giving as the Spirit. For as the
Father gave what is as precious to Him as Himself, His only-
begotten Son, and as the Son gave Himself, so also the Spirit
gives nothing less than Himself as He enters sinful humanity
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and radically converts it to God. This work is costly to
the Spirit, since nothing could be more abhorrent to Him
than sin, yet, precisely in His righteousness, and on the
ground of the completed work of the Son, it is His
pleasure to give Himself to sinners. He completes the
self-giving of Oeus pro nobis: for as, according to the
Father's good-pleasure, the completed work of the Son for
man aimed at God's dwelling in man, so the Spirit now




THE SHAPE OF EARTH'S DOCIRIEE OF RECONCILIATION
The main thrust of Barth's doctrine of election is
that God loves man as He loves Himself. His being for Him¬
self is also His being for man. He elected man with the
same ultimate seriousness as He elected Himself. God is
truly Deus pro nobis.
Barth gives equal stress to God's being in His act.
In His act in Jesus Christ He realised His being for us men.
It is in eternity that He elected Himself for man, but it was
in time and in flesh that He actualisedthis election."'" This
actualisation reached its climax in Jesus' self-giving on the
cross, since there He gave His very being.
Further, it was not only that God gave Himself in
Jesus, but also that man gave himself to God. On the basis
of God's free election of Himself for man, man freely elected
himself for God. In the history of Jesus Christ there was
actualised the being of God for man and the being of man for
God.
Barth did not fully develop this doctrine until he came
to write the fourth and largest volume of the Dogmatics.
Under the heading: 'The Doctrine of Reconciliation' he
attempted a full treatment of the being together of God and
man in the history of Jesus Christ. (By the history of Jesus
Christ is meant not only His life until His ascension, but
1. By this is not meant that God is potential being who
actualised Himself by His act in time, but that He
expressed His eternal being in act by His act in time.
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also His continuing life with the Father and in His hody, the
Church.)
There is no need in this study to give an account of
earlier protestant doctrines of man's reconciliation with God,
but it will be helpful to point out some of their salient
features, particularly as they comp.romise the fullness of that
reconciliation. Barth was convinced that, for all their good
intentions, protestant dogmaticians failed to see man's recon¬
ciliation with God in its own light. They focussed unsteadily
on the central thing and so both the centre and its circum¬
ference were distorted. Instead of allowing Jesus Christ and
the reconciliation in Him to be its own light, man and his
problems took over as the centre and norm,"1" The doctrine of
sin preceded the doctrine of reconciliation, and it seemed
that man's plight determined the content of Christ's work.
2
Christ's person was separated from His work, with the result
that it became almost impossible to avoid the idea that Christ
performed a work which exists somehow independently of Him,
rather much as in economic theory the product of a man's
labour is separable from him and may be transacted quite
apart from him.
Failing to allow Jesus Christ to be the person He is,
protestant theology operated with a concept of personal life
in which personhood became a kind of discreet 'substance',
1. C.D. IV/1, pp. 369-87.
2. ibid., pp. 127-8.
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intrinsically private and separate from other persons."'"
It was unable to communicate its essential inner being to
others. Influenced by Melanchthon's Aristotflianism
protestant theology came to think of Christ as the One who
acquired certain 'benefits' for man. These benefits could be
transferred to men and become his possession, e.g., man has
justification, salvation, eternal life. Further, because
Christ's person and work were separated, it came to seem that,
although Christ alone had acquired benefits for man by His
unaided work, man had to appropriate them. While faith was
never called a work, it did become a 'condition' for salvation
and in this sense something which man has to do before Christ's
work can become his. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit (which
was notoriously neglected) ceased to be securely grounded in
Christ's communication of His inner being to other men, and
was confused with man's act of appropriating salvation. The
doctrine of the person of Christ lost the dynamic, personal
quality it undoubtedly had with Luther and Calvin, and
presented Christ's life in terms of two successive states,
i.e., the state of humiliation leading to the state of
exaltation. While this gave prominence to His cross as
1. This is not Earth's point, but this understanding of
personhood has been characteristic of much protestant
theology. J. Macmurray, The Self as Agent (Faber and Faber,
London, 1969) points out that modern philosophy has broken
down the attempt of the older philosophies 'to conceive the
Self on the analogy of the material world.' (p. 33)•
2. The doctrine of the Spirit was not neglected by Luther,
Calvin, the writers of the Scots Confession and others in
the early period of the reformation, but even so remarkable
a document as the Heidelburg Confession has little to say
of the Spirit. Neglect of the Spirit set in early in
protestantism.
3. C.D. IV/1, pp. 132-5.
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the central point in His history, it made it difficult to
see how at each point in His life He was both Lord and
Servant, and how He was both in such a way that He carried
through a work not for His sake but for others. This con¬
ception of Christ*s humiliation and exaltation made it seem
that Christ was first humble and then kingly; that He first
fulfilled a work for man and then left behind His real
involvement in man's humble condition, leaving His gifts to
be distributed, certainly under His kingly rule, but by the
Church and believers. It was forgotten that throughout the
entire course of His life He was the Lord expressing Himself
as a Servant and that He was the Servant exalted as the Lord,
and that in this way He was the One who tookuman's servile
condition into Himself in order to exalt man in Himself. It
was therefore also forgotten that man comes to •possess* the
benefits of his new exalted position through participation in
Christ. Dogmatics spoke of man's new standing because of
Christ, and *for Christ's sake' rather than of his justifi¬
cation in and through Christ in the power of the Spirit.
There was and is much valuable insight into man and
his conversion in these older dogmatics, but the one thing
needful - that man is reconciled in and through Christ - is
1. Cf. B. Citron, New Birth (University Press, Edinburgh, 1951),
passim. This book understands conversion very differently
from the present study: where it, understands,conversion
as a pilgrimage towards union with Christ, this study
understands it as sharing in what is already in Christ.
Inevitably in Citron's work grace becomes to some extent
separated from the person of Christ. Nevertheless, he
has brought 'the evangelical doctrine of conversion in
the protestant Fathers* to bear fruitfully on pastoral
problems.
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neglected. Indeed, so long as dogmatics made man and his
need their organising principle it could only be obscured.
Against all this Barth wished to find a way of treating
man's reconciliation which would allow the centre to be the
centre. If the centre shone clearly, everything else would be
seen in its proper place. For Barth there can be no doubt
what that centre is: if, as he argued in his doctrine of
election, Jesus Christ in His cross and resurrection is the
election of sinners by God and the election of God by sinners,
Jesus Christ is the centre. He is the living being of God
in His act for man, and it is in Him that man's reconciliation
is actual. If Jesus Christ is allowed to be the One He is,
then man also becomes the being he is. If Jesus Christ is
the form and the content of the doctrine of reconciliation,
man's reconciliation assumes its proper form and has its
proper content.
This revolution which Barth proposed (C.D. IV/1, pp. 3-128)
and carried through (the whole of Vol. IV) was simply this:
Jesus Christ, according to His self-attestation, is the being
together of God and man in reconciliation. Let Him be the
One He is. Let the doctrine of reconciliation he shaped and
filled by Him. Far from losing by this procedure, man gains.
Jesus Christ is no 'private' person who excludes others from
the space He occupies. On the contrary, living His life in
the act of His self-actualisation,1 He includes others in
Himself, bringing them to actualise their lives in Him. He
1. Cf. C. O'Grady, The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth
(Chapman, London, 1968), p. 160.
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communicates His inner riches to them in His Spirit so that
they may live in Him as reconciled, true men. As He is Him¬
self in freedom, so He calls them to "be themselves in freedom.
Barth has broken with the conception of personhood which
conceived of it as though it were a spiritual substance
excluding others from its place, and shows that Jesus Christ
lives in the Christian and the Christian lives in Him.
[Jesus Christ] does not exist merely for Himself and to
that extent concentrically, but,...in His prophetic work,
in the calling of disciples and Christians, with no
self-surrender but in supreme expression of Himself, He
also exists eccentrically, i.e., in and with the
realisation of the existence of these men, as the
ruling principle of the history lived by them in their
own freedom. (C.D. IV/3, p» 548)
Correspondingly,
[the Christian] cannot live for himself and to that
extent concentrically, but,...without detriment to his
humanity awakened rather to genuine humanity, he also
exists eccentrically, in and with the realisation of
his own existence, being received and adopted as an
integral element in the life and history of Christ.
(C.D. IV/3, P. 548)
It is through Christ's being in act, through His personal life,
that He communicates His benefits to others and it is through
their active participation in Him that they 'enjoy' them.
Christ bore man's sin by including their sinful being in Him¬
self, and thereby abrogated it on the cross; and He established
man's new being by making room for us in His resurrection.
Since this is true, the entire doctrine of reconciliation is
the doctrine of Christ, for in speaking of Christ we must also
speak of Christ in men and men in Christ. Since Christ is
the One He is, how can one better speak of man than by speaking
of his being and act in Him?
A number of observations about this revolution will help
to clarify its significance for the doctrine of turning to God.
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1. The Person of Christ
God is Deus pro nobis. Barth unfolds this doctrine
in his doctrine of reconciliation by saying that the being of
Jesus Christ is His being for us. He is not One who exists
for Himself at the expense of others. He is Himself in His
act of being for others. He loved others as Himself, giving
Himself for them that they may find their being in giving
themselves to Him.
In this light the three major perspectives from which
He is to be known come into view. (a) He is the Lord who
became a Servant. He did not will to be Himself, the Lord,
for Himself, but willed to be Himself only as He willed the
salvation of others. He was the Lord as He became the Servant
who burdened Himself with the sin of others. He gained His
life only as He lost it,and He gained it only as He brought
with Him those who were lost.
Early in the chapter on Barth's doctrine of election it
was observed that Earth's doctrine presents a radical answer
to the belief of Sartre and others that being is primarily for
itself and only secondarily and ambiguously for others.
Barth's doctrine of God's being in His act, as this is expressed
in reconciliation, extends his answer to the modern concept of
being for itself. His doctrine - the Lord as Servant - con¬
fronts and undercuts the tradition running through Hegel, Marx,
Nietzsche and Sartre which says that man is himself only when he
throws off all service, all submission. As is well known,
Hegel wished to include and not to exclude the other in the
final synthesis of the self, but his seminal analysis of the
slave who by his labour actually masters the masters indicates
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that he regarded service not as a means of benefitting others
but of including them in one's sphere of power.1 Nietzsche
made explicit this underlying contempt for service. Man is
2
himself only as he transcends himself as he is, overcoming
both himself and those who would hold him to what he is.
Barth could not have formulated a thesis which cuts more
radically to the centre of modern man's self-assertion than
this first part of his Christology: The Lord as Servant.
Christ maintains Himself as the Lord precisely as He is also
the Servant. He does this in order that He may bring His
authority and power as Lord to alter effectively and to
liberate the slaves of sin. He loves His enemies as Himself.
He is the free Lord of love who became a servant that He
might make the slaves of hatred what He is: those who love in
freedom. It is certainly true that these others become His
servants;, and are included in His final 'synthesis', but they
are included in Him as those who find their true being in Him.
He is the place in which they have the sure ground on which to
stand and to grow into full maturity.
(b) The second perspective which opens up is that of
Jesus Christ, the Servant as Lord. It depends on the first.
If God has become man in order not to overcome man but to
establish him on his own feet, the downward movement of God
to man reaches its goal in the upward movement of man to God.
1. G.Vv.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie
(rev. 2nd ed., (G. Allen and Unwin, London, 1949),
pp. 237^.
2. This is a major theme of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
3. Barth gives particular emphasis to this in the third part
of his doctrine of reconciliation.
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This perspective is of the greatest importance for man's
turning to God.
(c) All that needs to be said about the material
content of man's reconciliation with God is included in these
two perspectives, yet it must be made perfectly clear that
there is in Jesus Christ not only this twofold vertical
movement but also the outward movement of the God-man to others.
He is the living union of the being of God and man. He lives,
He acts, He is victorious and He moves out to conquer others.
He conquers them in order to bring them to share His victory,
to make them active workers in His victorious work of liber¬
ating all men. As the living union of God and man, He is
the guarantor of man's future. He therefore calls men to
live in the strength of His promise. His fullness does not
deny men their life, but instead He gives them space, time and
opportunity to ieap out into the future which He pledges for
them.
2. Why these three perspectives?
It is conceivable that Earth could have chosen different
perspectives from those he actually has. Jesus Christ is
infinitely rich with fullness (pleroma) which meets every human
possibility at its deepest level. While remaining faithful to
his determination to allow Jesus Christ to be the light which
illuminates both Himself and the men who look to Him, Barth
could have employed other perspectives. Calvin, for example,
chose the three offices of Christ as the most appropriate
categories in which to allow Christ's light to reach the needs
1. The offices of Prophet, Priest and King, Institute II, 15.
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of his generation. For Barth also, the story of Christ must
be told three times from different perspectives. Yet the
question remains: granted that Christ needs to be seen from
a number of different perspectives, why did Barth choose these
three? The answer may lie in this direction. Calvin
answered the desire of the humanists of his day for a full
humanity by witnessing to Christ as the Prophet, Priest and
King, who, in these three offices, fulfilled for men all that
he needs. In opposition to a false Church which claimed that
man (in the Church) could attain to salvation for himself,
Calvin witnessed to Christ in whom this salvation was already
present for man. Barth is in substantial agreement with
Calvin, but since the Enlightenment man has enlarged the
dimensions in which he understands himself. In particular, the
perspectives of man's subjectivity and his future have opened
up.1 History, evolution, development, process, growth, etc.
have become central in a way in which they were not in
Calvin's time. Existentialism and eschatology in theology
have attempted to take account of these new dimensions but,
as Barth has often argued, these orientations have not succeeded
in doing Justice to Christ. In the modern combination of
existentialism and eschatology, Christ is said to have done a
work in the past which creates for us only the possibility of
2
life. It remains for us, in our existential decisions of
faith, to realise that possibility and to act in the present
1. See Chapter I.
2. C.D. IV/1, p. 285. R. Bultmann, Theology of the hew
Testament, Vol. 1. trans. K. Grobel (S.C.M.. London.
T95277 p. 302.
197
for the future. Earth opposed this theology and tried to
give a more adequate answer to the contemporary need.
Looking to Christ, Earth saw again the reality spoken
of in the fourth Gospel: 'Truly, truly, I say to you, you will
see the heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and
descending upon the Son of man.' (Jn. 1: 51). With Irenaeus
and Athanasius, Earth saw the twofold movement of God to man
and of man to God as it is perfect in the Son of man. In
Him all creation is held together and the new creation is
already a reality. Apart from any effort on the part of
fallen man, God and man are united, without confusion or
alteration, in the person of Jesus Christ. The new creation
is objectively real in Him, and therefore it is not a matter
of our making it real by our decision, but of accepting Him
and actively living in Him. Far from by-passing man's
subjectivity and collapsing eschatology into an already completed
future, this classical Christology made both subjectivity and
eschatology essential. Since Jesus Christ is objectively
personal, men subjectively participate in Him only by a
personal relationship with Him;; and since He wills fully to
reveal the new creation in Him only at the completion
(sunteleisthai, Mk. 13: 4) of the present age, men are called
to live in hope, and therefore in increasing purity (I Pet.
1: 3-9; 2 Pet. 1: 3-11). Yet these rich insights into
man's situation needed development in order to meet the
demands of modern thought. Barth believed that the basic
categories of classical Christology were to some extent at least
198
bound to a static ontology.1 He believed that the being of
Christ can be adequately described only in the language of a
2
dynamic, actualist ontology. Taking up an insight of
Calvin,Barth speaks of the two natures of Christ only as they
are expressed in the movement of His history.
If we study what Calvin tells us of Christ, we shall
notice that he does not give us any abstract definitions
of his manhood and his Godhead, nor of their relations.
But he shows us the succession of the FACTS....Calvin
invites us to follow these facts. He bids us enter
into the history of Christ. The same holds for
Christ as it does for a bird in full flight. No
picture will convey that flight, except a moving
picture. Likewise in theology. You must follow the
positions, follow the assertions and view the whole,
not as if it were a system, but as a history. And
Christians are members of the cast of that history.
And their small stories exist only as referring to that
great history. For this reason, Calvin does not expound
an explicit doctrine of the two natures of Christ.
Instead he treats them as he proceeds along the movement
of the question: How can he be called Snn of GocTJ since
we are children of God?.... Calvin does not tell us what
Christ is but what he does. He does not tell us of his
being without telling us of his life. He does not
tell us of his person without telling us of his office.
(The Faith of the Church, pp. 47-8)
In other words, God's being is dynamic, and He expresses Himself
in His movement toward man, a movement which brings man into
movement with Him. Barth develops this insight (which is
itself a development of patristic Christology). The three
great volumes of Christology in the Dogmatics parallel Calvin's
account of the three offices of Christ, but Barth shows more
fully than Calvin that the dynamic being of Christ (His being
in His act) calls into being a corresponding movement in the
1. C.D. IV/2, p. 26. Cf. the very powerful arguments of
K. Kitamori, The TheoXogv of the Pain of God (S.C.M., London,
1966), pp. 46-9, 121-3.
2. This point is made strongly in E. Jungel, Gottes Sein ist
im Werden, J.B. Mohr, Ttibingen, 1967), passim.
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being of man. Each volume concludes with a discussion of
man's act (faith, love and hope) in the Spirit of Christ.
Thus Barth meets and answers the modern perception into the
reality of the human subject. Barth also meets and answers
the modern perception into the reality of man's future, his
eschatology. He develops the understanding of Christ's
prophetic office to the point where it is possible to see that
the fullness of the new creation already present in Christ
becomes the starting-point for man's projection of himself
into the future, the future which Christ unfolds to him.
The Christian follows Christ as His active servant, thus
participating in Christ's prophetic progress through history.
It is in this way that Barth has made the insights of
classical Christology directly relevant to the post-
Enlightenment concentration on subjectivity and history as
eschatology. But it still remains to be shown exactly in
what way the three perspectives Barth has chosen engage
with this post-Enlightenment perception of man's possibilities.
If the analysis of the modern cultural situation given
in the first chapter of this study is fundamentally correct,
three things need to be said about man's subjectivity and
history.
(a) If it is the case that post-Enlightenment thought
is obsessed with the problem of a starting-point, of that on
which to base itself, and therefore also the problem of man's
innocence and his right to be the ground of his project in
life,1 Barth has met this concern with the doctrine of God's
1. Many instances could be cited, but particularly notable is
the Hegelian preoccupation with the presuppositionless
moment; see Chapter I. Also, J. Collins, The Mind of
Soren Kierkegaard (Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1965), pp. 110-1.
200
movement toward man in Jesus Christ. In this self-
humbling God has given man a sure foundation for his own
standing in life. He is given the innocence which he
cannot provide for himself. In this act of God, in which
He is the Subject, man is established as an acting subject."*"
This happens in man's own act of faith. Thus, what is
acceptable in the modern belief that man is constituted man
2
not as substance but as subject is recognised and redeemed.
(b) If it is also true that modern man understands
himself as the actor and in a certain sense as the creator
of Himself and his history, Earth has met this belief with
the doctrine of the movement of man to God in Jesus Christ.
In this movement man is given a sure basis for his own act
and work. He builds himself up in love. As he participates
in Christ he grows in love. Thus, what is acceptable in the
modern belief that man must create his own life (realise
himself) is recognised and purified.
(c) If it is further the case that post-Enlightenment man
aims himself toward a teleological fulfilment of his self-
actualisation in his self-fulfilment, Earth has answered this
expectation with the doctrine that Jesus Christ is the promise,
guarantor and content of man's future. In Christ God and
man are united in plenitude of being, and united actively.
Christ does not immediately place men at the goal of their
journey, but gives them space, time and opportunity to live and
1. C.D. IVA. PP* 749ff.
2. N. Berdayev, Spirit and Freedom, trans. O.F. Clarke,(G. Bles,
London, 1935). Chapter I. passim.
3. This is fundamental to Barth's doctrine of the Church,
C.D. IV/2, pp. 64lff.
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realize their being in Him. He even makes them necessary
to His prophetic progress through history. As the Mediator
in whom true God and true man are united, He comes to men and
unites them with Himself in order that they may unite them-
3
selves in Him. He calls them to Himself, and as they follow
Him they move towards the fulfilment of their being in Him.
It is thus the final triumph of the grace of God in Jesus
that God has made their fulfilment necessary to His fulfil¬
ment. What is acceptable in the hope of Hegel and others,
that man would realise his subjecthood in a fulfilment in
4
which God also would find His fulfilment, is here recognised,
chastened and redeemed.
These three points indicate that Jesus Christ gives man
all that he needs for his project in life: the first concerns
the basis on which he stands, the second the act he makes on
that basis and the third the goal for whose realisation he
posits and activates himself. These three dimensions
coincide in every moment of man's new life in Christ, but this
study is concerned only with their intersection in man's
initial step toward God, i.e., in the transition from dead
works to the living God, conversion. Thus, conversion will
be studied from three perspectives: first, its basis in
justification; then its act of turning in the first moment
1. C.D. IV/3, PP. 274-367.
2. See Chapter VIII, -pp. 330-1.
3. CjD. IV/3, pp. 543-5.
4. The final stages of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind argue
that in man's self-consciousness Spirit comes to full
knowledge of itself. Cf. Coleridge in Frost at Midnight:
'God...who from eternity doth teach Himself in all.'
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of sanctification; and, finally, its projection towards its
goal as Chrises calling is heard. But since these three
dimensions of the one happening are actual only as a man
participates in Christ, it will first be necessary to study
Christ in His three dimensions of Judge, King and Prophet.
By means of this procedure it is hoped that a complete picture
of Barth's understanding of conversion will emerge.
3. The Atonement as the self-realisation of God's
being for man.
Barth's resolute intention to allow Jesus Christ to be
the One He is, and so to allow the atonement to be seen in
its own light, means that the doctrine of man's reconciliation
with God is liberated from sub-personal concepts. His
account of the atonement as the satisfaction1 and fulfilment
of God's being in free love for man makes it clear that God
was not conditioned into saving man, but that He expressed
and carried into effect His personal love for man. He was
not bound by laws and by necessity. Rather, He fulfilled the
1. Consider the following extraordinarily powerful passage in
which God's satisfaction of Himself in regard to us is
also the satisfaction of our being:
Weil Gott ist, darum hat und iibt er die Kraft als
dieser Mensch die Folge unserer Obertretung, den Zorn
und die Strafe, die uns treffen mussten, fUr uns Alle zu
erleiden und so sich selber uns genug zu tun* Und
wieder weil er Gott ist, hat und ttbt er auch die Kraft,
als dieser Mensch an unser Aller Stelle sein eigener Partner
zu sein, der der Bestimmung des Menschen zum Heil, der wir
Alle widersprechen, in freiem Gehorsam gerecht wird und so
also uns genug d.h. auch das fur uns postiv Genttgende zu
tun....Es [das christliche Botschaft] meint den Frieden,
den Gott selbst in diesem Menschen zwischen sich selbst
und uns Allen Gestriftet hat. (K.D. IV/1, p. 12).
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'law' of His own being,'1' and freely •bound1 Himself in love.
The atonement is thus to be understood only in terms of the
movement of God Himself, the movement of His perfectly free
loving.
The entire meaning of the atonement is the fulfilment
2
of a personal relationship. It is God with us: Immanuel.
It is the fulfilment by Immanuel of the covenant of God with
man, the covenant which man broke. It is the costly fulfil¬
ment of God's good-pleasure to have man as His own partner.
Thus, all the forensic and cultic language in which the atone¬
ment is conceptualised must serve only to witness to this
"5
personal relationship.
The doctrine of man's turning to God has been cramped
by ideas which imply the fear that God is not wholly and
completely loving toward man. This fear is not, of course,
expressed in so many words, but the structure of the doctrine
and the content given to some of its key concepts betray
l±
such a doubt. It is thought that God's being the One He
is, a,Tad therefore His righteousness, is His being for Himself
1. C.D. IV/1, pp. 529ff.
2. For Barth the atonement is the fulfilment of the broken
covenant, the covenant whose content is: 'I will be their
God and they shall be my people.' See esp., C.D. IV/1,
pp. 3-78.
3. Cf. R.A. Bagnato, 'Karl Earth's Personalising of Juridical
Redemption', Anglican Theological Review XLIX, Jan. 1967,
pp. 49-69, esp. p. 61. "
4. This is particularly evident in the common procedure of
laying down first of all the doctrines of sin, law and
satisfaction and only afterward the doctrine of Christ.
In this way the love of God in Christ is conditioned by
prior considerations of law and justice.
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and only secondarily and less seriously His being for man.
God does not love us as Himself, but first loves Himself and
only as a generous after-thought loves us."'" Nowhere is
this doubt of God more clearly evident than in some theories
of the atonement. God's being, and the righteousness in
which He expresses His being, are not understood solely i».
the light of God's demonstration of them in Jesus Christ.
Certain concepts of being, righteousness and personhood are
projected into God's act in Christ.
The man who doubts that God's being is identical with
His love for man, i.e., fallen man, inevitably conceives of his
2
own being as insecure and constantly under threat. Since he
believes that he is not completely protected by God, he
thinks that he must maintain his own being by acts of self-
preservation directed toward himself. He thinks of himself
and his righteousness as that which is fundamentally for itself.
He cannot avoid impersonalising his personal being. To some
extent at least he must conceive of his personhood by analogy
with ohe sub-personal creation, the creation which excludes
1. McLeod Campbell speaks of certain kinds of Calvinism making
justice a necessary attribute of God while love is only an
arbitrary attribute. The Nature of the Atonement (J. Clarke,
London, 1959), p. 63.
2. It would be possible to give a brief history of the concept
of personhood, tracing it from Greek thought through
Augustine, Boethius, Richard of St. Victor to Idealism,
Buber, existentialism and modern psychology. It is more
to the present purpose, however, to indicate the origin of
sub-personal concepts of personhood in the anxiety which
fallen man feels in relation to himself, his neighbour and
God.
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other things from the space it occupies. He cannot avoid
this, since, in order to preserve himself intact from what he
interprets as the threat of others, he must anxiously hold
himself as a private place where others are excluded or
admitted only on special terms. Others are welcome only
as he needs them, and they easily become transgressors -
they violate his right to himself. Even when Idealism
replaced notions of spiritual substance with those of subject
and spirit, the person was still thought of as excluding others.
It was thought of as the act in which a person says 'I am I',
positing itself in isolation.1 Position implied negation.
Even worse than this necessarily happens. When man believes
he must aintain his being by his own action, the threats
which others pose to him become threats to his very being,
and lie retaliates against any transgression. Others must
'pay' for their offence. Forgiveness becomes impossible.
These ideas are read into God's being and His act of recon¬
ciliation. He is thought of as being for Himself, jealously
defending His honour. His righteousness demands retaliation.
Forgiveness in its proper sense is denied. God does not
give Himself to the offender in the sense of for-give,
Ver-geban, but He demands payment from him.
In the Dogmatics God's being is identical with His love
1. This is a major theme of J. Macmurray, op.oit.,e.g. p. 31:
'Modern philosophy is characteristically egocentric. I
mean no more than this: that firstly, it takes the Self
as its starting-point, and not God or the world or the
community; and that, secondly, the Self is an individual
in isolation, an ego or "I", never a "thou".'
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for man. God acted out His being in His Son as His being
for man. (There is an important sense in which God is
primarily for Himself and secondarily for man, but this
happens for man's good."1" It is on the basis of His being
for Himself that He is for man. It is only as He maintains
Himself as Himself, not abandoning Himself but confirming
Himself, that He is the transcendent God who is the archimedian
point from which the human situation can be radically altered.)
It is in this sense that God's being is personal being.
His being is turned toward us and He relates Himself to us.
(This is why Barth resists every form of modalism. Modalism
would make God's turning to man merely a -persona of God,
merely an appearance of God, and not the expression of
2
Himself. In Biblical language, God has turned His face
toward us.
Once it is seen that it is with this God that we have
to do, the sheer glory of the atonement comes into view.
Man's sin is offence to this God who faces us, and yet He
does not retaliate but gives Himself. He forgives the men
■3
who offend Him. Barth loves to say that God overflows and
4
superabounds in mercy. Without ceasing to be Himself, but
in faithfulness to Himself, He overflows, giving Himself in
forgiveness. Atonement is the personal act of God.
1. C.D. IV/1, pp. 559-68.
2. C.D. IV/1, p. 196f.
3. Cf. Chapter II, pp.iOS"f. c.D. II/2, p. 125.
4. Barth emphasises this in Christ and Adam, trans. T.A. Smail,
Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers, No. 5
(Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1956).
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It is necessary to make this point at some length
because often in the history of theology the relationship
between God and man has been understood as though ideas of
law, righteousness and contract determined that relationship.
It is well known, for example, that within Calvinism there
grew up a theology which described the fellowship between
God and man almost entirely in legal and forensic categories.1
What Ba'rth has against this theology is not that these
categories were used - his own doctrine of Christ for us
centres on the judgment of Christ in our place - but that
these categories came to assume a certain validity independent
of the relationship they were intended to describe. Once they
came to assume this status they covertly made possible and
even necessary man's own initiative before God. Under the
cover of a rigorous system of doctrine whose watchword was
'justification by faith', men began to limit God's grace and
to make their own anxious works necessary for the enjoyment
of His favour. God's grace was impersonalised and men
ther fore felt that they must have some claim on Him before
they could be sure of His love.
Since this feeling that God's grace is somehow distant
and impersonal, and must be secured by man's act, is the
most damaging and yet persistent obstacle to man's turning to
God, it is worth looking briefly at the main elements in it.
(a) It is thought that God and man stand before each
other 'neutrally' and that man must prove his righteousness
before he is acceptable to God. God puts man on trial and
1. Barth's assessment of the value of Federal theology is
to be found in C.D. IV/1, pp. 54-66.
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will accept him on condition of his proving himself worthy of
it. According to Federal theology, this was the purpose of
the covenent of works. God promised Adam eternal life on
condition of obedience.
(b) It is thought that Christ fulfilled the law which
Adam broke, and so established man's claim to eternal life.
Although it is a manifestation of His free grace that He does
this, it is the covenant of works which He fulfilled and
so it is impossible to escape the idea that it is by works -
albeit the works of Christ - that man stands in God's favour.
(c) It is thought that men now enter into God's grace
if they repent and believe. It is difficult to avoid the
idea that it is by repentance and faith that one becomes
worthy of grace* For if man must first establish a claim to
God's grace, and if Christ has done this by His work on man's
behalf, it seems appropriate that men should establish their
'interest' in Him by their own work of repentance and faith.1
Of course, repentance and faith were never actually called
works, but they were thought of as means of controlling God's
grace. Since God and man at first stand related neutrally
and man must establish his claim on God by righteous works,
faith as such can never be that which God. reckons as
1. Cf. J. Fraser of Brae, A Treatise of Justifying Faith
XEdinburgh, 1679), p. lT: '...how flat and dull make
they the business and mystery of the Gospel, who maintain
that as the Lord required perfect Obedience, as the
Condition of the first Covenant, so he requireth a cordial
assent to the truths of the Gospel, and a sincere
Obedience flowing therefrom, as the Condition of the
Second Covenant.*
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righteousness.1 God's grace has been limited and distanced
by the concept of law and so it is not simply by trusting
God that man is righteous. Faith must be that act of man
which makes it legally possible for Him to impute righteous¬
ness to him, and hence it must have the character of an act
which satisfies legal requirements.
Barth's answer to this depressing kind of theology is
simply that God has always been gracious to men. From
eternity, in and with the election of Himself, He has loved
man as Himself. Man does not have to establish his claim to
grace. He is not separated from God by law. On the contrary,
God has fulfilled the law of His being, and has done it in pure
grace. Man may therefore find himself in a righteous relation¬
ship with God simply by trusting Him as the One He is.
A short account of Barth's doctrine of God's reconcil¬
iation of man to Himself will underline the intensely personal
nature of God's love for man as he understands it.
From the beginning God's whole being has aimed at man.
In Himself, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, He has that
2
'structure' whereby He is both love in Himself and also free
to love that which He posits outside Himself. As was shown
in Chapter II of this study, Barth's doctrine of election
1. i.e.. it is not simply by trusting God's righteousness
that man is accounted righteous. If God is neutral
towards man, faith in Him is not righteousness. Man
must work to make himself righteous. But since God is
not neutral toward man, to trust Him as righteous is to
enter into a right relationship with Him and therefore
is properly accounted as righteousness. Cf. Rom. 4.
2. K.D. 1/1, p. 333: 'Gestalt.'
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means that from eternity, at the beginning of all His ways
and works, God determined Himself for fellowship with man and
man for fellowship with Himself. This self-determination of
God was a real and costly event in God Himself: He •bound
and pledged [verbunden und verpflichtet ] Himself originally
to man, chosing and determining and making Himself the God
of man. •"*" Both the creation and the covenant exist for the
purpose of the fellowship between God and man. Sin, there¬
fore, was primarily the breaking of fellowship. It was
also the breaking of the covenant and transgression of the law,
but this only served to underline its nature as a personal
offence against God.
God's reaction to this broken fellowship was to remove
the obstacle to fellowship. He aimed to secure peace between
Himself and man. He did this by coming on the scene in
person. He did nothing rash or arbitrary, nothing on the
spur of the moment which would only have patched up the
broken relationship. On the contrary, He came in the
freec-im of His being, doing that to which He had pledged
Himself from eternity. He gave Himself. He interceded in
person, going to the depths of man's lostness, there to find
and rescue man. His intercession for man was successful
because He defended His own honour and glory. Man was lost
and cursed because he had offended God's glory. Therefore,
it was only by a superabounding display of His glory that
He could restore man to honour. Offending man could be saved
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 37; K.D. IV/1, p. 38.
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only if God affirmed His honour by displaying it at the
very place of offence and so proving His freedom to forgive
the offence. In defence of His wounded honour and for the
sake of increasing His glory in the world, God proved His
glory as God by giving Himself up to the shame and dishonour
of offending man. It is not straining Barth's meaning to
say that he sees God's work of reconciliation in terms of the
most personal passion within God Himself.1 God is love, but
man has offended Him. His love must therefore flame out as
His wrath. But God propitiated His wrath against sin and
the sinner by fulfilling that wrath as the fire of His love,
Himself bearing the sin and the wrath due to it, thus con¬
cluding peace with His enemies. He defended His wounded
honour by displaying His forgiveness, Himself bearing the
insult and its wound, thus absorbing it and defending the
honour of His defamers. In the language of Dautero-Isaiah,
♦the Lord laid on [Christ] the iniquity of us all.' But
Christ is very God and therefore it was God Himself bearing
away our iniquity, burdening Himself with it, and so embracing
the sinner into Himself.
What of the fulfilment of this will of God for fellow¬
ship with man? Man is a sinner whose sin aimed at wounding
1. Jesus Christ offered Himself 'as the sacrifice which had
to be made when God vindicated Himself in relation to man,
...choosing to suffer the wrath of God in His own body and
the fire of His love in His own soul.' C.D. IV/1, pp. 94-5.
2. '...where sin took the upper hand [God's] grace did not
cease or retire, but overflowed in the form of avenging
righteousness, showing itself to be super-abounding
(Rom. 5: 20), so that in face of this opposition His for¬
giveness was His iron sceptre, His weapon, His sword of
justice.' ibid., pp. 487-8.
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God's honour. But God has pardoned him. God has borne
away his sin, destroying his sinful being in Christ's death.
He has established man's righteousness, giving him new being
in Christ's resurrection. Therefore, all he must do is to
accept his place in Christ.
Barth's conception of God's act in the atonement is
rather different from what we find in Anselm's well-known
Cur Deus Homo, and a very brief comparison will draw out a
point of considerable importance for this study. Anselm
and Barth operate with the same general picture of the atone¬
ment as the restoration of a broken relationship. For
Anselm as for Barth it is a matter of God in His being as God,
but they radically diverge in their understandings of God's
action in defending His honour.1 According to Anselm, God
defended His wounded honour by demanding satisfaction from
man. It is true, of course, that Anselm makes it unambiguously
clear that God alone could and did make satisfaction on man's
hehalf, but it is also true that he regards God's act in
Christ as a satisfaction made by man to God. It was for this
reason that God became man. The opposite is the case for Barth.
God defended His wounded honour, not by demanding satisfaction
from man, but by satisfying His love for man by Himself bearing
away the obstacle (sin) to His love. Where Anselm thinks of
man paying God what he owes, Barth thinks of God giving Himself
1. C.D. IV/1, pp. 485-7. Barth locates his divergence from
Anselm in terms of their different understandings of God's
reaction to man's offensive action.
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to man in forgiveness. According to Barth, the payment of
man's debt to God was God's forgiveness.
It could be objected that this account overstates the
difference between Anselm and Barth and is rather unfair to
Anselm. It must be said in Anselm's favour that he did
understand that God not only demands but also saves by His honour
(Proslogium IX). Also, the entire thrust of Cur Deus Homo
is that God, and He alone, of His free grace, made satis¬
faction for man. Yet at the crucial point, in his description
of Christ's work on the cross, he is unable to say that God
interceded for man, that He forgave sin. Anselm says that
man in the God-man payed what he owes, not that God on the
cross forgave sin by bearing it away. Strictly, there is
no forgiveness in Cur Deus Homo: there is only the payment
of a debt.1 There is a very serious impersonality in this
book. Concepts of law and honour, necessary and proper in
themselves, come between God and man, and so obscure the
very personal act of God in forgiveness. Barth lays his
finger on this when he points out that Anselm does not believe
that it would be worthy of God to forgive 'out of sheer
2
mercy.' Boso asks Anselm why *a free forgiveness is un¬
worthy of God when He demands that we should forgive those
who sin against us omnino, purely, absolutely and uncondition-
3
ally.' Anselm believes he can answer this by saying that it
is not for us but God only to exact retribution. Boso
1. Cf. G.S. Hendrv. The Gosoel of the Incarnation (S.C.M..
Tendon, 1959), p. 101. ~
2. ibid.. p. 486.
3. ibid.. p. 486.
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further asks whether God's mercy 'can be measured by any
other standard than that of His own free will which, because
it is His, is righteous of itself'• Anselm replies that God
is free only to do what is proper to Him as God, and that it
would not be proper for Him to forgive without a prior fulfil¬
ment of what His honour as God demands. But in replying in
this fashion, has not Anselm set up his own concept of what is
worthy of God, and thus obscured God's 'pure, absolute and
2
unconditional forgiveness, His forgiveness sola misericordia?'
Has not Anselm made Jesus Christ no more than the One who
makes it possible for God to forgive, and failed to allow
Him to be the full actuality of the grace of God?^ In other
words, has not Anselm obscured the fact that Jesus Christ is
Himself the Word of divine forgiveness, and that He is the
effective Y/ord of forgiveness spoken from the heart of God?
Barth's correction of Anselm is of great importance
for the doctrine of turning to God. Anselm's doctrine makes
it seem that there was an element in God unwilling to forgive,
and that Christ had to come in order to make it possible for
Him to do it. This casts a shadow across our trust in God,
since it seems that God's inner being is not turned to us
and is not wholly gracious. Barth's more precise doctrine
removes this shadow, and points to God's pure, unconditioned
forgiveness. The God Earth speaks of may be trusted with
unbounded confidence. He has turned to us in pure forgiveness
1. ibid.. p. 487.
2. ibid., p. 487.
3. ibid., p. 487.
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and so we have confidence to turn to Him without fear.
Barth's account of the atonement is closer to
Calvin's than to Anselm's.1 With Calvin, Barth emphasises
Christ's unreserved entrance into the human condition and
His descent into the depths of human sin in order to suffer
for man. Christ was made sin; He was judged in our place.
2
He bore our punishment. Yet Barth is clearer than Calvin
as to the meaning of this punishment. It was not God's
punishment of sin in the sense of expending the force of
His vengeance against sinners, as it sometimes seems to be
in Calvin. Rather, it was God's judging our sin and putting
it to death, taking it into Himself in order to burn it away
in His wrath, which is the fire of His love. For Barth it
is true to say that Christ was punished as our substitute, but
he means that Christ has united Himself with our sinful being
in order utterly 'to make an end of us sinners and therefore
of sin itself.'^ Thus, Barth is speaking of the opposite
1. P. van Buren notes that Calvin's use of the word satisfaction
is to be distinguished from the idea of equality or compen¬
sation that is to be found in Anselm: Christ in our Place
(Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1957), p. 76. For Calvin
'satisfaction means that the obedient suffering of Christ
in our place is completely efficacious and sufficient.•
2. ibid.. Chapter IV.
5. One must put the emphasis on the 'seems to be' but, even sof
there is a disturbing element in Calvin. His use of the
idea of vengeance is particularly troublesome. A character¬
istic passage is the following: 'In order to interpose
between us and God's anger, and satisfy his righteous
judgment, it was necessary that [Christ] should feel the
weight of divine vengeance.' Institute, II, 16, 10. Calvin
does, however, say that God does not demand vengeance in the
same way as sinful man, Sermons on Isaiah 55, trans.
T.H.L. Parker (James Clarke, London, 1956), p. 72.
4. C.D. IV/1, p. 253.
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of punishment as retaliation for sin. He is speaking of
punishment as the suffering of what was necessary in order
to destroy sin and the sinner. Although this seems to be
the basic meaning of Christ's being punished in our place in
Calvin, Calvin does sometimes speak of Christ bearing a
punishment which reconciled God to us.1 In these cases
punishment seems to mean something like appeasement, and
(though it is notoriously difficult to interpret Calvin
correctly) we are again faced with the terrifying thought of
2
a hostile, unforgiving, vengeful element in God.
Later in this study it will be suggested that, following
Barth's lead, it is possible to purify further Calvin's
understanding of Christ's suffering in our place. Neither
Calvin nor Barth spoke of Christ's sufferings as His holy
sorrow over sinners. If it is possible that God's inter¬
cession for man can be described in even more richly personal
terms than does Barth, it may also be possible to describe
1. Many instances could be cited, e.g., 'under the Law [Christ]
was typified by sacrifices, to inspire believers with the
hope that God would be propitious to them after he was re¬
conciled by the expiation of their sins.' Institute, II,
17, 4. Calvin was aware of the difficulty involved in
saying that God is reconciled to us: see, ibid., II, 16, 2.
Nevertheless, the New Testament never says that God was
reconciled to us: the consistent affirmation is that God
was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.
2. However Calvin may be interpreted, the following words of
van Buren are apposite:
It would be highly inaccurate to ascribe to Calvin that
popular misconception of the Atonement according to which
an angry God exacts the poind of flesh due to Him....There
is a wrath of God, and man has certainly incurred that wrath,
but to reduce the doctrine of the Atonement to something so
cold and impersonal as the idea of satisfying an angry God
is incompatible with Calvin's teaching, (op.cit.. pp. 57-3).
217
the conversion to God of those who participate in Christ in
more fully personal terms.
It has been argued that Barth has revolutionised the
theology of reconciliation by allowing Jesus Christ to be
the One He is, and that this means (1) that His person
includes others in Himself in such a way that they participate
in Him as true persons; (2) that He opens up for men the
dimensions of their personhood and gives them the basis on
which to work and to live; and (3) that in Him the personal
God satisfies Himself in relation to sinful man so that man
himself is satisfied. In Jesus Christ God's eternal
covenant is fulfilled and the purpose of creation also fulfilled:
the dwelling of God is with man. This is objectively and
ontologically true in Christ.
What is objectively true in Christ flows over and
becomes subjectively true of other men. This happens in His
Spirit. This means nothing less than repentance. In the
measure that man has sought to 'absolve* himself from God he
has made himself his own absolute, but Barth's revolution
means that Jesus Christ by His Spirit is Lord, the absolute
sole Master. It means abandoning trust in ourselves and
committing ourselves to Another. But, as Barth says, we
know into whose hands we are committing ourselves: He is
the One who has given Himself for us. We therefore . dare
to allow Him to master us.
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CHAPTER V
THE INTERCESSION OF GOD
Barth's great discussion of the obedience of the Son
of God speaks of God's own personal intervention on behalf
of sinful man. It describes this intercession of God in
three basic stages. First, in becoming man and a servant,
God did not abandon His divinity. On the contrary;
God shows Himself to be the great and true God in
the fact that He can and will let His grace bear
this cost (i.e., the cost of making man*s situation
His own), that He is capable and willing and ready
for this condescension, this act of extravagance,
this far journey. (C.D. IV/1, p. 159)
Second, God as man was judged in our place in such a way that
He destroyed sinful man and established his righteousness.
Third, God the Father vindicated this work of His Son in
such a way that men may participate in the new being of man
in Him. In short, God became man in order to take respon¬
sibility for His guilty creature and radically to alter his
situation from within that situation.
In the following account of Barth's section 'The
Obedience of the Son of God', attention will be directed
chiefly to Barth's treatment of Christ's taking our place.
It will be shown that his doctrine of substitution does not
deprive man of his standing before God on his own feet.
Christ does indeed displace sinful man, but in doing so He
sets man up with a place of his own in Him. Barth's
doctrine of substitution1 is uncompromising. Christ took
1. Stellvertretung in the German. The English translators
of the Dogmatics make the point that as used by Barth
this word includes 'the notions both of representation
and substitution, and never the one without the other.'
C.D. IV/l, p. vii.
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our place without any co-operation on our part and, in the
face of our hostility, suffered for us. He not only took
our place, but did for us there a perfect and complete work.
There remains nothing whatever for us to add to it, yet
this exclusive perfection is the ground on which our standing
before God and on our own feet rests. Christ does away with
our disqualified being and gives us a place in Himself. The
fact that His work needs no addition on our part relieves us
of anxiety and gives us the confidence boldly to enter into
the place He has for us.
In order to open up this place for guilty man, God had
to act decisively in His creation. Only if He were God could
He do that which was not relative and ineffectual; only if
He were man could He alter and convert man. The incarnation
of God is thus the oresupposition of the conversion of man."*"
It is the incarnation of God Himself, God in person. Only
thus could a creation falling into the abyss be rescued.
And it is God as servant, for only thus could God take
responsibility for man. This involves the Church in the
astounding confession that God (in the Son) became a servant.
That God actually became man and a servant is something
which can be said only because God has in fact done it. Barth
says again and again that the Church must not tell God what
He can or cannot do, but must let itself be told by Him
2
who He is and what He does.
1. In this way the conversion of man in Jesus Christ is 'the
revolution of God', as opposed to all immanent judgments
and crises and catastrophes and revolutions with their re¬
lative and limited killing and making alive...' ibid.. p. 562.
2. e.g. ibid., p. 192; cf. also: 'what can all our statements
be but a serious pointing away to the One who will Himself
tell those who have ears to hear who He is?' ibid.. p. 210.
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If the Church allows itself to be told who God is, it
sees God in Jesus bearing the sin of the world on the cross.
It sees God entering into man's plight,
making His own not only the guilt of man but also his
rejection and condemnation, giving Himself to bear the
divinely righteous consequences of human sin, not
merely affirming the divine sentence on man, but
allowing it to be fulfilled on Himself.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 175)
Do we really dare to say that it was God who suffered in this
way? Barth answers that to take offence at this point is to
miss the glory of God and to question our salvation. He
first considers this mystery of God from the point of view of
the outer movement of God, the mystery of the Son's 'deity in
His work ad extra.If there is thought of diminishing the
deity of God in Jesus 'what sense can there be in talking
2
about the reconciliation of the world with God in Him?' He
then considers this mystery in relation to the inner mystery
of God. Any thought that by going to the cross God abandoned
His deity or compromised His identity with Himself (this
possibility would set God in opposition to Himself and make
Him contradict Himself^) would not only limit the glory of
God, but would render Him unable to be our Saviour:
Of what value would His deity be to us if - instead of
crossing in that deity the very real gulf between
Himself and us - He left that deity behind Him in His
coming to us....In the folly of such a contradiction
to Himself He could obviously only confirm and
strengthen us in four] antithesis to Him....
(C.D. IV/1, pp. 185-6)
1. ibid., p. 177.
2. ibid.. p. 183.
3. Barth points out that the more seriously we take the cry
on the cross, the more serious does the temptation to
think in this fashion become (ibid., p. 185). Yet to do
so would be to become guilty of 'supreme blasphemy'•
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In contrast to such appalling possibilities Earth
begins 'with the insight that God is "not a God of confusion
but of peace" (I Cor. 14: 33).Far from being divided in
Himself, God ('in whom is no,..interplay of light and dark¬
ness (Jas. 1: 17)') is the Lord in such a way that 'He
embraces the opposites of these concepts ['He is absolute,
infinite, exalted, active, impassible, transcendent'] even
2
while He is superior to them.' He is the Creator who has
created the world distinct from Himself, in relation to
which He can act in the form of a servant without losing His
form as God.
This answer of Barth's to the supposed possibility of
a self-abandonment of God's deity in the incarnation and on
the cross is of great importance in view of the recent thesis
of T.J.J. Altizer and others that God could be the God of man
only if He emptied Himself of deity, emptying that deity into
man. In Altizer, as in Earth, the cross of the incarnate One
was the conversion of the human condition, but, in contrast
to Earth, Altizer says that this is the case because God
ceased to transcend man. Altizer bases his idea on the
fear that, if God remains transcendent, He threatens man's
4
being as man. Altizer must be resisted because, if God
1. ibid., p. 186.
2. ibid.. p. 187.
3. T.J.J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Collins,
London, 1967), see esp. up. 62-9.
4. Altizer's fear is parallel to that of D. SOlle who thinks
that, because according to Barth and other orthodox
theologians, Christ took our place as our substitute,
man is deprived of a place and standing of his own:
Christ the Representative, trans. D. Lewis (S.C.M., London,
1967), esp. pp. 86-91.
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abandons His transcendent deity, He is unable to act
decisively for man, and man remains the prey of his sin.
Further, since man has sinned against the transcendent God,
how can there be forgiveness for him if God no longer acts
and lives as transcendent God? Altizer's thesis deprives
man of the very ground on which he can stand as man. What
we see in Christ is that God is free to be God as the Servant,
and thus free to reach man in his need and to rescue him. It
is as God affirms His deity that He helps man and gives him
the forgiveness that he needs to live as man.
Barth now turns to enquire whether we may properly
speak of obedience in God Himself. A positive answer to this
question means that the obedience of Jesus and the salvation
obtained in that obedience is as sure and necessary as God's
own being. A negative answer would be possible (and has
been given) in two ways: either by saying that in Jesus Christ
we have to do with God only in a secondary and subordinate
sense (subordinationism)"*" or by saying that in Him we have to
do only with a mode of God's being and not God Himself
p
(modalism). Barth engages this negative answer in 'a
•3
frontal assault'. He argues that there are 'three pre-
4
suppositions which, at all costs, we must...affirm.' We
must be clear, first, that God is the acting Subject of the
1. C.D. IV/1, pp. 195-6.
2. ibid.. pp. 196-7.
3. ibid.. p. 197.
4. ibid.. p. 197.
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reconciliation of the world with Himself; second, that the
atonement is an event 'in the world which not only touches
the world from without but also affects it from within to
convert it to God';"1" and, third, connecting these two
points, that God was the true Subject in the atonement in such
a way that 'His presence and action as the Reconciler of the
world coincide with and are indeed identical with the
2
existence of...the obedient Jesus of Nazareth.' God humbled
Himself to the cross of Jesus in order to convert sinners to
Himself, and therefore we dare to affirm that there is
obedience 'in the being and life of God Himself.' Indeed,
God's divine unity consists in the fact that in Himself He is
both One who is obeyed and Another who obeys.^ God stands
in reciprocal relationship with Himself: 'primarily,
originally and properly...it is not man...which is the counter¬
ed
part of God....God is all this in Himself.' If we free
ourselves from all arbitrary ideas that God is the prisoner
of His own being, monolithic and solitary, and that it is un¬
worthy of Him to become His own servant - if we give up these
notions and look to the cross of Christ, 'we cannot avoid the
astounding conclusion of a divine obedience.' The doctrine
1. ibid. P* 198.
2. ibid. P. 199.
3. ibid. P- 201.
4. ibid. P. 201.
3. ibid. P« 201.
6. ibid. P. 202.
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of the Trinity meets us here. In equal Godhead the one God
is the One and also the Other,...One who rules and
commands in Majesty and One who obeys in humility....
He is the one and the other without any cleft or
differentiation but in perfect unity and equality
because in the same perfect unity and equality He is
also a Third, the One who affirms the one and equal
Godhead through and by and in the two modes of being,
the One who makes possible and maintains His fellowship
with Himself as the one and the other.
(C.D. IV/1, pp. 202-3)
In virtue of this third mode of being, God is equally God in
His other two modes of being, and He is this without any
contradiction of Himself and therefore also 'without any
striving to identify the two modes of being, or possibility
of the one being absorbed by the other.'1 God thus exists
in genuine relationship, history and (what is particularly
significant for this study) fellowship with Himself. Because
He is this triune God, His activity ad extra consists 'in
the fact that He gives to the world created by Him, to man,
2
a part in the history in which He is God.* His being does
not exclude man, but takes man up into His fellowship in the
Spirit. He 'takes into unity with His divine being a quite
■3
different, a creaturely and indeed a sinful being.In
doing so He affirms His own inner being. It is 'the
strangely logical final continuation of...the history in which
/l 5
He is God.' His inner life takes 'outward form'^ and does
so by taking man into Himself.
1. ibid., P. 203.
2. ibid.. P. 203.
3. ibid., P. 203.
4. ibid., P- 203.
5. ibid., P. 204.
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Certain observations need to be made at this point
in order to underline the value of this doctrine of Christ's
incarnation as it relates to man's conversion.
1. Barth's doctrine of God's self-humiliation indicates
that the supreme confidence which God has in Himself as God
coincides with and is indeed identical with His humility.
His humility and His service are divine equally with His
Majesty and His commanding. Thus, He does not withdraw in
fear from the humble service of risking Himself and giving
Himself to the task of bearing the divine rejection on man's
sin. In this way, God's being as God is the very foundation
of the salvation of man.
2. Barth's doctrine of God's self-humiliation has its
central point in the cross of Jesus Christ. The true and
living God reached down to the depths of the human condition.
Barth's doctrine does not by-pass actual man in his misery,
but shows God coming down into man's terrible condition and
uniting Himself with it.
3. This second point demands a statement in terras of
God's being as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As this God, He
both maintained Himself as God and reached the depths of man's
misery. In the unity of the Spirit, His inner life took
outward form and did so in union with the man Jesus. Later
in this study (esp. Chapter VII) it will be asked why Barth
did not press this doctrine further, since it is the basis of
God's freedom to enter sinful men, and in the Spirit, to share
with them the Inner riches of His life. It is the basis
of a doctrine of the Spirit as the Spirit of the conversion
of sinful man as this was accomplished by God in the man Jesus.
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Jurgen Moltmann's recent book, The Crucified God,
connects the doctrine of the Trinity with the man Jesus and
argues that the Spirit of God proceeds from the event of the
cross as the Spirit of the justification of sinners. This
is a suitable place for assessing the value of his discussion
for this study.
Moltmann*s book would seem to offer a development of the
understanding of conversion along the lines indicated by this
study. It is argued in this study that Barth's work needs
to be extended in a more thoroughly trinitarian direction,
towards a more concrete doctrine of the cross and towards a
more complete pneumatology. Moltmann is strongly aware of
these three needs. He believes that the doctrine of the
Trinity is to be known only from the event of the cross.1 In
God the Son, the trinitarian God took into Himself man's
forsaken history. God the Spirit proceeds from the event of
the Son's abandonment by the Father, and therefore He is the
Spirit 'which creates love for forsaken men,...which brings
2
the dead alive.*
Moltmann*s doctrine would thus seem to offer a more
concrete involvement of God with man than we find in Barth.
In particular, Moltmann shows more clearly that the Spirit
1. J. Moltmann, The Crucifidd God, trans. R.A. Wilson and
J. Bowden (S.C.M., London, 1974), PP* 235-49.
2. ibid., p. 245. Cf. also: 'What proceeds from this event
between Father aricf Son is the Spirit who justifies the
godless, fills the forsaken with love and even brings the
dead alive, since even the fact that they are dead cannot
exclude them from the event of the cross;...' (ibid..
p. 244); 'Because this death took place in the history
between Father and Son on the cross on Golgotha, there
proceeds from it the spirit of life, love and election to
salvation.' (ibid., p. 246).
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proceeds from the event in which God takes sinful man to Him¬
self, and thus that the Spirit comes to forsaken men in their
actual forsakenness.
Moltmann, however, has not clearly grasped Barth's
doctrine that in the event of the cross God did not abandon
Himself or enter into contradiction with Himself. He strongly
protests against the absurdities of death of God theologies
when they say that God died when Christ died,1 but he does
allow such statements as 'in the surrender of the Son the
2
Father also surrenders Himself, though not in the same way.'
Moltmann does Insist that the Father did not suffer what the
•5
Son suffered. The Father suffered grief at the death of
His Son, and to that extent He remained the Father in His
4
self-surrender. But if Moltmann is to stand by this profound
doctrine of the gri?f of the Father as Father at the loss of
His Son, it is just this language of the Father surrendering
Himself which must at all costs be eschewed. There seems to
be an ambivalence in Moltmann as to whether God affirmed Him¬
self as God in the cross, or whether He abandoned Himself.
Insofar as this ambivalence leads to any weakening of the
doctrine of God's affirming Himself in the death of the Son,
it leads to a loss of God's power to save man, to be the God
1. ibid.. p. 207.
2. ibid., p. 243. Also: 'In the forsakenness of the Son the
Father also forsakes Himself.'
3. 'The suffering and dying of the Son, forsaken by the Father,
is a different kind of suffering from the suffering of the
Father in the death of the Son.' (ibid., p. 243).
4. Cf. also the excellent statement about 'the consummation
oT the Fatherhood of the Father' in the eschaton (ibid.,
p. 266).
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of man. But insofar as Moltmann avoids this ambivalence he
gives an excellent account of God's being God in the
suffering of Christ on the cross. It is an account of God
as the Father and the Son embracing in Himself the contra¬
diction to Himself of man1s sin. In this way he gives a
more concrete account than Barth of the reality of God in
Jesus' cry of dereliction.
Moltmann criticises Barth for retaining the distinction
between the immanent and the economic Trinity."*" Such a
distinction, he believes, hinders theology from affirming the
full involvement of God in the event of the cross, since it
implies a sense in which what God is in Himself He is not in
His dealings with men ad extra. Yet, as was shown above,
Barth holds that God in His obedience and in His taking up
man's sin 'strangely continues* the being which He is in
Himself. God Himself entered the depths. As He did so, He
was the God He eternally was, both in His union in Himself
and also in His freedom to be One and Another. Because God
in Himself this unity and this One and Another, He did not
abandon or contradict Himself when He went to the depths,
ad extra. On the contrary, He 'strangely continued' His
eternal being. Moltmann is unable to affirm this as unambig¬
uously as Barth. Because he refuses the distinction between
the immanent and economic Trinity, he cannot say as clearly
as Barth that the being of God as One and Another is maintained
and continued on the cross. Moltmann therefore comes close
2
to seeing, if not a contradiction in God on the cross, at least
1. ibid., p. 240.
2. Moltmann will allow no thought of contradiction in God,
ibid.. p. 244.
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a 'bifurcation'.1 For if the priority of the immanent
Trinity is denied, if it is not the immanent Trinity who
expresses Himself in the cross, what ground do we have for
saying that God's unity was not rant by the cry of dere¬
liction? What ground do we have for holding that God's unity
is stronger than all contradiction and able to overcome it?
Moltmann wishes to exclude all sense of 'deep division',
2
'contradiction' and paradox from God, but he could have
succeeded more effectively by showing that God in the event
of the cross was fulfilling His eternal deity, the deity
which He is antecedently in Himself.
Despite these reservations with Moltmann, his central
thesis does point the way to a doctrine of the very real
involvement of the trinitarian God in man's godforsakenness.
What is particularly valuable in his work for this study is
his witness to the Spirit. The Spirit moves out to
abandoned men as the Spirit of the God who took their abandon¬
ment into Himself and overcame it. Moltmann's language is
concrete and actualist, and he insists that theology speakcf
God and His involvement with man only as He is known at the
cross.
Anyone who speaks of God in Christian terms must tell
of the history of Jesus as a history between the Son
and the Father. In that case, 'God' is not another
nature or a heavenly person or a moral authority, but
in fact an 'event*. However, it is not the event of
co-humanity, but the event of Golgotha, the event of
1. ibid., p. 246.
2. ibid.. p. 244.
3. See the fine account of forsakenness as found in sinful
man, ibid., pp. 241-4.
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the love of the Son and the grief of the Father from
which the Spirit who opens up the future and creates
life in fact derives. (The Crucified God, p. 247)
Yet theology must have one final and serious reservation
with Moltmann. It has already been noted that his refusal
to think of the immanent Trinity as prior to the economic
Trinity1 compromises his witness to the power of the love of
God to include in itself and so to overcome man's 'forsaken¬
ness' , and the passage just quoted suffers from this weakness.
This refusal also deprives Moltmann of a basis for showing
the distinction in unity between the sufferings of Jesus and
those of other men. If theology does not see the basis on
which God is both One and Another in Himself, the basis on
which He is both One who is obeyed and One who obeys, i.e.,
the unity of the immanent Trinity in the Spirit, what basis
does it have for showing the Spirit to be the Spirit who joins
other men with Jesus without destroying their difference?
Moltmann in fact elides the suffering of Jesus and that of
other men. The suffering of God in Jesus becomes identical
2
with the suffering of men in concentration camps. Moltmann
obscures the completeness of the act of God in the cross of
Jesus, and therefore endangers the liberation of sinful men
1. Moltmann draws on K. Rahner here: K. Rahner, The Trinity,
trans. J. Doneeel (Burns & Oates, London, 1970), pp. 21-4.
2. e.g.. the astonishing statement: 'God in Aushwitz and
Auschwitz in the crucified God - that is the basis for a
real hope which both embraces and overcomes the world,
and the ground for a love which is stronger than death
and can sustain death.' (ibid., p. 278). For Earth,
as for orthodox protestantism, 'the ground for love which
is stronger than death' is Christ alone. 'The martyrs'
(ibid., p. 278) never share that status. Moltmann is
eliding the suffering of God in Jesus with His suffering
in the martyrs.
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in Him. He also deprives suffering men of their suffering
as men: he makes their suffering into something which it is
not, i.e., the suffering of God. The bond of love in the
Spirit between Jesus and other men is made into an identity
of being; or, more correctly, Moltmann has no way of
preventing this identity from taking place in his theology.
Thus, the love of Jesus for other men is robbed of its
compassion and grief, and other men are deprived of their
glory as those who are the objects of His love. Further,
man's redemption is endangered. Jesus' sufferings were
unique and strictly incomparable with those of other men
because in them God overcame the sin of the world. In His
sinless sufferings God made intercession for sinners. If His
sufferings are elided with the sufferings of sinners, He
cannot make intercession for sinners, and so sinners are
deprived of the love of God which, in the Spirit, moves out to
them to meet them in their sin and forsakenness and to
transform them.
The Act of the Intercessor
God's way of obedience into the far country of man's
ruin had a purpose: to intervene in person in order to avert
man's rushing headlong into the abyss. How did He do this?
By accepting unreserved solidarity1 with us sinners: 'He
willed to bear this need [of man's] as His own,... He took
2
it upon Himself, and He cries with man in this need.' He
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 215.
2. ibid.. p. 215.
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entered into our situation as our Brother, tempted and
assailed as we are. He came into closer engagement with
man's pride, cowardice, deceit and rebellion than any other
man.1 Why did He enter our situation? In order to change
it from within and therefore effectively to convert it to God.
In other words, Jesus Christ came to be the Saviour
of the world. This means that He came to be the Judge of
2
the world! This virtual identification of the titles
Saviour and Judge becomes clear and necessary when we note
the frequent meaning of the word Judge in the Bible.
The so-called "Judges" of the Old Testament in the
early period of the occupation of Canaan are described
as men awakened by God and their main office is to be
helpers and saviours in the recurrent sufferings of
the people at the hand of neighbouring tribes. It
was only in addition to this activity in "foreign
affairs" that they engaged in judging in the narrower
sense of the term. Similarly in the New Testament -
a fact which was later forgotten - the coming of the
Judge means basically the coming of the Redeemer and
Saviour. (ChD. IV/1, p. 217)
This broader meaning of the term Judge includes in it
the more obvious sense of pardoning and sentencing. Jesus
Christ is the ultimate Judge,^ perfectly just in His judgment,
5
against whose decision there can be no appeal. His appear¬
ance catches all men in the act of setting themselves up as
judges. No man can stand before Him: each man is judged
1. ibid., p. 216.
2. ibid.. p. 217.
3. ibid., p. 217.
4. ibid., p. 219.
5. ibid., p. 219.
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1
worthy of condemnation. As God, He holds each man to the
consequence of his pride as eternal damnation.
Yet if God appeared among us to make this radical
judgment, He did so only in order that He might fulfil that
sentence on Himself in all its unmitigated strictness, and
so pass on us an utterly merciful judgment. The Judge
came in order to be our gracious saviour.
As so often in Barth, the reader is confronted with a
truth which seems too good to be true. In the popular
mind, as in much 'evangelical* preaching, it is said that God
2
condemns by His justice. Yet the psalms connect God's
righteousness with His mercy, e.g. 'gracious is the Lord and
'Z
righteous, our God is merciful.' (Ps. 116: 5). Paul
argues in Romans that it is by His righteousness that God
4
justifies the ungodly. Although this knowledge was one
of the fundamental insights of Luther and the reformation
generally, protestant Churches have fallen back to thinking of
God's righteousness as that which is to be dreaded. God's
mercy has come to be seen as a weakening of His justice rather
than as a fulfillment of it. Evangelism has been robbed of
its greatest strength. Barth is well aware that his doctrine
sounds extraordinary, but he insists that the Church correct
its teaching and speak of God's judgment only as it is seen
1. ibid., p. 220.
2. Cf., Craig's Catechism: 'By [God's] mercy the chosen are
delivered, and the rest punished by His justice.'
T.F. Torrance, The School of Faith,(James Clarke, London,
1959), p. 102.
3. 'Good and upright is the Lord; therefore he instructs
sinners in the way.' (Ps. 25: 8).
4. Rom. 3: 26.
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in its execution in Jesus Christ. Admittedly, everything is
against the possibility that God should exercise His judgment
in this way, but in Jesus Christ the incredible thing has
happened: God has demonstrated His righteousness and His
judgment as sheer mercy.1
To some readers Barth's virtual identification of
salvation with judgment sounds legalistic and impersonal.
This problem has already been touched on in Chapter IV, and
it needs only to be said at this point that in Jesus Christ
God has exercised His judgment in a •personal1 and unlegal-
istic manner. The reservations which the reader may have
with Barth' s treatment of salvation in terms of justice
refer to the possibility of pursuing his thesis further,
particularly in the direction of a consideration of Christ's
saving work in terms of His priestly office. If Barth
had made Christ's priestly work more central, he would have
extended and enriched his thesis that all that Christ is and
does He is and does for us. He could have given greater
personal significance to his doctrine that Christ was judged
in our place, since it would have been perfectly clear that
Christ gave Himself - offered His own life-blood - for the
salvation of His brethren. Barth has recognised these possi¬
bilities (though perhaps not as fully as he could have done)
in a long footnote at the end of the subsection on the 'Judge
p
Judged in our place.' He shows that a study of Christ's
work as Priest confirms the conclusions he has reached in his
study of Christ as Judge. It was, therefore, a deliberate
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 222.
2. ibid.. pp. 273-83.
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decision on Barth's part to develop the doctrine of Christ
the Servant under the title of Judge rather than that of
Priest. His decision may be defended on the two grounds
that, first, the office of Judge is more fundamental than
that of Priest, since it has to do with man's right to live
and, second, the meaning of Christ as Judge in protestant
theology needs to be clearly understood in terms of His being
for us, and so rescued from all notions that He acts in it
in a 'legalistic'manner. Yet even when this is said it
remains a loss that Barth did not incorporate an interpre¬
tation of Christ the Priest more fully into his doctrine of
atonement. A potential in his theology remains unfulfilled,
a potential which relates to Christ's giving Himself
vicariously for sinners.
To return to the account of Barth's treatment of
Christ the Judge. God is free even as Judge. How He
carries out His judgment is His affair.^ How, then, has He
fulfilled His judgment?
What took place is that the Son of God fulfilled the
righteous judgment on us men by Himself taking our
place as men and in our place undergoing the judgment
under which we had passed. (C.D. IV/1, p. 222)
The Judge was judged in our place, for us. This 'for us' does
2
not indicate merely 'with us', but 'in our place'. The
Judge has done on our behalf and without our co-operation
1. Cf. H. Kttng, Justification, p.39. Barth underlines
IHe fact that God's judgment is His personal affair.
God would not be God if His reaction to wrong-doing could
be compared to a mechanism which functions, as it were,
independently of His free ruling and dispensing.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 221)
2. ibid., p. 229.
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what we cannot do. This radical exclusion of all human co¬
operation exists only for the sake of the radical 'for us*.
Barth fills out the content of the 'for us' in four
stages.
(1) Jesus Christ was and is for us in that He took our
place as Judge.3" According to Genesis 3, the root of man's
sin is his desire to be as God, himself the judge of good and
evil. He v/ishes to pronounce himself just and others guilty.
ile thus sets himself up in what he thinks is an inviolable
sanctuary. The coming of Jesus Christ the Judge attacks and
destroys this safe stronghold:
as very God and very man [He] has taken the place of
every man. He has penetrated to the place where every
man is in his inner being supremely by and for himself.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 232)
At this inner centre of our lives where we are for ourselves,
Jesus Christ took up His residence, in order to judge not in
His favour but in ours.
Barth observes that this means not only man's abasement
but also his liberation from the intolerable burden of
2
claiming to be judge. More important, this liberation
depends on man's having no part in its accomplishment: it
depends entirely on Christ's reversal of the human pride of
exalting himself as judge. It is He who converts man, He
who undoes Adam's pride.
What does Barth mean by saying that Christ took our
place? Clearly, he cannot mean that He took our place
1. ibid.. p. 231.
2. ibid.. pp. 233f.
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physically, since Christ displaced no one by His coming.
As the doctrine of the Virgin Birth indicates, He did not
even take the life of an already existing embryo or person.
Nor is the expression 'to take our place' meant only meta¬
phorically, since, if this were the case, we would have also
to say that His suffering; in our place is also metaphorical.
Similarly, Barth intends no nominalistic 'as if*. God sees
things as they really are, not as He wills to see them. If
God sees Christ as being in our place He really and actually
is in our place. How can this be? The answer would seem
to lie along these lines. We sinners have forfeited our
right to represent ourselves. God cannot call upon us to
answer ourselves, since, as has been shown, we are liars who
pervert the truth of our being. In Genesis 3 God came to
talk with Adam, but he was not there where he belonged. His
'replies* to God were evasive, shifting the responsibility
for his being and action onto others. He acquitted himself
and accused others. It is thus only with Christ, the sinless
One who does not lie, that man can answer for himself and take
responsibility for the being he is. It is only in Christ
that man is 'there' for God. Thus, it is only in Christ that
sinful man is there for God since only Christ acknowledges
man's sin. In this sense, Christ has taken our place.
IJf this accurately summarises Earth's meaning, he has
succeeded in avoiding any artificiality in the doctrine of
2
Christ's substitution in our place. Christ is the One who
1. Cf. D. Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, trans. J.C. Fletcher
TS.C.M., London, 19^9), pp. S2ff.
2. In other words, Barth gives a realistic account of what the
older theology called the imputation of our sin to Christ.
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could and did represent sinful man, without any action on
the part of sinful man. Jesus Christ did not actually
become identical with the sinners He represented, as the
absurd doctrine of 'commutation of persons' maintained.
Nor was He merely apparently in our place, 'as if' He were
there. Barth does not say that God saw and treated Christ
as though He were a sinner, when He knew that He was not.
If this were the case, God would be involved in an immoral
fiction, and the sinner could have no assurance that Christ
has really entered his place; or, more accurately, the
sinner's assurance would be as secure as it is supposed that
God is willing to regard Christ and men not as they in fact
are, but as He wills to see them. Against all this, Barth
demonstrates the 'legitimacy* of Christ's representing us,
and therefore the actuality of His taking our place in the
presence of God. God sees things as they really are, and
He sees that Christ the Judge is the one place where man's
being can be converted from false to true judgment.
(2) 'Jesus Christ was and is for us in that He took the
2
place of us sinners.' How can He come to this place where
we usurp the place of judge? He comes to our 'illegitimate*
place because 'as Judge He takes the place which belongs to
Him.'3
1. See P. Toon, Puritans and Calvinism (Reiner Publications,
Pennsylvania, 1973), pp. 97-9.
2. C.D. IV/1, p. 235.
3. ibid., p. 236.
239
The great and inconceivable thing is that He acts
as Judge in our place by taking on Himself, by
accepting responsibility for that which we do in
this place. (C.D. IV/1, p. 236)
n
He makes our evil case His own. He judges our sin in such
a way that He condemns it as He takes it upon Himself.
He as One can represent all and make Himself
responsible for the sin of all because He is very
man, in our midst, one of us, but as one of us He
is also very God and therefore He exercises and
reveals amongst us the almighty righteousness of
God. He can conduct the case of God against us
in such a way that He takes from us our own evil
case, taking our place and compromising and
burdening Himself with it.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 236)
As He does this, it ceases to be our sin. Our right to
represent our case is taken from us because it is now His.
He has accomplished the great exchange in which our sins,
with the accusation against them and the judgment and curse
which necessarily fall on us, fall instead on Him. It was
not an exchange merely in appearance, but in bitter earnest.
God Himself, in His eternal purity, willed to make our evil
2
case His own. Echoing Luther, Barth says that Christ is
quite alone in this: 'He is quite alone as disputatious man,
the transgressor, the enemy against God.' Therefore * our
sin is no longer our own but His. In this way He has
judged both our sin and ourselves as those who commit it.^
In view of this radical judgment of God, Barth makes
three observations about its scope. First, in that Jesus
1. ibid.. p. 236.
2. ibid.. p. 237.
3. ibid.. p. 238. See also Luther, Commentary on Galatians.
trans. J. Pelikan. Luther's Works Vol. 26 (Concordia.
Saint Louis, 1963), pp. 276-91.
4. ibid.. p. 238.
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Christ has taken our place, He reveals to us what our place
is;"*" second, it is He and not we ourselves who answer for
our sins: he has taken our sins out of our hands once and
2
for all; and, finally, our being as evil doers is over and
done with for ever, but, be it noted, it is not merely our
sins, but we ourselves as the doers of these sins, who are
■55
passed over and destroyed.
(3) 'Jesus Christ was and is for us in that He suffered
Ll
and was crucified and died.' By this Barth means that God
Himself was active in the passion of Christ, suffering what
was needed in order to make a complete end of sin. God Him-
5 6
self intervened in person^ to wrestle with sin and to defeat
it. In this action He suffered: His action was identical
7
with His passion. His being for us sinners was His
suffering for us.
It could be said that Christ 'suffered what we ought to
have suffered',
But [this] is true only as it derives from the
decisive thing that in the suffering and death of
Jesus Christ it has come to pass that in His own
person He has made an end of us sinners and there¬
fore of sin itself by going to death as the One who
took our place as sinners. In His person He has
delivered up us sinners and sin itself to destruction.
He has removed us sinners and sin, negated us, can¬
celled us out; ourselves, our sin, and the accusation,
condemnation and perdition which had overtaken us.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 253)
1. ibid. pp. 240f.
2. ibid. pp. 24lf„.
3. ibid. pp. 242f.
4. ibid. p. 244.
5. ibid. p. 251.
6. ibid. p. 247.
7. ibid. pp• 244ff
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It was not punishment as such which Jesus Christ suffered,
but punishment in the sense that He suffered what was
needed to satisfy for the removal of the obstacle to God's
love, i.e., the sinner.
For the sake of this best, the worst had to happen.1
A number of points call for comment here.
1. Barth holds that it was the sinner who was
destroyed. In Pauline language, the old man, Adam, has
been crucified. God is not merely against sin: He sets
His face against the doer of it. Sin has its origin in the
sinner and cannot be separated from him without artificiality
and nominalism. This is an important point, since there is
a tendency in many theories of the atonement to think of sin
rather much as a 'substance' and hence to introduce somewhat
mechanical, perhaps even magical, notions regarding its
removal. It is notoriously difficult to speak accurately
in this area, and often inadequate language is used where
something like Barth's meaning is intended. However, Barth
has purified and made more precise our concept of the removal
of sin. At least in this part of the Dogmatics it is quite
clear what is involved is not a payment of so much suffering
for so much sin, nor an incomprehensible transference of sin,
as if it were a substance, from the sinner to Christ. As
indicated above, Christ took the sinner's place and there
judged Himself in his place, thus suffering for him. Without
artificiality, He took responsibility for the sinner. In
His death as the God-man He destroyed the being of the
sinner for whom He legitimately assumed responsibility.
1. ibid.. p. 254.
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As noted above, Barth does not hold that Christ and
the sinner change places. Apart from the impossibility of
it, this would be immoral, since the innocent One would be
punished and the guilty let go.1 Rather, Christ as the
God-man took the place of sinners in such a way that He
killed the sinner in His death. This was just. Righteous
and proper judgment was passed on the sinner; he was
banished from God's sight, crucified, burnt up in God's fiery
wrath as completely as a burnt-offering in Jewish ritual.
Right and proper judgment was passed on Christ. He was not
treated as though He were a sinner, but as the righteous Son
1. Thomas Erskine expressed this point particularly well:
•What is the meaning of the sufferings of Christ...?
.... One answer that would be pretty generally given
to this question is, "That he came to save sinners,
and that he could accomplish this only by suffering
in their stead the punishment due to their sin, because
thus only their salvation could be reconciled with divine
justice, and thus only could it become a righteous thing
with God to remit the punishment of real offenders....".
This view of the atonement,...has, I know, been
held by many living members of [Christ's] body; and yet
I believe that, with some truth in it, it contains
much error....I may observe that it would not be
considered justice in an earthly judge were he to accept
the offered sufferings of an innocent person as a
satisfaction for the lawful punishment of a guilty person.
And as the work of Christ was wrought to declare and
make manifest the righteousness of God...to the minds
and consciences of men, it is not credible that that
work should contain a manifestation really opposed to
their minds and consciences....Christ died for every man,
as the head of every man, not by a fiction of law, not
in a conventional way, but in reality as the head of
the whole mass of the human nature, which, although
composed of many members is one thing - one body - in
every part of which the head is truly present.'
The Brazen Serpent (David Douglas, Edinburgh, 1879),
pp. 40-2.
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of God who in the strength of His own righteous judgment
carried the sinner and his sins into oblivion. Barth is
not saying that Christ was judged to be a sinner, - this
would be both fictitious and unjust. Rather, Christ was
judged competent and worthy to deal decisively with the
sinner and his sin. As this One Christ truly and really
'bore our sins in His own body on the tree.'1 Barth is not
taking offence at the radical language of Paul about Christ
being made sin and a curse £>r us, but rather making it
possible for us to see the reality and the justice of such
language. In this way, Barth is providing a kind of
commentary on Luther's famous exegesis of Galatians 3: 13.
2. In this doctrine of reconciliation, Barth is
making use of the ontology of the Dogmatics. Every man is
created in Christ andevery man has sinned and so forfeited
his being, having become a prey to eternal death. In His
mercy the Son of God has intervened in person, meeting man's
fall into the abyss and so arresting it. As He was handed
over to death, so He has handed over to death the death of
sinners, thus restoring them to life in Himself. All this
happened in Him and not in them, and therefore it is only in
Him that the being of the old man is dead. Yet, in Him, the
old man is no more.
« •
(4) In one respect these three preceding points
give a complete account of Christ in our place. Yet it
needs to be added that Christ's suffering in our place only
1. I Pet. 2: 24.
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appears to be negative. It is in fact supremely positive
because He has done right in our place. We exalt ourselves,
arrogating to ourselves the office of judge, making ourselves
like God. We acquit ourselves and judge others. We are
disobedient. Refusing to repent of our sins we justify
ourselves and thereby repeat the origin of all sin. Jesus
Christ reversed this: He humbled Himself, judged Himself
and interceded for others. He was obedient. He confessed
our sin, making resolute and indeflectible repentance for us.
He reversed Adam's fall, converting the human situation.
In a long and deeply penetrating footnote, Barth inter¬
prets Jesus' passion as His obedient repentance for sinners.
Jesus could be tempted as all men are, but His specific
temptation was to repent of His calling to make repentance
for His brethren. The three temptations of the tempter
immediately following His baptism aimed at this. 'The third
temptation, according to Luke's account, is the most astonish¬
ing of all.*1 The tempter suggests that He step out in utter
faith (as it would seem) so that God would justify Him,
vindicating His faith. Yet to obey this subtle temptation
would in fact be to require God to justify His (Jesus')
actions and thus to put Himself in the right over and against
God. He would thereby cease to put God in the right against
Himself.
He would have tried triumphantly to maintain His
Tightness with God instead of persisting in penitence,
instead of allowing God to be in the right against
Him. In an act of supreme piety, in the work of a
mystical enthusiasm, He would have betrayed the cause
of God by making it His own cause, by using it to
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 262.
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fulfil His own self-justification before God.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 263)
He would have stepped out of fellowship with the sinners
baptised in Jordan, and He would have ceased to make
repentance for them.
At the culmination of His obedience Jesus was again
tempted to abandon His repentance for sinners. In the
desert and throughout His ministry Jesus had constantly
resisted the devil, unceasingly repenting of man's sin, but
in the Garden of Gethsemane it seemed that the tempter
'returned all the more powerfully to avenge [his] defeat.'1
Yet the horror of Gethsemane was not this, nor even Jesus'
vision of the sin of the world, but God's answer to His
prayer. Barth. makes three points about the agony in the
Garden: 1. Jesus was quite alone: there can be no thought
of the disciples or the Church 'assisting' or even watching
with Jesus. 2. God did not reply in words to Jesus' prayer.
His answer was 'the sign of the prophet Jonah....God will
give His answer to the prayer only in this inconceivable,
2
this frightful event...* Barth comments:
Note that [the answer] came in the same language in
which Satan now spoke with Him as the prince of this
aeon, triumphantly avenging His contradiction and
opposition in the wilderness. The will of God was
done on earth as the will of Satan was done The
coincidence of the divine and Satanic will and work
and word was the problem, the darkness in which Jesus
addressed God in Gethsemane.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 268)
1. ibid., p. 266.
2. ibid., p. 268.
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3. Jesus therefore prayed that the 'good will...of
God...should not coincide with the evil will...of the tempter
and of the world controlled by him, the hamartoloi.11 He
clearly wished that it might not be so, yet He did not set
2
His will against God, thus setting up a 'precondition* to
obedience. He was 'shaken' by 'the coming concealment of
the lordship of God under the lordship of evil and evil men.',
yet He did not demand that God order things as He desired:
...He only prays, He does not demand. He does not
advance any claims. He does not lay upon God any
conditions. He does not reserve His future
obedience. He does not abandon His status as a
penitent. He does not cease to allow that God is
in the right, even against Himself.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 270)
He prayed 'Thy will be done' not in resignation but in praise
of the holiness of God's will. It must not be forgotten
what 'Jesus was taking on Himself with this: Thy will be done.'
It was a matter of divine judgment being taken out of
the hands of Jesus and placed in these supremely
unrighteous judges and executed by them upon Him....
It was a matter of the obedience and penitence in
which Jesus had persisted coming to fruition in His
own rejection and condemnation.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 271)
This prayer was answered as no other prayer has been
answered. Jesus received strength to carry through His
penitence to the end, 'punishing the sin of the world by
4
bearing it Himself.' He thus defeated Satan and the
hamartoloi even as they worked their will on Him. In this
1. ibid.. p. 269.
2. ibid.. p. 269.
3. ibid.. p. 269.
4. ibid., p. 271.
247
manner He fulfilled all righteousness just as He had engaged
Himself to do when He entered the way of penitence with the
hamartSloi in Jordan.
This footnote has been summarised at some length
because it gives a particularly rich account of the heart¬
beat of Earth's doctrine of Christ's suffering in our place.
As with Calvin, the centre of Christ's substitionary work j
is located in His obedience. Jesus Christ put God in the
right over and against Himself, and this obedience consisted
in His thorough binding of Himself to sinners. United with
them, He suffered in their place. His sufferings may be
described as His being punished in our place. Barth is
also willing to indicate the harshness of Christ's sufferings,
and he believes that Christ was forsaken by the Father. The
cry of dereliction is for Barth the key to the interpretation
of Christ's work on the cross."5"
Yet for Barth Christ's obedience to the Father and His
sustaining our punishment has the character of repentance.
This was by no means excluded by Calvin, and it is impossible
to miss the origins of this thought in his constant insis¬
tence on Christ both as sinless and as sinner, i.e., on
Christ as sinless in Himself and as bearing sins not His
2
own. Calvin had little to say of Christ taking the sin of
the world on Himself, and much to say of its being laid on Him.
Calvin was thinking of Isaiah 53» and of the great Pauline
1. Cf., also C.D. IV/3, pp. 388-97.
2. see. e.g., P. van Buren, Christ in Our Place (Oliver and
Boyd, Edinburgh, 1957), pp. 45-7.
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texts which say that Christ was made sin and a curse for us.
The imagery of John's Gospel, connecting Christ's obedience
with His being the lamb of God, also point to His bearing
sin as that which was laid upon Him. Barth has shown that
theology must also think of Christ's active taking man's sin
to Himself, and especially to His 'identification' with
sinners at the Jordan. Barth has indicated the intrinsic
connection between Christ's sinlessness and His 'identifi¬
cation' with sinners.
It is, however, surprising that Barth did not develop
further this very penetrating account of Jesus 'repentance'
in our place. Christ's attitude of mind, His repentance
is central for Barth. His fulfillment of all righteousness
consisted in His penitence, but this perception needs to be
pursued further, especially as it bears on the repentance of
sinners as they turn to God.
In McLeod Campbell's The Nature of the Atonement, the
forgiving righteousness of God is seen as the foundation of
the atonement. According to Campbell, God has in Him no
vindictive will, such as we would find in a proud man.1 On
the contrary, God's righteousness is expressed in free,
2
forgiving love. He saw God's forgiveness to sinners to be
1. This point is developed from his early sermons Sermons and
Lectures. Vol. 1 (R.B. Lusk, Greenock, 1832), pp. 11-3 •
2. Campbell is particularly thinking of the awesome nature of
God in His forgiveness: 'There is forgiveness with thee,
that thou mayest feared.• (Ps. 130: 4).
'The first demand which the gospel makes upon us in
relation to the atonement is, that we believe that there
is forgiveness with God. Forgiveness - that is, love to
an enemy surviving hisenmity, and which, notwithstanding
his enmity, can act towards him for his good; this we
must be able to believe to be in God towards us, in order...
to believe in the atonement.' Nature of the Atonement
(James Clarke, London, 1959), p. 18.
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as free and unconditioned as ours should be (but is not) to
our neighbours (cf. Eph. 4: 32). Indeed, the very nature of
righteousness and holiness is the very opposite of vindictive-
ness. Holiness is that which sorrows over the sins of men.1
Righteousness bears insults and desires the restoration of
the offender. Thus, what God required from men was a
confession of the evil which they commit as evil. But this
2
is gust what men as sinners cannot do. This is what Christ
does for men. As the perfectly righteous One, He sees sin
for the utter evil that it is and acknowledges the righteous-
■5S
ness of God's judgment. He justifies God. But He does
more than this. Righteousness means to love one's neighbour
as oneself. He loves His neighbour as Himself,^- and confesses
his sins as His own. By virtue of His holiness He bore the
sin of the world and made expiation for it. Loving His
brethren whose flesh He shared and whom He loved as Himself,
He prayed vicariously: 'I said, I will confess my trans¬
gressions unto the Lord; and thou forgavest the iniquity of
my sin.' (Ps. 32: 5).^ He thus received the divine forgive¬
ness on behalf of men.
Campbell's superior penetration is apparent in his
account of the mind which was in Christ, the obedience in
which He made repentance and received forgiveness for sinners.
1. J.M. Campbell, Nature of the Atonement, p. 140.
2. ibid.. pp. 144, 149.
3. ibid., pp. 119-21.
4. ibid.. pp. 230-1.
5. ibid.. p. 294.
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The mind that was in Christ, according to Campbell, was His
perfect love to God and His love for His neighbour as
Himself.1 As God in His righteousness sorrowed over the
sins of men, so He in His righteousness sorrowed over men.
This conception of Christ's sufferings as His holy sorrow
over sinners goes beyond Barth. Barth does indeed understand
holiness as the freedom of God to come to the sinner's side
1. J.M. Campbell, Responsibility for the Gift of Eternal Life
(MacMillan, London, 1873), pp. 14f.; Mature of the Atone¬
ment, pp. 125ff., 230f. G.S. Hendry, Tjae Gospel of the
Incarnation (S.C.M., London, 1959), p. 101, observes t!hat
•both McLeod Campbell and Barth have pointed out that
Christ's so-called summary of the law in the two command¬
ments of love is the law of his own life, in which it is
perfectly manifested.' Campbell and Barth are formally
the same here and Barth's account of Christ as fulfilling
the two-fold law of love is extremely powerful (C.D. III/2,
'Jesus, Man for Other Men', pp. 203-22, esp. pp. 2lbf.),
but Barth lacks some of Campbell's penetration into the
material content of Christ's loving His neighbour as Him¬
self.In development of Barth's own moving perception
into Christ's bearing sin as His compassion for His
neighbour (pp. 211f.) it can be said that the Son, loving
His Father with all His heart, soul, strength and mind,
completely embodied His Father's yearning over His sinful
people: He sorrowed over them with the holy love which
hates sin and so answered to His Father's desire for the
purification of sinners. Campbell says: 'Loving the
Father with all His heart and mind and soul and strength,
the Saviour loved His brethren as Himself. He, the
perfect elder brother, unlike the elder brother in the
parable, sympathised in all the yearnings of the Father's
heart over His prodigal brethren; and the love which in
the Father desired to be able to say of each of them, My
son was dead and is alive again.,.; in Him equally
desired to be able to say, My brother was dead, and is
alive again...' (Nature of Atonement, pp. 125-6).
Campbell's insight into the yearning, sorrow and pain of
the Father's heart as embodied in the Son as He sought for
lost sons fills out the content of Barth's perception, and
gives it an even greater personal character. This point
corresponds to the argument of K. Kitamori that without in¬
sight into the content of the pain of God in the cross,
talk of the incarnation becomes 'empty formalism'
(Theology of the Pain of God, E.T. (S.C.M., London, 1966),
P. 43).
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and to overcome his sin, but he does not speak of it as
God's sorrow for sin. Some passages from McLeod Campbell
will indicate what is involved here.
...what I contemplate is the following out of the
conception of the Son of God suffering in suffering
flesh that which is the perfect response of the
divine holiness and divine love in humanity to the
aspect of the divine mind in the Father towards the
sins of men. (Nature of the Atonement, p. 140)
Again:
Surely the tears of holy sorrow shed over the sins of
others - the tears, for example, of a godly parent
over a prodigal son, are not penal, nor, if shed
before God in prayer, and acknowledged in the merci¬
ful answer of prayer in God's dealing with that
prodigal, are they therefore to be conceived of as
having been penal. But the fact is, that God
grieves over our sins is not so soon received into
the heart as that God punishes sin, - and yet, the
faith that He so grieves is infinitely more important,
as having power to work holiness in us, than the faith
that He so punishes, however important....Men more
easily believe that Christ's sufferings shew how God
can punish sin, than that these sufferings are the
divine feelings in relation to sin....
(Nature of the Atonement, pp. 140-1)
And again:
...He has taken the nature and become the brother of
those whose sins He confesses before the Father, and...
He feels concerning their sins what, as the holy one
of God, and as perfectly loving God and man, He must
feel. (Nature of the atonement, p. 146)
An, ever richer account of Christ's holiness in the atonement
is found in Irving:
"he bare our sins in his own body on the tree;"...
in that body of flesh and blood...our sins were
borne...and yet he was sinless. How so? His per¬
fect righteousness...made him love men and all mankind
as he loved himself. Our sins were thrilling up
into his soul, as if they had been all his own; from
the ends of the earth, and the two extremes of mankind,
the beginning and the ending, the sins of all flesh
came up in a dark cloud to cover his soul with dis¬
trust and dismay: and the gathering darkness is
called in Scripture "the hour and power of darkness."
Great was his terror and agony and forsakenness;....
252
This is the nature of sin-bearing. It is not as if
sins were laid upon, and lapped about him like a
physical covering. The sting of sin is not outward
and physical, but inward in the conscience, in the
darkness, distance, and alienation from God, in the
waste desolation of soul, and dismal forsakenness of
God which it worketh...
This concentration of a world's guilt came upon
him because he was holy and righteous; and by virtue
of his right manhood he felt every man's transgression
as his own; and speaketh as his own of them in the
Psalms. And their effect upon him, their number
against him, their strength to sever between him and
God, was all the same as if they had been his own.
And so bearing them in his flesh, gathering them all
within his grasp he lifted them from the earth, and
strangled them upon the Cross....
.•..What made him capable of gathering within
his heart the sins of all men? His holiness, his
perfection of holy manhood....Christ though Son of God
was a perfect man, and therefore perfectly one with
all other men, notwithstanding the distinctness of
their personality; and every man's sin was his in the
experience and feeling of it, Just because he was
himself holy and sinless....God was well pleased with
him therefore, because thereby he felt as God intended
man to feel, unity of substance with all other men,
notwithstanding the distinctness of their personality.
....The most holy man is the greatest sin-confessor;
and a perfectly holy man, that is Christ, is the
confessor of all sin; as we find him to be in all
the Psalms which speak of him.
(Christ's Holiness in Flesh, pp. 60-63)
In view of this picture of the mind which was in
Christ, the following points can be made.
1. Christ's righteousness consisted in His loving
sinners as Himself.
2. In this righteousness He knew the evil of sin and,
3. also took that sin to Himself and bore it in His
person as His own. At this point the doctrine of Christ
as Judge must be enriched to include that of Christ as
Priest. Though Barth says that the two doctrines coincide,
it is difficult to give full scope to Christ's vicarious
work without including a discussion of His priestly office.
In order to gain access to the structure of the priestly
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office, it will be helpful for a moment to refer again to
Blake's poem London, discussed in Chapter I in relation to
the poet's conception of his (self-chosen) priestly role.
In that poem, the poet speaks on behalf of the victimised
child who is unable to represent himself. By his act of
imaginative self-identification with the child, he spoke
and (In a certain sense) suffered in his place. There is
posited here a substitionary role for the poet endowed with
imagination, a role which indirectly points to the priestly
role of Christ. In both cases, an incapacitated person is
represented by another who does something costly for him and
which engages with his needy situation. In both cases this
work is done through a power which transcends their common
humanity but which also indwells it. For Blake, this power
is the creative imagination, man's innermost spirit which
exists at the central point where man is constituted man, and
which therefore enables one man to compassionate with another.
It was argued that Blake's view was an audacious and ill-
founded assertion of innocence and that only Christ's
righteousness is truly able to represent others. Barth
says that only He has the competence to represent others
because He is also God: 'because He was the Son of God and
1
Himself God, He had the competence and the power' to suffer
in our place. As the Son of God through whom all men are
created, He held all men in being and could legitimately take
their place. This is surely correct but more must be said.
First, it is the triune God who acts in the Son of God, the
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 223.
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God who is also Spirit and in whom the Creator integrates
the inner centre of the life without displacing it, and
who therefore enables the Son to compassionate with all
other men. Without this reference to the Creator Spirit
in the Son of God, without this reference to God's being in
act whereby He is both One aid Another without competition or
lust for absorption, how can the Son identify Himself with
others without either absorbing them into Himself or being
so separate from them as to substitute them without repre¬
senting them? Second, it is by His innocence that He
represented others without absorbing or replacing them:
loving them as Himself He can interpose Himself for them in
such a way that He acts for them with the same seriousness
and effectiveness as He is Himself. Again, it is in the
Spirit that the Son does this. The doctrine of the Epistle
to the Hebrews, much used by Campbell and Irving, that it
was by the eternal Spirit that Christ offered Himself in
innocence to God on behalf of sinners, answers the view of
Blake that it is the creative imagination which endows man
with the competence to represent those who cannot represent
themselves. This doctrine also delivers the doctrines of
imputation and substitution of the impersonal notions of
transference which have crept into them. Because Barth
does not specify the God who makes the Son competent to
suffer in the sinner's place as the Spirit, he has not wholly
escaped these notions even in Volume IV of the Dogmatics.
4. It was in the strength of His righteousness that
Christ confessed, Judged and 'strangled' the sin which He
bore in Himself. He made repentance for the sin of the
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world, sorrowing over sin and thus existing it. Christ*s
sorrow over sin also awakens repentance in sinners with a
life-giving sorrow which penal notions tend to stifle. It
is a great loss in the Dogmatics that Barth does not
develop Christ*s obedient repentance as His sorrow.
5. This sorrow of Christ, as His loving His brethren
as Himself, included His utterance of the Amen in our humanity
to God*s condemnation of sin. Further, He made intercession
for us sinners. He is therefore the one place where sinners
may utter the Amen to God's condemnation of their sin.
Since genuine forgiveness implies condemnation of offences,
this Amen gives the sinner access to God's pure forgiveness.
Again, the doctrine of the Spirit is inescapeable, since by
the Spirit man participates in the intercessions of Christ.1
The weakening of this dimension of Barth*s Christology leads
to the narrowing of the understanding of the self-judgment
of sinners as they participate in Christ.
6. For the sake of completeness it should be added at
this point that this conception of the righteousness of the
1. D. Sdlle, op.cit.. pp. 88-91, complains that Barth's
conception of substitution replaces sinners so that they
. have no place of their own. She completely ignores
Barth's argument about our place in Christ, and has no
notion of Christ's continuing work as Mediator (cf.
J. Moltmann, op.cit., pp. 262-5), but it must be said that
the doctrine of Christ's righteousness in the Spirit
answers more effectively than can either Barth or Moltmann
her fears about Christ in our place. By the Spirit,
Christ, who acted totally for and without incapacitated
sinners (Solle, p. 89), brings them actively to share in
His continuing intercessions, and so He does not by-pass
their willingness to live in Him but in fact makes
them willing to do it.
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Son of God in His bearing our sins, also indicates how He
communicates His righteousness to us without artificiality.
Calvin asks:
How are we righteous in the sight of God? It is
assuredly in the same respect in which Christ was
judged a sinner, that he might be a criminal in
our room, and might be dealt with as a sinner, not
for his offences but for those of others....It is
in the same manner, assuredly, that we are now
righteous in him.
(Commentary on II Corinthians, p. 244)
If, then, through His righteousness whereby He loved sinners
as Himself, Christ was righteously judged as bearing sins
not His own, so we, though sinners, are by the same righteous¬
ness righteously judged to be righteous in Him. If we add
that Christ was righteous in this way through the Holy Spirit,
every suggestion of artificiality will be purged from the
doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us,
and it will further be clear that we are neither absorbed
into Him nor established separately from Him. We are
righteous in Him.
These points regarding Barth's understanding of
Christ's repentance have been made in order to draw out a
development which Barth's theology needs.
The Vindication of the Intercessor
If Jesus Christ is the Judge judged in our place, our
being as sinners and our sin has been overcome in Him. Our
sins are not merely potentially forgiven: in Him, they are
forgiven. He does not become our Saviour as we decide for
Him: He is Himself our Saviour. But it would have been
possible for God to leave the matter there, with ourselves
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1
and our sins dead on the cross. It was only the sheer
mercy of God that He performed the new act of vindicating
Christ, of raising Him from the dead and so raising us to
2
newness of life. By this act, God vindicated His own
righteousness in demanding obedience unto death from Christ
and also He vindicated Christ's righteousness in obeying
Him even to the death of the cross. The resurrection was
the mighty act of justification: 'He was raised for our
justification.' (Rom. 4: 25).^ This means that we have a
future, a future as justified men, and that our justification
is not in ourselves but in Christ. He, He Himself, is our
justification.
Ever since Lessing (with his perception of the 'ugly
ditch' of history)^ it has been difficult to understand how
Christ who lived nearly 2000 years ago can be present to us
here and now. The problem has normally been solved by
saying that Christ by His work established for us the
possibility of life and justification and that it remains
5
for us to actualise that possibility by our act of faith.
Much has been made of the human act of appropriation.
Earth will have none of this: Jesus Christ is risen and
He comes across the centuries to us. He is our living
Contemporary.
1. C.D. IV/1, pp. 296-7.
2. ibid.. pp. 304—9.
3. ibid.. pp. 305-6.
4. ibid., p. 287.
5. see Barth's dissatisfaction with Bultmann in this respect,
ibid., p. 285.
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Yet it is not merely that Christ seems to be
separated from us by space and time. That is merely an
intellectual problem and does not touch the profound
spiritual problem of how we sinners can exist together with
the Holy One. As He approaches us, will we not cry out as
Peter did: *Depart from me, Lord, for I am a sinful man1
(Lk. 5: 8)?1 Jesus Christ is again the answer. He has
destroyed our sinful being and now comes to us as the One
in whom we have new being. He Himself is our transition
from our sinful being to our justified being. Barth has
much of deep spiritual insight to say in relation to this
point, but, for the purpose of this study, it needs only to
be underlined that the resurrected Christ is God's Yes to
sinners and that in Him men do have 'room' and space of their
own to live as justified men.
Now that we have before us Barth's doctrine of
election, of Christ's incarnation, cross and resurrection as
these indicate God's movement to man, three important points
come into view. First, from the beginning to end of this
work, righteousness is at work. In election, God elected
Himself as He who loves man as Himself; in Christ's incarnation
God expressed His right to become man; in His obedience
unto death, He exercised His right to be the Judge judged in
our place; and in His resurrection, the Father vindicated
His righteousness as suffering for our sin and thereby
established ourrighteousness. Thus, in proving His right¬
eousness God justified us sinners. His righteousness and
1. ibid.. p. 290.
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His mercy are identical. Second, to say the same thing in
another way, this entire work of God's - in its origin,
execution and vindication - is His being for us. In
election, He affirmed the identity of His being for Himself
with His being for us; in His incarnation, Christ became
man in order to take his place and to do him good there; in
His cross, He was obedient unto death in order to repent of
man's sin, to convert him from death to life; and in His
resurrection, He was raised as the One in whom man's new
being has been established. The work of McLeod Campbell
and Irving was used above in order to strengthen this thesis.
To say the same thing from a third angle, Christ's work of
justification is identical with His person. His being is in
His act. He Himself is the living One who is the justifi¬
cation of sinners.
A serious incompleteness in Barth's account of God's
movement to man now comes into view. Earlier he was praised
for recognising that the triune God was wholly involved in
the obedience of the Son, but now it must be said that he has
not carried this perception through to its climax: he gives
scarcely any recognition to the Spirit of the Father in the
Son's self-offering on the cross. He recognises the
Spirit's work in the incarnation and the resurrection, thus
acknowledging His work in forming the new creation out of the
old, but if the Father and the Spirit were not wholly
involved in the passion of the Son, how can we speak of the
cross as an event in God's own history? How can we speak
of the Father, in confirmation of His eternal Fatherhood,
bearing the loss whereby He could destroy the old creation
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and raise up sons to Himself? How can we speak of the
Spirit who, in confirmation of His eternal love of the
Father and the Son displayed to the uttermost on the cross,
become the Spirit who adopts aliens as the sons of God?
Has not Barth thereby to some extent at least mitigated
the severity of the love in which the Father yearned over
His prodigal creatures, sent His Son into the far country
to repent in holy sorrow of their sin and thereby also
raised up sons through His Spirit who would run into the
Father's open arms with tears of joy?
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CHAPTER VI
THE CONVERSION OF HUMAN NATURE IN THE SON
In the previous chapter it was seen that Barth under¬
stands God the Son to be He who humbled Himself to become
man, to be God as man* As this man He brought man's sin
to a full end. In this chapter Earth1s discussion of the
conversion of human nature in Jesus Christ will be examined.
It is not -enough (glorious gift though it is) for man's sin
to be destroyed and replaced with righteousness. For man
truly to be man he needs to live a new life: he needs
conversion. This conversion has taken place first of all in
Jesus Christ, and He is the basis and power of the turning to
God of other men. It is this doctrine which especially
concerns this study, particularly as many theologies locate
the central point of man's conversion, not in Christ, but in
these other men who are the object of His work.
A point regarding terminology needs to be made. Barth
is dissatisfied with the static and impersonal overtones of
the terminology of classical Christology, and so he prefers
to speak not of Christ's human nature (Natur) but of His
human essence (Wesen). Unfortunately, to speak of human
essence only adds to the impersonal sound of the idea in
English, and so for the sake of clarity Barth's usage has
been retained only when specific reference is made to his
thought.
This study is concerned with the turning to God of
men other than Jesus Christ and the following account of
Barth's discussion of Christ's human nature will be oriented
toward that question. Three questions in particular will
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direct the account. First, does Barth give the humanity of
Christ its full amplitude? Second, is there in fact a
conversion of human nature in Barth's account of Christ?
And, third, is the exaltation of human nature in Christ as
Barth conceives it in fact communicable to others? These
questions will not be tackled directly until the following
section is reached, but they will form a pattern of guidance
for the present task.
Barth believes that the traditional understanding of
the vere homo of Jesus Christ, though correct, must be
deepened. This traditional account includes two elements:
(a) Christ had that humanity in common with all other men,
i.e., that which makes a man distinct from all other beings,^
and (b) He also had a particular determination of that
2
creaturehood, flesh. By flesh, Barth means man under
divine condemnation, adamic man. This account does not speak
of the representative power of the vere homo and leaves
Christ's humanity rather much in the air as something which
exists for its own sake rather than for others. Barth
argues that because we have here the humanity of the Son of
God we have also the true man who, precisely in being this
true man, is unlike us so that He may be wholly what we are.
He finds that Jesus Christ gives Himself to be known as the
'good creature of God and also flesh*,^ and that He is both
1. C.D. IV/2, p. 25.
2. ibid.. p. 25.
3. Barth does not actually say this, but it is clear that he
is dissatisfied with the traditional account of the
vere homo.
4. C.D. IV/2, p. 27.
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completely like and completely unlike us.1 This is not only
because His humanity is something which ours is not, i.e.,
the humanity of the Son of God, but also because His humanity
2
is exalted humanity. His human essence is not destroyed
•3
or altered, it is exalted. This exaltation brings human
essence to its true status: it is freely itself and therefore
truly itself. Because His human essence is exalted, while
still being our human essence, our human essence is exalted
4
to God.
This is the very briefest answer to the question of
the vere homo of Jesus Christ. The vere homo has for Barth
a vicarious quality. It is our humanity, only it is our
5
humanity differently from ours and in such a way that ours
is exalted in it. It is surprising that Barth connects this
vicarious power more closely with His union with the Son of
God than with His sinlessness, i.e.. with the act and
righteousness of His human will - though it should be noted
that the freedom and spontaneity of Christ's will as man is
essential to Barth's argument. Barth says that the exaltation
of human essence in Jesus takes place in 'free, spontaneous
/r
and inward agreement with the will...of God', and it is
therefore clear that it is not in a special kind of 'humanity'
1. ibid.. p. 27.
2. ibid.. p. 28.
3. ibid., p. 28.
4. ibid.. p. 30.
5. ibid.. p. 28: 'Because and as He is the Son of God, He is
exactly the same as we are, but quite differently.'
6. ibid.. p. 29.
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(as though that were possible) but in our humanity that this
exaltation takes place. However, for Barth the vicarious
power of Christ's humanity depends more on its being the
humanity of the Son of God than on its being our humanity,
i.e., our humanity in which He does not do as we do.
The exaltation of human essence must be understood in
three phases.1 First, in its 'first and final base in the
2
divine decree of grace.' There is nothing contingent in
■3
the exaltation of human essence. More, the exaltation of
man in Jesus Christ in no 'by product' of divine willing, or
one purpose among others: it is the divine will. The
exaltation of man and his sanctification is the will of God
for which He has determined Himself from eternity, and for which
He humbled and gave Himself in the history of Jesus Christ.
Therefore, man's sanctification has this absolutely firm and
unshakeable foundation. Second, this divine will was
realised in time, in the flesh of Jesus Christ. And, finally,
the realisation of this will in flesh was revealed in the
resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ. In other words,
the exaltation of man originated in the divine counsel and
was the whole of that counsel; it was actualised in the
flesh of Christ and is now revealed and imparted to men
through Him.
The actualisation of the eternal will to exalt man
particularly concerns this study because it is the 'place'
in which human nature was converted to God. It is necessary
1. ibid.. p. 31.
2. ibid.. p. 31.
3. ibid.. p. 31.
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to gain a clear picture of what Barth has in mind here.
The 'Vere Homo' of Jesus Christ
God did not cease to be God when He became man. His
becoming a creature was the 'act of divine majesty',but it
p
was the majesty of divine humility. This is why it was
neither the Father nor the Spirit who became man. Not that
the Father and the Spirit are not also humble, but 'humility
is not alien to...the true God, but supremely proper to Him
A
in His mode of being as the Son.' Thus, man does not cease
to be man, but for the first time becomes true man, himself,
in his assumption by the Son of God. Barth notes briefly
5
that the incarnation is the work of the whole Trinity. The
Son did not descend to the depths without the Father who sent
Him and who loved Him, nor did He do so without the Holy
Spirit, who, as the love of God both inwards and outwards, is
'the divine principle of creation, reconciliation and
£
redemption'. This life of the Son in the Trinity is His
suitability to descend to the depths of man's failenness.
Barth stresses His suitability as the Son of the Father -
especially His obedience:
It is in Him that God can be not merely the One who
sends but the One who is sent, the One who practises
that basic and total mercy; that, because His free
mercy wills that He should, He can break through the
1. ibid.. p. 37, cf. p. 39. Cf. C.D.. 1/2, pp. 172-202.
2. ibid., p. 42.
3. ibid.. p. 43.
4. ibid., p. 42.
5. ibid., p. 44.
6. ibid., p. 43.
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bounds of the divine being and descend into the
depths, into the far country, the world, and there
become and be a completely different being - man;
that as man He can open up the frontier, not to
make man a second God, but as man, by Himself
becoming and being man, to set him within this
frontier, to bring him to His own home, to place
him in and with Himself at the side of the Father.
(Jn. 1: 1-2). (C.D. IV/2, p. 44).
Sadly, this profound doctrine is not developed throughout
Barth's ensuing discussion of the vere homo, and there will
later be cause to observe that his brief mention of the Holy
Spirit jeopardises the intention of his doctrine as
indicated here.
Barth unfolds the humility of the majesty of the Son
in four stages, each showing that the vere homo is grounded
in the act of His divine majesty.
First, the Son of God became and is also man."1" The
Son expressed the humility of God, and therefore the fact that
the Subject in this becoming is the Son involves no alteration
of human essence. The divine sonship of Jesus grounds His
humanity. The enhypostasis and anhypostasis of post-
Chalcedon Christology affirm the complete humanity of the
2
Son of God. Because Godfs majesty is not self-exalting
but self-humbling and includes obedience within itself, His
act of majesty in becoming man gives Jesus from His very
origin the grace of true and obedient humanity. These
classical terms also witness to the fact that the
incarnation could not have arisen from human potentiality:
•The divine act of humility fulfilled in the Son is the only
1. ibid.. p. 45.
2. ibid., pp.49-50.
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ground of this happening and being.'1 Further, the divine
Subject has as His object flesh. He became not a son of man
2
but the Son of man. The object of His self-abasement was
not simply one man but the humanum of all men.
Second, the Son of God became a man: 'this One exists,
not only like the Father and the Holy Ghost as God, but in the
fulfillment of that act of humility also as man, one man,
this man.'-^ Thus 'God Himself acts and suffers when this
4
man acts and suffers as a man.* And therefore
the human...acting...of this one man directly concerns
us all, and His history is our history of salvation
which changes the whole human situation, just because
God Himself is its human subject in His Son...
CC.D. TV/2, p. 51)
Further precision is needed. Third, 'in this one
5
Jesus Christ divine and human essence were and are united'.
There is a genuine participation of the divine in the human
and of the human in the divine which, since it is based on
the majestic act of the Son of God as Subject, takes place
in its proper order: the condescension of the divine to the
human is the basis of the exaltation of the human to the
fl
divine. There is, therefore, neither confusion nor
7
separation of essences in this union of twofold participation.
From this there follows a fourth statement, the goal of
the preceding three: the Son of God exalted human essence
1. ibid. P- 46.
2. ibid. P. 48.
3. ibid. P. 50.
4. ibid. P. 51.
5. ibid. P- 60.
6. ibid. P. 63.
7. ibid. P. 64.
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into Himself.^ Human essence (let it be said again) is not
destroyed or altered, but there is rather a mutual partici¬
pation in which 'the divine acquires a determination to the
2
human and the human acquires a determination from the divine.'
This mutual participation is not at all impersonal or a
mingling of 'natures': it is wholly personal. The Son of
God, He Himself,'is the active Subject and takes the
•3
initiative. Because the union is personal in this sense,
grounded in the act of the Son of God, a twofold differen¬
tiation of this participation must be made. First, there
A
is no interchange of divine and human essence: the divine
5
gives and the human receives;^ and, second, human essence
does not become divine, but is elevated into fellowship with
it.
In later parts of this study the work of the human
nature of Christ as filled with the Spirit will be emphasised,
in order further to strengthen the point that man remains man
and does not become something other in the incarnation. This
emphasis carries with it the danger that it may minimise the
fact that it was the Son of God, the second person of the
Trinity, who is the Subject in Jesus Christ. In order to
avoid this danger, and therewith the loss of salvation itself,
Barth's twofold differentiation will be borne in mind. How¬
ever, if this danger is noted, a danger in Barth's own
1. ibid.. p. 69.
2. ibid., p. 70.
3. ibid., p. 70.
4. ibid.. p. 71.
5. ibid., p. 70.
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position needs to be noted. Where it is said that the Son
of God is the Subject in Jesus, and the doctrines of
enhypostasia and anhypostasla are employed, there is a
tendency toward Eutychianism unless the presence of the Holy
Spirit is taken into account. As is clear from the above
summary, and from the twofold differentiation just noted,
Eutychianism is abhorrent to Barth, yet it still remains
true that Barth has made no mention of the Spirit in the
receiving and obeying of the human nature,1 and that he leaves
himself open to the danger of suggesting that Christ's human
nature was true human nature without the Holy Spirit, and
therefore in a way not possible for the human nature of other
men.
Barth proceeds to a more precise explanation of what
is meant by this union. First, in Jesus Christ 'the divine
essence imparts itself to the human, the human essence
2
receives the impartation of the divine...'. There is no
reserve of the one from the other. Second, we must go further
and speak of the address made to the human essence of Jesus
Christ, and so of the 'fulness of the concretion in which
the union of the two natures take place...*. This means
that His human essence does not 'possess' grace: it is a
l±
matter of active obedience to the divine address of grace.
1. Barth leaves undeveloped the pregnant statement which he
makes at the beginning of his account of the divine act
of majesty in the incarnation: 'He [the Son] became and
is [also man] according to the will of God the Father, in
the humility of His own freely rendered obedience as the
Son, in the act of majesty of the Holy Spirit.' p. 45.
2. ibid.. p. 74.
3. ibid.. p. 84.
4. ibid., p. 88.
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He is completely determined by the electing grace of God.
The grace of the hypostatic union thus means that human
essence is not altered1 but exalted 'to harmony with the
2
divine will'. His sinlessness is not self-evident. Barth
* •*.
speaks of the grace of sinlessness. Sinlessness is not a
denial of free humanity, but its recovery. Sin is a
perversion of human nature - a 'possession' to sin as opposed
to the grace of sinlessness. The grace of this exaltation
'...is the exaltation of human freedom to its truth, i.e.,
the obedience in whose existence it is not superhuman but
A
true human freedom.' This freedom to be man in the grace
5
of God is not a habitus, a 'transferred condition', ;but
% rather the actualisation of One who shares fully in the good-
pleasure of the Father and the fullness of the Holy Spirit.^
His humanity participates, not by habit, but by act, in the
grace of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Jesus
Christ not only participates fully in this grace, but, as
it is addressed to His human essence, He is also qualified
7
to be the organ of the action of the Son of God as Mediator.
1. ibid., p. 91.
2. ibid.. p. 92.
3. ibid.. p. 92. C. O'Grady, The Church in the Theology of
Karl Barth (Chapman, London, 1968), pp. 148-9 emphasises
the active nature of Christ's sinlessness.
4. 'the determination of His human essence by the grace of God
does not consist in the fact that there is added to Him the
remarkable quality that He could not sin as a man, but in
His effective determination from His origin for this act in
which, participant in our sinful essence, He did not will to
sin and did not sin.' C.D. IV/2, p. 92.
5. ibid.. p. 94.
6. ibid.. pp. 94, 95.
7. ibid.. p. 96.
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As this man, Jesus Christ receives power for the reconcil¬
iation of the world. It is the power of grace, Just as
His authority is not for His own aggrandisement but is
authority in 'execution' of the divine will,1 it is power
for and on behalf of other men. In mediating this power
and authority, His human essence is not superfluous but,
since it is fully recipient of divine grace and obedient to
2
it, it is the indispensible organ of His power for man.
Barth stresses that this exaltation must not be understood
as an appropriated state, but as event and history.^ If
it is not so understood there is the danger of a divinis-
ation, or, at least, a dehumanisation, of human essence.
This is the highest possible dignity for man. Since Jesus
is the recipient of divine grace in this history, we can
say that in Him
our human essence is given glory and exalted to a
dignity and clothed with a majesty which the Son
who assumed it...has in common with the Father and
the Holy Ghost.... (C.D. IV/2, p. 100)
Barth now completes his account of the exaltation of
human essence in the incarnation. He speaks of the common
actualisation of divine and human essence in Jesus Christ.^
He notes that in the preceding discussion we 'have repre¬
sented the existence of Jesus Christ as His being in His
5act'" and that there is little to add to what has already
1. ibid.. p. 97.
2. ibid.. p. 99.
3. ibid.. p. 99.
4. ibid.. p. 104.
5. ibid., p. 105.
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been said. Earth*s consistent concentration on Christ's
being in His act means that he guarantees the reality of
God as God and the reality of man as man, as this happens in
the grace of the hypostatic union. But it is at this point
that one would expect Barth to speak of the grace of the
hypostatic union as the grace of the Holy Spirit. Without
this reference to the Holy Spirit it remains unclear as to
how the human essence of Jesus Christ was maintained in its
being as human essence. It is, of course, true to say that
it was maintained as such by grace, but it was maintained as
human essence in the act of obedience by the indwelling of
the Spirit. This reference to the Spirit is necessary and
not superfluous because the Spirit is that mode of the being
of God, that act of God, in which He indwells what is other
than Himself without displacing it but by bringing it into
obedience and union with Himself. A reference to the grace
of God does not go as far as this because it does not specify
this mode of God's being in His act and therefore it does not
show how man's being as man is actualised.
Barth first speaks of the common actualisation. The
inner life of God does not need any actualisation,1 but the
divine essence of the Son 'needed a special actualisation in
the identity of the Son of God with the Son of Man.1 Also,
human essence as such does not await actualisation in the
Snn of God, 'but it needs a special actualisation in identity
1. ibid., p. 113.
2. ibid.. p. 113.
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with this One, Jesus Christ, and therefore in its union
with human essence.'"1' Barth then speaks of the common
actualisation. 'It is not just a divine novum, nor just a
human, which appears....At one and the same time it is the
2
great divine and the great human novum.' The great new
thing appears, the fellowship of God and man in Him, actualised
in Him. It is this which is the ground of Barth's major
thesis on sanctification and conversion: man's new life is
actual in Him. The divine and the human are joined in Him,
but they 'are always as different as God and man are
different.'-^ But in this difference they are commonly
actualised: 'It is where the divine rules and reveals and
A
gives that the human serves and attests and mediates.'
The Ground of the Communication of the Exaltation of Human
Essence which is in Christ
In the preceding section of this chapter the
historical realisation of God's eternal gracious election
of the man Jesus was studied. We now turn to the revelation
of this humanity in His resurrection. The act of divine
majesty in the incarnation of the Word 'has a subjective
5
character as well' as the objective character we have noted.
It is genuine revelation. We do not look inward to our¬
selves, but only to Jesus Christ, who alone may reveal who
He is. Our knowing Him is based only in Himself. When He
1. ibid.. p. 113.
2. • P • lib.
3« ibid.. p. 116.
4. ibid.. p. 116.
5. ibid.. p. 120.
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is known, 'a twofold opening up takes place - the opening
up of the fact [the incarnation] and the opening up of the
human subject to receive it.'1 This takes place in the
2
'event of the speaking of the Holy Spirit.' This witness
to the human spirit thus depends on no capacity within man,
but solely on the fact of Jesus Christ. The Holy Spirit
is no 'second force' alongside Christ; rather His renewing,
4
liberating and enlightening power is that of the effective
presence of Jesus Christ Himself. Jesus Christ Himself
witnesses to Himself in man's subjectivity through the Holy
Spirit.
'The Holy Spirit is...the divine act of majesty in
its character as revelation.'^ He leads to Christ, takes
us captive, and brings us to know Christ and ourselves in Him.
He comes as light, i.e., revelation. What He does also
has the character of light, for where He is there is genuine
liberty. It is the liberty of the sons of God in the Son
whom He reveals to us. The Holy Spirit thus brings about
the self-witness of Jesus Christ in individual lives.
Christ's witness to Himself has its objective basis
in His resurrection and ascension. His being is secret, but
He reveals Himself in His resurrection. He reveals Himself
as the One He is, the One whose work was fulfilled in the
crucifixion. Because Hevas hidden in the crucifixion, He
is hidden even in His revelation in the resurrection. The
1. ibid.. p. 126.
2. ibid., p. 126.
3. ibid.. p. 128.
4. ibid.. p. 126.
5. ibid.. p. 128.
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resurrection, therefore, is the objective basis for the
inner, subjective revelation by the Holy Spirit of the work
completed on the cross: it is the event of Jesus' self-
declaration.1
This must be said because it may seem that Christ's
2
self-attestation is 'void', vacuous, lacking concretion
in actual history. But in His resurrection He witnesses
to Himself as the crucified One, as the One who fulfilled
a concrete history there. Barth therefore turns to 'the
New Testament attestation' of Him. We will not discuss
Barth's treatment of the historical Jesus other than to note
that the same lack of reference to the Holy Spirit, which
was noted earlier, becomes a problem, especially in relation
to his understanding of the miracles. A certain distance
between Jesus' humanity and ours emerges because Barth
attributes the 'royalty' of Jesus more to His union with the
Son of God than to His faith in the Father and His filling
with the Holy Spirit.
In the section, 'The Direction of the Son', Barth
speaks of 'the power of the existence of Jesus Christ for
those among whom and for whom, as the Reconciler He, the
Son of God, became also the Son of man.How does He
reach and affect us with His power? Barth assumes at once
that this power does actually reach us^ - not because we
1. ibid.. p. 142.
2. ibid.. p. 249.
3. ibid.. pp. 264-5.
4. ibid.. p. 265.
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actually see the evidence of it (as we do), but because the
way from Him to us 'is wide open.'"*" The discussion of His
work with us can, therefore, be only a matter of the
'development and explication' of the meaning of the being
2
and action of the Son of man.
At this point, two errors need to be avoided. First,
that of 'throwing doubt...upon the power and lordship of the
Son of Man, which as such reach and affect all men.'^ Whether
we recognise it or not, He lives as our Brother. There can
be no questioning 'the perfection of the decision which has
4
taken place concerning us in Him.' Any decision we make
concerning Him can only be a reflection of the decision
taken concerning us in Him. The second error is to under¬
estimate the radicalness 'of the change...which the perfect
5
decision taken in the Son of Man means for our existence.'"^
The Son of man has set us in a unique freedom 'which has to be
...lived out in its uniqueness.' This freedom becomes ours
in the freedom of Jesus the royal man. The only question
with which we 'must occupy ourselves whether and in what
7
circumstances this can...take place.'
Basically, this is a question of knowledge, of judging
ourselves according to the judgment of the Lord which He has
1. ibid., P» 265.
2. ibid.. P. 265.
3. ibid., P. 267.
4. ibid., P- 267.
5. ibid., P. 267.
6. ibid.. P. 267.
7. ibid., P. 268.
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made concerning us. This testing can take place only in
Jesus Christ. It is a matter of knowing ourselves as those
who have been accepted in the decision concerning us in Him.
Barth has I Cor. 11: 31-2 in mind here, where Paul argues
that if we judge ourselves truly we shall not be judged of
the Lord. We are to reckon what we are in Jesus Christ.
(This theology of ourselves in Christ is rooted in I Corin¬
thians, especially 1: 30, where it is said that Christ is
made sanctification.) We must look away from ourselves and
see ourselves only as found in Him. This is true self-
knowledge.
But this being of ourselves in Jesus Christ is concealed.
This is not primarily because of our sloth (however true
that may be), but because of Christ Himself, and above all
because of His cross. The dominating characteristic of His
royal existence and its radical power in us is the cross.
Because of His death, He has power from beyond death. 'He
was alive from the dead....He comforted and claimed His people
from the place where there can be no question of the possession
1
and exercise of human help and authority.' He alone was
powerful in death, but His power is on behalf of all others.
It is His power over all others to represent them - to judge
them in their old being and to direct them to a new existence.
Thus, Jesus Christ in the concealment of His cross is 'the
2
turning point of the human situation.' The very conceal-
1. ibid., p. 295.
2.. ibid., p. 296.
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merit of our being in Him serves, therefore, the radical
reversal of our human direction.
To this point Barth has not spoken directly of our
response to Christ. He wishes to make it perfectly plain
that our obedience can be a matter only of living out the
conversion of man accomplished in Him. But the New Testament
counts on the fact of our human decision, and Barth now
turns to consider it.
There can be no question as to the being of Jesus
Christ, and therefore our being in Him. There can
be no question as to the love with which God has
loved us from all eternity and once for all in time.
This does not need our assistance or completion or
co-operation or even repetition....What is needed,
and therefore the point at issue, is its attestation
in a corresponding way of thought, direction of will...
and determination of our existence which come to us
in relation to it, and which we have to fulfil in
relation to it, so that in response to the love with
which God has loved us we love Him in return.
CC.D. IV/2, p* 296)
Our response to Christ depends on letting ourselves be told
of Jesus and of ourselves in Him.1 As the New Testament
imparts its witness to Jesus, He lays claim to us. This
exposes our old existence to attack, killing in order to make
2
alive. The New Testament 'counts on a very definite power*
which is not compulsion but freedom, i.e., the freedom to
receive as our own the conversion of God to man as it has
taken place in Jesus Christ :
the freedom to keep to the fact, and orientate our¬
selves by it, that the alteration of the human
situation which has taken place in Him is our own;
1. ibid.. p. 303.
2. ibid., p. 304.
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the freedom, therefore, to set ourselves in the
alteration accomplished in Him.
(C.D. IV/2, pp. 304-5.)
Barth speaks with great care of this freedom, Which he
thinks of as a freedom 'to appropriate', 'keep' and 'set'
ourselves in the conversion already achieved for us in
Christ. In no sense at all do we repeat or complete the
turning of man to God in Christ. Rather, we turn to God
through the grace of Jesus Christ. His power is no distant
power, but power from within, which gives us freedom to
decide positively in relation to what we are told in the
New Testament witness."1" This is our conversion, our
correspondence to the conversion in Christ. As He makes
Himself known in this way, He completes His witness of
Himself to us.
In reflecting on the nature of this power we must
guard our thinking against any suggestion of magic,
mechanical force or demonism. It is the wholly personal
power of Jesus Christ, and comes entirely from Him. It
does not therefore mingle with man's supposed power, nor
does it blind him or rob him of his will and capacity for
deliberation. Barth connects it with Christ's resurrection:
The power of the transition on which the New Testament
counts when it looks from the base and origin of its
witness to its goal in the existence of Christians
is absolutely unique as the power of the resurrection
of Jesus Christ. (C.D. IV/2, p. 310)
It is therefore utterly separate from any 'worldly' power
which might seek to dominate and overpower man. It is the
power in which a man freely, because uncompelled, makes a
leap into a new dimension, the dimension of life beyond death,
1. ibid.. p. 305.
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and does so not in his own strength but entirely in the
strength of Hirn who overcame death.
.Another way of speaking of this power is to say that
here the Holy Spirit is present, for the Spirit is none
other than the presence of Jesus Christ in His resurrection.
Earth does not proceed to a doctrinal discussion of
the Holy Spirit, but attempts a precise elucidation of the
nature of the power and the holiness of this power of
transition from Jesus Christ to us Christians. This power
•aims at an enlightened, liberated and understanding life
which is peace in all its dimensions.'"*" It is a 'power
distinguished from all other forces', and this is especially
2
true because it alone 'gives man an immutable foundation',
and therefore a peace which is eternal life. What is this
power? Barth answers: 'the power whose operation is pre¬
supposed in the New Testament is the outgoing and receiving
■3
and presence and action of the Holy Spirit.'
Yet if the Church is to count on the Holy Spirit alone,
having no 'tangible' assets of her own, is she not 'defence¬
less', abandoned with nothing of her own to fall back on?
How is she to know that the Spirit is a Spirit to be trusted
with the absoluteness which the above answer requires?
Barth answers: the Spirit is holy in that He is separate
and separating, because He is the Spirit of Jesus Christ, 'the
L
self-expression of the man Jesus.* In this sense the Spirit
is separate from all other spirits and wholly to be trusted.
1. ibid., p. 316.
2. ibid., p. 318.
3. ibid.. p. 319.
4. ibid., p. 331.
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He is the Holy Spirit because He is the imparting of the
royal man Jesus in His resurrection.1
2
This answer is complete and needs no addition, but it
admits of a certain elucidation.^ According to the New
Testament, the Spirit is not only the Spirit of Jesus Christ,
4
but also the Spirit of God, the Lord. Barth observes that
the pouring out of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost did not
5
in fact come on 'all flesh', but came on only a few. This
small number was indeed the reason for the continuing
existence of the world, 'all flesh'. God was at work 'in
His own most proper cause - the cause in which it is a matter
of the purpose and meaning of all creation and the attainment
of His will with it.'^ There are three decisive factors
in this history: first, the man Jesus, 'who supplies the
initiative and makes the whole possible and actual'; second,
the goal of this history, the 'existence of the community';
and, third, 'the power of the transition', His disclosure
7
to them and their disclosure to Him.'• In this whole history
God is at work, God in a threefold sense, but it is only in
relation to the power of transition that there is a material
coincidence with one of the persons of the Trinity, i.e.,
the Holy Spirit who is not only the divine power mediating
between Christ and Christendom, but the mode of being of the
1. ibid.. pp. 322-3.
2. ibid.. p. 331.
3. ibid.. p. 332.
4. ibid.. pp. 322-3.
5. ibid., p. 334.
6. ibid.. p. 335.
7. ibid., pp. 336-7.
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one God which unites the Father and the Son.'1 This
knowledge throws us back again onto the Spirit, and so makes
it seem that we are giving an unpragmatic answer to a very
pragmatic problem. Earth asks (with the practical concern
of a man calling for God):
Why is it that He is always so invisible and so
inconceivable....And yet...why is it that He and His
work,...that mutual disclosure, in which the man
Jesus and other men find each other and are united,
are always so real...more real, in fact, than the
more obvious and visible and conceivable connections
of earthly and conceivable history?
(C.D. IV/2, pp. 340-1.)
The answer comes in what is nothing less than worship, for
it is a discovery of the newness of God Himself. In His
being as the mediator between Jesus and other men, in this
mystery of His being and work in our earthly history, •there
is repeated and expressed and represented what God is in
Himself.'2 The act of union of God Himself, of the Father
and the Son, 'falls straight down from above into the sphere
of our essence and being and life, repeating and representing
and expressing itself in the unknown and yet known event
of that transition [between Jesus and us].'^ It is there¬
fore no magical alien work that the Spirit does in this
transition (as if He were dressing up in a role, assuming a
'persona'). On the contrary, in it God 'lives His own
most proper life'.
1. ibid.. p. 339.
2. ibid., p. 341.
3. ibid.. p. 341.
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The Father lives with the Son, and the Son with the
Father, in the Holy Spirit who is Himself God, the
Spirit of the Father and the Son....It is as this
living God that He is with us in this event. This
is what makes the event so powerful, so distinctive,
so different in its nature and power from all other
events. (C.D. IV/2, p. 342)
Such is Barth's 'spiritual' answer to this highly practical
problem. Such are the 'pragmatics of God'J
To conclude: In the Spirit, the distance but also
the transition between God and us are the 'representation,
reflection and correspondence' of the distinction but also
the union in which God 'is the Father and the Son in the Holy
Spirit as His own eternal living act.'1 For us men this
means that the astoundingly good thing is true that the
transition from Jesus to us is as true and as sure as the
being of God Himself! This doctrine has been summarised
at some length in order that a significant development of
it may be made in the following chapter.
1. ibid., p. 346.
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CHAPTER VII
ASSESSMENT OF BARTH'S ACCOUNT OF THE EXALTATION OF MAN
IN CHRIST.
It has been noted that according to Barth the Son of
God is the Subject in the incarnate Christ, but that this
means no overshadowing of the complete humanity of the Son
of man. Barth can maintain this because he grounds his
doctrine of the two essences of Christ clearly on the self-
humbling of the Son of God. The exaltation of man in Christ
depends entirely on the humiliation of God in Him. Because
the Son of God exercises the majesty of His divinity in this
servitude, when He took human essence into union with Himself,
He did not render the human essence merely a passive vehicle
of His divine power, but made it the active residence of the
self-impartation of God to man.
This doctrine of the self-humiliation of the Son of God
answers certain difficulties which have been felt with the
doctrine that the Word is the Subject in Christ, and with
the corresponding doctrines of enhypostasis and anhypostasis.
Many have said that if the Son of God is the Subject in the
hypostatic union the human nature of Christ can no longer be
human nature in the sense that other men have it."1* Does not
human nature always and everywhere exist only in the self-
1. 'The protest against enhypostasia must be maintained.
Jesus Christ had his own individual human hypostasis and
human mode of existence. The man that I am, Jesus was
also. Of him alone is it really true that nothing
human remained alien to him.' D. Bonhoeffer, Christology.
trans. J. Bowden (Collins Fontana Library, London, 1971/»
p. 107.
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activation of a subject and human energy? But it should
be noted at the outset that Maximus the Confessor and
John of Damascus, men for whom the doctrines of enhypostasis
and anhypostasis were of the substance of the faith, insisted
on two wills and two energeia in the incarnate Son. Maximus
insisted that Christ's human will was not what he called
thelema gnomikov, i.e., a will directed by desire toward the
world, but he did so only that he might stress the perfection
of Christ's will and therefore the full humanity of His
human will.1 Only thus could He save other men. For
Maximus and John the doctrine of the hypostatic union meant that
the human willing was in no sense independent of the Word,
that it had no existence apart from Him, but that this union
with the Word involved no weakening of the full humanity of
His human nature. Barth has pushed this doctrine further.
He has done this because he has penetrated further into the
self-humbling of God, and has thus made it plain that God's
self-address to man is that which makes man freely to be
himself.
To understand this advance it is worth examining some
aspects of the history of the doctrine of the human nature of
Christ. As is well known, the early Church resisted any
attempt to diminish the humanity of the Saviour. It attacked
docetism and gnosticism. The Council of Constantinople (381)
1. K. Rozemond, La Christologie de Saint Jean Damascene (Buch-
Kunsterverlag, Ettal, 1959), p. 34. Cf. also P. Sherwood,
St. Maximus the Confessor (Longmans, Green and Co.,
Westminster, 1955), pp. 58-63; and H.t). von Balthasar,
Liturgie Cosmique. trans. L. Lhaumet and H.-A. Prentout
(Aubier, Paris, 1947), p. 201.
286
affirmed that Jesus Christ is perfectly (teleos) man, against
the Apollinarians who held that the Logos replaces the nous
(as the seat of sin) of Jesus. Similarly, the Council of
Chalcedon (451) affirmed, against Eutychians and Monophysites,
two distinct natures in the one Person, Jesus Christ. These
two natures, while united indivisibly and inseparably are
unconfused and inconvertible, and therefore the Council up¬
held the full, unrestricted humanity of Christ. When the
Monothelites argued that the one hypostasis in Christ meant
only one will, the Council of Constantinople (680) expanded
the dogma of Chalcedon to affirm that Jesus Christ possessed
a human as well as a divine will.
The work of three Fathers calls for attention. First,
Leontius of Byzantium, who believed that it would be a return
to Nestorian heresy to hold that Christ's human nature could
exist apart from the Word. He therefore developed the
doctrine that Christ's humanity had no independent hypostasis
and that it existed only together with the Word. He meant
by this no disrespect to Christ's human nature. He argued
that '"not being without hypostasis" is not the same as
"being a hypostasis"and that there can be an 'enhypostatic
nature', i.e.. a nature which does not exist in itself but in
another. Such was the human nature of Christ. It retains
in its enhypostatic existence its 'proper principle of
existence' and is therefore 'not devoid of the quality of
self-determination, as if it were wholly dominated by the
2
Person of the Logos.' Maximus the Confessor developed
1. R.V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon (S.P.C.K., London,
1953), p. 318.
2. ibid.. p. 319.
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this understanding, giving particular prominence to the
struggle and victory of the human will of Christ. He
opposed monothelitism, urging that Chalcedon 'safeguarded
the autonomy of manhood and granted an independent status
and positive value to the order of creation.11 Central to
Maximus' strenuous Christianity was the resistance of Christ
to every temptation, His victorious granting forgiveness to
His enemies, and, in obedience to Him, the Christian's war-
2 3
fare against all temptation. He ascribed autexousion^ to
Christ's human nature and attached great importance to the
effort and struggle of His human will. So real was this
struggle and victory that Maximum could say that other men are
called to be imitators of Christ and he makes much of the
correspondence between Christ's battle against the demons
4
and ours. J.A. Dorner says:
Instead of upholding a Christology which required
the human to be merely a passive organ and point of
transition for the almighty will of the Logos, the
efforts of Maximus were directed toward an ethical
Christology. (Person of Christ, p. 191)
Dorner also argued that what he termed the 'Oriental'
tendency of the Council of Constantinople stressed the unity
of the two natures in such a way that Maximus' insight was
crowded out:
1. This is the opinion of H. Chadwick, The Early Church
(Pelican, London, 1967), p. 211.
2. P. Sherwood, op.cit.. pp. 108-11. Maximum is particularly
insightful concerning the victory of love won by the
Lord against death and the devil, but he does not relate
this victory to the Holy Spirit and he does sometimes write
so as to suggest that it was in the power of His divine
nature that His human nature triumphed.
3. J.A. Dorner, The Person of Christ. Div. II. Vol. I, trans.
D.W. Simon (T.' & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 186l), pp. 195-6, 231.
4. P. Sherwood, op.cit.. p. 111.
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The two physical wills were not opposed to each other,
but the human will followed, that is, never took the
initiative,...It was, further, not hostile or
rebellious, but subject to the divine and almighty
will. All decisive volitions proceeded, thus, from
the inmost centre of Christ, from the divine nature
which formed His personality. Originally, indeed,
there were two wills conceived of as capacities, and
two natures;...but the divine will, by its omnipotence,
carried the human will along with it in its course at
every volition. (Person of Christ, p. 204)
At this point Dorner himself is surely confused. He is
correct to regard with horror the idea that 'the divine
nature, by its omnipotence, carried the human will along
with it', but he misconstrues the way in which the human
nature activated itself. If the human will had ever taken
the initiative it would be sinful human nature; if it were
not subject to the divine will it would cease to be obedient
human nature and therefore it would be no longer sinless,
true human nature. The fundamental difficulty here is that
Dorner conceives of the omnipotence of God in a way which
does not allow for His self-humiliation. If Dorner allowed
the Son's omnipotence to be His obedience and servanthood,
he would no longer be afraid to allow divinity its omnipotence
and initiative.
John of Damascus is the third figure who deserves
mention, not because he carried further the doctrines of
either the divine or the human nature of Christ, but because
his understanding of the enhypostasis is helpful. His
Christology is closely related to his soteriology.1 He
allows the human will and energy its full and unrestricted
area, but, because he has grasped so firmly that it is the
1, K. Rozemond, op.clt.. pp. 4-16.
289
Son of God who acts in the human acting of Jesus Christ,
Pelagianism is kept effectively at bay without threatening
the role of the human subject in faith. There is in John
no suggestion of the human operating in an almost self-
sufficient sphere, as there is, for example, in Theodore of
Mopsueatia."*" Though John did not advance the doctrine of
God, he did speak clearly of the condescension of the divinity
of Christ. It is the divine which comes to the human and not
the human which reaches into the divine. The Word, without
change and without mingling with human nature, united it with
Himself. Because of this condescension (it is hardly self-
humbling in Barth's sense, though John at this point resembles
- 2Barth) there is a perichSresis. a movement of the divine to
the human and therefore a participation of the human in the
divine. This mutual penetration is rooted solely in the
divine:
The mutual indwelling did not come from the flesh, but
from the divinity, because it is inconceivable that
the flesh should indwell the divinity - rather,
once the divine nature indwelt the flesh, it gave the
flesh the same ineffable indwelling, which, indeed, we
call union. (Orthodox Faith, IV, 18, p. 379)
1. Cf. R.A. Norris, Manhood and Christ (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1963), pp. 173-89, and also p. 209: 'Theodore's
thought requires not only that 'the Man' be a subject of
attribution, independent of the Word; it requires also
that he have a function, as a centre of voluntary activity,
in the work of redemption.' Theodore regarded man's
salvation to consist primarily of his rational, free
obedience to divine law. Therefore his Christology can be
envisaged 'as an effort to understand the kind of Redeemer
it was who can bring about this kind of redemption.' (p. 189)*
Hence his dualism in Christology and his insistence on the
independence of the human nature of Christ.
2. K. Rozemond, op.cit., pp. 129-33: perichoresis is here
understood in the sense of interpenetration.
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Further, John spoke of the role of the Holy Spirit in the
conception of Christ,1 thus making it clear that the
enhypostasis was an initiative on the divine side which
indwelt and activated the human nature. Yet his summary
of the Orthodox faith gives a finally unsatisfying account
of Christ's humanity. He comes close to regarding
Christ's human nature as intrinsically sinless, if he does
not in fact do so, and his exaltation of Mary's virginity and
2
sanctity distances Christ's humanity from ours. This lack
of an unambiguous doctrine of the taking up and sanctifying
of fallen humanity in Christ means a serious limitation of
his doctrine of salvation and, indeed, the doctrine of
Christ's victory over sin seems to recede behind the fact of
the hypostatic union.
No really important advances in the understanding of
Christ's human nature were made until the Enlightenment.
Anselm, Bernard and the Victorines did give an amplitude to
the picture of the humanity of the Saviour which was new in
■x
theology, and they penetrated deeply into the mystery of
His obedient suffering, but they did not refine the doctrine
of the hypostatic union. Again, although the Reformers
recovered and expanded the place of Christ's human nature
in the two-way movement from God to man and from man to God
in Christ, they did not substantially advance the doctrine of
1. John of Damascus, The Orthodox Faith, trans. S.D.F. Salmond
(Catholic University of America, Grand Rapids, 1958),
Book III, Chap. 2, p. 270.
2. S. Jean Damascene, Homelies Sur La Nativlte. trans.
P. Voulet (Sources Chretiennes, Paris, 19bl), paras 2, 3,
pp. 49-53.
3. R.W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (Hutchinson,
London, 1953), Chap. 5.
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Christ's victory in human flesh. It took the Enlightenment,
with its perception into the historical and developmental
character of man's activity, together with the Romantic
movement, with its perception into the self-constitutive
quality of the act of the human subject, to pose for theology
the problem of what actually took place in the human subject
and life-history of Jesus. To answer the question of the
Enlightenment regarding development and history, the old
distinction between Christ's person and His work had to be
dissolved into the dynamic picture of Christ's work as His
life-act.1 His achievement had to he understood as the
fulfillment of the person He is, and His continuing work as
the declaration and impartation of His perfect self-offering
in the cross. Calvin's presentation of Christ pointed in
this direction, but his understanding of the perfection of
Christ in His three offices needed e:xpansion. Calvin's
account of Christ's offices concentrates chiefly on the way
in which they express His mediatorial role, but he says almost
nothing about Christ's development of these offices through
the phases of baptism, crucifixion, ascension and return.
The understanding of Christ's development within His media¬
torial work, and His revelation of His perfection within it,
could come only with the answer to the question of the
Romantic movement regarding the human subject of Christ. Only
when it was seen that Christ took up fallen human nature, won
a terrible battle in it against temptation and sin, finally
presenting that humanity perfect to God as the culmination
1. It is one of the great achievements of Barth in the
Dogmatics to have done this.
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of a life of perfect trust in God, could it be seen that the
human subject of Christ developed and grew in His mediatorial
office. McLeod Campbell displayed great understanding of the
human subject in Christ in his account of Christ dealing with
the father on behalf of men, and of His final self-offering
n
as the culmination of His life of trust. Throughout the
preceding century the understanding of the humanity of Christ
had been growing. J.K. Dippel (1673*1734) argued that Christ
inherited fallen human nature, experienced and overcame all
2
temptations and was therefore sinless. It was in the
nineteenth century that the doctrine of Christ's victorious
struggle to win siniessness came into its own. In his
commentary on Hebrews, Gottfried Menken said that Christ
•took human nature as it was after the Fall in Adam',^ and a
very similar doctrine was preached at about the same time by
A
Edward Irving. Erskine of Linlathen, Kohlbrugge, J.C. von
Hoffmann, E. Bohl and Hermann Bezzel are listed by H. Johnson
5
as preaching Christ's victory over sin in fallen human nature.
1. J.M. Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement (James Clark,
London, 1959), p. 300.
2. H. Johnson, The Humanity of the Saviour (Epworth, London,
1962), pp. 145-8.
3. Quoted in ibid.. p. 150. Cf. C.D. 1/2, p. 154.
4. 'They [Irving's critics] argue for an identity for an
identity of origin merely [between Christ and other men];
we argue for an identity of life also. They argue for an
inherent holiness; we argue for a holiness maintained by
the Person of the Son, through the operation of the Holy
Ghost.' E. Irving, Our Lord's Human Nature (Baldwin and
Cradock, London, 1830), p. xi.
5. H. Johnson, op.cit., pp. 155-67. Cf. the list in
C.D. 1/2, pp. 154-5.
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Common to all these theologians was the belief that Christ's
true humanity was due neither to a special constitution nor
to its union with the Word. They affirmed His divinity and
His sinlessness, but they believed that His perfect righteous¬
ness was a 'moral election' and not a necessity of His
personal constitution.1 It became possible to give full
weight to the thesis of the Epistle to the Hebrews that Christ
was perfected through what He suffered and in this way became
the author of salvation (Heb. 2: 10; 5: 8)• The dynamic
movement of the human nature of Christ as He perfected
Himself within the priestly and kingly offices could now
become an integral part of the doctrine of salvation. This
emphasis on the victorious contest of Christ's human nature
with sin would have been Pelagian if it had not been based
on the realisation that it was through the Holy Spirit that
Christ wrought his triumph. This is particularly important
because it not only means that Christ achieved perfection
in the same strength and by the same means as other men are
to be sanctified, but also that a trinitarian dimension is
given to the life of the incarnate One. It opened the way
not only for a fuller and richer account of the conversion
of human nature, but also of the dwelling of God in the
men converted by Him.
Barth's doctrine of Christ's human essence in the
Dogmatics portrays a human essence fully responsive to
divine grace, tempted as we are and yet fully victorious.
The Word assumed not only creaturely existence but also
1. E. Irving, Christ's Holiness in Flesh (John Lindsay,
Edinburgh, 1831)$ p. bb.
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fallen humanity, sarx, human existence under the divine
condemnation. But Christ did not do as other men do:
where they sin He resisted all temptation and maintained His
life in the grace of sinlessness. He had an active human
will, and His sinlessness was not a habit but a matter of
will and act and obedience to grace. Indeed, it is because
of the grace of God that the union of Jesus with the Word
means no diminution of His humanity but His elevation to be
true man, i.e., to be freely what He is and in this sense
true man. Precisely because God as God, true God, is
gracious to man, the humanity of Jesus is true man.
Barth's understanding of Christ's human nature is a
great advance for theology in that he has rooted it firmly
in the grace of God. Where in the nineteenth century
kenotic theories were used to account for the presence of
God in Jesus,1 Barth has shown that it is precisely because
God is God that He could enter into union with man without
in any way threatening man or dominating him. Because God
is God in His free grace, His freedom to be Himself is the
basis of man's freedom to be himself and therefore truly man.
But in two other respects Barth has not advanced as far as
some of the theologians mentioned above. First, Barth
holds that Christ assumed fallen human nature and that He
presented that human nature sinless, through His own act of
obedience to grace, to God, but he says very little of the
victorious struggle which Christ enacted so to convert human
nature. Second, Barth almost completely ignores the work
of the Spirit in this victory of Christ. These two weaknesses
1. C.D. IV/1, pp. 180-3.
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are related since Christ's warfare in, and conversion of,
human nature was a battle conducted in the power of the
Spirit.
In order to assess Barth's doctrine of the human
essence of Christ, we will first look at Christ's person and
then, second, at the life-act of his person. In this way it
will be possible to see the significance of Barth's failure
to give proper weight to the battle waged by Jesus in the
Spirit, and, in particular, it will become clear that it
involves a great loss for the understanding of the conversion
of men to God.
Human Essence in the Person of Christ
The Creed confesses that Jesus Christ was 'conceived
of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary...', and thereby
witnesses both to the fallen origin of His humanity and also
to His sanctification by the Holy Spirit.
Barth also confesses both the fallenness and the sin-
lessness of Christ, but the reader of the Dogmatics is unable
to suppress a question about his grasp of the tension involved
in such an astounding confession. For a theologian who has
so successfully combatted static conceptions of God and of
man, as well as static conceptions of the person of Christ,
the reader is surprised that Barth makes so little of what
was the greatest and most all-inclusive of the acts of Christ,
his wrestling with the power of sin. If, as Barth states,
Christ's sinlessness was not intrinsic to Him, but His act,
by what power did Christ live out this grace of sinlessness?
Barth's answer is: by the grace of the hypostatic union.
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This answer is inadequate to explain the warfare of Jesus as
man against sin, since it attributes to Jesus a power which is
not available to other men. Certainly, Barth insists that
this is a union of grace, and therefore does not alter
Jesus' human nature, but it locates the victory above the human
nature and not within it. We must still ask Barth: what is
the power of the grace of the hypostatic union such that the
Word does not mitigate the full onslaught of the conflict
waged in flesh against sin? Following the Creed and the
Gospels, the answer must be that the Word took flesh through
the Holy Spirit, and therefore did not alter flesh or
guarantee its sinlessness from above but sanctified it from
within. Thus, Jesus was sinless, not because He was united
with the Word, but because He received the Word and obeyed it
in the power of the Holy Spirit.1 This reference to the
Spirit is indispensible because the Spirit is that power of God
1. In arguing this against Barth it is not suggested that
either the Word was not the Subject in Jesus Christ or
that the Spirit-filled man performed the salvation of the
world. Rather it is being argued that Jesus Christ was
man as other men are men. Cf. H. Hartwell, The Theology
of Karl Barth (Duckworth, London, 1964), pp. 185f•» wbo
suggests that 'it is not impossible to think of the Subject
of the person of Jesus Christ as being from the beginning
both human and divine,...the Spirit of God (Jn. 4: 24)
blending at the Incarnation and in a manner we cannot under¬
stand with the human centre of consciousness, the human ego.'
Hartwell's suggestion is helpful because he points to the
place of the Spirit, and it also gives the human willing a
more essential place than is always the case in Barth, who
sometimes gives the impression that the divine Subject
swallows up the human subject. Hartwell's idea of the
one divine-human Subject in Christ through the Spirit is
the one outlined in this chapter: there are not"
two subjects in the one person of the Word, but, by the
Spirit, the Word assumed Spirit-filled flesh into union
with Himself so that we do not have an abstract human
nature but one whose ego is united with the Word.
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in which He indwells both the Father and the Son, indwelling
Them without displacing Them but rather by confirming Them as
Father and Son, and therefore, when He indwells the flesh of
Christ, He does not displace the flesh but brings it to its
truth as flesh, confirming it in its own identity. If the
sanctification of Christ's flesh is attributed to union with
the Word without reference to the Spirit the nature of the Word
is altered, because He achieves His purpose without the
Spirit - Word is separated from Spirit -, and the nature of
flesh is altered, because it achieves its response without
the Spirit, and therefore is made intrinsically capable of
response to God. The address of the Wrord is made to sanctify
without the indwelling of the Spirit. Even if the gracious-
ness of this Word is underlined, as Barth very properly does,
*
this remains true.
Barth does not ignore the Holy Spirit in the actual
event of the incarnation.1 Indeed, he argues that Jesus'
birth from the Spirit meant that His humanity was conceived
in the freedom of God which also gave it the freedom to be
free, true, man. The fact that His birth was not as ours
is granted Him true humanity.
It is not with His birth as it is with ours;...His
human existence begins in the freedom of God Himself,
in the freedom in which the Father and the Son are one
in the bond of love, in the Holy Spirit. When we
look at the origin of Jesus we ought therefore to
look into this depth of the Godhead, in which the
Father and the Son are one. This is the freedom
of the innermost life of God, and in this existence
there begins thfe existence of this man, A.D. 1.
(Dogmatik im Grundrlss, p. 115 (my trans.))
1. See, e.g.. C.D. 1/2, p. 199.
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It should he noted in this connection that the birth of
Jesus in the Spirit answers a difficulty many have felt
with the doctrines of enhypostasis and anhypostasis. If the
man Jesus has His origin in the freedom of God, the freedom
in which He is the Creator Spirit, and if it is through
this Spirit that the Word takes this man into union with
Himself, then the fact that Jesus has no independent hypostasis
does not threaten but rather establishes His free humanity.
As Jesus was born without a human father and in the freedom
of the Creator Spirit, so those who receive Him are 'born not...
of the will of man, but of God.' (Jn. 1: 13), and so, if we
have no fear of attributing our life as regenerate men to the
action of the Word through the Holy Spirit, we ought to have
no fear in attributing the life of the perfectly regenerate
man to the same source.
Barth fails to continue this excellent insight beyond
the event of the incarnation into the actual life of the
incarnate One. There is almost complete silence in the
Dogmatics about the work of the Spirit throughout Jesus'
life and ministry.1 It is noticeable that even in his
account of the incarnation he is as much concerned to
stress the absence of human possibility as he is to speak of
the positive power of the Spirit to accomplish in man what is
impossible for man to do without Him.
This silence is particularly evident in his great,
1. The excellent footnote C.D. IV/2, pp. 323-30 is not
sufficient to establish the integral place of the Spirit
in the wrestling of Jesus for holiness.
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extended discussion of the vere homo in IV/2. The account
of the hypostatic union there makes no integral use of the
doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Barth does not, of course,
deny the continuing operation of the Spirit in Christ, and
in footnotes he mentions it, but the fact remains that he
can discuss the vere homo at what he believes to be adequate
length without making the doctrine of the Spirit an
integral part of his affirmation.
It seems proper, then, to make the following observations.
1. Barth seems to have neglected his own belief and
doctrine that Word and Spirit may not be separated, but
always work together. In 1/2 he said:
The very possibility of human nature*s being adopted
into union with the Son of God is the Holy Ghost.
Here, then, at this frontal point in revelation,
the Word of God is not without the Spirit of God.
(C.D. 1/2, p. 199)
Barth has failed to develop his own perception. This is
all the more surprising as he develops his perception with
great power in relation to the Word of the risen Christ,
i.e., the self-communication of Christ in His resurrection
in the power and holiness of the Spirit of God. Why does
Barth neglect the fundamental relation, inherent in God Him¬
self, between Word and Spirit when he comes to speak of the
life-act of the Word made flesh? It may be fear of
Nestorianism, i.e., the fear that Jesus may come to be thought
of as the Spirit-filled man whose act is merely parallel to
and not identical with the act of the Wrord. Is it not
rather a failure to bring the doctrine of the Trinity into
full involvement with the life-act of Jesus Christ? - a
failure, that is, to show that in the incarnate One not only
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the self-humbling Son but also God the Spirit were unfolding
the inner riches of God Himself in such a manner that the
inner life of God could overflow and actually dwell in man.
For in the flesh of Jesus Christ it was not only the Word
who was imparted to man, but the Spirit who, as the richness
of God's own inner being, opened man's inner being to receive
the self-impartation of the Word. As in the life of the
Trinity the connection of Word and Spirit is the freedom of
God to give Himself (Word) without 1 osing Himself (the Spirit
as the bond of union), so in the incarnate One the connection
of Word and Spirit is the freedom of God to give Himself to man
so that man freely responds to that self-impartation without
1 osrng or dissipating it. In this union of Word and Spirit,
the flesh of the incarnate One becomes the bearer of the
externalisation of the inner riches of God. In this union
of Word and Spirit, then, the flesh of the incarnate One
becomes the bearer of the self-unfolding of the inner riches
of God. In this way, the flesh of Jesus receives the Word
and remains steadfastly faithful to it (through the indwelling
of the Spirit): there takes place in flesh the victorious
contest against sin, death and Satan. Flesh, which was
under the condemnation of God, condemns sin in the flesh.
Flesh vindicates itself against the Accuser.1 It does
1. Earth's friend, Pierre Maury, seems to have understood
more clearly than Barth himself, the importance of Jesus'
answer to the devil. Maury sees that God answers the
devil through the obedience of the man Jesus. In C.D.
IV/3 Barth displays profound insight into Jesus' response
to the Father as prefigured in Job, but he does not stress
that this defeated the devil.
'What [God] must have was the wonderful response which he
received in the filial obedience of Jesus of Nazareth, the
first to call him Father in all truth, in order for his
(Contd.
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not do this in its own strength - it does it solely through
the indwelling of the Spirit - but for that very reason it
is flesh which wins the contest. It is the glory and
justification of God that His creature defeat the Accuser.
He stakes His own glory on the victory of His creature.
Thus Jesus in the flesh is the bearer of the inner riches of
God. His victory in flesh, through the Spirit, is the
vindication and glory of God Himself, for in Him God's not
repenting of having created man is justified. And if this
is true, it must also be true that in this victory God
increased His own glory, enriching Himself through the
actualisation of His inner riches in the flesh of man.
Only if He won this victory as man could He vindicate the
Creator and only if He received the Word in the power of the
indwelling Spirit could He do it as man. Thus, the doctrine
of the Trinity needs to be brought into full involvement in
the doctrine of the life-act of Jesus Christ, and Barth's
discussion of the vere homo suffers because he does not do so.
2. If it is the case that Barth allows the Word to
operate without the Spirit in the life-act of Jesus Christ,
the nature of the Word has been altered from that of He who
does not achieve the response of human nature without the
indwelling Spirit to that of He who dominates and overpowers
Contd.) purpose to be fulfilled, that unchanged purpose of
him in whom 'we live and move and have our being'.(Acts
17: 28); in order that the Tempter of Genesis, and of the
desert where Jesus withstood him for forty days, might be
shown to be the impotent liar who tries to pervert the
work of the Creator, asserting to God's face, as in the
prologue to the Book of Job, that none loves God disinter¬
estedly (Job 1: 1-9). The fact is that Job, mysteriously
prefiguring Jesus of Nazareth, is the man who does really
love because he is loved.' P. Haury, Predestination,
trans. R. Mackie (S.C.M., London, I960), p. 34. ~
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human nature. It is the Word and not the Spirit who indwells
man and creates the response of man. Barth is careful to
avoid saying anything of this kind, yet because he has the
Word operating without necessary reference to the indwelling
Spirit, the Word has to do the work of the indwelling Spirit,
and therefore inevitably has the character of mingling with
human nature.
3. Not only the Word, but human nature itself is
altered. Human nature is altered from that which achieves
its response to the Word only through the Spirit into that
which responds solely through union with the Word.
Inevitably the nature of man's response is altered. But
when the hypostatic union is spoken of as union with the
Word and indwelling by the Spirit - when the different
functions of Word and Spirit are respected - then man's
response is fully his own, made from the centre of his
willing at the place where the free Creator Spirit frees
him for his true creaturely response. Indwelt by this
Spirit, he is not displaced but freed to be himself.
4. The combination of points 2 and 3 make the
question of Eutychianism unavoidable. Barth has taken
great care to avoid any suggestion of a mingling or confusion
of the divine and the human in Christ. He says that 'Joined
in the One who is very God and very man, they [divine and
human essence] are always as different as God and man are
different.'1 But if they are Joined without the Holy Spirit's
continuous act of union, how can the Word and flesh exist
1. CjD. IV/2, pp. 115-6.
303
together in common activation without merging into each
other? Edward Irving's bold words are relevant here:
...as His conception was, such also was His life;
His constitution never changing; being in the
embryo what it was in the man of stature; being
in the humiliation what it was in the exaltation...the
development of its power and glory being the only
cause of apparent change. And what is this wonderful
constitution of the Christ of God? It is the
substance of the Godhead in the person of the Son, and
the substance of the creature in the state of fallen
manhood, united, yet not mixed, but most distinct for
ever. And is this all? No: this is not all. With
humility let it be spoken, but yet with truth and
verity, that the fallen humanity could not have been
sanctified and redeemed by the union of the Son alone;
which directly leadeth unto an inmixing and confusing
of the Divine with the human nature, that pestilent
heresy of Eutyches. The human nature is thoroughly
fallen; and without a thorough communication,
inhabitation and empowering of a Divine substance, it
cannot again be brought up pure and holy. The mere
apprehension of it by the Son doth not make it holy.
Such a union leads directly to the apotheosis or
deification of the creature, and again does away with
the mystery of the Trinity in the Godhead.
(Doctrine of Incarnation, pp. 123-4)
If there is no acknowledgement of the indwelling Spirit in
Jesus' human nature, His human nature is no longer freely
itself: it is made perfect through the 'inmixing' of the Son.
Two consequences of the utmost seriousness for the theme of
this study follow, (a) man is robbed of the conversion of
his fallen nature and (b) God is robbed of the manifestation
of His glory and justification of His purpose, since man does
not as man defeat Satan. Irving's words are worth hearing:
He was the person of the Eternal Son, manifesting
forth the will of the Father and the work of the
Holy Ghost, as well as the word of the Son, in man¬
hood, yea, fallen manhood. He took up the creature
in its lowest estate, in order to justify God therein,
by proving how good even that estate was; verily to
prove that it was holy.
(Doctrine of Incarnation, p. 124)
It cannot seriously be maintained that Barth is
Eutychian, but his failure to allow the Holy Spirit His proper
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place in the life-act of Jesus Christ does leave him
vulnerable to the two charges just noted. Barth does note
that Jesus in His historical obedience justified God,"'" but
he does not draw out the fact that it was as man that He did
so. There would be no special glory for God to defeat sin
and Satan: but for God so to humble Himself in the Word and
so to indwell man in the Spirit that man as man defeats the
Accuser is the very actualisation of God*s glory.
The Life-Act of Jesus Christ, with special reference to
His human essence
The discussion of the preceding section concerned the
constitution of the person of Christ, and was particularly
interested in showing that it is only if the presence of
the Trinity, and especially of the Holy Spirit, is acknow¬
ledged in Christ that it is possible to speak of man as man,
vere homo, defeating evil and being elevated to be with God.
This section will be concerned with the conflict and victory
of that vere homo, and with the kind of salvation which that
unique humanity realised for other men.
No-one doubts that it was salvation which Christ
achieved for man when He assumed human nature, but the under¬
standing of that salvation depends on the prior understanding
of what He did in our human nature. His humanity is saving
humanity because it is unique. If that uniqueness is
primarily understood as the uniqueness of the humanity of the
Lord, it will not be the conflict and victory of that humanity
1. C.D. II/2, p. 123.
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which constitutes its saving uniqueness so much as the fact
that in it the Lord acted to save men from sin. If, however,
that uniqueness is understood primarily as sinlessness - as
the victory over sin - its saving uniqueness will he under¬
stood as fundamentally freeing men for a life victorious over
sin. This second emphasis entails the understanding of
Christ's saving uniqueness as His conversion of human nature.
Properly understood, the first emphasis (on the human
nature of the Word) leads on to the second emphasis (on the
sinlessness of Jesus). If (as Barth shows) the Word is He
who gave Himself to human essence, addressing Himself in pure
grace to man and thus elevating man to be the pure recipient
of grace - if that is the grace of the hypostatic union, then
flesh is activated by grace, and therefore activated to wage
war and to achieve sinlessness in exactly the same way and
through the same grace as other men should but do not. The
election of grace which is implied in the hypostatic union
means that Jesus is destined for sinlessness, but that this
predestination was the handing over of His humanity to live
entirely by grace. In no sense did it mean that He was
preserved from sinning by powers not available to other men.
His election meant no easier battle. On the contrary,
because it was the election of grace and union with the grace
of the Son of God, He was committed to the battle which all
others shirk but which He must carry through to the end. One
could say that His union with the Word meant that He was
'imprisoned', 'cornered' by grace, if these words did not
imply the opposite of the liberation which grace brings.
Perhaps a better way of expressing it is to say that grace
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frees man and that men fear freedom, but Jesus was the one man
who faced that fear and lived wholly by grace, thus being
freely, truly man.
Whatever may be the best way of expressing this, it is
clear that the grace of the hypostatic union leads us to say
that Jesus was sinless in the same way that other men should
be but are not. If this is true, the nature of the grace of
the hypostatic union must be developed further in the direction
of the grace of sinlessness than does Barth: it must be specified
as the grace of the Holy Spirit. It then becomes clear that
Christ was indwelt by that power of God which did not dis¬
place His human willing, but empowered it for obedience. The
Word was united with flesh through the Holy Spirit, and there¬
fore the flesh of Christ received and obeyed the Word as all
men should, the decisive difference between His humanity and
theirs being that He, filled with the Spirit, obeyed graoe
wholly. The flesh of Christ achieved sinlessness by faith
in the Word and empowering by the Spirit. This may be
expressed in a paradoxical way by saying that, because of its
union with the Word, the flesh of Christ was sinless without
relying on its union with the Word. The paradox is dissolved
by the fact that this union was by the Holy Spirit, and there¬
fore flesh obeyed not because of its union with the Word but
because it was filled with the Spirit. Of course, Barth's
doctrine of the hypostatic union as a union of grace, and
therefore that flesh was sinless not by a special status but
by act, implies the 'paradox' just noted, but his doctrine
does need this further specification of the Holy Spirit
because only then does it become clear what it was on the human
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side which enabled Jesus actively to obey the address of
divine grace. Barth has specified only the grace of the
hypostatic union from the divine side, not from its corres¬
ponding human side. It should be added immediately that
Earth's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as the subjective
reality of revelation, seems to call for this added specifi¬
cation.
When this further step is taken, and the uniqueness of
Christ's human nature is seen in this second light as His
sinlessness, the nature of the salvation which He accomplished
is specified as the conversion of human nature. If this step
is neglected, and Has uniqueness specified only as His union
with the Word, the conversion of human nature which He
achieved is not communicable to other men because it was
achieved in a way in which these other men cannot participate,
since they are not united with the Word. But when the
uniqueness of His human nature is specified as the union with
the Word by the Holy Spirit, His conversion of human nature
is communicable to other men: it is a conversion of their
human nature, since it is conversion through the indwelling
of the Spirit, just as theirs is. Without mention of the
Spirit, the power which empowered His flesh is left out of
account, and therefore the conversion of human nature in
Christ is of a different kind from that in other m&a.
What is lacking in Barth may best be indicated by
pointing to the New Testament witness to Jesus as the Spirit-
filled man. There is no space in this study to discuss this
at any length, but it must be noted that all the Gospels show
the Spirit descending on Jesus after His self-commitment to
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sinners in the Jordan, and that they frequently point to the
continued indwelling of the Spirit in Him as He prosecuted
His warfare against the devil and as He exercised compassion
in bringing in the Kingdom. The writer to the Hebrews gives
powerful witness to Jesus learning obedience through His
sufferings and to His being perfected."1" He says that Christ
offered Himself without blemish to God through the eternal
Spirit. Gathering together the range of the New Testament
evidence, it seems proper to say that Jesus completed His
baptism in Jordan through His baptism of fire of His cross.
2
In that self-offering in the Spirit, He perfected His com¬
passionate self-commitment to sinners, loving them as Himself
3
and bearing their diseases and sins in His own body. By
1. teleiotheis egeneto (Heb. 5: 9). The Greek verb teleo
and cognates implies a dynamic movement toward fulfilment
and contrasts with the Western idea of a timeless, static
perfection. In relation to Christ, His being perfected
through His suffering and obedience must mean that His
flawless holiness was unfolded and proved throughout His
life until it reached its fulfilment in the supreme
testing of the cross.
2. Heb. 9: 14. Cf. R.S. Wallace, Calvin* s Doctrine of the
Christian Life (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959), p« 8.
3. It has already been noted (Chapter V, p. ) that Barth
understands Chiistfe compassion as that righteousness whereby
He loves others as Himself and so bears their griefs and
sins as His own. Interpreting the verb splagchnizesthai
he says: 'What it means is that the suffering and sin and
abandonment and peril of these men (i.e., those who Jesus
encountered) not merely went to the heart of Jesus, but
right into His heart, into Himself, so that their whole
plight was now His own, and as such He suffered it far more
keenly than they did.' C.D. III/2, p. 211. It is suggested
here that it was by the Holy Spirit, that power of God
whereby He enters into the inner depths without displacing
them but rather by making them more sensitive, that Jesus
compassionated in this sense.
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the indwelling Spirit His tender love for others was
broadened and deepened - in sum, perfected - so that He felt
and knew their sin as His own: such was the victory over the
temptations of the devil through which the Spirit led Him.
A number of points of importance for this study emerge
from this witness to Jesus* life in the Spirit.
1. Jesus* human nature was both fallen and sinless.
He came in 'the likeness of sinful flesh* (Rom. 8: 3). This
cannot be understood as a paradox but only as the fruit of
the most awesome victory of His holy obedience to the Word
through the Spirit. It was through the law of the Spirit
of life that He condemned sin and triumphed over the law of
sin and death.
2. Jesus thus converted sinful human nature into
righteous human nature. This may not be interpreted to
mean that Jesus progressed in holiness in the sense that He
began unholy and ended holy. Jesus was holy from the
moment of His conception by the Spirit (Lk. 1: 35)» and He
needed no progress in holiness."1" He unfolded through the
most rigorous testing His spotless holiness, and in this
sense perfected it. Only in the Jaws of the ultimate
testing could He win the conversion of human nature; only
as faced with the most radical temptation to sin could He
prove humanity as perfectly righteous humanity. Psalm 22
gives the experience of One who felt forsaken by the God on
whom He had cast Himself 'from the womb*. Because He remained
steadfast even at this ultimate point, the rebellious humanity
1. E. Irving, Christ's Holiness in Flesh, pp. 76-93#
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He took from His mother was proved perfectly faithful to
the Creator."1"
3. Jesus' righteousness is thus to he understood as
His victory against the temptations of the world, the flesh
and the devil. As Mark's Gospel indicates, the battle with
Satan was particularly intense: Jesus overpowered the strong
man (Satan) who had usurped God's place in man. Barth is not
at all helpful on this unremitting and full-scale contest
which was Christ's from the moment of His baptism to His
hurling back the gates of Hades.
4. While it cannot be said that Barth ignores these
points, it is undeniable that he underplays the tension in
Jesus' life. Granted that Jesus was bound to be victorious,
and that Barth does not say that the earthly is only the
shadow of what was played out in heaven, Barth shies clear
of entering into the wrestling in the strength of the Spirit
which took place in Christ's flesh in order to fulfill. God's
eternal will.
It is now possible to make a series of points about
God's self-commitment to Jesus which enables Him to communi¬
cate Jesus' conversion of human nature to sinners.
1. Jesus was the Spirit-filled man who was perfected
in His self-offering on the cross.
2. To regard Jesus from this perspective in no way
endangers the truth that it was the Son of God who was the
acting Subject in the life of Jesus Christ. Some of the
figures who have stressed Jesus as the Spirit-filled man
may have suggested that the Son of God was passive during
1. ibid., pp. 16-17.
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His incarnation,1 but Barth has shown very clearly that the
activity of the Son includes His freedom to be obedient and
to suffer. The Son willed not His will but His Father's
will; He handed Himself over to the betrayer and He handed
over His life. Even in His death, He was the acting Subject.
This understanding of the act of the Son of God allows us to
say both that the Son of God was the active Subject in Jesus
Christ and that He was also the Spirit-filled man. No
tension exists between these two statements. God actively
obeyed and suffered as did also his human nature. But it
must be added that this common activation of the divine and the
human took place through the Holy Spirit. The Son of God
activated Himself through the eternal Spirit; the Son of man
activated Himself also through the Spirit of God; and the
union of both in Jesus Christ was also by the Spirit. It is
important to stress this, not only to guarantee the undimini¬
shed humanity of Christ, but also the guard against Nestorian-
ism, for, unless it is understood that the divine and human
were held together by the Spirit who indwelt them both, in¬
dwelling them as the Spirit of the inner union of the Creator
both ab intra and ad extra, it will seem that God and man
merely coincided in perfect common activity and were not
united in the one person. If the activity of the Spirit is
honoured in the hypostatic union, the suggestion of Nestorian-
2
ism which R. Prenter detects in Barth's Christology will be
1. G.S. Strachan, The Pentecostal Theology of Edward Irving
(Dartman, Longman and Todd, London, 1973), P» 224.
2. R. Prenter, 'Karl Barths Umbildung der traditionellen
Zweinaturlehre in lutherischenBeleuchtung', Studia
Thieologlca XI, 1957, pp. 1-87, esp. pp. 22ff.
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obviated, as will also the suggestion of Eutchyianism which
was noted above,"*"
3. If the act of majesty of God in Christ's incarnation
is understood in this way, it is necessary to say that there
was a self-movement within the triune God such that He became
the Redeemer of sinners in a way in which He was not
previously.^
(a) The Son of God was not unaffected by His incarnate
life. There was a new actualisation of eternal grace such
that He entered the depths of man's sin there to rescue and
convert him. Earth would agree with this statement but it
must be added that by His union with the Spirit-filled man He
became Son of the Father in a sense in which He was not
previously. Through His lowly life, death and resurrection
He became Head of the new humanity, the One in whom sinners
are born again sons of God. He assumed Adam's fallen humanity;
He was baptised into repentance for sinners; He was baptised
in the Spirit, so that in Him mankind 'took a step above its
original creation,....[becoming] the residence of God, his house
to dwell in, his tongue to speak, his hand to act'; He
1. Cf. C. O'Grady, The Church in Catholic Theology (G. Chapman,
Tiohdon, 1969), p." 70. O'Grady seeks to avoid both
Nestorianism and Eutchyianism by stressing the 'sub-operation'
of Christ's humanity in our salvation, but this study hopes
to give His humanity a more realistic place than does Earth
by honouring the work of the Spirit, and thus also overcoming
any suggestion of synergism and Pelagianism.
2. 'The fulness of God's love is only conceivable in the
"growing together" experience of the Father-Son relationship
in the Spirit.' G.A.F. Knight, A Biblical Approach to the
Doctrine of the Trinity. Scottish Journal of Theology
Occasional Papers, No. 1 (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1953),
p. 66.
3. E. Irving, Christ's Holiness in Flesh, pp. 18-9.
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fulfilled righteous repentance for sinners by His self-offering
on the cross by the eternal Spirit; and He was 'designated
Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by
his resurrection from the dead' (Rom. 1: 3), the resurrection
in which we have been born again to a living hope (I Pet. 1:
3). Through His death and resurrection for sinners, He became
a life-giving Spirit (I Cor. 15: 4-5). Thus, not through His
incarnation as such, but through that perfection of His always
completely holy God-manhood and its manifestation in His
resurrection from the dead, He makes dead sinners to live as
sons of God. In this sense, it is correct to speak of a
progressive filiation of the Son of the Father, an unfolding
and augmentation of His perfect sonship of the Father in the
Spirit through birth, baptism, transfiguration, and resurrec¬
tion.1 When this development in Christ is seen, it is
possible to see how He could convert sinners without auto¬
matically including them in Himself, for it becomes clear
that, through the perfection of His self-offering in the
Spirit for the purification of sinners, He comes to them as
the life-giving Spirit: i.e., 'in the power of the Spirit, by
2
which we are born again in Christ and become new creatures.'
The tendency in Barth to regard Christ's humanity in the
incarnation as universal humanity, as 'the humanum of all
1. Psalm 2: 7: 'You are my son, today I have begotten you,'
is quoted in the New Testament in relation to Christ's
resurrection (Acts 13: 33)» and the words 'You are my son'
are spoken at both His baptism and transfiguration.
Clearly His eternal Sonship was not static but dynamic.
2. J. Calvin, Commentary on St. John, trans. T.H.L. Parker
(Oliver and feoyd, Edinburgh, 1959;, comment on Jn. 7: 38,
p. 199.
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men,'1 inevitably involves Christology in a Platonic
2
tendency unless it is clear that the Son of God, who gives
His humanity its representative power, became the Creator of
the new humanity only through His death and resurrection in
the Spirit. If, as Barth (together with the early Fathers)
holds, Christ by His incarnation 'assumed an ontological
relation with mankind' such that 'the work of Christ done for
man was done in man prior to its appropriation hjr man', it
is equally true that this position can be delivered from
Platonism and impersonality only if it insisted, with Calvin,
that Christ through His death and resurrection recreates men
only as His Spirit comes on them and that He establishes a
4
different union from that established in the incarnation.
Put simply: Christ the Word in whom all are created became
the life-giving Spirit not by His incarnation but by the
fulfillment of His incarnate life in His resurrection by the
Spirit, and therefore He recreates men only as His Spirit
comes on them.
(b) The Spirit was not unaffected by His being all of
one 'bundle' with the incarnate One. He comes in a new form
coming with the experience of the conversion of humanity in
Christ, and therefore coming as the Spirit of the conversion
of men. A doctrine of this kind is not an innovation and
can be found in the work of two Scottish theologians,
1. C.D. IV/2, p. 49.
2. R. Prenter, art, cit.. pp. 75-7.
3. G.S. Hendry, The Gospel of the Incarnation (S.C.M., London
1959), p. 62.
4. ibid.. pp. 69-70.
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Wotherspoon and Milligan. It is worth quoting a summary of
their teaching:
Christ's own human nature had to be perfected in every
respect, in life, death, resurrection and ascension,
before the Spirit could descend without measure on
humanity....The Spirit who comes at Pentecost comes
in a new relation, in a new mode of His being.
Obviously the Spirit who comes to the Church is still
the Spirit in all His divine majesty and glory, the
Spirit of life and creative power. But the Spirit
who comes now is not a naked Spirit, in all the
exclusiveness of His own deity, but is the Spirit
charged with all the experiences of Christ, as He
shared to the full our mortal nature and weakness,
and endured its temptations; griefs, suffering and
death. He comes tingling with the experiences of
Christ as He struggled and prayed, worshipped and
obeyed, and poured out His life in compassion for man¬
kind. He comes attempered to our hv^arnty, coloured
now with Christ's glorified humanity, as the Spirit
of the risen Christ, the Spirit of victory and
heavenly inheritance.
(J. Walker, unpublished paper: The Holy Spirit)
Barth is unable to affirm this at all strongly, since he
places so little importance on the Spirit in the struggle and
victory of Jesus.
The Spirit not only comes with this new experience:
He also comes in a new mode. The fourth Gospel dares to say:
'The Spirit was not yet, for Jesus was not yet glorified.*
(Jn. 7: 39). Thus, through the death and resurrection of
Jesus (His glorification) God Himself comes in a new mode.
It is scarcely incorrect to say that God Himself becomes
Spirit in a sense in which He was not previously. W. Milligan
says:
He [the Spirit] is not so much the Third Person of the
Trinity in His original and absolute existence, as that
Spirit in the effect produced upon Him by the economy
of salvation, that as Spirit, He is the bond, not
between God and the Eternal Word alone, but between the
Father and the incarnate Son; or that Spirit as He is
the Spirit of the Christ from whom in His combined
natures proceed all the blessings of the covenant of
grace. (Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood of our
Lord. P.-I55]
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As was noted in the previous chapter, Barth argues that the
Spirit is the Spirit who imparts Jesus Christ to other men
since He is antecedently the Spirit of the fellowship between
the Father and the Son in the Trinity, but, in the light of
the above it must further be said that God Himself in the
Spirit is now able to bridge the chasm between Himself and
sinners because He Himself, for the first time but also
perfectly and finally^ went in the Spirit to the depths of sin
in the man Jesus. That the Spirit is the bond of union
between the Father and the Son in the eternal Trinity qualifies
Him only to bridge the distance between Himself and other men,
but that He is the Spirit who was the union between the Father
and the man Jesus as He bore the sin of the world qualifies
Him to overcome the chasm between Christ and sinners. Because
Barth is weak at this point, he is not as strong as he appears
to be on the impartation of the conversion of man in Christ
to sinners.
Barth does not give Pentecost its full status as the
coming of God in His new mode of being. Through His
perfection in the Spirit, Jesus became the repository of the
Spirit, the Man qualified to reign at the right hand of God.
He became the life-giving Spirit, the Word of God who was
also the Seed of God who, having fallen into the ground and
died, now brings forth much fruit, multiplying, as it were,
His life in those who are reborn through Him. He does this
through pouring forth the gift of the Spirit which he received
of the Father. This Spirit is also the Spirit who ^as1 only
after God Himself gave Himself in the history of Jesus. He
is God Himself who has been to the depths in Jesus and has not
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been rent asunder but has affirmed His unity with Himself,
and has thus enriched Himself through His own history. As
God who proceeds from this self-giving - proceeding from the
riven side of the Lamb - He comes in a new mode of enriched
inner unity, and falls on sinners to indwell and convert
them. Because He has conquered the alienation of sinners
in Himself, His inner riches now indwell sinners and become
in them rivers of living water welling up into eternal life.
Thus Pentecost is the * final goal of the divine economy on
earth. ,'L
(c) The Father also received a new pctualisation of
His eternal Fatherhood. In a moving passage Barth says:
...there is a particula veri in the teaching of the
early Patripassians. This is that primarily it is
God the Father who suffers in the offering and sending
of His Son, in His abasement. The suffering is not
His own, but the alien suffering of the creature, of
man, which He takes to Himself in Him. But He does
suffer it in the humiliation of His Son....This
fatherly fellowsuffering of God is the mystery, the
basis, of the humiliation of His Son; the truth which
takes place historically in His crucifixion.
(C.D. IV/2, p. 357)
This deep insight could well form the basis of a doctrine of
the further realisation of the Father's eternal Fatherhood
such that, in the Spirit, He is the Father in the promised
sense that He now dwells in sinners who have been raised up
as His sons (Jn. 14: 23). Through the fatherly fellow-
suffering of the Father, He became the Father of sons: the
inner riches of the fatherhood of God were unfolded through
1. V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern uhurch
trans. Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Serguis {James
Clark, London, 1957), p. 159.
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His self-giving so that those who were not worthy to be
called his sons now are indwelt by Him.
These aspects of Christian doctrine have been
developed in order to show that if the doctrine of the
Trinity is brought into closer relationship with the life
perfected by Jesus of Nazareth, an even richer understanding





The Christology of Barth's Dogmatics IV/3 is at once
the most exciting and the most disappointing of his entire
Dogmatics. It shows Christ in His ftOJxess and glory opening
up a fullness and glory for men, and yet at the central point -
where Jesus is the Victor in such a way that He opens up
victory for us men - Barth fails to give his doctrine the
decisive content it needs. In the outline of this Christology
which now follows it will become clear that the glory of the
Mediator, which is the theme of this section of the Dogmatics
calls for more radical treatment.
Jesus Christ lives.1
This simple truth contains a great and complex range of
truth. Jesus Christ is Himself the reality of the reconcil¬
iation of God and man. He Himself is the content, and there¬
fore the pledge and guarantee, of the reconciliation made in
Him. In Dogmatics IV/1 Barth spoke of the God-manward move¬
ment in Him; in Dogmatics IV/2 he spoke of the man-Godward
movement in Him; but now in Dogmatics IV/3 Barth speaks of
the movement of the God-man outward toward other men. The
first two perspectives taken together exhaust the material
2
content of the doctrine of Christ, but this third per¬
spective is necessary to show that the life in Him radiates
out to men and makes them alive. Christ lives not for Himself
but for others, and therefore in the fulfillment of His life He
1. CjD. IV/3, p. 39.
2. ibid.. Editors' Preface, p. ix; C.D. IV/1, p. 136.
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will not be alone any more than will God Himself be without
His people. Thus, the content of reconciliation which is
actual in Jesus Christ (as demonstrated in Dogmatics IV/1
and IV/2) shines out to other men in such a way that they
are called to serve Him and actively to participate in the life
in Him. As the pledge and the guarantee of the reconciliation
made in Him (as demonstrated in Dogmatics IV/5) He gives men
the sure hope of eternal life and they live in this hope as
they follow Him in His progress through history to its
consummation. He is the hope of the world, and they actively
share in His self-attestation, i.e., His truth.
It is impossible in this study to do justice to the
rich and complex truth which radiates from the living Jesus.
Some aspects, however, should be particularly noted. The
first and fundamental point is this. We have to do with
the living person of Jesus Christ, not with doctrines about
Him or with impersonal forces. Barth emphasises that Jesus
lives in His act. He lives in the act of His self-actual-
isation. This is the meaning of His personal being. But
it must be remembered that His existence is the being together
in act of both God and man. As 0'Grady puts it:
That he lives means that His existence is act,
actualization of being in sovereign spontaneity
after the manner of God, and also actualization
in limited spontaneity after the manner of the
creature. (Church in the Theology of Karl Barth. p. 160)
Because He is this person, we must note, second, that His
glory is not empty but full and radiates out to men. He
lives in the very act of communicating Himself. He is light,
and His light shines out to men, shining in the enlightening
1. ibid., p. 41.
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power of the life which He is. He is truth, active truth,
and therefore He attests His truth, proving Himself to be
the One He is. He is life, and as He lives He communicates
the life in Him. Finally, we must note that, since He lives
as this active being together of God and man, He reveals Him¬
self and manifests His glory in such a way that men are
brought to know themselves in His light. He is the Prophet,1
2
making known the truth of God and man. This making known
is active and not passive, and therefore in making Himself
known as the Word of God He calls men into the service of His
self-attestation. This is the goal of His personal act and
it is the point which must be stressed here. The glory of
the Mediator shines out to men so that, as the men they are,
they actively attest the active being together of God and man
in Him.
Since Jesus Christ is this person, He manifests His
glory only as He lives His history of conquering man's
resistance to Him and as He brings them to witness actively
to Him. As He reveals Himself as the One in whom the
reconciliation of the world is actual, He encounters the
world's opposition and He overcomes it. His revelation of
■3
Himself has a dramatic, warring character.
In general terms, this means that:
1. Jesus Christ not only speaks the Word of God: He is the
Word of God (ibid.. p. 96).
2. Jesus Christ is 'the total and complete declaration of God
concerning Himself and the men whom He addresses in His
Word.' (ibid., p. 99). He Himself guarantees the truth
of His Word (p. 103). He has no need of proof: He
proves Himself to be the One He claims to be.
3. ibid.. p. 180.
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as the event of reconciliation is also that of...
prophecy,...it emerges from the apparent distance
in which it is played out for us men, and comes to
affect us directly, so that we are not merely
implicated in its occurrence, but realise that it
is the case. (C.D. TV/3, p. 181)
In the occurrence of the prophecy of Jesus Christ, He
establishes knowledge of Himself and as He does so the world
opposes Him.1 (Barth argues that knowledge of Jesus Christ
2
is not 'the acquisition of neutral information', but know¬
ledge which affects the whole man'; it is an event.In
Jesus Christ the light of the reconciliation of the world
4
shines into the darkness of the world, meeting it and over-
5 6
coming it. This is the warfare of Jesus.
The story of Paul's 'conversion' or metanoia illustrates
7
this personal victory of Jesus. The 'primary' subject in
the story is Jesus of Nazareth. Certainly, the story speaks
of Paul's decision, but his act follows Jesus' decision
Q
concerning him. Paul's transformation can be understood
only if we see that previously Saul resisted knowledge of
Jesus (he kicked against the pricks), and that then 'Jesus
Q
made Paul acquainted with Himself.' Jesus as acting Subject
1. ibid., p. 185.
2. ibid.. p. 183.
3. ibid.. p. 191.
4. ibid.. p. 191.
5. ibid., p. 196.
6. ibid.. p. 197.
7. ibid.. p. 198.
8. ibid.. p. 198.
9. ibid., p. 202.
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enlightened Saul."'" Saul ceased to live. Christ now lived
in him. He was a new man in the knowledge of Jesus Christ.
•The whole process typifies the event designated in the New
_ 2
Testament by the terms gnosis and metanoia.'
The atonement made in Jesus Christ may therefore be
described as revelation which establishes active knowledge on
the part of men.-' It is a self-multiplying history, making
itself known in the face of opposition. Barth makes four
observations in this connection. (1) The distinction between
the history of reconciliation and our participation in it is
4
confirmed. Qntic and noetic, objective and subjective,
Jesus Christ and others do not merge into each other, but
•acquire the character of an encounter in which neither robs
the other of its autonomy and distinctiveness, nor indeed of
5
its specific place and function in the encounter.'^ But
(2) Jesus Christ and other men belong together^ and (3) He
comes to men in such a way that those who participate in
knowledge of Him 'participate in the event of salvation
7
itself.• This happens as men come to genuine knowledge of
Christ. Lest knowledge should seem too weak a word to carry
what is involved here, (4) Barth protests against a devaluation
of the concept of knowledge:
1. ibid. p. 202.
2. ibid. p. 203.
3. ibid. p. 211.
4. ibid. p. 213.
5. ibid. pp. 213-4.
6. ibid. pp. 214ff.
7. ibid. p. 217.
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What takes place in real Christian knowledge is... -
here we are reminded again of the New Testament concept
of metanoia - that the whole man with his possibilities
and experiences and attitudes is grasped by the object
which takes and retains the initiative in relation to
him, and turned right around to face this object, to
he wholly orientated on it. (C.D. IV/3» p» 220)
Christian knowledge is 'participation in His action.*
As a human action it takes place in participation in
His action. It has not grasped at this participation;
it can only receive it. Nor can it control this
participation; it can only be continually given it.
But as it takes place in this participation, His action,
i.e., that of Jesus Christ, takes place in it as a
human action. If it does so secondarily and not
primarily, it does so no less really, and no more and
no less as the work of reconciliation itself. In
virtue of the fact that the event of salvation is also
as such the revelation of salvation in the power of
which it becomes the object, basis and content of human
knowledge, Christian knowledge, as it receives this
object, basis and content, and takes pj.ace with reference
to it, is the knowledge of salvation. As such, however,
it is obviously itself an event of salvation.
(C.D. IV/3, P. 220)
This needs to be emphasised, especially as Barth holds that
the ontological alteration of the human condition took place
on the cross and in the resurrection of the incarnate One,
and that Christ makes this known to men when they believe in
Him. Some interpreters have taken this to mean that a man
is virtually unaffected by his coming to faith,"'" whereas
this passage shows that Barth speaks of Christian knowledge
as an active thing which 'is obviously itself an event of
salvation.•
Barth now attempts a sketch of the history in which the
light of Jesus Christ shines and man is opened up to Him. It
is the history of His victory. (1) Light begins to shine in
darkness as God freely and graciously posits the gift of Jesus
1. e.g. C. Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message
(Tyndale Press, London, 1967), pp. 136f.
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Christ in the world."1' He, Christ, speaks for Himself,
revealing and imparting Himself. (2) As He shines in the
world, a history of conflict ensues. 'Jesus Christ opens
the conflict.' The law of His action is imposed on His
2
opponent and not vice-versa. His attack is total and
radical because He brings with Him nothing less than the
radical alteration of the world.^ On the negative side,
men foolishly proceed as though nothing has happened, as
/»
though the old creation has not been passed over. On the
5
positive side, Jesus Christ proclaims the new man, and the
reality of this new existence is freely given to men. This
is an attack on man as he is, and man puts himself on the
£
defensive. He 'cannot bear what is here said about the
7
passing of the old man and the coming of the new.' He
tries to evade the Word (he cannot escape it); to set general
world-views in its place; and, worst of all, he may realise
that all resistance is futile and adopt the Word of grace for
Q
himself, attempting to render it innocuous. There is an
anti-Christian Church. (3) This conflict has a consummation,
though theology must remember that this final word can be
Q
spoken only by the living Jesus Christ in His return in glory.
1. C.D. IV/3, p. 221.
2.ibid., p. 239.
3. ibid., p. 241.
4. ibid., pp. 242-5.
5. ibid.. pp. 245-9.
6. ibid.. p. 251.
7. ibid., p. 251.
8. ibid., p. 258.
9. ibid., p. 261.
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His victory is not yet consummated. Theology can only witness
to the certainty of His victory. This certainty does not
refer to the goal of human history, nor to the Church nor
even to the inner certainty of Christian faith: the living
Jesus Christ alone is the Victor.
This bare reference to Jesus' victory, correct as it is,
may leave the impression that something magical takes place.
To guard against this danger it must be seen that His
superiority consists in the fact that He is the Word of the
act of God, and that this Word 'appeals directly to the real
man.'1 His victory is not magical (though it is miraculous)
because it does not operate despite man but works in man by
overcoming the resisting element in him.
Barth now turns to the communication of Christ's life
to us. Jesus Christ Himself presses this question on us.
In His resurrection from the dead, He revealed the whole
fullness of the reconciliation of the world with God. There
was nothing lacking in Him, nothing which remained to be
added. His consummation of world history at His final coming
will be only the conclusive revelation of what He was at His
first coming in His resurrection. Why, then, did He not
there and then, at His resurrection, conclude world history?
Would it not have been better if He had not posited this time
between His first and His final parousia?
Why, when order and peace had been established between
God and man in His life and death and powerfully enough
proclaimed in His resurrection, did He will to entangle
Himself first, and with Him the world, the community
and ourselves, in the conflict against darkness still
1. ibid.. p. 270.
327
somehow remaining, against sin, evil and death as
somehow still persisting forces?
(C.D. IV/3, p. 331)
Barth answers:
The answer is quite simply that it was His good will
because it has as its aim the granting to and pro¬
curing for the creation reconciled to God in Him both
time and space, .not merely to see, but actively to
share in the harvest which follows from the sowing of
reconciliation. In willing this and not something
supposedly better, Jesus Christ confirms Himself and
His whole being and action. (C.D. IV/3, pp. 331-2)
Confirming His whole being and action, He also grants us to
confirm our being and action in Him.
He does not will to be alone and without us, because He
does not will to go over our heads, because He wills
to give us a share in His work in our independence as
the creatures of God summondd to freedom....And so He
wills to give us time and space for participation in His
work. He wills to preserve the world...in order that
it should be the place where He can be perceived and
accepted and known and confessed by the creature as the
living Word of God. (C.D. IV/3, p. 332)
Of His pure grace, He gives men 'time, place and opportunity'1
for their free action as His witnesses and servants.
A further question must be asked: could there not
have been a more precise relationship between Jesus Christ
2
and ourselves? He is not identical with us, but we exist
3
in encounter with Him. He is the hope of all men, and yet
L
some have fruitful encounter with Him, others unfruitful.
Some demonstrate their freedom without knowledge of Him,
others demonstrate it with Him. 'In the sphere left for us
between the commencement and completion of the parousia and
1. ibid.. p. 333.
2. ibid.. p. 335.
3. ibid.. p. 335.
4. ibid.. p. 335.
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not yet redeemed is not solved, but it does have a bright
side. All our human longing and sighing in this transitional
time is not 'to be cast off as quickly as possible*; but
is a 'specific form of the greatness of the pitying love of
God.'1
The bright and luminous side of the riddle of our
existence in transition, in the time of the "still"
and "not yet", is the fact that Jesus Christ Himself
is in transition, living, acting, speaking and working
under the same sign, and that this is not even
partially to His shame but to His distinctive glory,
so that it cannot be to our hurt that He is present
in the form of the promise of the Spirit, but to our
full salvation. (C.D. IV/3» pp. 361-2)
Barth 3peaks of this time as the day of Jesus Christ.
For us men it points the way to full salvation. (1) 'Our
O
day is a day of His revelation'; (2) it is the time in
which Jesus Christ actively seeks the lost, converting them
from ignorance to knowledge; and (3) during this time Jesus
Christ sets the Christian in His service, actively bearing
witness in the world.
To know Jesus Christ is...to take the side of Jesus
Christ, to become a responsible subject instead of a
mere object in His cause, to be prepared not merely
to hear His Word, but also to repeat it...
(C.D. IV/3. p. 366)
He joins Christ's fight against darkness, and in his weakness
calls on God who gives him the strength needed to stand at
His side.
The purpose and goal of Christ's victory is thus our
active participation in it. As Christ Himself is in
1. ibid,. p. 361.
2. ibid.. p. 364.
3. ibid., p. 364.
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transition, moving through history toward His final
revelation, we follow Him and take part in His warfare.
Indeed, as Barth dares to say, we are not superfluous to His
victory, but, by His grace, necessary to it.1
The Weakness of Earth's Discussion of Jesus the Victor
It is impossible to read Barth's account of Christ in
His prophetic office without being aware of its great advance
on the usual protestant understanding of Christ in that office.
For the purpose of this study, the great advance consists in
Barth's picture of Christ as the One who, as the fullness of
the being together of God and man, gives man space, time and
opportunity fully to live in Him. As Christ moves through
history, making Himself known as the One He is, He overcomes
man's resistance to Him and so brings man actively to share
in His self-attestation in the world,
Barth has, of course, already hinted at this in the
two preceding sections of Christology. In the first pers¬
pective, Christ the Judge and Priest, he spoke of the verdict
of the Father who vindicated Christ as the foundation of the
new creation. In raising Christ from the dead, the Father
established a way from the old man to the new, a miraculous
continuity since it involved the utter death of the old and
the completely new beginning of the new. In the second
perspective, Christ in His royal office, Barth spoke of the
direction or command of the Son. In the resurrection of the
Son, there is a transition from Him to us in which we are
1. ibid.. pp. 365-7.
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made free to obey Him in love. Our slothful life is set
aside and we are set in a new and free existence. In this
third perspective, Christ in His Prophetic office, Barth
speaks of the promise of the Spirit. Christ makes room for
us fully to live in Him. Barth is thinking of the completed
work of Christ not only as that which comes forward to us from
the past, but also which comes backward, as it were, from the
future to us. We taste of the powers of the age to come.1
If Jesus is the fullness of the being together of God and. man,
He comes to us in this present in the power of the pledge of
the coming consummation of all things in Him. In this
perspective Barth stresses the Holy Spirit, since the Spirit
is the form of Jesus' coming to us in which we may move to¬
ward the coming future glory. In Johannine language, He
is the Paraclete whom Jesus sends us in the time of His going
away from us, the One who can come to us only if Jesus goes
away and is glorified, the One who takes what is His and
declares it to us. We are not left orphans because Jesus
comes to us in Him, and comes in such a way that it is for
2
our good that He is present in this form. In this form,
Jesus leads us into all truth. Thus, under the heading 'The
Promise of the Spirit' Barth is able to give scope to man's
active service in Jesus' triumphant self-demonstration as
the hope of the world.
In the light of this underlying trinitarian structure
of Barth's doctrine of reconciliation, it is possible to
1. Heb. 6: 5.
2. Jn. 16: 7.
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see that Barth holds that God's being Father, Son and Holy-
Spirit opens up for man an active part in the conquering of
the world for its redemption in Christ. The Father gives
man the basis of his new life in the new creation in His
Son; the Son exalts man to freedom as the sons of God; and
the Spirit gives men a share in the life of the world to come.
In the power of the Spirit the Son Converts' men from hostile
ignorance to obedient knowledge. As He wins this victory,
He also makes them soldiers at His side. Through the Spirit,
He lives in them and they fight the good fight in His cause.
Thus, it is correct to say that the Spirit dwelling in men
is the spear-head of the warfare of the triune God. This
statement in no way detracts from the basic truth that Jesus
is Victor. Rather, it implies that the victory which Jesus
is prosecuting through to its conclusion, the victory which
the Father has ordained for Him, is prosecuted by Him in
the men who are united with Him in His Spirit.
Such is Barth's magnificent vision. But it needs
to be deepened.
Jesus is the Victor. But what enemy does He overcome?
Barth answers: 'something in man',1 his ignorance and hostility.
2
It is not the real man, but something in man which cannot
bear to be told that it is all up with him and his works.
The real man is already in harmony with the Word of God, and
■*
therefore Jesus 'overlooks' the resisting element and
addresses Himself to the real man. Barth is not denying
1. C.D. IV/3, p. 251.
2. ibid., p. 270.
3. ibid.. p. 270.
334
that this 'something1 is very serious and that it puts man
under threat of condemnation. But if there is already an
undisturbed alliance between the real man and Christ, where
is the battle and therefore where is His victory? Barth
seems to make the victory a matter of course, as though it
were an integral part of creation, or, at least, of the
real man.
It may seem that this criticism takes up merely one
point amidst a great deal of writing which indicates Earth's
belief in a contest and victory played out in creation, but
a similar criticism has to be made of his concept of our
certainty of Jesus* victory. As quoted earlier in this
chapter, Barth thinks of the light of the Holy Spirit coming
like an irresistible flood, breaking down the closed doors
of the unbelievers. He makes no mention of an unbeliever
'hardening his heart' and being swept away in judgment. If
Barth means his metaphor seriously, and there is no reason
to think that he does not, Christ wins His victory despite
man. A man's being open or closed to the Holy Spirit means
no more than it does in the relationship mentioned above
between Christ and the real man. Christ comes to His
victory irresistibly and irrespective of the opening or
hardening of man.
The triumphant cry: 'Jesus is Victor' originally meant
that Jesus is victorious over the demons.1 On the cross,
Jesus defeated the adversary. Barth agrees that this is so:
1. K. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century
trans. J. Bowden (S.C.M., London, 1972), p. 644.
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in Dogmatics II/2, III/3 and elsewhere he speaks of the
defeat of Satan.1 There is no basis for Wingren's remark
2
that 1 there is no devil in Barth's theology.* It is, then,
surprising that Barth scarcely mentions the devil in
Dogmatics IV/3.
Barth may have been reluctant to speak at any length
of the devil and his hosts because of his well known and
surely correct observation that to give the devil any space
is just what he wants, and nothing so effectively puts him to
flight as disbelief in him. But surely it is to give the
devil no place to boast of his defeat as Jesus has accomplished
it on the cross. It is to give him no more place to take
pleasure in Jesus* defeat of him through the work of those
who follow Him.
Barth himself says that he has paid sufficient honour
to the opponent of the prophecy of Jesus Christ by describing
the resisting element in man. In fact:
What has been defined and described in the present
context as the resisting element in man is naturally
identical with the being which is not systematically
or consistently taught in Holy Scripture, but in the
New Testament especially is frequently mentioned as
the "devil", the principium or principens of darkness...
K.ft. ivV3, p. 2W)
This extraordinary statement does at least have the very
great merit of affirming that men do not lose responsibility
for what they do and are when subject to the devil. If a
man resists the light, it is true that it is both the man
1. C.D. II/2, pp. 122-3; CJD. III/3, pp. 349ff.
2. G. Wingren, Theology in Conflict, trans. E.H. Wahlstrom
(Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1958), p. 25.
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who is responsible for this evasion of the truth and also
that the demonic powers are tempting him to do it. Again,
it is true to say that when the resisting element in man is
defeated, Satan is also defeated. But to equate the
resisting element and the 'devil' overlooks the indispen-
sible doctrine that, in the name of Jesus, men are to resist
and to cast out the devil. Berth's equation would make this
a less significant doctrine since it would mean only that men,
through grace, cast out a resisting element from themselves,
and not that they subdue their enemy the adversary.
In his 'brief glance' at the devils (III/3) Barth
linked them with das Nichtige. with the chaos which God
passed over.1 Das Nichtige was not chosen and defeated at
the creation, as the work of God* s left hand. This means
that there is no defeat of the devil in the creation, or,
more correctly, what defeat of him takes place in creation
takes place on the ground of the revelation of his pre-
creational defeat. To the extent that das Nichtige and the
devil are placed together there is no defeat of man's enemy
by man. If Satan were defeated with das Nichtige before
creation, all that now remains to be defeated within creation
is his lie that God is a deceiver. It must be maintained
with Barth that Satan has no power except that of non-being,
of the unreality of a lie: if this were not so, we would be
X
faced with dualism. But it is equally true that Satan must
be defeated within creation, for it is in creation that he
has the target of his attack against God. God could have
chosen to defeat Satan simply by His Word of judgment, but in
1. C.D. III/3, pp. 522-4.
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an overflowing of His free grace He determined to defeat him
by the man Jesus. In this way He vindicated His grace, and
man as the creature of grace, vindicating Himself and man
against the accuser.
What must theology say about Jesus' victory over the
opponents of grace? If we look steadily at the heart of
theology, at the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, we see a
man demonstrate the fatherly purpose of God. We see Jesus
chose God simply because God is God, simply for God's sake,
and hence choose Him for no personal gain but simply 'for
nothing'.1 We see Him confirming that decision on the cross
by giving His whole being into the hand of God who has taken
everything from Him, including Himself. In this completion
of His decision we see Him imitating God: for just as God
in His free grace loves Him 'for nothing' and simply for Him¬
self, so He loves God freely and for God's sake. Thus, in
this perfected decision of Jesus, God's grace reaches its
fruition: He has a man who is as He is, a man who imitates
Him in His being while being other than Him, and therefore He
1. In the book of Job (1: 9), Satan taunts God that no-one,
not even Job, fears God 'for naught'. This must mean
that no-one loves God simply without regard to personal
safety and reward, fearing, loving and choosing Him simply
for Himself. The word used here in the Hebrew is hanan:
'without cause' (cf. Ps. 35: 7; 69: 4). The Psalmist can
speak of those who ha^Ee him without a cause, i.e.. for
naught. Very instructive is the fact that when he calls
on God for mercy he can also use a word from the same root,
e.g.. 'Be gracious to me (hannenl)*(Ps. 51: 1): he is
pleading with God to be merciful to HTm without cause
(i.e., without cause other than God's own mercy, since
there is no reason in himself why God should show him
favour). Jesus chooses and loves God simply 'for naught',
for God's sake, and thus He corresponds to and imitates
in His being the being of God who turns to man 'for
nothing'•
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has a man who has trusted His grace to that point where He
is worthy to be crowned at His side, to be with Him eternally.
In the overflow of His fatherly grace He has brought that
which is other than Himself freely to turn to Him and to
become worthy to share His own being while yet not ceasing
to be itself, other than Him. Further: we see Jesus as the
author and finisher of the faith of those not Himself. God
is so wholly gracious that He purposes men other than Jesus
to repeat Jesus' relationship with Him, and thus, through
His Spirit, freely to confirm themselves in their election
of Him.
In the light and strength of Jesus' perfect turning to
God, that which God's grace overcomes is seen falling in
defeat. This is the enemy who is the sum of all graceless-
ness, that which God did not choose (as Barth so correctly
says) but which chose itself (as Barth so unfortunately does;
not say): it is the rebel creature of God, the fallen angel
Satan, who refuses to live by grace and confirms himself in
this evil decision, thus making himself worthy of the
bottomless pit which is the opposite of the Kingdom of heaven.
Against Barth, it must be maintained that the devil is
created, for only then would it be necessary for God to defeat
him by the fullest demonstration of His grace, i.e. by a
creature, a man who trusts His grace and thus proves it to be
a lie that creatures cannot be as satisfied with not being
as God as God is with being God.^" Against Barth it must also
1. It is possible to paraphrase the temptation of Genesis 3
by saying that the devil was insinuating that God is not
wholly gracious, that it is impossible for those who are
not God to be as satisfied with being what they are by
grace as God is with being Himself, and that therefore
man can be fulfilled only by grasping ungraciously at
being 'as God'.
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be maintained that the devil has chosen against God, for
only then would it be necessary for God to defeat him by
the choice of man, i.e., by that perfectly grateful choice
which answers to and vindicates God's grace, the choice
which vindicates His grace as that which man is pleased to
choose 'for nothing', simply because it is God Himself.
As theology looks to Jesus and sees Satan fleeing in
defeat, it also becomes clear that he is made, despite him¬
self, to serve God's fatherly purpose. It becomes clear
that the Father posits the time between Jesus' first and
conclusive though not final defeat of Satan in order that His
Son may have the glory of prosecuting His defeat through the
service of those who are other than Him and live in His
grace, those who stand on His victory and overcome God's
enemy and theirs in Jesus' name. For the God and Father of
our Lord Jesus Christ wills wholly to be gracious: He wills
the defeat of the accuser of His grace through the men who
are the objects of His gracious love: these men, through the
Spirit of His beloved Son, are to be the demonstration to
both heaven and earth (Eph. 3: 10) of the iich.es of His
grace. These men, as they turn to Him in gratitude and
imitation of His turning to them, defeat the accuser who
said that the gracious God had no men who loved Him simply
for Himself, for nothing. And the very intensity and
subtlety of the accuser's temptations only serves to purify
the deliberate and simple turning of men to God for His sake.
If this account of the 'eternal purpose of God
realised in Jesus Christ' (Eph. 3:11) is substantially correct,
the following deepening of Barth's vision can be made. 1. The
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God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and not Jesus Christ,
posits the time of the Church. This is in order that the
riches of His grace might "be displayed through His sons in
the Church. 2. Jesus Christ conquered not only das Nlghtlge
and the resistance in man but also the rebel angel Satan in
order that men in Him might, standing on His victory, them¬
selves contend against spiritual evil. In this way it is
men in the name of Jesus who are the vindication of the
Creator and His creation against the accuser. 3. Men in
the Church do this, as Barth indicates, in the power of the
Holy Spirit, "but the decision of men must be emphasised in a
way Barth does not. For if the rebel angel who is the sum of
all gracelessness was defeated by the decision of Jesus
completed on the cross, men must participate in that decision
if they are to participate in that defeat: there can be no
talk of an already existing alliance between the real man
and Jesus. Rather, it must be said that only as men for
their own part turn to God in correspondence of His turning
to them do they resist the devil. It is through the Spirit
that men enter into this victory for themselves, for in the
Spirit they both participate in Christ and also make their
own free decision.
G.C. Berkouwer has made some observations about the
devil in Earth's theology which are similar to those made here."'"
He thinks that Barth demythologises the devil and under¬
estimates the seriousness of the threat which he constitutes
1. G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of
Karl Barth, trans. H.R. Boer (Paternoster, London, 1956)»
pp. 239ff.
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to men and to the Church. If the argument of this chapter
is basically sound, Berkouwer's criticisms can be accepted
insofar as they indicate a more strenuous warfare with the
devil in the time of the Church. But Bwrkouwer quite
overlooks the purpose which this warfare is ordained by the
Father to serve.1 A note of old Calvinist stoicism enters
his thought and he quite forgets (what Barth celebrates)
that the Church moves forward in joyful victory, rejoicing
in the victory of Jesus. Rather than state the shortcoming
of Barth in Berkouwer's way, it is better to point to the
victory of Jesus over Satan as described in Luke's Gospel.
When the seventy returned from their mission, they rejoiced
that even the demons were subject in His name. It was in
relation to the authority He had given that He said: 'I
saw Satan fall like lightening from heaven.' (Lk. 10: 18).
God accomplished Satan's defeat through His people in Jesus
name. The significance of this may be gauged from some
aspects of the letter to the Ephesians. There, the goal of
the good-pleasure of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ is, through and in the beloved Son, not Christ Himself
but the Church, His body. The Church is called to be strong
in Him and to stand against the wiles of the devil (6: 11),
1. The dimension of triumph over Satan recedes behind a gloomy
sense of man's frailty and Satan's power and the corres¬
ponding unremitting battle against him in Berkouwer's
Faith and Perseverance, trans. R.D. Knudsen (W.B. Eerdmans,
Grand Rapids, 1958), pp. 157-68. While he is correct to
stress the vigilance needed, should he not locate the
reason for this not so much in man's (very real) weakness
as in the power of the Lord and the devil's consequent fear
that man will use that power?
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taking offensive action against him in the Spirit (6: 17-20).
Christ's victory against the devil does not mean that he has
no more power, but that Christ is the place where men may
stand (6: 11, 13) securely against him and prosecute a
victorious battle against a still dangerous enemy. Through
prayer in the Spirit, Paul boldly proclaims the gospel
which brings men into Christ and so defeats the devil. Thus,
the word proclaimed by men in the .Spirit is the spearhead of
the victory of Jesus as ordained by the Father. As men
exercise this bold decision on earth and in time, the triune
God vindicates His gracious purpose both to men and against
the evil decision of the 'principalities and powers in the
heavenly places'. (3: 10; 6: 12).
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CHAPTER IX
MAN'S GRACELESS DECISION: SIN
With the long discussion of the one and undivided
grace of Jesus Christ now behind us, it is possible to take
up the question of what happens in the initial encounter of
Christ with the sinner. For Barth, just as there are three
dimensions in which the whole Christ displays His riches
for man, so there are three dimensions of His claiming the
whole man for Himself. In order to do justice to Barth's
comprehensive treatment, this study will follow his procedure.
First, however, it is necessary to look at his account of
man's decision against grace. Once the nature of this
decision from which man is to turn has been discussed, the
three perspectives of the decision for Christ will be studied.
These are, first, the basis of man's new life in justifi¬
cation and faith; second, the act of turning made on that
basis in the initial moment of sanctification; and, finally,
man's venturing out on that new life in the hope of reaching
the goal of his calling. Though this procedure involves a
measure of repetition, it is the only way of comprehending
the multiform grace of the one grace of Jesus Christ as He
encounters the individual. The study will conclude with an
examination of Barth's account of the first step of man's
new life, his baptism.
Barth undeviatingly affirms that sin canbe known for
what it is only when men turn from it to God. Sin is the
negative refusal of Jesus Christ, and cannot become an
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autonomous area of study. The doctrine of sin depends at
every point on the doctrine of the positive grace of Jesus
Christ.
The sinner cannot know his sin because sin means the
2
crookedness and corruption of the whole person. His self-
■3
knowledge is corrupt. He cannot Judge himself to be a
/1
sinner, and it is only when the grace and holiness of Jesus
Christ shine on him that he knows who he is.
Unless the knowledge of sin arises from knowledge of
Jesus Christ, every attempt to construct a doctrine of man's
evil is bound to be merely a form of self-projection and so
also of self-Justification. Why does Barth hold so drastic
a view? Because only as Jesus Christ confronts man does he
5
have concrete, specific knowledge of himself. Jesus Christ
is true God, and therefore man's Lord who confronts him as
his superior and Judge. Jesus Christ is also true man and
confronts man face to face with himself - with concrete
humanity and not a concept of humanity. As true God con¬
fronting man in Jesus Christ, man's ideals and concepts, by
which he had hoped to measure himself, are shown to be
abstractions; and as true man confronting men in their
1. C.D. IVA, P* 139: Barth says that the discussion of sin
'•..must not be a doctrine of sin which is autonomous,
which considers the matter and...presents it in a vacuum,
and therefore...abstractly.'
2. ibid.. pp. 359-61.
3. Cf. Jer. 17: 9: 'the heart is deceitful above all things.'
4. C.D. IVA, PP* 360-1. The sinner 'cannot accuse himself
Las]...finally and totally guilty.' (p. 360).
5. C.D. IV/2, p. 383.
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situation, He exposes man's self-knowledge as abstract, un-
specific. As very God and very man, Jesus Christ confronts
man inescapeably with himself, and He closes in on him so
that there is no room for him to create ideals or to invent
a concept of himself.
In this concrete knowledge of man, man's wrong is
revealed to be something he never imagined it to be: trans¬
gression against God's grace. If man's wrong were failure
to reach an ideal it might be excuseable; if it were the
breaking of the law, it might also be excuseable; but since
it is transgression against the perfect grace of God to man,
it is wholly inexcuseable.1 Since sin is this turning from
2
God's grace, it is unreasonable, absurd, chaotic. It has
3
no basis in God, and it turns against man's own good, and
so it is groundless, plunging man headlong into the descent
into the abyss. It merits only the rejection of God, and
4
renders man liable to eternal damnation. It should be
added that Barth holds that man does not lose his humanity
5
as created in the image of God, and that this only serves to
indicate the utter self-contradiction and absurdity of sin.
The most extraordinary and powerful aspect of Barth's
doctrine is that he holds sin to be that which is already
£
overcome. Because Jesus Christ has already died for the
1. ibid., pp. 397-403.
2. C.D. IVA, P- 139.
3. ibid.. p. 140: 'Sin is man's denial of himself in the face
of the grace of his Creator.'
C.D. IV/3, p. 465.
5. C.D. IVA, PP« 480-1.
6. The man of sin 'was set aside' in the death of Christ (my
underlining): C.D. IV/1, p. 358; cf. IV/2, p. 378.
346
sin of the world, sin can only be that which has been passed
over. Man's sin is a kind of impossible survival from the
old man which God has done away with. However strange this
may sound, it should be remembered that the Epistle to the
Hebrews presents a similar doctrine when it says that Christ
'appeared once for all at the end of the age to put away sin
by the sacrifice of himself.' (Heb. 9: 26). Also, Paul asks:
'How can we who died to sin still live in it?' (Rom. 6: 2).
This understanding of sin opens up the nature of
repentance in at least three ways.
1. Barth's doctrine is of the greatest help in en¬
couraging men to turn from sin to righteousness. Where
men are said to be sinners because they have broken the law,
it can always seem that God's condemnation of them is unjust.
It can seem that God has required them to do works beyond
their powers and that He condemns them for the slightest
deviation, like a severe task-master. But if the law which
condemns is in fact grounded in God's love towards man, if
God first gives and commands only what he gives, then God's
condemnation of disobedience is fully justified. Man is
left without excuse.
This understanding of sin reveals it to be a far more
terrible weight than can ever be felt by the preaching of the
law and its penalties. Unless it is seen that the sinner
offends against God's grace, the intolerable character of
the offence cannot appear. Barth argues that Anselm's
famous account of the intolerable weight of sin in fact under¬
estimates its seriousness. Anselm correctly notes that man
is bound to a superior Lord, but he fails to indicate the
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character of the relationship."1' He neglects to show that
the superior Lord, God, has first bound Himself to man in
perfect grace. Because He has first turned to man, He
becomes the basis of man's free and joyful obedience to Him.
2
With His command He also gives the grace to obey. Thus,
when man turns from his superior Lord, he turns from grace,
and is wholly in disgrace. Man's debt is therefore not a
quantity which can be paid back, as can the debt of an
inferior servant to a superior Lord. Man's debt is a breach
which can be healed only by the free, unconditional pardon
of the offended Lord. The only payment which cancels man's
debt, his transgression of grace, is superabounding grace:
forgiveness.
It would be possible to point to a whole tradition in
the history of the Church which, like Anselm, has believed
that it was preaching the seriousness of sin while it was
giving an all too rational account of it. It is more
pertinent to the purpose of this study to point to a preva¬
lent misunderstanding of sin in modern culture. In lands
dominated by Calvinist theology, or, more correctly, by the
systems of theology derived from Calvin, it is commonly
believed that Christianity teaches that God requires obedience
to Himself before He will be gracious to men. He punishes
the slightest deviation from His law with eternal damnation.
It is forgotten that God first surrounds man with His goodness,
and that His commands are gracious. Because this is forgotten,
1. ibid.. pp. 484-91. This entire passage abounds in
references to Cur Deus Homo.
2. ibid.. p. 488.
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God appears to be tyrannical, One who loves only fthen He sees
reason to love. Rebellion becomes not only excuseable but
almost morally necessary. It would be possible to quote
poem after poem, novel after novel, in which this theme is
prominent. So long as the Church clings to a theology in
which God is gracious only on condition of man's worthiness,
it is futile for the Church to protest against this praise
of rebellion in modern literature. Men will be convinced
of the seriousness of their sin, and see its inexcuseable-
ness, only when they see that from the beginning they have
been rebelling against God's grace. Only then will they
turn from their dead works to the forgiveness of the living
God.
2. It has been noted in this study that modern culture
is afraid that God 'transgresses' into man's domain. Barth's
doctrine of sin indicates that exactly the opposite is the
case. Man accuses God of his own sin! Since God is
entirely gracious, and both gives man a place of his own and
helps him in it, when man turns away from God and tries to
set himself up, he enters a sphere not his own and so becomes
a transgressor and a usurper. He is an intruder.1 The grace
of God in Jesus Christ directs ma:ds accusation of God back
to himself. As God apprehends the transgressor, He does
not pay back evil with evil, but abounds in grace, forgiving
him and restoring him to fellowship with Himself.
3. Since man's sin is already forgiven, sin has the
2
character of repeating sins already forgiven. The significance
1. ibid., p. 139.
2. C.D. II/2, p. 450: 'God forgives [the rejected man] his
sins; but he repeats them as though they were not
forgiven.'
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of this point may be expressed by pointing out th?t nothing
so strikes at the root of man's pride as the knowledge that
he is forgiven. To be told that he is forgiven is to be
told that his sin is so serious that he can do nothing about
it; he can only accept the forgiveness of the God he has
offended. But this is too shameful, and therefore he sets
out to justify himself, and in doing so repeats the root of
all sin - self-justification.1 Barth has not mitigated the
seriousness of sin: he has put his finger on its utterly
stupid and abysmal nature. The 'already' particularly shows
man's sin, since it indicates that not even his repentance
can bring him freedom from sin. He is forgiven before he
repents.
It is now time to turn to some of the details of
Barth's doctrine of sin as found in Dogmatics IV. He gives
a remarkably rich and complete account of man as the man of
sin, but only those aspects will be discussed here which
bear on men's 'freedom' to turn from sin to God.
2
1. Sin cannot alter God's grace toward man. As was
shown in Chapter II, Barth holds that God determined Himself
for man before the creation of the world. Sin did not take
Him by surprise, and from eternity He pledged Himself to give
Himself to save man. Further, Christ gave Himself for
sinners, and it is therefore certain that it is precisely
1. C.D. IVA, P« 490: 'It is the sinister aspect of all
religious history that in it men are caught in the act
of committing again the very sin from which they are
trying to free themselves.' Cf. K. Barth, Gospel and Law,
trans. J.S. McNab, Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional
Papers, No. 8 (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1939), pp. 16f.
2. C.D. IVA, PP. 482-4.
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sinners who are the objects of His love.
Sin does not, however, cease to be intolerable. On
the contrary, just because the sinner cannot alter God's
love toward him, his condition is intolerable.^" The love
of God flames out as His consuming anger. 'It is a terrible
2
thing to fall into the hands of the living God.* Barth
makes the perceptive comment that Ritschl's refusal to
concede any objective reality to the wrath of God makes God
•3
unable to love.
2. Nor can sin alter man's being created in the image
of God. Man cannot destroy his nature as created by God,
and hence Barth cannot agree with the reformation statements
about man losing the image of God. His reason for claiming
this is that:
Man has not fallen lower than the depth to which God
humbled Himself for him in Jesus Christ. But God
in Jesus Christ did not become a devil or nothingness.
His Word became flesh, participating in our corrupted
being. But corruption does not mean the changing of
man into another being, like the transformation of the
fairy-tale prince into an evil and horrible beast. If
this were the case the atonement would be pointless.
Even the lost sheep remains in the sphere of the
shepherd who seeks, even the lost coin in that of the
woman who seeks, even the lost son feeding with the
swine in the same world as the distant house of his
father. (C.D. IV/1, p. 481)
Sin does not, however, fail to have the most dreadful
consequences. Because man remains inalienably man, it means
1. 'Man still belongs to God, but this means that in
resisting God he is hurt as only God can hurt him....The
grace of God is still turned to man, but this now means
that it is non-grace, wrath and judgment to the one who
despises and hates it....' ibid., p. 483.
2. Heb. 10: 31; cf. Heb. 12: 29.
3. C.D. II/l, p. 366.
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the total corruption and perversion of his created nature.
He is man, but he is dead. The above quotation continues:
Fallen man is dead. But for the miracle of his
awakening from the dead, which he needs, and in
which his reconciliation with God consists, it is
necessary that he should still be there as a corpse,
a human corpse. (C.D. IV/1, p. 481).
3. Sin means that man is radically disqualified from
saving himself. He has offended the love of God for him, and
therefore it is only God who can restore him to favour. He
has corrupted his good nature, and therefore he is powerless
to restore himself.
One of the most sobering passages of Barth's doctrine
of sin is his account of the sinner's inability not to sin.
The sinner is able only to sin. The bondage of the will is
not to be conceived as did Luther, deterministically and non-
Christologically. It consists in refusing the freedom
Christ has for him.
Of the free man it has to be said: non potest peccare.
His freedom excludes this. It excludes the possi-
bility of sinning. He "cannot" sin in the capacity
granted him by God....He can sin only as he renounces
this capacity and therefore...makes no use of his
freedom....It does not rest on anything which can
seriously be called a posse. It has no basis either
in God or in man by which it can be explained. It can
only be described as a freedom not to be free, which
is nonsense....It is the grasping of the possibility
which is no possibility, but which can only be
characterised as an impossibility It is the "choosing"
which is not an alternative to the genuine choosing of
faith and obedience and gratitude but only the dread¬
ful negation of this genuine choosing. It is the
irrational and incomprehensible decision of man. It
is a fact only as neccare, hamartanein. transgression.
Yet in this character itis a real fact. It is a
sinister fact which is not illuminated by any posse.
It is the fact of sin in which man reveals and demon¬
strates that he is inexplicably the slothful man who
does not make any use of his freedom. He can have his
freedom only as he uses it, in the choice of the
possibility which corresponds to it. If he does not
use it, he goes out into the absolute void of a being in
unbelief ana disobedience and ingratitude, into a being
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which is no true being. And this means that he
looses it. He does not have it. There is no freedom
in this unreal being and for those who turn to it.
It is eo ipso the sphere of bondage. As a sinner
man has decided against his freedom to be genuinely
man. And in this decision he will necessarily
continue to decide against it. "Whosoever committeth
sin is the servant of sin" (Jn. 8: 34). In this
briefest of biblical formulalTFons we have the whole
doctrine of the bondage of the will. Non potest non
peccare isWhat we have to say of the sinful, slothful
man. (C.D. IV/2, p. 495)
This passage has been quoted at some length because it uses
the doctrines of the ontological impossibility of sin and
of man's freedom only for obedience, doctrines which will be
questioned later in this chapter. For the present purpose
it is clear that Barth holds sin to be a decision and turning
of man from whose consequences he cannot possibly extricate
himself. In the Dogmatics Barth has moved toward the
classical catholic understanding of sin as the perversion
and corruption of man's nature as created good by God.1
This is a gain for the protestant understanding of sin, at
least insofar as protestant doctrines made it seem that in
sin man lost his will and thus made it very difficult to see
how man could be responsible for his works. It is appro¬
priate in this connection to underline Barth's insistence
that man is responsible for his sin. His correction of the
notion of 'original sin* is particularly helpful. Many
conceptions of 'original sin' mitigate man's actual respon¬
sibility for his sin, e.g., the well-known account in the
Westminster Confession:
[Our first parents] being the root of all mankind,
the guilt of this sin [of eating the forbidden fruit]
1. Cf. H.O. von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth. trans.
37 Drury (Anchor Books, itew Vork, 1972), pp. 13M.
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was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted
nature, conveyed to all their posterity descending
from them by ordinary generation. From this
original corruption...do proceed all actual trans¬
gressions. (VI, 3-4)
Earth observes that original sin was early in the Church's
history regarded as 'hereditary sin', being passed on by
propagation.1 This view probably arose through a combina¬
tion of a misreading of Romans 5: 12 (which was taken to mean
that all men sinned in Adam) with Psalm 51: 5 ('in sin did my
mother conceive me.'). Barth asks: 'how can propagation be
simply a vehicle by which the sin of an earlier man becomes
2
that of a later?' Barth answers that there 'can be no
objection to the Latin expression peccatum originale' so
long as it is not defined in terms of propagation and that
it is indeed quite adequate, telling us that we are
dealing with the original and radical and therefore
the comprehensive and total act of man, with the
imprisonment of his existence in that circle of evil
being and evil activity....It is...his peccatum. the
act in which he makes himself a prisoner and therefore
has to be a prisoner. This is the point which is
obscured by the term hereditary sin (Erbsunde). What
I do as the one who receives an inheritance is some¬
thing that I cannot refuse to do, since I am not asked
concerning my willingness to accept it. It is only
in a very loose sense that it can be regarded as my
own act. It is my fate which I may acknowledge but
for which I cannot acknowledge or regard myself
responsible. And yet it is supposed to be my deter¬
mination for evil...and I myself am supposed to be an
evil tree merely because I am the heir of Adam.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 500)
In view of this, Barth suggests that the term Erbsunde be
replaced by a more strict translation of peccatum originale.
Ursunde.
What is meant is the voluntary and responsible life of
every man...which by virtue of the judicial sentence
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 500.
2. ibid., p. 500.
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passed on it and with his reconciliation with God
is the sin of every man, the corruption which he
brings upon himself so that as the one who does so...
he is necessarily and inevitably corrupt.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 501)
One further point needs to be noted in this connection.
In Earth's account of man's responsibility for his sin, and
of his utter inability to save himself, man's being and man's
act are bound together. Man's being is utterly perverse
and his acts are utterly unfree, utterly sinful. Further,
man's sinful acts follow of necessity from his perverted being.
Man i^ a sinner, and therefore does sinful deeds. Barth does
not separate man's act from his being. This point antici¬
pates a problem to be raised in connection with man's salva¬
tion: does Barth separate man's act from his being when he
argues that men are saved in their being before they actively
participate in their salvation?
4. If sin is the total corruption of man in both
being and act, and yet if it cannot alter either God's
relentless love for man, or man's being created in the image
of God, we shall not be surprised to find that God sets
limits to man's fearful situation. The question immediately
arises as to whether Barth succeeds in defining these limits
without compromising man's responsibility.
The primary limit set to man's sin has already been
discussed in Chapters II and III, i.e.. man's election in
which Christ has borne man's rejection. Jesus Christ is the
one rejected man, and because He has experienced this
rejection to the full, rejection can never again be the lot
of any other man. It was argued in Chapter III, however,
that Christ bore man's sin in such a way that man escapes
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rejection only if he participates in Christ by faith.1 It
was further argued in Chapter V that Christ said the Amen to
the divine condemnation of sin, and that man can be saved only
as he participates in Christ's response to the Father. None
of these modifications of Barth intends to question his thesis
concerning the perfection and complete adequacy of Christ's
work. Rather, these modifications are intended to strengthen
it, and to insist that all that Christ has He has for us in
such a complete way that we are His only when we share
actively in Him. The point at issue concerns Christ's self-
communication in the Holy Spirit. Does Christ include men
in Himself and save them in their being apart from their
baptism in the Spirit? Or is the Spirit equal God with
Christ with the consequence that Christ's salvation saves
man's being only as they are recreated by the Spirit?
In Volume IV of the Dogmatics the chief limitation set
to man's sin is again ontological. Sin was not created by
God and does not belong 'to the constitution of the world as
2
He willed it.' It can be active and present in the world
only as an 'alien', as an 'usurpation against the creative
will of God.* It is entirely negative, and 'even where God
uses it in His service...it can serve only to fulfil His
judgment...* Sin has no place and it is effectively negated
by God in Christ. The extent to which sin has been overcome
1. Chapter III, pp.'^"-2--
2. C.D. IV/1, p. 139.
3. ibid., p. 140.
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according to Barth can be seen in his discussion of the
Christ-Adam parallel. He takes up Paul's comprehensive
statement: 'For God has consigned all men disobedience,
that he may have mercy upon all.' (Rom. 11: 32). This
refers to two great •unities *: the concluding of all men
under sin, which belongs to man's past since it is overcome
in the death of Christ, and the future of man under God's
mercy. Sin has been overcome, passed over in Christ's
cross. This is the sin of all men as it is played out in
2
world history. For the Bible this history is indicated by
the name Adam. Who is Adam? The man who sinned from the
beginning. And who are his successors? According to the
Bible they are his physical descendants, but it must be asked
how they become like Adam in his act of transgression.
If by the word sin, whether it is Adam's sin or our
own, we have always to think of a human decision and
act,...then the answer to this question can only be
that the successors of Adam are...those who are repre¬
sented in his person and deed.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 510)
'Adam is the truth concerning man as it is known to God and
told to us.'^ It is thus God who establishes the relation¬
ship between Adam and us. It is the Word of God which 'fuses
5
all men into unity with' Adam. But to what extent is it
true that all men are condemned in Adam? Barth answers with
a brief consideration of Romans 5: 12-21. Adam for Paul is
1. ibid.. pp. 501-3.
2. ibid.. pp. 505-6.
3. ibid.. pp. 509-10.
4. ibid., p. 511.
5. ibid.. p. 511.
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obviously the figure of Genesis 3> but Genesis 3 became
decisive for him because in Adam he recognised another but
quite different figure: Christ, the Representative, bearing
the sin of the world."3" Christ is so far superior to Adam
that we cannot speak of Christ being compared with Adam, but
only of Adam as he appears 'like the rainbow in relation to
2
the sun.' Adam's offence is as nothing compared with the
free gift which comes in the righteousness of Christ.
•
It is in relation to the last Adam that this first
Adam...has for Paul existence and consistence, and
that in what is said of him he hears what is true and
necessarily true of himself....It is beyond the thres¬
hold which Jesus Christ has crossed, and every man in
Him, that he hears in Him the sentence on himself and
all men as a Word of God and not of man - a sentence
against which there can be no appeal passed on the man
of sin, who was every man, but who no longer exists
now that God has had mercy on all with the same
universality with which He once concluded all in dis¬
obedience. (C.D. IV/1, p. 513)
This extraordinary thesis, which is argued even more power¬
fully in his pamphlet Christ and Adam, leaves no doubt that
for Barth Adam and his sin have been passed over and 'no
longer exist.'
Corresponding to this ontological limitation of sin,
and based on it, Barth also speaks of the limit set to man's
sinful acts. '[The bondage of the will] has its limit in
the mercy of God, or concretely in the liberation accomplished
3
for man in Jesus.' Man has been converted and been born
again in Him. The flesh has already been passed over because
1. ibid., p. 512.
2. ibid., p. 513.
3. C.D. IV/2, p. 496.
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the Spirit has come.
A third limit to sin is set eschatologically. The
sinner is not yet sentenced to eternal damnation, he is only
under threat of it.1 He cannot change the truth of God,
however much he may suppress it and hold it in uprighteousness.
2
Although God does not owe man 'eternal patience' there is no
reason why theology should not be open to the possibility of
the final deliverance of all men. It is a matter of God's
freedom as to how He will finally exercise His judgment and
mercy, and theology can prescribe nothing for Him beforehand.
Before setting out to answer the question about the
limits to man's responsibility, it will be useful to make a
number of assessments of Barth's understanding of sin.
Assessment of Barth's doctrine of sin
Barth's fundamental thesis about sin is astounding but
surely Biblical. If the centre of Barth's doctrine of sin
has been correctly described as the offence against the grace
of God which lias already been overcome by the superabundance
of that grace, Barth is following Paul closely: 'where sin
increased, grace abounded all the more (hupereoerisseusen he
charis)' (Rom. 5: 20). Indeed, it could be said that the
main argument of Romans 5 and 6 is that God's grace in Christ
has abounded so fully that sin has been crucified and that it
is an absurdity to continue to live in it.
There are, however, certain difficulties with Barth's
interpretation of his thesis. It must be asked whether, in
1. CjD. IV/3, PP. 465, 473-8.
2. ibid.. p. 477.
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order that God's grace may reach its goal of man's proven
freedom for Himself, there is a possibility of and temptation
to sin in a sense Barth does not allow, and whether what may
be called the ontological impossibility of sin was not
achieved by the decision of Jesus against Satan's graceless
temptation.
It is notorious that Barth speaks of evil as das Nichtige.
the impossible possibility, and even an ontological impossib¬
ility.1 He further constantly maintains that man has no free¬
dom for evil, that he is not free to choose between good and
evil and that he is free for good only. By these provocative
terms and ideas Barth does not mean to deny the existence and
reality of evil. Rather, he wishes to present as strongly
as he sees Holy Scripture telling us the fact that evil has no
right of existence, that it was not willed or posited by God
and that on the contrary it is negated by God so that it exists
only as nothingness, only as that which has been rejected and
passed over. There is no concession to the Platonic and neo-
Platonic conception of evil as non-being in the sense of what
is unreal. Barth intends to underline the seriousness of evil,
its impossibility as that not willed by God and the fact that
1. Barth has created this word in order to re£er to that which
exists only as that 'which has been brought to naught.'
See H. Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth (Lutterworth,
London, 1964), p. 117. G. ivingren strongly opposes this
concept of evil, Theology in Conflict, trans. E.H. Wahlstrom
(Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1958), p. 109. The root of
Barth's conception of the impossibility of evil is to be
found in his doctrine of God, e.g. C.D. II/l, p. 532, where
he argues that God in His concrete freedom is the criterion
of all genuine possibilities. Cf. 'The Gift of Freedom',
trans. T. Weiser in The Humanity of God (Collins, London,
1961), pp. 71f.
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it exists only as absurdity and self-contradiction. So
serious is evil, so radically does God not will it that
Barth does not like the expression often used by theologians=
that God permitted evil -- for Barth that sounds too much like
conceding to evil a place in His plan of redemption and there¬
fore at least the possibility of some good in evil. Evil
is of course made to serve the good, but that is its punish¬
ment and it is compelled to do it against its will."*"
Barth explains the meaning of his terms in this way.
By das Nichtige:
I mean that it exists only in the negativity proper
to it in its relationship to God and decisively in
God's relationship of repudiation to it. It does
not exist as God does, nor as His creatures, amongst
which it is not to be numbered. It has no basis
for its being. (C.D. IV/3, p. 178)
Of 'impossible possibility' he says that:
If it is a paradox, it is used in the sphere to which
paradox properly belongs. What it denotes is the
absurd possibility of the absurd. Since evil has
and is reality in its fatal manner, we have to reckon
with its possibility, with its power to be real. What
kind of power is this? Can it be described as any
other than the power of impotence and therefore as the
possibility of the impossible? Evil exists only per
nefas, in the fact of a revolt which has no positive
basis, which can have its ratio only in the abyss,
which as such can be no more than the product of un¬
reason. It lacks any justifying raison d'etre.
(C.D. IV/3, p. 178)
Though he says that he 'has no great affection' for the term
•ontological impossibility' he does not see that it is
'wholly inappropriate'.
What it means is that the nature of evil as the
negation negated by God disqualifies its being, and
therefore its undeniable existence, as impossible,
meaningless, illegitimate, valueless and without
foundation. (C.D. IV/3, p« 178)
1. C;D. IV/1, p. 140
361
Barth's understanding of man's freedom follows from
God's utter rejection of all evil. God wills only good for
His creature. He has not therefore given man a 'freedom' to
choose between good and evil. He does not give man such an
ambiguous gift, nor does he posit man at a neutral point
suspended between good and evil. In His fatherly care He
has made man free for freedom only: in no sense is man free
for unfreedom.
In order fully to understand Earth's conception of
man's freedom, it must be seen that man's freedom is grounded
in God's freedom. It is a reflection of the divine freedom.
It is a kind of 'silhouette of the elective, free and total
activity of God Himself to whom he makes a human response.'1
That this is so is a measure of the boundless love of God. God
in His grace wishes to have man as His partner, as the object
of His love. He turns to man with no ulterior motive, with
no other purpose than to display His love and to choose man
for Himself. But His love will be fulfilled only if man
chooses Him for no ulterior motive and only because of God
Himself. In the language of Job, He desires man to love
2
Him for naught, to love Him simply because He is God. This
is the 'fellowship* which is to exist between man and God,
the freedom of man responding and corresponding to the free¬
dom of God. Man's freedom exists and is used only when man
freely turns to God in loving reflection of His turning to
him. He has no freedom to turn away from God.
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 104.
2. C.D. IV/3, p. 387.
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If, in the next few pages, it is found necessary to
modify Barth's account of man's freedom, it will only be for
the purpose of strengthening this glorious conception of man's
freedom, as rooted in God's free turning to man.
Barth holds that man has no freedom to sin. How, then,
does he understand the archetypal sin of Adam? Does not
the very existence of a forbidden possibility imply, at least
in some sense, the freedom to sin? Barth argues that God, in
His fatherly wisdom, did not want man as the merely passive
object of His grace, but as the active subject who confirms
His grace. Therefore God (a) planted not only the tree of
life but also the tree of the fruit of the knowledge of good
and evil. It was God"1" who posited this reality and there¬
fore also the possibility that man could partake of it. His
purpose was wholly good, since He desired that man should freely
2
chaosfe to allow Him to be the judge of good and evil. By
planting this tree, He made it possible that man should put
behind him the evil possibility of making himself the judge,
and so that man should freely follow His judgment of good and
evil."* God (b) not only planted this tree, He also pointed
4
it out to man. He did this so that man's obedience would
be informed and deliberate. Further, He (c) neither made
man's confirmation of His decision physically necessary, nor
5
his disobedience physically impossible. Man's decision would
1. C.D. III/1, p. 263.
2. ibid.. p. 264.
3. God willed that man should acknowledge His office as Judge,
and confirm God's decision in his own decision (ibid.,
pp. 264-5).
4. ibid.. p. 263.
5. ibid.. p. 263.
363
be a matter of freedom and not of necessity. Thus, man is
free only to obey God, but, for the sake of that freedom, it
is not impossible for man to refuse Him. The negative
possibility exists only for the sake of the freedom of the
positive actuality of obedience.
Barth's account of the temptation to sin is not so
perceptive as this account of the possibility of sin. In
the previous chapter it was argued that Barth is mistaken to
deny that the tempter is a fallen angel, and that he thereby
misses the full significance of Jesus' defeat of him. It
was argued that God is so entirely gracious that He has staked
the vindication of His glory and His grace on His creatures.
The tempter is the fallen spiritual creature who desires to
vindicate his rebellion by seducing earthly creatures into
believing that grace is not sufficient for their fulfilment
and that they must become 'as God*. God could, of course,
have destroyed the devil merely by uttering His Word of
judgment, but in His mercy He chose to vindicate His grace
through the man Jesus. Jesus was the perfect Job. He was
perfectly obedient to the Word of grace, choosing and loving
and trusting God in the midst of the most severe temptation.
He thereby feared God 'for naught*, and proved that earthly
creatures are wholly satisfied with God's grace. This
free trust in God's grace gave God the answer to Satan which
He desired: His grace was proven to be adequate for the
creature's fulfillment, and He had a creature who loved Him
solely for Himself.
Barth does not give sufficient weight to the fact that
it was by man's obedience that God vindicated His grace. He
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undervalues the doctrine that man's free obedience defeats
Satan and vindicates His grace - simply because God's grace
is satisfied when that which is not God is wholly satisfied
with that grace, Barth has quite properly argued that evil
can be defeated only if God meets it and overcomes it."*"
Further as H. Hartwell has said, for Barth God overcomes evil
2
at the cross, Barth says:
nothingness is to be known only at the heart of the
Gospel, i.e., in Jesus Christ. In the incarnation
God exposed Himself to nothingness even as this enemy
and assailant. He did so in order to repel and
defeat it. (C.D. III/3, p. 311)
What does this mean for the temptation to which man is
exposed? It has been noted that for Barth God (a) planted
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and therewith
posited the possibility of disobedience, (b) pointed it out to
man and (c) did not make it impossible for man to disobey.
God did this in order that His free decision for man might have
its correspondence in the free decision of man. But what is
the point of God's not only positing the forbidden possibility
but also exposing man to temptation? For Barth, since he
holds this temptation to be only that of das Nichtige, it
serves only to indicate that man can be preserved in being
only by the superior power of God's grace. Because he does
not allow that this temptation comes from the spiritual
creature who has decided against grace, he cannot say that
God (a) assigned a specific purpose to this temptation,
1. C.D. III/3, pp. 354-60. 'The controversy with nothingness,
THs" conquest removal and abolition, are primarily and
properly God's own affair.' ibid.. p. 354.
2. Cf. H. Hartwell, op.cit.. p. 122.
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(b) entrusted its defeat to His earthly creature, man, and
that He (c) did not make it impossible for man not to succeed -
in order that man, as the creature of His grace, might prove
by his deliberate decision against gracelessness and for
grace that God's gracious decision is sufficient for him. For
man to decide against the temptation of das Nichtige would
mean no special vindication of God's grace since it would not
involve, by grace, the decision against the possibility
realised by Satan of deciding against grace. The effect of
this shortcoming in Barth is that he cannot say of the tempt¬
ation to evil what he can of the planting of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil, i.e., that God gives it its place
in order that His grace may reach its goal in man's free
decision for Himself. The tree and the temptation to evil
are, of course, antithetical in that God planted the one and
rejected the other, but the tree could not have served its
purpose in bringing men freely to obey God's election unless
the temptation to decide against grace had come in the form
of the devil who had already chosen against it. Barth robs
temptation of the purpose which, despite itself, God's grace
makes it serve, i.e.. to prove and perfect man's obedient
election of God's gracious election of him, to prove man's
freedom.
In the light of these observations, two modifications
of Barth's understanding of man and his sin must be made.
1. It is confusing to speak of an ontological
impossibility of sin. Granted that sin is an ontological
self-contradiction, given no right of being by God and
utterly forbidden by Him, and in this sense 'impossible', it
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must still be maintained that unless sin is a possibility, and
a possibility which man must reject (albeit on the grounds of
*
God's superior rejection), it makes no sense to talk of man
freely chDosing and affirming God's decision of grace. Unless
man has been created in such a way that he is not secured
against evil by virtue of his creation, it is meaningless to
speak of man's proving the adequacy of grace for his created
being.
2. Granted that man is not Hercules at the cross-roads,
that God has not put man on trial"3" and has not set before him
good and evil, it must still be maintained that it is not im¬
possible for man to refuse grace and that in this sense man
is free to sin. Unless this is so it is meaningless to speak
of God's grace finding its goal in the free decision of man.
It may be helpful at this point to make explicit two meanings
of the word freedom. The first is the meaning which Barth
constantly has in mind and is the use found in Holy Scripture:
2
'if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed'; 'where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom'; 'for freedom
4
Christ has set us free*. There is no passage in the New
Testament which even remotely suggests that man has any
freedom apart from Christ. But there is a second meaning of
freedom which may perhaps best be described absence of
necessity. For example, no man is compelled to choose Christ.
In this sense, he is free to choose or to reject Christ. It
1. C.D. III/l, p. 264. We 'must...abandon the idea that God
put man on trial'. Barth points out that a test is an act
of justified suspicion, and that there is no place for this
in Eden.
2. Jn. 8: 36.
3. 2 Cor. 3: 17.
4. Gal. 5: 1.
367
It is true that the two decisions are quite unequal and that
one is a free decision in the first meaning of the word and
the other is an absurd decision. Nevertheless, unless we
can meaningfully speak of freedom in this second sense, we
cannot meaningfully speak of free love and obedience of God.
This second meaning of freedom exists only because God has
first chosen us, but, precisely because He has turned to us
and chosen us, we are called to make the free and unconstrained
decision for Him.
Hans Kiing makes a similar distinction between two
understandings of freedom. After reviewing the history of
the use of the concept of freedom in catholic tradition he
says:
On the basis of this biblically grounded Catholic
tradition we propose to make a terminological distinct¬
ion between "the capacity to choose" ("ability to
choose" - arbitrium; adj. "capable of choice," "capable
of decision," etc.) and "freedom" (libertas; adj.
"free"). (Justification, p. 1751
To speak of 'the capacity to choose' comes too close to the
notion Barth surely correctly rejects of the sinner choosing
between sin and not sinning. It seems to imply that the
two choices are of equal possibility. For this reason it
seems to be better to speak not of freedom of choice but of
the unconstrained freedom to choose what God has already
chosen. However, provided that it is clearly understood
that man confirms God's prior election, there seems to be no
objection to using Kung's distinction.
These two modifications of Barth relate to the being
of man and to his act. In the first it was said that man's
being is not secured against sin by virtue of his creation.
In the second it was similarly maintained that man is not
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secured against the act of sin by virtue of being the
object of His love. If these two points are combined it
emerges that man is responsible to God for himself in a more
comprehensive sense than Barth allows.
This may best be expressed in the following manner.
God in His grace wills that man as an active subject confirm
the grace given to Him. In order that this confirmation
may be genuine it is necessary that his obedience be in no way
constrained. To mention Job again, in order that Satan's
accusation, that man does not fear God 'for naught', may be
refuted, man must choose God freely, for His sake alone. For
this reason God holds man to the consequences of his decision.
It is not that God could not perhaps will to suspend the
effects of man's decision, but that in His mercy He will not.
As it is said in the Psalms and echoed in many other places:
'God is merciful, therefore he requites a man according to
his work.' (Ps. 62: 12; cf. Rev. 22: 12). It is because
man is constituted by grace that he cannot avoid the fruits
of his actions. He is responsible to the divine Word and,
therefore,he is responsible for what he makes of himself.
God is so gracious that He does not deprive man of the
dignity of making himself the person he chooses to be. If
he sows according to the Spirit he reaps a rich harvest in
the Spirit; if he sows according to the flesh he reaps
according to the flesh.
If God's freedom for man means that we cannot speak
of an ontological impossibility of sin and that we must
speak of a certain non-impossibility of sin which exists for
the sake of man's freedom and thus that we must speak of man's
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uninterrupted responsibility for this freedom, it is
necessary to ask: what has man made of himself, what has he
done with Ms being, act and responsibility? What are man's
works wMch, because God is merciful, He has promised to
requite (Ps. 62: 12)? In the following pages it will be
argued that it is necessary to develop BartMs conception of
what was achieved in the humanity of Christ to the point where
it is seen that, by God's mercy, He has so exercised man's
freedom in the face of very real temptation to capitulate to
the graceless decision of the devil that He has achieved the
ontological impossibility of sin which was God's purpose for
man in exposing Mm to temptation and which gives Him a
genuine share in God's own impossibility of sin. In His
mercy, God requites Jesus for His good work by crowning Him
at His side. It will be urged that, if the self-giving of
the gracious God in the Spirit is developed in the manner
suggested in this study, it becomes clear that there is a
self-giving of man in Christ through that Spirit which
fulfils the covenant and in this sense the law, and in so
doing gives ontological completion to the creation through
man's responsible acts. In other words, on the grounds of
a strengthened doctrine of God's gracious self-giving, it
will be argued that we must think, even more radically than
does Barth, of the Mstorical realisation of His grace, of
the historical completion of creation through man's
responsibility.
Barth has never deviated from the belief that the
grace of God is single and undivided. It is the giving of
God Himself. Thus, he resists the idea that there is first
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law and then gospel; first a covenant of works and then a
covenant of grace; first works and then faith."1' On the
contrary, there is the one eternal covenant of grace,
2
broken by man but fulfilled in time by Jesus Christ. Sin
has always been offence against grace. Even Old Testament
law should be understood in this way, since the inner meaning
of the law is grace, love and the gospel.
Some writers, e.g.. G. Wingrei? and G.C. Berkouwer,^
think that this leads Barth into an unhistorical conception
of God's dealings with men. They see 110 place in Barth for
the historical events in which God realised His will for men,
no place for a development toward the fulness of God's grace
in this present time. It seems to them that Barth comes
perilously close to holding that everything has been realised
in eternity and in heaven and that it needs no earthly enact¬
ment. This, however, is a serious misinterpretation,
since for Barth the eternal covenant was realised in the
historical obedience unto death of Jesus Christ. He fulfilled
the broken covenant. The event of the cross did not merely
reveal eternal truth: it fulfilled it in the obedience of
Jesus Christ.
Yet, for all the clarity of Barth's affirmation here,
-
1. see, e.p.. K. Barth, Gospel and Law, trans. J.S. McNab,Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No. 8
(Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959).
2. This is argued at length in the introduction to the doctrine
of reconciliation, C.D. IV/1, pp. 3-154.
3. G. Wingren, op.clt.. pp. 115ff.
4. G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of
Karl Barth, trans. H.R. Boer (Paternoster. London. 1956).
pp. 2^6-61:
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he does not allow his thesis to come to its full statement.
In Chapter III of this study it was suggested that he does
not fully allow the priority of the Father in electing to
reach its goal in the human electing by men of God as they
participate by the Spirit in His Son. It was further argued
in Chapters V and VII that he undervalues the involvement of
the triune God in the self-humbling of the Son and of the
Spirit in the perfection of Jesus. In Chapter VIII it was
also argued that he does not fully allow the victory of Jesus
on the cross to be such that it opens the way for other men to
fight Satan victoriously in His name: he does not fully allow
the Church to be the historical goal of the grace realised
historically in the decision of Jesus perfected on the cross.
These questions focus on Barth*s understanding of the
Spirit. The whole grace of God aims at man. God gave Him¬
self in Jesus Christ for man's salvation. God now comes to
man in the Spirit of Jesus Christ. But does Barth allow the
Spirit to be the fulfillment of the grace of God, does he
allow the Spirit to be the self-giving of God as seriously as
Christ is the self-giving of God?"1" If the Spirit is given on
the ground of the once-for-all self-giving of God in the Son,
should not the self-giving of God in the Spirit (who is equal
God v/ith the Son) have the same ultimate seriousness as God's
1. This question may be put by asking whether Barth is able to
affirm as clearly as Eastern theology that 'in a certain
sense the work of Christ was a preparation for that of the
Holy Spirit: "I came to cast fire upon the earth; and
what will I, if it is already kindled?" (Luke xii, 49).
Pentecost is thus the object, the final goal of the divine
economy upon earth.' V. Lossky, Mystical Theology of the
Eastern Church, trans. Fellowship of St. Alban and St.
Se'rguis (James Clarke, London, 1957), p. 159.
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self-giving in the Son? Further, if questions are raised
as to the self-giving of God in the Spirit, questions must
also be asked as to Barth's understanding of man's self-
giving in the Spirit.
These remarks are rather cryptic, and so it will now
be helpful to elucidate them in relation to two areas of
doctrine: first, that of God's self-giving, and, second,
that of man's self-giving on the basis of God's self-giving.
First, what is the meaning of the grace of God, the
grace in which God gives Himself wholly for us sinners?
Barth answers that God gave Himself to the uttermost in Jesus
Christ. He Himself suffered the death which necessarily
falls on man's sin, and He Himself is man's new life, man's
resurrection from the dead. Barth does not fail to give
this its trinitarian context: the Father gave His Son and
God now comes to man as the Spirit of His Son. But does
Barth allow God to give Himself fully to sinners? Is Barth's
concept of God the Spirit adequate? In Chapter VII it was
argued that Barth almost entirely overlooks the work of the
Spirit in the self-offering of Christ. If this is so, it
follows that the Spirit cannot be the Spirit of man's
recreation, at least in the full sense in which we find Him
in the New Testament. For if the Spirit, who is the
Creator Spirit in whom God created the world, did not Himself
descend to the depths, to the shaking of the very foundations
of the world, and descend in union with the Word by whom the
world was created, how can He be the creative power of God in
whom sinners are recreated into saints? This is not an idle
question, since Barth locates the recreation of sinners in the
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death and resurrection of Christ and not in the coining of the
Spirit. There is, of course, a very important sense in which
Barth is correct: the conversion of the human condition took
place in Jesus Christ1s death and resurrection. But Barth
is on questionable ground in allowing only a revelatory work
to the Spirit. Barth understands that revelatory work in
a dynamic sense and even accords it the status of the new
birth and the new creation. Christ1s work is perfect and
all that remains to be done is the revelation of it: it is
a revelation which awakens a man from death to life, for the
revealing work of the Spirit claims the whole man for Christ.
But surely the Spirit's work as He proceeds from the death
and resurrection of Christ is that of baptising men into the
perfect reality of Christ: He reveals the ontological conver¬
sion of the world in Christ, and brings men to share in it.
If this is not basically correct, the self-giving of God in
the Spirit is less complete than the self-giving in Christ,
since the Spirit accomplishes no ontological work. Against
Barth, it must therefore be said that, since the Spirit is
equal God with Christ, He recreates the sinner, bringing
about an ontological change in him. In Biblical language,
this is expressed in the sayings about being born from above
of the Spirit and about being adopted as sons of God by the
Spirit.1 The early Church spoke of the dwelling of the
Trinity in man, the dwelling of God Himself in man through
2
the Spirit. It is only with the coming of the Spirit that
1. Jn. 1: 13; 3: 3, 5, 8; Gal. 4: 6.
2. Cf. V. Lossky, op,cit.. p. 171: 'through the coming of
the Holy Spirit the Trinity dwells within us...*
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man is remade as the habitation of God.
This truth has its negative side. If a man refuses the
Spirit, he cannot share in Christ and he is not re-born."1* No
ontological transformation has taken place in him, although it
remains true that Christ has borne his sins. It must also be
said that the man who refuses the Spirit is refusing God Him¬
self - God in His ultimate and complete self-giving. God has
given Himself for man's forgiveness in Christ, and now, on the
basis of that self-giving, He gives Himself in the Spirit in
order to impart that forgiveness and new life. He comes to
communicate His inner life to man's inner life. Thus, if He
is refused, the very forgiveness of God Himself is refused,
2
and theology must speak of the unforgiveable sin. Two
aspects of this fearful possibility can be distinguished.
First, because the Spirit is the giving of the inner life of
God on the basis of the sacrifice of Christ, there remains no
■3
further sacrifice for sin. It is not that God's forgiveness
is incomplete; precisely the opposite. God has expressed
His forgiveness to the full, communicating it to man in His
Spirit, and therefore to reject the Spirit is to reject for¬
giveness itself. Second, because the Spirit is the giving
of God to man's inner life, and therefore the very foundation
of his repentance, to refuse the Spirit is to make a
1. This does not alter the fact that he owes his existence to
Christ and that he is sustained by Him, cf. H. Kiing,
Justification, trans. T. Collins, E.E. ToTk and 0. Grandskou
(Burns and Oates, London, 1966), p. 159: 'Even the damned
sinner will have a continued existence in Jesus Christ.'
2. Matt. 12: 31-2 and parallels.
3. Heb. 10: 26.
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restoration to forgiveness and repentance impossible."1' The
ground of repentance has been rejected.
Barth recognises the seriousness of the sin against
2
the Holy Spirit, but, because he does not accord the Spirit
a creative function as important as that of the Son, he does
not recognise its ultimate seriousness. He can speak of the
overwhelming power of the Spirit which breaks down all barriers
as though there were no such thing as hardening oneself against
Him.^ He holds this because for him the sinner is already
recreated in Christ, and therefore it is impossible to think
of a final resistance to His Spirit. This inevitably
leads to an undervaluing of man's responsibility to the Spirit
and of his decision in regard to the grace offered to him.
These observations relate to the historical self-giving
of God in the Spirit, and lead to the conclusion that Barth
undervalues the creative power of that self-giving. It is
now time to turn to the self-giving of man on the basis of
God's self-giving.
The whole grace of God aims at man. That grace
achieved its vindication when Jesus gave Himself to God in
the face of the most severe temptation from Satan who had
chosen against it. He exercised to the full man's
responsibility to the Word of grace, perfecting His decision
for grace in His self-offering on the cross. There He won
through to that victory for which God crowned Him at His side.
1. Heb. 6: 4.
2. C.D. IV/3. P. 358.
3. ibid.. pp. 355-6.
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God, not by necessity but by His steadfast love, requited
this man according to His work (Ps. 62: 12), granting Him a
share in His own ontological impossibility of sin. Jesus
was rewarded at God's sidewith the ontological fulfillment which
Adam forfeited when He chose the temptation to be 'as God*.
The point to be emphasised is this: neither Adam nor Jesus
enjoyed an ontological impossibility of sin, but Jesus,
trusting the Father in the strength of the Spirit, won as
man and for man a complete victory over the most radical
temptation and thus won in man's history and responsibility
the ontological impossibility of sin.
Barth unfortunately compromises this victory of grace.
By locating the ontological impossibility of sin with the
creation itself, and not with the creation as radically
tested and proved by the Spirit of the Creator, he short-
circuits his own thesis about the historical realisation of
God's grace in man's history. His insight into the 'crowning'
of Jesus, penetrating though it is, does not go far enough.
Barth speaks of Jesus' perfectly free obedience, His 'unreserved
committal' to God and God's free crowning of Him,1 but he does
not indicate what Jesus achieved in this freedom, and therefore
he also fails to show the full scope of His being crowned.
The idea of an ontological impossibility of sin is
explicit in the New Testament only in I John, where it is
stated three times. 'We know that any one born of God does
not sin, but He who was born of God keeps him, and the evil
one does not touch him.' (I Jn. 5: 18); 'No one borti of God
ibid.. p. 383.
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commits sin; for God's nature abides in him, and he cannot
sin because he is born of God.* (I Jn. 3: 9). These two
passages connect the impossibility of sin with being born of
God, but the following passage connects it with abiding in
Christ: 'You know that he appeared to take away sins, and
in him there is no sin. No one who abides in him sins....'
(I Jn. 3i 5-6). It is thus reasonable to say that the onto-
logical impossibility of sinvhich Christians have derives
from Christ, the One who was born of God and who keeps those
who abide in Him. I John does not speak of how Christ
acquired this inability to sin, but other passages of the New
Testament point to it. Romans 6: 1-11 speaks of the Christ¬
ians freedom from sin through his death in Christ's death (6:
7)» and so indicates that freedom from sin comes through
Christ's obedience unto death. The strange saying of
I Peter 4: 1 - 'whoever has suffered in the flesh has ceased
from sin' - connects the end of sin with Christ's sufferings
in the flesh. The Synoptic Gospels, however, give the
decisive clue. They show Jesus' temptations continuing
right up to His death on the cross. He aras even tempted to
come down from the cross. By defeating these temptations
and remaining steadfast throughout the ultimate 'testing'
of the 'hour and power of darkness* He won through to a life
beyond temptation. He still lives in our flesh (Lk. 24:
37-43) and ever lives to make intercession for us, but He
has passed through the tempted life and put temptation
behind Him. In the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews,
He has been perfected. Thus, though it is not explicit in
any passage of the New Testament, it is in accord with its
witness to say that Jesus triumphed over the ultimate in
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temptation and was crowned with an ontological impossibility
of sin corresponding to God's own freedom from temptation.
For the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews Jesus'
crowning 'with glory and honour'1 came at the end of an
awesome contest with temptation. The writer stresses Jesus'
humanity, seeing His crowning as the fulfillment of 'Vhat is
2
man, that thou art mindful of him..?' and also seeing His
crowning as the outcome of His being 'made perfect' through
suffering. This doctrine is parallel to that of the
Apocalypse where Jesus reveals Himself as the Conqueror. He
is the Victor who has won a real victory in time and has
now taken His seat at the Father's side. It is on this
ground that Jesus exhorts His followers to a similar conquest:
'He who conquers, I will grant him to sit with me on my
throne, as I myself conquered and sat down with my Father on
his throne.' (Rev. 3: 21). Each of the exhortations to the
seven Churches includes a call to Christians to conquer and
it is impossible not to associate their conquering with that
of Jesus, who is described as 'one like a son of man' (1: 13),
as One who suffered ('his feet were like burnished bronze,
refined as in a furnace' (1: 15)) and as One who has conquered
(5: 5), received power (2: 27) and been crowned (3: 21). It
is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the whole doctrine of
the Apocalypse depends on this vision of Jesus the Conqueror.
For the purpose of this study, it is particularly instructive
that the victory of Jesus in our flesh is stressed and that
1. Heb. 2: 9.
2. Ps. 8: Heb. 2: 6.
3. Heb. 5: 8-9.
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His feet are described as being like 'burnished bronze,
refined as in a furnace', since this points to His being made
irreversibly perfect through suffering. The Son of man is
brought to share in the indeflectible holiness of God.
If this account of the grace of God realised in Jesus
Christ is substantially correct, Earth's description of the
realisation of the one grace of God in Christ must be modified.
He does not see that it was only by Jesus' free obedience
that the ontological impossibility of sin was established.
He robs the crowning of Jesus of its full significance as the
perfecting of the creation, as the fulfillment of the man's
potentialities. Barth does recognise, and in fact giv^ great
weight to, the fact that the creation 'is not an aid but a
beginning - complete in itself and as such, but still a
beginning,'1 but he fails to show what the man Jesus, by the
grace of God, did in the bringing of the creation to its telos.
This criticism must be made carefully since, as has been seen
many times in this study, Barth speaks eloquently of the
man Jesus as fulfilling man's part in the covenant and so
fulfilling the very raison d'etre of the creation. What is
lacking in Barth is the achievement of Jesus in combatting
the temptation to sin, in triumphing over sin and in bringing
the creation to its telos as the counterpart to God which
cannot sin. He fails to bring out the difference between the
'ontological impossibility' of sin implicit in creation and
its 'ontological impossibility' explicit in the recreation
in Jesus.
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 109.
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This modification of Barth is a serious one, and it
does mean that the criticisms of Wingren and Berkouwer must
be conceded insofar as they imply that a more definite content
to man's responsibility must be given in the historical
realisation of the grace of God. Sin is inexcuseable
cost Christum in a sense in which it was not ante Christou.
> am—m mmmm n «« ■ ■■iwm——— i*u '<» nwimwn' mmm
It has always been inexcuseable as the offence against God's
grace, but now that grace has superabounded in the cross of
Jesus, man is responsible in a supreme sense: 'Behold, I am
coming soon, bringing my recompense, to repay everyone for
what he has done.' (Rev. 22: 12). There may be value in the
suggestion of some theologians that, since man is responsible
to God's grace, sin is serious according to the measure of the
realisation of grace which is refused: sin before Christ
should be considered as failure of responsibility to the
Creator; sin after Christ is sin against one's salvation, but
sin against the body of Christ in which God dwells with man
is sin against the complete outpouring of God to man and there-
1
fore the sin against the Spirit which is unforgiveable. Al¬
though this idea runs the risk of dispensationalism, it has
the great merit of indicating that, since God's grace has been
realised historically in the responsibility of Jesus, grace
does not abrogate man's responsibility but establishes it.
This modification, however, amounts to no more than a
development of Barth's fundamental thesis that God in His
grace aims at man's free correspondence to Him. It concedes
nothing to the concern of Wingren and Berkouwer to place law
before gospel. On the contrary, the one and undivided grace
of God has been realised in man's responsibility, the eternal
1. E. Irving, The Day of Pentecost (no publisher or date),
pp. 53-5.
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covenant of grace has been fulfilled. The law given through
Moses is a form of the gospel and has been fulfilled in the
concrete historical decision of Jesus fulfilled on the cross:
He loved God and His neighbour. Berkouwer approves a passage
of H. Berkhof in which he suggests that Barth mitigates the
essential role of the law in accusing man of sin and of calling
for decision.1 It must be said in reply that the effective
accusation of man is the free grace of God realised in the
gospel, i.e.. the law of the being of God as demonstrated in
Jesus Christ. Berkhof's point could better be expressed in
terms of the need in Barth for a fuller account of the con¬
vincing and converting power of the Holy Spirit. For if the
Spirit is the Spirit in whose strength Jesus obeyed the Word,
overcame demonic temptation and fulfilled the law of the
covenant, He comes to sinners as the sword who cuts to that
central point of man's being where he is responsible for his
obedience to the Word and for His love to God and his neighbour.
He does not mitigate man's responsibility, but, precisely
because He is the Spirit of grace, holds man to it.
It is appropriate to end this chapter with a reference
to this work of the Spirit in holding men to their responsi¬
bility for sin and in bringing them to exercise that respon¬
sibility by turning from it. Barth undeviatingly holds
(what should be clear from Jn. 16: 8-11) that it is the gospel
and not the law as such which is powerful to convict of sin.
The self-humbling of God to man. confronts man with his pride,
the obedience of Jesus shames man into realisation of his
1. G.C. Berkouwer, op.cit.. pp. 267-8.
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failure to use the freedom "bestowed on him (sloth), and the
mutual, free self-giving of God and man in Him unmasks man*s
lie against this being together of God and man.
Barth's account of this third dimension of the gospel
of grace is particularly rich in spiritual insight. He
argues thfct the Spirit has incontestable competence to unmask
sinners for what they in truth are because He is the Spirit
of the man Jesus Christ in whom (a) the wagering of God on
1 2
Jesus and Jesus on God was (b) completed at the cross and
(c) who can speak with the authority of the God who has over¬
's
come sin. Yet should not this glorious picture of the
historical venturing of God on man and man on God in mutual
responsibility "be filled out by reference to the Spirit who
is the content, even the concreteness, of this free commit¬
ment of each to each? It can be said of the wagering of
God on man that (a) it was the trust He had in Jesus as the
One to whom He gave His Spirit without measure that ("b) was
vindicated in His holding to Him *for nothing* in the dere¬
liction of sin-bearing and that (c) therefore the Spirit
proceeds from this utter self-giving of God as God who has
proved Himself equal to the risk involved in carrying
through to its completion His decision against sin. Thus,
in speaking His Word from beyond the death to sin accomplished
in Him, Jesus sends forth the Spirit in whom God confirms
1. C^D. IV/3, PP. 378-88.
2. ibid., pp. 388-408.
3. ibid., pp. 408-34.
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Himself in His freedom to dwell in sinners, cutting to the
root of their responsibility for sin and giving them the
courage to decide for Him who has given Himself for them.
It can further be said of the wagering of Jesus on God that
(a) it was His trust in God by the indwelling Spirit that
(b) was vindicated, since, by the Spirit, even in His
dereliction He was .not torn asunder but possessed Himself in
His completed decision against the disintegrating temptation
of Satan. Therefore (c) the Spirit proceeds from the riven
side of Jesus as the concrete reality of man's free decision
against sin, thus penetrating to the centre of man's respons¬
ibility and granting him the courage to venture himself by
turning to God. Put comprehensively: Jesus' Word is the
Word of the One whose blood is the seal of the wagering in
mutual responsibility of God and man and in whom God's not
choosing of Satan's decision not to venture himself on God
was decisively enacted. The Spirit is the concrete freedom
in which this decision was projected and completed, and
therefore He creates in sinners the courage to venture them¬
selves on Jesus' Word, the courage to exercise their respons¬
ibility in deciding for God and against sin.
To say this is merely to strengthen what Barth says,
but it does allow us to speak more concretely of the con¬
vincing and converting power of the Spirit. The decision
Jesus completed in His self-offering by the Spirit was the
fulfillment of the law of the covenant. He loved God and His
neighbour. His Spirit therefore comes to the sinner as the
Spirit of love. As He awakens him to God's love, courage is
created in him to confess responsibility for himself. Sins
384
which before were hidden in shame are now confessed. He
sees that he has lived under the power of the negation of love.
•Each does but hate his neighbour as himself.*"1' He sees
that under the guise of love, he has sought to enter the
inner centre of his neighbour's life in order to harm him.
He recognises that he has obeyed the devil and not the Spirit.
Barth gives too little content to this necessary aspect of
the responsibility for himself to which the Spirit awakens
men. Again, he gives too little content to the repentance
unto life which he describes with considerable formal accuracy.
The Spirit creates confession of sin only in order to create
repentance to life, the godly grief for sin which turns from
hatred to love. This repentance takes place with tears of
joy. For where the law with its message of condemnation
merely enclosed men in their sin, the law of the Spirit of
life in Christ Jesus liberates them to confess Him in whom
is *no condemnation*. Such is the content of the unmitigated
responsibility to which the Spirit of Jesus holds men.
1. A Pope, Moral Essay III, line 110.
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CHAPTER X
THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN
According to Barth, the crucial thing to be said in
connection with the justification of man is that Jesus Christ
is his justification. Jesus Christ is not merely the possi¬
bility of justification: He is its actuality. He does not
require anything on our side, not even our act of faith: He
Himself is our justification.
Subjective justification is therefore a matter of
participating in Christ. This participation is not a sharing
in the once-for-all work on the cross. That work is complete
and unrepeatable. Further, we could have no part in it
because we were His enemies, and His work was that of
destroying us sinners (which we could not do) and of re¬
creating us. Rather, subjective justification means partici¬
pating in Christ on the ground of His perfected work. He
has created a place for us: 'We are in Him and comprehended
in Him but we are still not He Himself.'"1'
Three observations will be helpful before proceeding
to a more detailed examination of Barth's doctrine of
justification.
1. In the place opened up for us by Christ, we neither
merge into Him nor He into us. On the contrary, we are set
up as human subjects who, in a real sense, constitute our¬
selves in the act of faith. The precise meaning of this will
be discussed in connection with Barth's section on the Holy
Spirit and faith.
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 549.
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2. Justification is the basis of the justified man's
works (sanctification) and his hope of redemption. There can
be no question of man's works of love justifying him: his
works of love issue from his justification and not vice-versa.
But since this basis is sure and unshakeable, man can project
himself in love and hope from this starting-point. He has
a basis for a complete life of conversion, i.e., a basis for
the work of love and the life in hope of redemption.
3. For Luther, justification was the article of a
standing or falling Church.1 Barth corrects this by pointing
out that this article itself is dependent on the prior doctrine
2
of Christ. This correction allows the Church to develop the
doctrines of sanctification and redemption, without which the
doctrine of justification is itself truncated. Yet Luther's
thesis is in need of qualified re-affirmation in our day. It
is possible to preach Jesus Christ without bringing men to
the crisis of repentance and faith. An objective Christ may
be preached who does not alter men's lives. When this happens,
Jesus Christ, the objective Christ, is not being preached as
He is. He has been made into a dead Christ. In terms of
Barth's understanding, He has been deprived of the structure
of His being whereby He communicates Himself. Just as God
has that 'structure' in Himself whereby He communicates Himself
3
as Lord to the subjectivity of believers, so Jesus Christ has
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 522.
2. Ibid.. p. 527: 'The articulus stantis et candentis
ecclesiae is not the doctrine of justification as such, but
its basis and culmination: the confession of Jesus Christ,
in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge...'
3. C.D. 1/1, p. 367; K.D. 1/1, p. 333: 'Gestalt.'
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that personal structure whereby, through the Spirit, He
imparts Himself to us. Where Christ objectively is, He of
necessity makes Himself known subjectively. Thus, justifi¬
cation by faith must stand alongside the article concerning
Christ. If Christ is our justification, and He communicates
Himself as such, the doctrine of Christ entails justification
by faith. It could be said that Christ is truly preached
only when justification by faith is also preached. In a
certain sense the preaching of justification by faith is the
criterion of the preaching of Christ. It is important to make
this slight alteration to Earth's correction of Luther since
the Church in our day needs to recover Luther's passion for
the personal encounter with Christ in faith.
The Judgment of God
The justification of sinners depends on the execution
of God's judgment on them. As has frequently been noticed,
Earth repudiates any nominalism in Christianity."1' God
desires man himself, the real man, not the shadow or the
fiction of a man. It is therefore only as He executes His
judgment on the sinner, actually setting him aside and
establishing his right, that He justifies him. It is an
alteration in man's being. This God does in the being of
Jesus Christ.
Man has sinned against God and therefore stands in a
wrong relationship with Him. The restoration of a positive
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 538; Cf. also ibid.. p. 542: '...[God]
does not fashion a mere quid pro quo, a mere "as if",
but actualities.'
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relationship depends (l) on there being a right absolutely
superior to man's wrong, i.e., the right of God Himself;
(2) on this right being enacted in man, as it was in Jesus
Christ; and (3) on the fulfillment of this right in the
setting aside of man's wrong and the establishment of his new
human right, which happened in the death and resurrection of
Jesus Christ."1" In this movement God enacted His righteous
judgment on sinners, not in appearance but in reality.
In other words, the backbone of justification is the
2
fulfilment of the law of God's own being. He is just in
Himself.^ He affirms Himself; He is faithful and true to
Himself. There can be no talk of a change in God; if there
were, how could 'there be a confidence in His grace which
/i
corresponds to the deity of God.' Rather, it is 'a confir¬
mation of His Godhead that He causes His Holy Spirit to dwell
...as the witness of His grace...in those who are still
5
threatened by sin...•^
It is as God is true to Himself that He encounters men
in their wrong. Man's wrong is his offence against God: man
hates God, and thus has fallen into the destruction which he
deserves. Yet this insult and affront to God cannot alter
g
God's grace toward him - it 'grieves' and 'offends' Him but
His love burns as fire for His creature and He affirms Himself
1. ibid.. PP . 52Qf.
2. ibid., P. 532.
3. ibid.. P. 531.
4. ibid.. P- 532.
5. ibid.. P« 533.
6. ibid., P« 533.
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in steadfast faithfulness to man as His creature and elect.
Precisely because God is love He cannot consent to man1s
wrong, and therefore chastises his beloved creature. Because
the grace of God rules here, a crisis of total seriousness
comes on man.1 God kills in order to make alive.
Because this righteous and therefore faithful and
merciful God holds man fast, He brings on man 'a crisis which
2
cuts him in two, dividing him into a right and a left.'
It is a complete and perfect judgment, making man both wholly
righteous and wholly unrighteous.
Life under this righteousness is not 'the static co-
existence of two men.' It is something inconceivable. It
is known only as it is lived in the event of God's justifi-
4
cation of the godless. Because it is the dynamic judgment
of God, it is not perceptible to ourselves in terms of 'self-
understanding',^ though it is not 'hidden from the knowledge
6
of man.'
What is the meaning of this riddle? It is the puzzle
of the 'strange today' in which God's judgment falls on us
and takes place as 'our true and actual transition from wrong
to right.'It is the today of Jesus Christ.'8 The whole
truth and actuality of our justification depends on this today
of Jesus Christ. We cannot invent it: we can only 'find' it
1. ibid.. P« 538.
2. ibid., P. 541.
3. ibid., P. 543.
4. ibid., PP . 544-5.
5. ibid., P« 547.
6. ibid.. P- 547.
7. ibid., P. 548.
8. ibid.. P. 548.
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at the place where it is reality and truth, the
reality and truth which applies to us and comprehends
us, our own reality and truth. \e have found it
where we ourselves are, and not merely appear to he.
(C.D. IVA. P• 5495
It depends, therefore, on the resurrection of Christ, on His
being present to us now as our justification. It is not
a matter of self-understanding, but of knowing the Other and
ourselves in Him. It consists in knowledge of His history.
Because the alien righteousness which comes to us is His
righteousness - the righteousness of the One who was
crucified and resurrected for us - it is our, my righteousness.
Barth speaks here of the 'existential1 more adequately
than he did in Romans and more accurately than does Bultmann*
Because the Other is for us, because in being Himself He
comprehends us without merging us into Himself, He makes His
righteousness ours. In the language of the Fourth Gospel,
all that He has is ours. Barth does not use Luther's
language of imputed righteousness (though it is arguable that
Luther meant something very similar to Barth). He is con¬
cerned to say that Christ's righteousness is ours without
legal fiction, that it is actually ours by virtue of the
being of Jesus Christ. Also, because this Other is alive
today, in this present, He meets us in our today and in our
situation and makes us alive in dynamic judgment. It is as we
know Him that we know ourselves to be justified sinners. We
have genuine self-understanding only as we look to Him and
know ourselves in Him. We know our today in His today.
As Barth elucidates this riddle further, Christ's
being for us in this present, and our being in Him, becomes
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clearer. He first points out that, in the concrete history
of Jesus Christ, God has realised His right against the
1 2
wrong of man. God effectually substituted Himself for man,
identifying Himself with man, so becoming his justification.
On its negative side this involved the setting aside of the
A
doer of this wrong. God Himself as man did right in our
place, and therefore 'between us and our past there stands
positively and divisively the act of right which is His
death.'^ In Christ, therefore, our sin is absolutely
finished: His action as the passion of the cross bars the
way back. On its positive side God's judgment involved the
establishment and introduction of the new man. Again, this
happened in Christ and not in ourselves, yet in such a way that
it is true of our being in Him. God resurrected Him and made
us new men in Him.
His resurrection is the beginning from which we all
come when we leave behind the past which He has
concluded, going forward in Him to the future which
is already present. (C.D. IV/1, p. 556)
Bultmann has a fine passage in which he says that in
forgiveness we have freedom from the past so that we are
£
free to live in the present for the future. He does, how¬
ever, locate this freedom in the present moment of our
decision of faith. If Barth is correct, this freedom should
be located in the decision enacted in Christ and vindicated in
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 550.
2. ibid., p. 550.
3. ibid.. p. 551.
4. ibid.. pp. 550-2.
5. ibid.. p. 554.
6. R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology (University Press.
Edinburgh, 19$1), pp. 156-1.
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Iiis resurrection. It is in Christ that the past is buried
and in His resurrection that our future reaches us in our today.
As we participate in Him we have the freedom in our present
to turn from the past to the future. Negatively, it means
our basic turning away from wrong; positively, it is our
basic turning to God. It is our affair only as it takes
place in Him.
In Christ, then, the old has been removed in order to
make place for the new. He is the Way in whom there is
the irreversible movement forward from our sin into our
righteousness. We move along this Way as we participate in
His today. In His today, our totally sinful past is still
present but behind us, and our totally justified future is
ahead of us but present with us.
Barth concludes his account of the judgment of God by
showing that in justifying us God justified Himself. God
was not unaffected by our justification.1 It cost Him His
personal interference and intervention. It is true that in
the first instance He justified Himself, but this is the basis
2
of the seriousness whereby He kills in order to make alive.
(He justified Himself as Creator, not allowing sin to over¬
rule His right as Creator; deeper than this, He justified
Himself as man's covenant partner; and, higher, in union with
man, He justified man in Christ's cross and resurrection.)
He did not need to justify Himself, for He has no need of man.
Yet He gave Himself in Christ in order that He might justify
1. C.D. IVA, P- 560.
2. ibid.. pp. 56lf.
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us 'and, on the basis of His self-demonstration', give us a
share 'in His own inner-life.'"1"
God is Himself, therefore, only as He expresses the
inner riches of His being and does so with such free grace
that He gives us sinners a share in His own inner-life. This
meant for God the passion of uniting Himself with sinners in
order to put sin to death and the vindicating of His right
to demand such obedience of Christ, i.e.. the resurrection of
Christ and ourselves with Him. Nothing less than this satis¬
fied His justice. He lived out this inner law of His being,
thus satisfying Himself, and therefore also His love, His
justice, His honour and His wrath. In satisfying Himself,
He also satisfied us, for He enacted His wrath against our
unsatisfactory being and established peace between Himself
and us.
With this concentration on what pleases and satisfies
God Himself, Barth continues an important tradition in
Christian theology. In justification we have to do with God.
and only as we have to do with Him do we have to do with law
and justice. Man stands before God (coram Dei). It is not
merely rectoral justice or the order of the universe which
man has offended by sin: he has offended God Himself. It is
only as He is satisfied - and this includes His righteous
wrath - that we have peace with Him. Anselm, Luther, Calvin,
Jonathan Edwards (to name but a few) saw this clearly. McLeod
Campbell found that he had to re-affirm this against certain
2
modifications of Calvin. He pointed out that in justification
1. ibid.. p. 568.
2. McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement (James Clarke,
London, 1959), p. 81.
394
we have to do with God's absolute justice, not merely with
the justice He must maintain as the ruler of His creation.
The preaching of conversion can be truly effective only if
it presents sinners with the fact that it is God that they
have offended and that it is He who gives Himself in pardon.
Earth has made this unambiguously clear. No law comes
between God and the justification of sinners. God lived
out the law of His being in justifying us, and therefore
sinners:. may trust His grace as being identical with Himself
and His law.1 God justified Himself in justifying them,
expressing the law of His being, and therefore did that which
is supremely lawful.
Barth also uncovers the danger of a common misconception
of the justification of the sinner. To distressed persons
forgiveness nan easily seem to work in this manner: we can¬
not suffer what is needed to propitiate God, but Christ has
suffered the measure of punishment which we could not attain.
We are forgiven for His sake. For the sake of His payment
we are free. Barth's account of justification provides a
powerful answer to this misconception. First, we are
justified not merely 'for Christ's sake'. We are justified
realiter in Christ. And, second, this is because Christ not
merely suffered instead of us but was united with us so that
the sinner was put to death and the new man raised to life.
The sinner is thus not exposed to the fear that his justifi¬
cation depends on the transference to him of a freedom from_
condemnation essentially unrelated to him. On the contrary,
1. C.D. IVA, P« 532.
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his justification has involved a genuine condemnation of his
sinful being and a genuine justification in the presence of
God. The judgment of God has been executed on him through
his participation in Christ.
When the sinner is convinced that his justification is
both real and just he has confidence and even boldness in the
presence of God. It is this boldness that Barth's account
of justification encourages, and which is of great value in
bringing men wholly to turn to God.
The Pardon of Man
God* s judgment is man's pardon. It is unconditional
and true whether or not men accept it. This pardon is a
divisive judgment, 'since it is God's sentence on man, the
'content of His Word to us.'1 As such it has absolute
authority. It is God's unconditional Yes to sinners,
2
calling for an unconditional human Yes in response. In
other words, this divine pardon is something which happens
in man. It is the living Word of the living God in every
present of every man.
Looking backward, this justification is the pardon of
sinful man. The sinner is pronounced free, free from himself,
in this sentence.^ Barth insists that no-one has tasted 'the
surpassing glory of this event' who has not recognised himself
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 570.
2. ibid., p. 570.
3. ibid.. p. 573.
4. ibid.. p. 574.
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as a sinner."1" Man has no basis for this pardon in himself:
it exists only because God forgives, and forgives the sinner.
Man does not grow beyond the need for forgiveness.
'There is no present in which the justification of man is
2
not still the beginning of his justification.' It is always
the miracle in which divine pardon breaks into man's unwilling¬
ness; and there is never a present in which man does not need
to cry out 'God be merciful to me, a sinner.' But if man does
not progress toward worthiness of forgiveness, this is no
cause for hesitation in our confidence: God's mercy is perfect
and therefore the beginning and the completion of justification
are simultaneous. This is why, for example, the so-called
penitential psalms thrill with the sense of mercy and are
•x
joyful songs of 'thanksgiving.''
If there is no place for frivolity in relation to past
sin, even less is there any room 'for questioning...the goal to
4
which the justified man moves in every present.' Man is a
sinner, but he is already justified. So true is this that
it is a 'test of the genuineness of the confession of sin*
that a man 'who is ready to accuse himself of corruption' is
5
even readier to accept God's sentence of justification.'
Barth offers some shrewd comments on man's willingness (or un¬
willingness) to give up boasting of his sins, something he
thinks the modern novel, for all its greater awareness of sin,
1. ibid.. p. 574.
2. ibid.. p. 575.
3. ibid., p. 577.
4. ibid., p. 591.
5. ibid., p. 593.
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is unready to do."*" The man who is justified knows that the
promise of pardon rules in the present with such power that
he moves from his past into his future.
Earth says that 'we can gather together the whole
promise, as the Creed does, under the term: "forgiveness of
2
sins."' Man does not possess this forgiveness. It is
promised to him, and therefore there is no present in which
he does not have to look for it and to receive it. Man
enjoys it only as he moves forward into it. Forgiveness
only appears to have a backward reference. It does not mean
3
that God makes what has happened not to have happened, but
that God really frees a man from his sin:
The act of divine forgiveness is that God sees and
knows the stain [of sins] infinitely better than the
man himself, and abhors it infinitely more than he
does even in his deepest penitence - yet He does not
take it into consideration, He overlooks it, He
covers it, He passes it by. He puts it behind Him,
He does not charge it to the man, He does not
"impute" it (2 Cor. 5: 19). (C.D. IV/1, p. 597)
It is pure forgiveness: powerful, because the One offended
pardons; lawful because He exercises His right as God; not
only verbal but effectual because He pardons as He forgives
and so alters the human situation from its very foundation;
and it does not treat man 'as if' he were not the sinner that
he is, but it is the 'creative work of God in the power of
which man, even as the old man that he...still is, is no
l±
longer that man, but is already...the new man.'
Barth's account of the unconditional pardon of man must
be praised because it shows that man has good ground for
1. ibid.. p. 594.
2. ibid.. p. 596.
3. ibid., p. 597.
4. ibid.. p. 597.
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unmeasured confidence in God. If God forgives the sinner,
he is forgiven in very truth. It is a present reality,
since the now of Jesus Christ is man's now. Yet this for¬
giveness is promised to man and therefore does not become
his possession, but sets him in an irreversible movement from
sin into righteousness.
In this way Barth gives what might be called the
existential dimension of forgiveness the place which properly
belongs to it. Further, he allows the emotional and
psychological concomitants of forgiveness their legitimate
place. This may be said because Barth bases his account,
not on man's apprehension of what takes place, but on the
reality of Jesus Christ who in His today claims the whole man
for Himself. If later it is argued that a richer account of
these elements (existential and psychological) is needed,
the argument can be sustained only by developing Barth's own
primary thesis.
Barth's understanding of the now of divine forgiveness,
i.e., the simultaneity of its beginning with its completion,
contrasts sharply with that of R.C. Moberly in Atonement and
Personality. Moberly was much concerned with the righteous¬
ness of forgiveness1 but could regard forgiveness as Just
only if God could find an element of 'forgiveableness' in the
2
repenting sinner. God is able to forgive on the grounds
of a forseen and perfect holiness. Thus he held that
1. R.C. Moberly. Atonement and Personality (John Murray,
London, 1904), p. 48.
2. ibid.. p. 53.
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'forgiveness is not finally consummated till the consummation
of holiness.'1 Moberly's view inevitably imported a sense
of strain into the reception of forgiveness: forgiveness is
to be attained, and so the penitent sinner cannot abound in
the thanksgiving which Earth noticed in the penitential
psalms. The now of forgiveness became dependent on moving
forward in holiness, rather than on receiving Christ's
completed forgiveness in the present. Inevitably man's
striving for holiness began to assume an indispensible role
in forgiveness itself, and thus both the existential and
psychological dimensions of forgiveness were distorted. In
particular,forgiveness was no longer pure forgiveness; for¬
giveness ceased to be a complete and trustworthy reality in
the present and it lots its joyful gratitude.
The Subjective Apprehension of Justification: Justification
by Faith
Barth has no section on repentance as such. Though
he has much to say about it, all that he has in mind is
included under the heading of 'faith'. Repentance is the
negative side of faith. It is not a prior condition of
faith, far less a condition of forgiveness. It is the
acceptance of the judgment on man implied in forgiveness, and
it is that renunciation of trust in oneself whose positive
side is trust, faith, in Christ. Repentance is therefore
not gloomy mourning over sin, but joyful giving up of the
sinful self and thus the turning to life.
1. ibid., p. xix; cf. pp. 71f.
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Barth begins his discussion with the problem of realism.
Who is the man who is pardonned?"1" Does he exist? If what
has been said above about Jesus Christ is correct, there must
be a self-demonstration of the Justified man, but where do
we find him?
Man cannot himself produce this self-demonstration. If
he attempts to do so he only proves that he does not trust the
2
reality of God's justification. All that he can do - and
this is faith - is to let it happen in its own power.
This happens in faith because it is the human act which
corresponds to the divine act of justification, and may there¬
fore be counted as righteous. Faith is 'reckoned'
(eklogisthe) to man by God as dikaiosune, as a righteous human
work, i.e., as a work which corresponds to God's righteous-
ness. This does not, of course, mean that faith itself is
a justifying work, but rather that faith is a righteous human
act, and therefore not merely a passive receiving but an
active attitude to God on man's part which God may count as
righteousness. It is indeed righteous in that it trusts
God to be what He is: the justifier of the ungodly.
What is the meaning of this faith 'which makes a
faithful...and adequate response to the faithfulness of
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 608.
2. ibid.. p. 612.
3. ibid.. p. 615. This passage answers the question of
C. 0'Grady: '...where does [Barth] say that man's actions
with God's grace are not totally sinful?' The Church in
Catholic Theology (G. Chapman, London, 1969), P. 249. '
While harth willnot say that the sinner can have any
part in his justification, he does affirm that grace
creates in him true and good actions.
401
God...?'1 It is wholly and utterly humility.2 The vain-
3
glorious man abdicates from his vain-glory. It is not a
self-chosen humility (which would only be another form of
pride), nor is it the resignation of enforced humility (which
\ 4
would again be pride), but the humility of obedience. It is
therefore
a free decision, but made with the genuine necessity
of obedience. To put it the other way round, it is
'a necessary decision, but made with the necessity of
a genuine and therefore a free obedience.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 620)
In this sense, faith is 'comforted despair' and contrasts
5
with the 'wild desperate despair' of self-chosen faith.
£1
On the one hand, faith excludes all human works.
This negation is based on the positive truth that before
God man is not nothing, but someone, someone whose act of
faith He values. He values the appropriate response to His
act of justification and values it as righteousness.
This self-demonstration of the justified man is the
crucified and resurrected Jesus Christ, who lives as the
7
'author of the justification of all men.' There is no-one
whose sin is not finished and whose justification is not
Q
perfected in Him. Because of this inclusiveness of Christ,
all other grounds of confidence are excluded. 'He alone
1. ibid. P« 617.
2. ibid. P. 618.
3. ibid. P- 618.
4. ibid. P. 620.
5. ibid. P« 621.
6. ibid. P- 627.
7. ibid. P. 629.
8. ibid. P- 630.
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has fulfilled the penitence in which the conversion of man
to God is actually and definitely accomplished.'1 The
exclusiveness of faith is really the inclusiveness of Christ
in which He has justified all men. Every attempt of men to
secure their own conversion is superfluous, ignorant of the
conversion of all men and therefore of their own conversion.
For Barth, it is the positive form of justifying faith
which is all important. Renunciation, penitence, etc., are
negative only in appearance. Faith is openness to Jesus
Christ and as such it is a human form of being (menschliche
p
Daseinform). The nature of its object, the living Jesus
Christ, empties the human subject of all pride and brings
him to that human act and experience which corresponds to
Him. Many theologies so stress the negative aspect of faith
that faith becomes almost a via negative. In some protestant
theologies it is impossible to see why it is faith which God
reckons as righteousness. But where Jesus Christ is clearly
understood as the object of faith, faith means gladly
trusting Him who is our justification. It is a positive act.
Barth even goes so far as to say that faith as humble
obedience corresponds to the humble obedience of Christ, and
in a certain sense it is the proper form of imitatio Christi.
As pure receptivity of Christ, faith imitates Him, following
Him in humble obedience. Just as Jesus Christ who was rich
for our sakes became poor, faith is poor and thereby receives
all.4
1. ibid., p. 632.
2. K.D. IVA, P» 707.
3. C.D. IV/1, p. 634.
4. ibid., p. 635.
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Assessment of Barth's Doctrine of the Justification of Man
Barth's understanding of justification by faith alone
depends on the doctrine that Jesus Christ is the justifi¬
cation of all men. The subjective depends on the objective.
Man's knowledge of justification has this sure foundation,
resting not on himself but on God. Barth opens the way for
a full and rich experience of justification. If the Church
and the individual look to their own experience, they lose
their contact with the source of that experience and so the
experience withers away. But if they look to Christ, their
experience is constantly renewed.1
Barth's doctrine may be considered as an unfolding of
the Biblical saying: 'we have set our hope on the living God,
who is the Saviour of all men, especially those who believe.*
(I Tim. 4: 10). The living God is Himself the Saviour,
whether or not people believe in Him. Further, He is the
Saviour of all men, though He is the Saviour of believers in a
special sense. Barth's unswerving allegiance to this doctrine
enables him to speak clearly where the modern Church often
speaks ambiguously. Some points may be made in this connection.
1. The most obvious point is that God does not become
our Saviour in virtue of our accepting Him.
2. If God Is the Saviour of all men, there can be no
limitation to the preaching of the gospel. The gospel is
intended for every man. The kinds of Calvinism which would
limit the extent of the atonement are ruled out from the
1. K. Barth, ~ atik im Grundriss. (EVZ-Verlag, Zurich,
1947), p.
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beginning."1' That Christ died for all men means that Christ
died for me. In his doctrine of election Barth carefully
points out that the gospel is properly preached only when it
is addressed directly to the individual. God loves all men,
2
therefore He loves you.
Barth, however, makes little of the corollary of this
gospel that if a man does not know God the Saviour he is
resisting his salvation. This corollary is important in
3
preaching, and emphasises the urgency of accepting the gospel.
3. Barth acknowledges the unconditional freeness of the
gospel. Repentance is not a work whereby one becomes either
worthy or capable of receiving the gospel. It is the
reverse side of 'through faith alone'. Jesus Christ is
already man's justification and therefore He is simply to be
accepted. There can be no preparation to receive Him. He
comes to sinners. This means the giving up of all 'justi¬
fying' works, even repentance and faith themselves in so far
as they are thought of as means of making oneself worthy of
the gospel. Barth does not stress the elements of sorrow
and grief which are present in repentance, and this is
appropriate to the extent that these emotions are often
attempts to make oneself worthy of forgiveness and are the
last and most subtle forms of self-justification. A man
who thinks that he has plumbed the depths of despair is often
1. Note the limitation of the atonement in C. Brown, Karl
Barth and the Christian Message (Tyndale, London, 1967),
p. 135.
2. See Chapter II, pp.il4f.
3. McLeod Campbell did not shrink from using this corollary
in his preaching and it gave great urgency to his message.
See Chapter III, p. i34>.
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proud of this very fact and hardens himself all the more
against true repentance. In the Dogmatics Barth makes this
point particularly tellingly because he bases it on the
present Word of Jesus Christ. We are not constrained to
posit our despair absolutely because Jesus Christ places Him¬
self in our present, and therefore we are freed to posit
ourselves in obedience to Him.
One aspect of Barth*s mature teaching is particularly
liberating here. It is often thought that a sinner must
judge himself to be a sinner before he can receive justifi¬
cation. Sometimes evangelists speak of the steps required to
accept Christ, and put early on the list the realisation of
the fact that all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of
God. While it is an integral part of accepting the gospel
to judge oneself a sinner, it is only in Christ that one is
able to do this. The marvellous truth is that Christ judges
us to be sinners and that our judgment of ourselves takes
place only in His judgment. When this is understood, self-
judgment ceases to be an impossible burden with many of the
marks of self-punishment and becomes the liberating freedom
of confirming Christ1s judgment.
4. It cannot be doubted that justification involves man
in a crisis, and that this crisis includes painful emotional
elements. Nor can it reasonably be doubted that those deeply
experienced in the Christian life are able to help others
through this crisis. Of the many instances which come to
mind, that of Staupitz and Luther is particularly well known.
The Roman Church has long recognised the value of spiritual
advisers, men experienced in advising concerning spiritual
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matters. It is difficult to see anything but good in the
extraordinary influence of the Cure d'Ars. His influence
was simply that of a man deeply experienced in prayer and the
spiritual life who could help others with their difficulties.
The protestant Churches used to be rich in such men. One
has only to read Baxters The Reformed Pastor to see what
deep penetration in spiritual matters the Puritans expected
of their ministers. Yet in the contemporary protestant
Church even where accuracy in doctrine is valued, spiritual
wisdom is often sadly lacking. Helmut Thielicke has some¬
where remarked that the recent improvement in doctrinal
accuracy in the German Church has been accompanied by almost
negligible spiritual results.
Barth has given the Church an extraordinarily careful,
perceptive and complete account of man*s justification, an
account desperately needed by the Church. The justification
of which he has written needs to become the experience of
people in the parishes. Without compromising his doctrinal
accuracy - for that would be to lose everything, even justifi¬
cation itself - his doctrine needs to be developed towards the
pastoral ministry. Barth has already begun this task. The
Dogmatics is rich in spiritual insight and Barth writes with
the wisdom of a man who knows the Lord of whom he speaks.
Though he has criticised the concept of Christian mysticism,
many passages of the Dogmatics recall the teaching of those
Mystics' who have gone far along the road of the love of God.
Yet he falls short of giving us the urgent wrestling with the
problems of men encountering and growing in Christ. Something
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1
like what Henry Drummond called 'spiritual diagnosis' would
be of great value to the Church, i.e., an account of the
sensitivity toward both God and man which is needed for the
nurturing of men and women in Christ.
If a satisfactory account of the esqperience of
repentance and faith is to be won, there can be no return to
Schleiermacher. It is by holding to Christ alone, and not to
the experience of Him, that we grow in the knowledge of Him.
Also, the superiority of Calvin's starting point to that of
Luther's must be recognised, i.e.. theology must begin with
Jesus Christ and not with unregenerate man. Jesus Christ
alone gives helpful knowledge of man's desperate plight. Yet
no theology of justification can be considered adequate which
does not address itself to the man who needs justification.
Apologetics will be of no help, since, as Earth argues, it
surrenders from the outset the very strength of its address
to the unbeliever, i.e., the self-witness of Jesus Christ.
If Jesus Christ is indeed the reality of man's justification,
the account of the experience of justification will have to
be undertaken within the circle of the knowledge of Christ.
Two ways of going about this task seem to be possible.
First, a history of the personal experience of men as they
come through the crisis of accepting Christ. Second, an
account of how Jesus Christ has taken up the human situation
and experience of it, and has opened up the experience and
knowledge of justification for those who participate in Him.
1. Henry Drummond: An Anthology, ed. J.W. Kennedy (Harper,
New York, 1953J, pp. 221-43.
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Augustine's Confessions is the best known example of
the first way. Although it retains elements of Platonism,
Christ is the hidden protagonist of Augustine's pilgrimage.
His search for the good life is undergirded by Christ's
search for him, and the famous crisis in Book VIII is simply
the time when Christ brought him to realise that He, Christ,
is life and that Augustine must either 'put Him on' or harden
himself against Him.1 Christ surrounds Augustine, is closer
to him that he is to himself, and is his soul's peace. He
narrows down on him until he reaches the point where he must
confront Him and acknowledge Him. It is, of course, pre¬
destined that Augustine will accept, but, in the Confessions
at least, this means that his whole life is encompassed by
Christ, that Christ is the ambience in whom he lives and moves
and has his being, and that therefore he can find himself
only by finding Christ. He is subject to no compulsion.
He becomes no automaton - precisely the opposite, since it
is at the climax of his search, when it is at its most personal
and intimate, that he accepts Christ. He has tried other
solutions (the way of the flesh, Manicheeism, Neo-Platonism)
and they have failed - though each successive solution is
lightly nearer the truth. He now freely, and yet of
necessity, accepts Christ.
In modern times Augustine's concept of the movement
toward faith in Christ has been sharpened into the image of
Christ as the One who chooses us, loves us and pursues us
p
until He captures us. He is the hound of Heaven (Thompson).
1. Augustine, Confessions, trans. T. Matthew (Collins, Fontana,
1957), p.217.
2. F. Thompson, The Hound of Heaven.
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He surrounds us with Himself even while we flee from Him and
in His love He will not let us go but pursues us until we
freely and yet of necessity accept Him. G.M. Hopkins, in a
particularly powerful passage, addresses God as 'Thou master¬
ing me Godi'1 Christ appears to be our enemy (cf. Jeremiah):
we flee Him and it is only when He captures us that we
realise that He is infinitely tender even in His severity.
2
His severity is the severity of unrelenting love. Coleridge
Ancient Mariner, with its extraordinarily vivid and precise
e3<ploration of the states of mind involved in discovering
the grace of God, seems to have provided the seminal pattern
and imagery. The Mariner kills the albatross and thinks no
more of it until he is becalmed at sea. There he becomes the
prisoner of his own action. He becomes Ms own victim,
caught in the guilt of his past. Yet he is surrounded by
an imperceptible but ambient grace which holds him prisoner
until, at the depth of his self-hatred and knowledge of his
4
own ugliness, he is freed to bless the Creator and His works.
This secret grace is intimately connected with the albatross,
who has unmistakeable affinity with Christ (the language used
in speaking of the bird suggests a sacramental presence in
which the creation is held together).^ It thus appears that
Christ Himself has been pursuing the Mariner and will not let
1. G.M. Hopkins, The Wreck of the Deutschland. stanza 1.
2. See Lamentations 3> where the writer can both say: 'He
[GodJ is to me a bear lying in wait, like a lion in hiding'
(v. 10) and: 'New every morning are his mercies' (vs. 22-3)
3. S. Coleridge, The Ancient Mariner, stanza 34.
4. ibid., stanza 66.
5. ibid., stanzas 16-19.
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him go until he blesses the grace which holds him. The poem
provides a basic metaphor for the interpretation of Christian
experience, a metaphor which enables us to see both the pre¬
ceding grace of God and the awakening to genuine self-knowledge
which are at work in conversion.
This first way of gaining access- to knowledge of Justifi¬
cation depends on a second way. Jesus Christ took up the
experience of fallen man, converted man to God and thus became
the One in whom the experience of Justification is opened up
for sinners. It is only because Christ has taken up and
redeemed man's knowledge of his situation that he may have
the self-knowledge described above.
This second way of understanding the experience of
Justification may best :be approached through the Hebrew
Psalter. The Psalter explores the condition of man in the
presence of his Creator and Lord. It gives us the experience
of men like ourselves, men involved in sin. How, then, can
it really describe our situation in the presence of the Holy
One of Israel?
It is not only the innocence psalms which raise this
problem. The words of a great penitential psalm:
Thou art Justified in thy sentence
and blameless when thou Judgest (Ps. 51: 4)
imply an innocence as inaccessible to sinful man as do the
words of a great innocence psalm:
if thou triest my heart,
if thou visitest me by night,
if thou testest me,
thou wilt find no wickedness in me. (Ps. 17: 3)„
How can man praise God's righteous Judgment when he is a
sinner and therefore unable to know either the purity of God's
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justice or the impurity of that which God judges?
The only solution to this problem can be if a perfectly
just and holy man prays these psalms. Only such a man would
know God's righteousness and the condition of man as revealed
in His sight. This has in fact happened in the life of Jesus
of Nazareth. He has prayed and pleaded the Hebrew Psalter
before His God and our God, and has done so in our flesh and
in our name. In this way He has made the experience of the
psalms accessible to sinners.
Yet does not this solution entail the blasphemy of '
denying Christ's perfect righteousness? If Christ prayed the
penitential psalms, must He not have confessed personal sin?
The answer must be that it was because He knew no sin that He
could confess the perfect righteousness of God's sentence.
Because He was sinless He knew the utter evil of sin. Further,
it was in the strength of this righteousness that He not only
condemned sin as it is in others but also loved these others
as Himself and confessed their sin as His own. To say that
Christ prayed psalms 32, 51, 69, 130, etc., and that He prayed
them personally, is to praise His sinlessness. It is to
acknowledge that righteousness in Him whereby He loved sinners
as Himself and acknowledged and judged their sin in His own
person.
In order to demonstrate the value of this doctrine for
the Church, psalm 51 will be studied briefly from three per¬
spectives. First, in relation to its writer, a man of the
Old Testament; second, in relation to Christ; and, finally,
in relation to the man of the new covenant, post Christum.
This procedure is to some extent artificial, since the psalm
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does not exist on three levels, yet a careful reading of the
text as it stands shows that it is unintelligible without a
reference beyond it to a sinless man. Jesus Christ is the
One who makes it intelligible, and a third reading is needed
in order to indicate its meaning for those to whom He makes
its experience accessible.
(1) Psalm 51 falls into a number of parts. There is
an initial plea for mercy followed by a full confession of
the writer*s sin against God and the righteousness of God's
judgment (vs. 1-5). The writer then considers God's desire
for truth in the inward being and accordingly prays that his.
inner life be thoroughly cleansed, purged (vs. 6-12). As he
prays this he also longs that his lips be opened that he might
declare the righteousness of the God who thus has mercy on him
(vs. 13-15)• He realises that God's mercy is so great that
He does not delight in sacrifice, but accepts the broken
heart of the sinner (vs. 16-17). This sacrifice of penitence
and thanksgiving pleases God and He will then again delight
in the sacrifices for sin prescribed in the law (vs. 18-19).
This brief analysis of the contents of the psalm shows
that it encompasses a clear development of efl$>erience. It
could be said to illustrate the logic of repentance. It moves
from confession of sin, through acknowledgement of a completely
new beginning, to self-offering in thanksgiving for God's
mercy. God's causeless love (there is no reason whatever for
Him to love a sinner or to show him mercy), His grace, is the
presupposition of this entire movement. It is even the
ground of the initial confession of sin. The opening burst
in which the writer pours out his acknowledgement of wickedness
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calls on God's mercy (hesed). He appeals to unconditional
mercy, promising God neither sacrifice nor repentance. In
the act of confessing his appalling offence, he makes no
offer to appease God's wrath. He runs straight to God's
mercy. The opening confession is thus a pleading and a
praising of God's pure mercy: the writer pleads 'the multitude
of thy tender mercies' (v. 1). In the light of this mercy
he confesses the iniquity of his sin, recognising himself
(v. 3) as utterly sinful (v. 5) against God (v. 4). In the
presence of the purity of God he sees God's desire for truth
in the inward parts, and, like the writer of psalm 32 he
seeks to have no guile (32: 2) before God. Because he
counts on God's mercy he does not hide his sin or lie about
it but confesses it in order that his inward parts may be
cleansed of it. He knows that God's mercy is so sure that
He will wash away what offends Him and so God will again be
able to look on His servant and uphold him with His spirit.
This psalm pays great attention to the inner parts, the
spirit (ruah), of the sinner, because God desires fellowship
with the very centre of man's being which is defiled by sin.
It thinks in terms of nothing less than a thorough renovation
of the inner man. Because the writer is confident of God's
willingness completely to purify him, he concludes his psalm
with a celebration of God's desire, His delight and good-
pleasure. Just as God's mercy rests only on His good-pleasure,
so the psalmist now thanks God for His mercy by offering him¬
self in thanksgiving for His good-pleasure. God does not
delight in sacrifice but He will accept a broken spirit.
There is, however, a riddle here. Vs. 5-7 imply a
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judgment on sin so radical that the sinner is wholly judged
and can continue to exist only if he is created anew. He
knows that God is justified in His sentence against him.
Further, this offence against God issues from the origins of
his identity (v. 5)* The psalmist agrees with God's judgment
that he can only be put to death and, if he is to live, re¬
created. He must have a new heart. But what is the basis
for this knowledge? If a man is a sinner he cannot judge him¬
self to be the sinner he is. Again, how can the psalmist
speak of the creation of a new heart when the only creation
the Old Testament knows of is the one creation at the beginning?
This psalm implies a total rejection of the sinner and his
total recreation. In Barth's language, there is a complete
cleavage into a left and a right, into the sinner and the
justified. The closer this psalm is studied the clearer it
becomes that it calls for completion in terms of the perfect
righteousness of Jesus Christ.
(2 ) The radical conversion of man - the complete judgment
of the old and the introduction of the new - celebrated in
psalm 51 could happen only in the sinless man, Jesus Christ.
He alone exercised that perfect holiness in which sin can be
known as the intolerable thing it is; He alone can justify
the radical judgment of God on the sinner; and in Him alone
can there be the basis for the new creation.
Psalm 51 seems to bear particular relevance to Jesus1
work on the cross, since it was there that He justified God's
sentence against sinners. The cross is the only place where
an end of sin and a beginning of righteousness so radical as
is implied in this psalm has taken place. It was here also
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that the Amen was uttered to the divine righteousness. In
our humanity and for our sakes Jesus acknowledged that God
is Justified in His sentence and blameless in His Judgment.
In this way humanity for the first time answered and
responded to God's righteousness, and similarly it for the
first time received the Justification which is in that
righteousness.
(3) What, then, are we to say of psalm 51 in the era post
Christum? Without Christ the words of this psalm
exaggerate the truth: no sinner can truthfully exclaim that
he knows that he is totally sinful. But when the sinner
receives the Spirit of Christ, in whom this confession was
perfectly made in our humanity, he is freed to pray the
words of this psalm in sober truth.
The heart of man is deceitful above all things, and
deceives itself even in its most sincere confession of sin.
It is Jesus alone who is without guile, the sincere confessor
of sin. As He confessed sin, He acknowledged the righteous¬
ness of the divine sentence and so Justified God. He made
the true repentance for sin which claims nothing for itself
and throws itself entirely on God's righteousness. He
looked entirely to God for His Justification. In this way
Jesus received the Justification of God in our humanity and
for us men. He does not keep the truth which is in Him to
Himself: he communicates the riches of His heart to us
crooked sinners. In the strength of His Holy Spirit He
gives us all that is His, and thus brings us to participate
in the true confession of sin and the reception of Justifi¬
cation which took place in Him.
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Jesus Christ made vicarious repentance for us. He
has made the experience of the psalms His own and prayed
them in their truth. This does not mean, however, that
He has prayed them so that we do not pray them. He has not
prayed psalm 51 instead of us, but in our humanity and in
such a way that we are liberated to pray it in truth. We
can pray it only in Christ, only in His Spirit, but precisely
because the Spirit Joined with Christ as He prayed in our
fallen humanity, His Spirit now brings us to an active parti¬
cipation in the prayer life of Christ. It needs to be
stressed that Christ has once and for all made repentance
for our sin: He alone has Justified God so as to make atone¬
ment. But, on the basis of that perfect repentance, we are
liberated to follow Him into the presence of His God and
there tc acknowledge for ourselves the righteousness of God.
On the basis of His atonement we are freed to share in His
repentance and His faith, and thus to come before His God as
Justified sinners.
In view of these observations it becomes clear that
Barth could have given a richer account of the faith in
which the sinner receives his Justification. Later in this
chapter Barth*s account of the act of faith will be discussed
in some detail, but it is appropriate at this point to
notice the weakness in his correlation of Christ's repentance
and faith with ours. If it is the case that Christ took up
and made His own the experience of psalm 51» and if it is
further the case that we participate in Him through His
Spirit so that all that He has is ours, it follows that we
also Judge ourselves to be sinners and that we also exercise
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that faith in God's righteousness which is counted as
righteousness. If Christ prayed: 'thou art justified in
thy sentence and blameless in thy judgment', we also,
through His Spirit, pray these words. There is in the
Christian life a real and indispensible self-judgment. The
fact that this is self-judgment in the Lord (I Cor.11: 31-32)
only confirms and emphasises this truth. Barth neglects
this element of self-judgment. He neglects the judgment of
the sinner in which he acknowledges the Lord's judgment on
him and for his own part says the Amen to it.
One further aspect of psalm 51 is significant. As the
psalmist pleads God's good-pleasure, as he pleads with the
heart of God, his own heart and affections are liberated
into their true and proper freedom. The psalmist is
released into the true feelings of a man - a man who is
truthful and not deceiving - and thus his feelings, emotions,
desires, in short, his whole emotive being, comes into its
own. His whole emotive life has found its proper centre
and is therefore no longer bound in eccentricity and dis¬
tortion.
The ground of this liberation is in God. Man is truly
man only as he lives in fellowship with God. This fellow¬
ship depends on God's turning toward man. Psalm 51 is
rich in insight into God's feeling toward man. The psalm
begins with the psalmist calling on God to be merciful,
propitious, toward him. He recognises himself as abhorrent
in God's sight, yet calls on God's desire for truth. He
realises that God does not delight in sacrifice, nor would
He be pleased with burnt offering; rather, God delights in
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and does not despise the lowliness of a broken heart. The
psalm concludes with God's delight in right sacrifices. It
is God's good-pleasure to purge man of his sin and to
recreate him. Thus, as God satisfies His desire in relation
to man He also brings the sinner to peace, joy and satis¬
faction.
This dimension of feeling, which is present in the psalms
generally, fills out Barth's doctrine of the justification of
man. It is not a superfluous dimension, as though it were
merely an addition to something more significant, but refers
to the total man. It refers to man's heart, to the seat of
his thinking and feeling, to the centre of his life. It
refers to the centre where a man finds the satisfaction of
his being (or fails to find it). Barth has refused to
countenance anything but a realistic account of justification,
but his thought could be given greater realism, greater human
depth, by taking into account this dimension of the heart.
In this study of psalm 51» the work of McLeod Campbell
has not been explicitly mentioned, but his understanding of
Christ's vicarious humanity has been constantly in the
background. As in The Nature of the Atonement, it has been
stressed that Christ's confession opens up confession for us.
It has also become clear that, as this act of man's heart is
carried through, he calls out to God's fatherly heart. In
justification there is an intensely personal movement between
man and God, a movement which is itself called forth by the
Father. Barth does not ignore this movement - indeed, it
is an integral part of his description of the judgment enacted
on man - but he does not give it the rich content which he
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could have given it if he had taken more seriously Christ's
vicarious humanity. It is hoped that the preceding dis¬
cussion goes some way toward opening up that rich content.
Faith and the Holy Spirit
It was argued in Chapter I that since the Enlightenment
man's subjectivity has come to the forefront of his under¬
standing of himself. Christian theology has come to
recognise that man's being the object of God's love
means for him that he posits himself as an active subject
and that he makes himself the man that he is (cf. I Cor.
15: 10). Barth has taken up this bold theme and does not
hesitate to speak of man's positing himself in action""" and
of his freedom for the good. It is impossible to miss in
Barth the richly active place he gives to the human subject -
a far more active place than is found even in Calvin.
In considering the 'subjective realisation' (subjectiven
Realisierung) of the atonement Barth argues that theology
must not leave Jesus Christ. The entire 'active partici-
•3
pation of man in the divine act of reconciliation'-^ is
carried through by the Spirit of Jesus Christ. He brings
men genuinely to turn to God, and they do it not in 'their
own reason and power'but only as God converts them to Him¬
self. The Spirit is Lord, attesting Himself as the Spirit
of the Son, thus distinguishing Himself from all other spirits
1. C.D. III/2, pp. 181, 194ff.
2. C.D. IVA, P» 643; KjD. IV/1, p. 719.
3. ibid.. p. 643.
4. Barth is quoting from Luther, ibid., p. 645.
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who are not lord in this way. 'He is the form of [Christ's]
actiorf,1 and as such gathers the Church as the body of Christ
on earth and in history. He is 'the power in which Jesus
Christ attests Himself, attests Himself effectively, creating
2
in man response and obedience.' Barth stresses that
nothing more 'palpable' than this can be said of the 'how'
3
of the Spirit's working, since what we need to know is that
we belong to Christ and He to us. It really happens that
there is an 'actualising of [Christ's] history in other human
4
histories', but this is as certain and as puzzling as the
blowing of the wind where it wills (Jn. 3• 8).
The being of the Church flows from the Holy Spirit. It
is the form of Jesus Christ as He lives in men and they in
Him, and therefore it consists in the activity of men as they
are moved by the Spirit.
This self-communication of Jesus Christ through the
Spirit gives men their own place in Christ. He brings them
to live and to act in Himself. This is also true of the
individuals who compose the Church. They have an active
place in Jesus Christ.
When Barth comes to consider man's act of faith he
describes the unique glory of it. It 'cannot be compared
with any other [human activity] in spontaneity and native
1. ibid., p. 648.
2. ibid.. p. 649.
3. ibid.. p. 649.
4. ibid., p. 649.
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freedom.'1 It cannot be dissolved into its object but
2
has a definite dignity in relation to that object. It
does not create its object, but 'discovers' what is already
3
there for believers and unbelievers alike. Therefore
faith leaves behind an abnormal and eccentric for a normal
and central existence. Barth goes so far as to say that
in it 'there takes place the constitution of the Christian
4
subject.'
All this is true because the object of faith is 'the
5
living Jesus Christ Himself.' He is a 'present person',
the 'circle encircling...every man', and faith apprehends
£
Him as such.
Barth first describes faith as the activity of the
Christian in relation to Christ. In faith, a man is no
longer closed to Jesus Christ, but is open to Him and
orientates himself on Him. The centre of his being is open
to Christ, and therefore he has found 'the true centre of
7
himself which is outside himself.'
Faith is not only oriented on Christ: it also has its
origin in Him.
We do not compromise its character as free act if we
say that it has its origin in the very point in which
it also originates. It is also...the work of Jesus
Christ who is its object. (C.D. IV/1, p. 744)
1. ibid.. P. 741.
2. ibid.. P. 742.
3. ibid.. P« 742.
4. ibid., P. 749.
5. ibid., P. 743.
6. ibid.. P. 743.
7. ibid., P. 744.
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Sinful man has no basis or possibility for faith in himself,1
but Jesus Christ makes faith necessary for him, since He
makes his unbelief an impossibility and faith his only
possibility. This is because in Jesus Christ the old man
of unbelief is passed over and the new man of faith is
placed in his stead. In the awakening power of the Holy
Spirit this impossibility of doubt and the sole possibility
of faith 'so confronts...a man that he does the only
objective, real and ontological thing which he can do....
[He] chooses that for which he is already chosen,...faith.'
Faith is the only human act which is 'self-evident1. He
awakens and finds himself where he really is, i.e., 'in his
4
father's house and on his mother's lap.'
The decisive thing still remains to be said. In faith
5
there is 'the constitution of the Christian subject.*"^ In
6
it there 'takes place a new and particular being of man.''
Barth states precisely what he means:
the creaturely subject constituted in the being and work
of Jesus Christ and awakened as such by the power of the
Holy Spirit...is the individual Christian in the act of
his personal faith. (C.D. IV/1, p. 751)
That is, Christ constitutes the Christian subject, but He
does so only in the act of faith of a man enlightened by
the Holy Spirit. It is important to note this, since
Barth also holds that the being of all men is included in
1. ibid., P- 746.
2. ibid.. P. 748.
3. ibid.. P. 748.
4. ibid., P. 748.
5. ibid., P« 749.
6. ibid., P. 749.
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Christ apart from their act of faith in Him. Barth here
indicates a special sense in which men become Christians,
i.e., in faith as they are enlightened by the Spirit. Faith
does not alter anything, but it does bring a man into active
participation in the alteration of the human situation as it
took place in Christ.
As a human act [faith] consists in definite acknowledge¬
ment, recognition and confession. As this human act
it has no creative but only cognitive character. It
does not alter anything. As a human act it is simply
a confirmation of a change which has already taken place,
the change in the whole human situation which took
place...in Jesus Christ. But it obviously belongs to
the alteration of the human situation which Christian
faith can only confirm, that it does find this confir¬
mation. . . - that there are individual Christian subjects.
(C.D. IV/1, pp. 751-2)
God alone can alter the human situation and man can only
confess and enter into that perfect act of God. Thus Barth
describes the act of faith in terms of knowledge, the active
knowledge of Anerkennen. Erkennen and Bekennen. The act of
Jesus Christ is not complete without the act of the human
subjects who were its objects. Their act is that of taking
cognisance of His act. It is not because they believe but
as they believe that 'they become and are Christians.'1
Yet they do become Christians in this act and 'to this extent
we cannot deny to the event of their faith a certain
?
creative character.'
How does faith acquire this 'creative character' 'which
it can have only on the presupposition of what man himself
does in it, but which on this presupposition it cannot derive
1. ibid.. p. 752.
2. ibid., p. 752.
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from sinful man?'1 Barth answers that Christ 'encircles'
the sinner and 'proves Himself to be the stronger by the
irresistible awakening power of the Holy Spirit':
In this strength and in this proof He calls him to
faith. And in doing so He creates the presupposition
on the basis of which the sinful man can and does
believe. He introduces him as a new subject which is
capable of and willing and ready for this act... .Because
the faith of the sinful man is directed on Him and
effected by Him, the event of his faith is not merely
cognitive as a human act, but it is also creative in
character. The new being effective and revealed in
it, the new creation, the new birth, - they are all
the mystery of the One in whom he believes and whom
he can acknowledge and recognise and confess in faith.
(C.D. IV/1, p. 753)
2
•This creative mystery of Christian existence' must be
thought of in terms of the form of Jesus Christ as He
confronts individual man, bringing each person to discover
himself as the one loved by Him. Each person is uniquely
himself and no other, and Christ confronts him in order to
bring him to know that it was just for him that He died and
rose. As sinful man comes to this active knowledge of
Christ, as he takes hold of the astounding fact that *1
myself am just the subject for whom [Jesus Christ] is', he
has 'the newness of being, the new creation, the new birth
of the Christian.'^
Barth now turns to consider the free act in which the
Christian comes into being,
point of view) is 'the act of
inward, central, decisive act
1. ibid., p. 752.
2. ibid.. p. 753.
3. C.D. IV/1, p. 755.
4. ibid., p. 757.
Christian faith (from this




Offence has been taken at Barth's view that Christian
faith is primarily knowledge. Though it is argued in this
study that when the Spirit calls a man to faith there is
also an ontological alteration in his being, Barth is on good
ground in giving only a limited creative role to the human
act and also in insisting that Christian knowledge is active
and, in this limited sense, creative knowledge. Since faith
is knowledge of Christ it is also obedience and is the
alteration of the whole man. Barth describes this knowledge
under three related terms, Anerkennen, Erkennen and Bekennen.
The astounding thing here is that acknowledgement precedes
recognition: Christ reverses the usual order. If acknow¬
ledgement of Christ followed knowledge of Him, it would not
be obedient knowledge, since the obedience would depend on
the believer's knowledge and would therefore not be subject
to Christ. Barth says: 'The recognition is certainly
included in the acknowledgment, but it can only follow it.
Acknowledging is a taking cognisance which is obedient and
compliant.'1
Christian faith is also recognition. The obedience
implied in acknowledgement of Christ is not blind. It has
form because Jesus Christ has form. The knowledge present
in this recognition of Christ cannot be abstract knowledge
since Christian faith is knowledge of the One who gave Him¬
self for him. The Christian also has real and not abstract
knowledge of himself:
...if [faith] is an active recognition - a recognition
in the full sense of this important word - then
1. ibid., p. 758T
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necessarily it reaches out from that knowledge to aware¬
ness, the self-understanding and self-apprehension, of
the whole man, thus becoming an action and decision of
the whole man. What does it mean when I know that...
Jesus Christ is for me...?
...From this knowledge, from the recognition character¬
ised by this knowledge, does there not necessarily
follow a total disturbance of my being, a radical
decision in relation to my situation vis h. vis myself and
the world? Does not this recognition...necessarily take
on the form of a free act which is characterised as a
basic act by the fact that it is - we must not say only,
but Just-the act of my heart. (C.D. IV/1, pp. 766-7)
In emphasising this radical disturbance Barth first notes
a •danger' in what he has said. Does not this talk of a
'total disturbance' approximate to the existentialists'
absolute crisis or the Roman repetition of Calvary? Barth
replies:
We have referred to a total but not absolute disturbance,
a radical but not an eschatological decision, a free
act of man...grounded in the act of God, but not the act
of God itself and as such..•.We are speaking of the
most important penultimate things, not of ultimate
things. (CjD. IV/1, p. 767)
Barth distinguishes his position completely from any idea
of a repetition in the act of faith of what took place
eph* hapax In Jesus Christ. 'The real representation
(repraesentio) of the history of Jesus Christ is that which
He Himself accomplishes in the work of His Holy Spirit when
He makes Himself the object and origin of faith.' Existen¬
tialist theology disregards this:
What is Bultmann's conception but an existentialist
translation of the sacramentalist teaching of the
Roman Church, according to which, at the climax of
the mass, with the transubstantiation of the elements...
there is a "bloodless repetition" of the sacrifice of
Christ on Golgotha? (C.D. IV/1, p. 767)
Barth stands by his thesis that faith is 'the free act of
man', 'If this is secure we cannot speak too strongly of
1. C.D. IV/1, p. 767.
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what takes place in it as the recognition and apprehension
of Jesus Christ, as the subjective realisation of the pro
1
me.
If Christian faith is acknowledgement and recognition
of Christ, it must also be confession. A Christian would
deceive himself as to his being in Christ if he did not
confess Christ. Confession is the free act oi man in which
he shows concretely his thankfulness to Christ. He cannot
respond to Christ without telling others that Christ has
died for all men and therefore not only for him but also
2
for them.
The Work of the Spirit in the Act of Faith
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that
Barth distinguishes the act of God in the Spirit from the
act of man which is called forth by it. God'sw^rk alone
is creative in the full sense; man's act of faith is creative
in only a very limited sense. On this ground he accords
man's act of faith only penultimate seriousness and not the
full eschatological seriousness which is proper to God's act.
In maintaining this Barth follows through one of the
major theses of the Dogmatics, and there can be little doubt
that he is on good Biblical ground. Nevertheless it must
be asked whether the Holy Spirit does not exercise a greater
creative role than Barth allows in the act of faith which He
calls into being. If the Holy Spirit is equal God with
the Son, and the Spirit by whom,, with the Word, the world was
1. ibid.. p. 769.
2* ibid.. p. 779.
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created, does He not recreate man when He creates faith in
him through the Word? Does not the Holy Spirit bring about
an ontological alteration in the men who come to faith?
To ask these questions is not to suggest that man's act of
faith alters anything, but it is to suggest that coincident
with the act of faith the Holy Spirit accomplishes an
ontological alteration in man. It is to suggest that Barth
undervalues the creative power of the Spirit.
Barth is reluctant to accord this ontological role to
the Spirit because he believes that the ontological condition
of all men was altered by Christ on the cross and in the
resurrection. The work of the Spirit of Christ can therefore
be only that of calling men - of awakening, enlightening and
empowering them - actively to know and to make use of what is
already true of them in Christ.
It has been the constant argument of this study that
Barth is correct to locate the ontological turning of the
human condition in the death and resurrection of the
incarnate One. To think otherwise would mean a retreat
into the work-righteousness of giving man a part in his
salvation, even if only a minimal part. H. Bouillard1 and
2
C. 0fGrady have reproached Barth for giving man's faith no
saving role, and while their criticism is acceptable insofar
as it means that man is not saved apart from faith, they
seem to suggest that faith is something which must be added
3
to Christ's work. C. Brown also has difficulty in
1. H. Bouillard, Karl Barth. Premiere Partie (Aubier,
Paris, 1957), pp. 77-9.
2. C. O'Grady, The Church in Catholic Theology (G. Chapman,
London, 1969), pp. 249-50.
3. C. Brown. Karl Barth and the Christian Message (Tvndale,
London, 1967), pp. 153-7.
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witnessing to the necessity of faith without making it
something addition to Christ*s perfect work. Yet it re¬
mains true that Barth's statement falls short of the
Pauline and Lutheran insistence that it is in faith that
a man is justified. There is a riddle here: how can Jesus
Christ be the ontological alteration of the human situation
and yet it still be the case that individual men are
justified only by faith? The riddle is resolved in the
mystery of the Spirit.
Jesus Christ is Himself the ontological conversion and
salvation of man, but He does not come generally to men: He
comes in the particularity of the Spirit. In His Spirit He
shares with a particular man the salvation which is in Him
and also the faith in which He won that salvation. In the
language of McLeod Campbell, the faith in His Father by which
He exercised His vicarious repentance is given to us through
His Spirit. It is only as He thus shares His faith in the
Father with us that we share in His salvation, i.e., the
salvation which consists in the favour of the Father.
A slight but significant correction of Barth's view of
the seriousness of faith follows from this. Barth holds it
to be of penultimate, not ultimate, importance: it is man*s
act not God's. But if the Spirit performs the creative role
of baptising the believer into Christ, the act of God and the
act of man coincide in such a way that man*s act of faith is
inseparably linked with his recreation into the eschatolo-
gical new creation in Christ. Man's act of faith does not
itself alter anything, but it coincides with the act of the




THE SANCTIFICATION OF MAN
Man's turning to God could not be termed a 'turning*
unless it involved the will to cease to move in one
direction and the will and energy to move in another. In
his chapter on 'The Sanctification of Man', Barth addresses
himself to this aspect of conversion. He thinks of it as
an •about turn', as freedom as opposed to bondage of the
will, and as energy as opposed to sloth. In this chapter
it will be asked whether Barth does not underestimate the
radical effect which Christ has on those who trust in Him.
Although Barth cannot be called 'Christomonist', there are
some aspects of his doctrine of sanctification that are not
entirely free of this danger. If Christ loves us as Himself,
the goal of His being in His act is nothing less than to make
us as He is, and Barth's language about the 'smallness',
'pettiness' and 'weakness' of our turning to God, however
accurate it may be in describing the conversion of many
Christians, falls far short of an accurate description of
what He can and does do with us sinners.
The divine act of atonement consisted not only in the
self-humbling of God, but also, grounded in that act of
majesty, in the exaltation of man. Man has his being in
Jesus Christ, and therefore man's being in Him includes not
only his justification but also, grounded on it, his
sanctification. God is not content simply to turn to man:
1
He also turns man to Himself.
1. C.D. IV/2, pp. 499, 503.
431
Of the many terms which may be used to express this
turning of man,1 Barth chooses that of sanctification, since
it points most clearly to the Holy One, the Saint, the One
whose holy work is to make others holy, Barth says that
2
God alone is 'originally and properly holy', meaning by
this not that there are not other holy ones and saints, but
that He creates holiness in others.
The discussion of man's sanctification cannot be based
on the sinner himself. The sole basis of his sanctification
is the Holy One Himself. Yet Barth does begin with what
takes place here below with man, starting with the
astounding fact, on which the Bible counts, that there is a
holy people in the world. We may speak so confidently of
this holy people of God only because of the prior reality
of the Holy One Himself, yet, simply because of Him, we
must speak of and count on the existence of saints here on
earth.
This is to anticipate Barth's discussion of the
conversion of individual men and women. Barth first notes
that the conversion which has come to all men de .jure has
1 3
in fact come upon only a limited number of men. This
conversion is intended for all men, and 'this special people
of special men...[are] marked off from all others because
1. Other terms which Barth mentions are: regeneration,
renewal, conversion, penitence and discipleship, ibid..
p. 500.
2. ibid.. p. 500.
3. ibid.. p. 511.
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they are set aside by God'1 in order that they may make
'a provisional offering of the thankfulness for which the
p
whole world is ordained.1 This special people is made
holy by the Holy One. He 'is the active Subject of their
sanctification.'^ He is unique, absolutely superior to
them, and yet this holiness consists in His superiority to
bridge the distance between Himself and sinners, and in so
doing mercifully to create saints 'in reflection of His
4
holiness.• Barth marvels that sinners should be called
saints. We are, he observes, not yet saints, but even al¬
though we are only a 'copy' and 'reflection' of His holi-
5
ness, God has crossed the gulf and has created a new
existence for us. We are therefore not improperly called
saints.
Who are and where are these people called saints?
Barth replies: 'We shall certainly speak of them, but we
are well advised not to speak of them too quickly or too
6
directly.* Barth*s reason for this is not without
ambiguity. He says:
...if, as the Subject of this occurrence in the
course of which there arises the existence of saints,
God alone is originally and properly holy, this
necessarily means that even human holiness, as the
new form of the existence of the covenant-partner of
this God, cannot originally and properly be that of
many, but only of the one man who on the human level
is marked off from all others (even the holy people
1. ibid.. P- 511.
2. ibid.. P. 499.
3. ibid.. P. 513.
4. ibid.. P. 513.
5. ibid.. P- 514.
6. ibid.. P* 514.
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and its members) as sanctified by God, and therefore
as the Holy One. (C.D. IV/2, p. 514)
God and Jesus Christ are alone originally holy, but is it
true to say that They alone are -properly holy? Granted
that men are sinners, and that the holiness they have
originates solely in God, does not God's holy coming to
men recreate them as properly holy? Barth makes his point
as he does because he wishes to insist that men are holy
only as they participate in Christ, but surely it must be
said that Christ's action is so radical that in Him men are
properly holy. Barth goes on to amplify his point.
The sanctification of man which has taken place in
this One is their sanctification. But originally
and properly it is the sanctification of Him and not
of them. Their sanctification is originally and
properly His and not theirs. (C.D. IV/2, p. 514)
Again, this is expressed ambiguously, suggesting that our
sanctification is less real than Christ's. Barth intends
to stress that Christ alone sanctifies us and that our
holiness is His action, but, precisely because this is true,
it must be said that His holiness is also ours. All that
He has is ours. Barth comes very close to saying this:
We look into the void if...we do not fix our gaze
steadfastly on this centre as the place where alone
[sanctification] is a direct event, reaching out
with the same reality (but only in virtue of this
centre) to all the other places.
(C.D. IV/2, p. 515)
If Christ's holiness reaches out to the circumference'with
the same reality' as it exists at the centre, should not
Barth agree that those who participate in Him are properly
holy? They are born of His Spirit and therefore have His
nature.1
1. I Jn. 3: 9.
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This may seem to be no more than a mere quibble, yet
Barth hesitates to ascribe to Christians the holiness
which is theirs according to the New Testament. It is not
that Christians have any holiness apart from Christ, but
that Christ makes their participation in Him so radical that
they are holy as He is holy.
Barth's fundamental thesis about sanctification is
participatio Christi: 'our sanctification consists in our
participation in His sanctification as grounded in the
efficacy and revelation of the grace of Jesus Christ.'1
Jesus Christ was sanctified for all men, but how does the
de ,1ure sanctification of all men in Him become factually
true? Barth says that it is a matter of Christ's self-
interpretation to men, so that they come to 're-interpret'
themselves in the light of their being in Christ. If
He lives, this royal man, and if He does so as Lord, their
Lord, this means even for their self-understanding that they
2
are His, the people of His possession. Through the Holy
Spirit, He places them under His direction and 'creates
saints.'
Barth's description of this impartation from Christ to
4
the Christian begins with man and works upward. We are
indeed slothful sinners, and our sanctification does not
mitigate but confirms this fact. Christians are distinguished
1. ibid.. p. 517.
2. ibid.. p. 521.
3. ibid., p. 523.
4. ibid., p. 523.
435
from other sinners by the fact that they are •disturbed'1
sinners to whose sin an •overwhelming* limit has bean set
2
by the breaking in of the powerful divine direction. We
are called - not merely corrected but also instructed - and
X
live our sanctification de facto as we look to Jesus.^ Even
as we lazy sinners lift ourselves up and follow Him we are
in need of forgiveness, but the glorious fact is that we
actually do rise up and obey Him. Although this rising up
is similar to all our other acts, it is different from them
to the extent that the * spontaneity with which [man]
expresses himself in it1 arises not from his heart but origi-
L
nates in the direction which Jesus Christ gives him. He
executes it as the answer to a call which comes from his Lord,
and therefore, although he has •no means to hand which are
not common to all men1
it is absolutely dissimilar in the fact that it is his
correspondence to the life-movement of his Lord as
produced, not by his own caprice, but by the will and
touch and address and creation and gift of this Lord.
Those who receive Him, who are given the power to
become children of God, who believe in His Name, are
born not of blood, or of the will of the flesh, or of
the will of man, but of God. Their action is nourished
by the mystery of the life-giving Spirit by whom the
Lord has united these sinful human creatures to Himself.
Their action attests this mystery, and therefore the
One who has united them to Himself.
CC.D. IV/2, p. 529)
Because this direction comes from the Lord, it is the
5
real alteration of man's being.In His kingly work, Jesus
draws men to Himself, and man's sloth no longer reigns. More
1. ibid.. p. 524.
2. ibid.. p. 526.
3. ibid.. p. 527.
4. ibid., p. 528.
5. ibid., p. 529.
436
than this, as Jesus brings men to participate in Himself,
He makes them free. This sovereign freedom is not
guaranteed by the use they make of it. Saints are still
•inclined by nature to hate God and [their] neighbours,'
but the fact is that Christ has set them free for the freedom
■which they have in Him. Barth says:
It is true that in its original and proper form they
have the freedom, not in themselves, but in the One
who is above. But called by Him to fellowship with
Himself, placed in it, united with Him by His Holy
Spirit, they are free here and now in correspondence
to His kingly rule at the right hand of God the Father
Almighty. (C.D. IV/2, p. 533)
Formally, man's sanctification consists in looking to
Jesus and freedom; its substance comes in Jesus' summons
to discipleship, the command which is 'the form of the grace
which comes concretely to man.•1
Barth makes four points about this call. First, Jesus'
call to discipleship is the particular form of the command
by which Jesus reveals Himself to man and claims him wholly
2 "*>
for Himself. Grace has the form of law, since Christ
reveals to men the freedom they have in Him and also commands
them to make use of it. Second, the call to discipleship
ll j
binds a man to the One who calls. The living ^esus calls
as the One who has 'fulfilled the promise of God' and there-
5
fore as the One who is to be trusted and obeyed. Therefore,
third, the call to discipleship is always the 'summons to
take in faith.•.a definite first step.' It must be an act
1. ibid.. p. 535.
2. ibid., p. 534.
3. Cf. K. Barth, Gospel and Law, tjans. J.S. McNab (Oliver and
4. C.D. IV/2, p. 536. Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959), pp. 14ff.
5* iBid.. PP» 536-7.
6. ibid., p. 538.
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in which a man denies himself and simply obeys Jesus, doing
neither mcr0 nor less than He asks. It is specific, definite,
concrete obedience, the one thing he is free to do. "Finally,
the call to discipleship involves a definite break with
himself1 and all the 'gods' of family, honour, possessions,
etc., which are really forms of self-concern. Jesus is the
Conqueror of these powers and, as we follow Him, we necess-
2
arily witness to this fact. The disciple attests the
victory of God through his obedience to the Victor. He
witnesses to a victory already won, and therefore in this
witness the Church is militant: it attests in action the
revolution of God against the 'gods' of both Christians and
the world.
This revolution of God finds its expression in the
Christian's awakening to conversion. As conversion is the
subject of this study, this sub-section of the Dogmatics will
be discussed in some detail. It is well to recall that Barth
holds that God has freely turned to man and that in the
strength cf this turning and on its basis man has turned to
God. This twofold turning is actual in the person of Jesus
Christ. In the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ communicates Him¬
self to other men, and hence they are freed to participate
in His turning to God. As they hear His gospel, they are
both freed and commanded to turn in gratitude to God.
Barth counts on the fact of the actual turning of men to
God. According to him, there can be no legitimate doubt
1. ibid.. p. 543.
2. ibid.. p. 544.
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that men turn to God because God has already turned to us.
As surely as God has turned to man, so surely will it be
found that men turn to Him.1
Barth enquires concerning the origin and basis of this
conversion. It is only as man looks to Jesus, the author
and the finisher of faith, that he finds himself in the
movement of conversion. Conversion must be thought of as
2
fellowship with Jesus. It may be described under several
headings - awakening, the movement of the whole man in
turning, renewal, and a total falling out with oneself as
sinner. Each of these four headings refer to the same
reality, but gives a closer examination of it than the
preceding heading. The more exactly Barth looks at the
human reality of conversion, the more he is driven to look
at the source of its reality. Indeed, his entire discussion
of conversion moves toward an affirmation of the presupposition
of everything said within it, i.e.. man's participation in
Christ. Fellowship with Christ is fundamentally partici¬
pation in Him.
This manner of understanding the phenomenon of conversion
leads to greater, not smaller, insight into the practical
sphere. In the experience of conversion, men feel that they
begin with a hesitant but increasing fellowship with Jesus.
They feel that this sense of His presence will eventually
culminate in their participation in Him. They believe that
the goal of their conversion is union with Christ. This
conception, natural though it is, depends on emotions, and
1. ibid., p. 558.
2. ibid.. p. 553.
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obscures the solid ground on which conversion rests. We can
begin to convert to God only because we already participate
in Christ. Union with Christ is the starting-point, not
the goal, of conversion. When feelings shape the conception
of conversion, conversion seems to be an achievement which
we must complete before we are fully participant in Christ,
but when we look to Christ, who is the source of conversion,
we realise that from beginning to end conversion is the gift
of participation in Christ.
Barth's account of conversion parallels his discussion
of the event of man's vocation (see Chapter XII). There
Barth speaks first of fellowship with Jesus, then of His
calling men into discipleship, next of communion with Him
and finally of union with Him. Each of these headings
implies greater intimacy with Christ, describing as they do
more accurately what vocation means. But the final stage,
union, is the presupposition of the preceding stages. Union
with Christ is the very reality and possibility of fellowship,
discipleship and communion. It is not the culmination of
fellowship, but its ontological ground.1
1. It has been the constant argument of this study that, al¬
though all men are created by Christ, they are not in
Christ in the New Testament sense apart from their actual
living in Him. In Chapter III (pp. 141-5) it was argued
that Barth is not correct to describe the awakening which
takes place in conversion as a transition from one kind of
being in Christ to another. This means that Barth's
account of the awakening to conversion as described in this
chapter must be modified, but this modification will not
be made until the following chapter where Barth's account
of union with Christ will be discussed at some length.
Without compromising Barth's central affirmation that the
sinner cannot turn to God apart from participation in
Christ, it is hoped to stress the grace in which Christ, as
the living Way from alienation to union, awakens sinners to
Himself as the One in whom all they need is given to them,
(Contd.
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Because Barth makes union with Christ and participation
in Him the basis of man's actual turning to God, he makes it
clear that it is not something which we bring to Christ. It
is what He gives us. This does not mean the exclusion of
activity on our part, but the inauguration of it. Barth
goes so far as to say that 'man lifts himself up,'1 empha¬
sising man's activity. Far from being Pelagian at this
point, he is following out the implications of his doctrine
2
of incarnation, where he argues that God's grace creates
the freedom for man to be man. It is in the true Son of
God that we are freed to elevate ourselves as sons of God.
Even more than in creation, in recreation God establishes
man's 'autonomy' as His children.
This standing up may be described under the heading
"5
awakening. Men rouse themselves out of their sloth and
use their energy. This metaphor, however, is inadequate to
describe what is really happening here, since it is a rising
'from the sleep of death.So fearsome is this sleep that
5
only a new act of God can wake up the sinner. This act
6
takes place according to the 'law of divine action.' This
Contd.) and so awakens them to participate in Him by faith.
Union with Christ is still the ontological ground of
conversion, but this union is always a living union, and
therefore something which men have only as they are
renewed actually to live what is theirs in Christ.
1. ibid., p. 553.
2. C.D. 1/2, 15: 'The Mystery of Revelation', and 18: 'The
Life of the Children of God.'
3. C.D. IV/2, p. 554.
ibid** P« 555.
5. ibid.. p. 556.
6. ibid., p. 556.
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law is the manner of the being together of God and man such
that God's ordinance has the dynamic authority to call the
creature into freedom. This awakening happens within 'the
context and under the conditions of human freedom.*^" God
takes man seriously as man, doing him no violence, and
meeting him in an initiative which jolts him into action as
true man. As God acts according to this law, 'the
creaturely is made serviceable to the divine and does actually
2
serve it.'
These words exactly parallel Barth's account of Christ's
humanity as considered in relation to the communlcatio
onerationum. In Christ, the human has the dignity of
■3
acting with the divine, serving and revealing it. This
happens according to the power of the divine initiative.
Similarly, the divine initiative brings it about that we
men actually serve Him. The point to be noted here is that
Barth allows our humanity to correspond to Christ's humanity.
We genuinely participate in Him. Barth also speaks of
conversion as 'mystery and miracle', closely recalling his
discussion of Christmas, arguably to focal point of the
entire Dogmatics: 'this mystery and miracle is a subordin¬
ate moment in the act of majesty in which the Word became
l±
flesh and Jesus Christ arose from the dead.* Conversion
is an act of majesty because in it God acts in the majesty
proper to Him and yet also in humility, so that He takes up
1. ibid., p. 556.
2. ibid.. p. 557.
3. ibid., p. 116.
4. ibid.. p. 557.
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sinful human nature and converts it to Himself without
violating it. It is a subordinate moment because originally
conversion took place in Christ's incarnate life and
resurrection. Strangely, however, Barth makes no mention
of the Spirit or of Pentecost.
Conversion must be further described as a turning around
from facing away from God to 'going in the opposite direction*
towards Him.1 No more radical change is possible, since it
is a new life, not the renovation of the old. Yet the
Bible does not present us with men whose turning to God is
a completed matter; rather, we are 'caught up in the move-
2
ment of conversion.' Man is awakened to conversion not
converted. No man is converted in the sense that he is not
in daily and hourly need of turning to God.
Conversion is also the renewal of the whole man.
Calvin rightly spoke of a new heart and of being born from
above. Jeremiah's prophecy of man's new heart is here ful¬
filled. Man's whole life is placed on a new basis.
Previously his life had no axis on which to turn, now it is
established on such an axis. The image of the axis illus¬
trates that (a) man's whole life is claimed and (b) that the
turning is a movement in which man is continually engaged.
Man's entire life is claimed for conversion - totally
1. ibid.. p. 560.
2. ibid.. p. 560.
3. ibid., pp. 560-3.
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claimed. The claim in no way depends on man's willingness,
but wholly on God who is totally for man. Every aspect of
man's life is touched: his relationship with his brother;^"
2
both his disposition and his acts; his being called out of
a private life which was an end in itself to a life of
3 4
service; and his whole time. The claiming of man's time
is particularly significant in view of the avoidance of it
in the Roman and the Pietist understandings of repentance.
The Roman confessional treats repentance as repeatable, but
in fact repentance cannot be repeated because it is already
5
established and given in Jesus Christ. Properly, only one
course is legitimate and possible, that of proceeding forward
on the basis of the irrevocable repentance which God has
laid down as the foundation on which all else depends. The
content of repentance is not exhausted in momentary acts of
repentance, but is filled out in a life of repentance. The
Pietist idea of a specific moment of repentance similarly
avoids the claiming of man's whole time, since it makes
repentance less than the engagement of one's whole life in
conversion.
To be claimed by God for repentance involves a total
fT
falling out with oneself. The utter seriousness of this
mortiflcatio can be grasped only when it is seen that its
purpose is vivificatio. The telelogy of this radical dis¬
pute with ourselves is the new man, the fulfilment of our
1. ibid.. pp. 563-4.
2. ibid., pp. 564-5#
3. ibid.. pp. 565-6.
4. ibid.. pp. 566-70.
5. ibid.. pp. 568-9.
ibid.. p. 570 (Auseinandersetzung).
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liberation.
Clearly, such a total dispute with oneself can only
originate above man himself - man could not enter into such
a complete falling out with himself from within himself.
Barth therefore enquires concerning its origin.
First, the image of the axis is too mechanistic to convey
the personal character of this dispute and turning.1 Barth
2
speaks directly of what happens. Man is not 'betrayed' into
turning, nor is he forced into it by being acted upon from
above. If this were so, man would encounter an usurping
demon and not the Spirit of Christ. It is certainly true
that in conversion man is subject to omnipotence, and even
to compulsion, but it is the omnipotence of God who acts
within the human situation, and it is the compulsion which
grants the ability to use the freedom which it bestows.
God's commandment gives the permission, ability and freedom
to obey. Despite his sloth, man is made free. In exer¬
cising this freedom, man fulfills his conversion.^ Thus, the
falling out with oneself which originates above man is acted
out in man himself.
Second, the origin of this freedom is the truth that God
4
is for man and because of this man may be and is for God.
This is the gospel, and it can command with authority because
it gives good news. The law is powerless to effect mortifi-
catio. let alone vivificatio.
1. ibid., p. 578.
2. ibid.. p. 578.
3. ibid., p. 579.
4. ibid., p. 579.
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Third, the truth of the gospel is at work here. Barth
notes: 'the event of revelation which has been our starting
point in all these discussions must be merely the manifes¬
tation of a real event which takes place with incontestable
objectivity.'1 This is the Christ event. Jesus Christ is
the climax in whom man's turning to God is primarily real.
In Him it is 'properly, primarily and comprehensively real...
that God (vere Deus) is for man and man (vere homo) is for
God.' He is not for Himself but for us men and therefore
in Him 'the divine summons to halt and to advance breaks
into the life of man.In Him man's radical falling out
with himself 'is an event which is effective and valid for
many...' He is the Head engaged in conversion for the
4
members.
These three points concern 'the power which sets and
keeps [man in the engagement with his conversion],..as his
<5
falling out with himself.' They indicate that conversion
originates and is carried through in participation in Christ.
If we look honestly at ourselves we see little evidence
of this movement of conversion, but if we look to Jesus
Christ, everything becomes clear.
Everything is simple, true and clear when these
statements [about conversion] are referred directly to
Jesus Christ, and only indirectly, as fulfilled and
effectively realised in Him, to ourselves.
(C.D. IV/2, p. 583)
1. ibid.. P. 581.
2. ibid.. P. 582.
3. ibid., P. 582.
4. ibid., P. 582.
5. ibid.. P. 577.
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The human subject is not forgotten, however, since the words:
'fulfilled and effectively realised in Him' convey the
meaning that what Jesus Christ has, He has for us. He is
the Head, we the members. '...by His Holy Spirit He has
clothed us with that which properly He alone is and has;...
He allows us to have a share in that which belongs to Him.'1
How seriously Barth means this can be seen from the
following remarkable passage:
It is in His conversion that we are engaged. It is
in His birth, from above, the mystery and miracle of
Christmas, that we are born again. It is in His
baptism in Jordan that we are baptised with the Holy
Ghost and with fire. It is in His death on the cross
that we are dead as old men, and in His resurrection
in the garden of Joseph of Arimathea that we are risen
as new men. Who of us then, in relation to our own
conversion or that of others, can seriously know any
other terminus for this event than the day of Golgotha,
in which He accomplished in our place and for us all
the turning and transforming of the human situation,
and as He did so was crowned as the royal man He was,
our Lord? (CLD. IV/2, p. 583)
What remains for us? Jesus Christ. There remains
for us Jesus Christ, faith in Him, 'our little moments' which
reflect Him, and in which we know that we are borne along
by His movements as those 'who are His to love Him as the
One who is ours - always wholly and exclusively in response
2
to the fact that He first loved us.'
This glorious account of our conversion in Christ does,
however, raise a serious question. Is not Jesus Christ and
the conversion of man in Him ours without reservation? Can
we then be content with Barth's talk of our 'little
conversion'? Does not this minimising of our conversion in
Him in fact detract from the perfection of the conversion in
1. ibid., p. 583.
2. ibid., p. 584.
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Him? Does it not detract from the Christ Earth seeks to
exalt?
Only a brief glance at the rest of Earth's account of
man's sanctification is needed here before taking up the
problem of its adequacy for the subject of this study. Barth
continues his theme of participatio Christi into the two areas
of man's work and his cross bearing. He shows that in both
spheres man has definite tasks of his own to do. Participatio
Christi does not mean that Christ works and therefore we do
not. Rather, Christ liberates us for work. Our good works
are done in obedience to Him, in His strength and are acts
of thanksgiving to Him, yet God himself praises us for them.1
Similarly, the Christian's suffering is his own and not
Christ's. He carries his own cross, though he does so
solely in the strength of Christ's bearing His cross for our
sake. In this dissimilarity and yet similarity to Christ,
2
the Christian's suffering attains a genuine dignity. Thus,
the life into which the Christian enters as he is engaged in
conversion is one in which Christ gives him a place of his
own for his own correspondence to Him.
This correspondence of the Christian to Christ is a
major theme in Barth's section on 'The Holy Spirit and
Christian Love.' Some observations about this section will
be helpful before taking up an assessment of Earth's under¬
standing of man's conversion. Barth argues that it is
right and proper to speak of the Christian's love for God
and his neighbour, and that this should be understood as
iMSl*» PP# 584-93.
2. ibid., pp. 598-613.
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free self-giving.1 It is self-giving freed from the will
to use others for one's own pleasure and ends. It has its
2
basis in God's overflowing and self-giving love. God
genuinely gives Himself for our good. God does not seek
Himself when He seeks man, but man. This love of God for
man is (a) free, electing love,^ (b) chastening, purifying
love and, most important for the present study, (c) creative
£
love. In this love of God in the Spirit, man genuinely
corresponds to God's self-giving to him. Man's act of love
is thus his free love of God. Since it takes place in the
Spirit it is his own act.
How inconceivable is this simple fact - that to the
eternal love which is in God...there corresponds the
fact that man may love God. Is not the mystery of
reconciliation almost greater on this human side...
thai it is on the divine?...by the quickening power of
the Holy Spirit...small and sinful man may love the
great and holy God, responding to the divine self-
offering with his own....As truly as God loves us we
may love Him in return....It is no less a miracle
than the Virgin Birth of Jesus Christ or His bodily
resurrection from the dead. Only if we measure it
by the miracle of Epiphany, which is its basis and
original, can we comprehend the mystery by which the
act of love is surrounded as the love of man for God.
(C.D. IV/2, p. 791)
Such is the glorious mystery of man's love for GodI Through
the Holy Spirit, our turning to God is an analogy of God's
turning to us.
1. ibid.. p. 730.
2. ibid.. pp. 757, 760.
3. ibid., P. 750.
4. ibid.. pp. 766-71.
5. ibid., pp. 771-76.
6. ibid.. pp. 776-83.
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Assessment of Earth's Account of Participatio Christi in
relation to Man's Turning to God
Earth's conception of man's turning to God is founded
on his doctrine of participatio Christi. The conversion of
man to God which took place in Christ is communicated by His
Spirit to other men. The great gain for theology which
this doctrine represents may be summarised in the following
points.
1. Jesus Christ is Himself man's sanctification. All
that man needs for his sanctification is complete in Him.
Further, it is already complete in Him. Christ does not
become our sanctification as we turn to Him and grow in
holiness. We are already sanctified in Him, and we partici¬
pate in what is already perfected.1 Jesus Christ has been
made our sanctification (I Cor. 1: 30: egenethe).
2. (a) In sanctification no less than in justification
the sinner receives everything from God. The sinner does
not sanctify himself any more than he justifies himself.
God does not need his repentance before He can extend His
holiness to him. On the contrary, it is God's holiness
which enables him to repent and to take his first (and last)
steps in sanctification. Yet man is not passive in
sanctification. God brings the sinner to active repentance.
Through the Holy Spirit he is awakened actively to engage
1. This doctrine is most important for theology and the
Church since it indicates the perfect adequacy of Christ
over against certain tendencies in the Church to say
that something (e.g. morality) must be added to Christ in
sanctification. It takes away the anxiety a Christian
may feel as to his ability to serve God.
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in the turning to God which is laid up for him in Christ.1
(b) God loves the sinner, and therefore He desires
that he should turn from his wickedness and live. Repentance
is repentance unto life. Mortification does not exist for
its own sake, but has its purpose and its goal in renewal.
Because this is so, the man engaged in conversion has no
further use for his sins - not even to mourn over them.
His entire repentance is directed toward life, righteousness
and God.2
(c) Conversion is thus a dynamic, radical falling out
with oneself. It is an about face, a 180° turn from dead
works to serving the living God. It is not something which
1. In both Roman Catholicism and Evangelical protestantism
there is a strong tendency to say that justification is
by Christ alone but that the Christian must sanctify Him¬
self. The doctrine of the Spirit indicates that sanctifi-
cation comes entirely from Christ and that the Christian
is not inactive in it. When this is realised there can
be no talk of self-sanctification or sanctification by-
works. The Scots Confession makes it particularly clear
that man has no merit in sanctification: 'we willingly
spoil ourselves of all honour and glory of our own
creation and redemption, as we do of our regeneration and
sanctification.' (Art. XII). Knox could argue this so
strongly because he saw sanctification issuing solely from
our living in the 'Spirit of the Lord Jesus.' However, to
the extent that this is understood, Hans Kiing's observations
about man's activity in his sanctification are proper and
indeed necessary: 'There is no self-justification of man,
but there is a "self-sanctification". It is God in Jesus
Christ who sanctifies men through His Holy Spirit. But
the greatest marvel of God's pure grace is that in the
working out of God-given sanctification, man - not by
himself, but he himself - may sanctify himself.'
Justification, trans. T. Collins, E. Tolk, CLGrandskou
(Burns and Oates, London, 1966), p. 300.
2. Barth points out that Calvin did not make it sufficiently
clear that mortification is not an end in itself, but has
as its goal renewal. The result was that repentance
became a gloomy affair, and not a joyful turning to life.
C.D. IV/2, pp. 580-1.
451
may ever be regarded as completed, but an activity in which
the Christian is engaged all his days. He is not converted,
but awakened to conversion. In this movement, the whole
Christ is claiming his life totally for Himself, and his
life rests on the unrepeatable and complete foundation of
repentance laid down by Christ."1"
3. This claiming of man's whole life for conversion is
an indubitable fact of experience, but (sadly) our lives show
little evidence of it, and we are obliged to speak of our
'little' conversion. The statements about conversion are
2
unambiguous only when referred to Christ, since it is 'in
His conversion that we are engaged.• But, for just this
reason, the more we look away from ourselves and look to
Him, the greater our conversion will be. For, 'as truly as
God loves us, we may love Him in return.*
The liberation which this position means for theology
may be suggested in Barth's own words:
It has not always been taken with sufficient serious¬
ness that [Jesus Christ] took our place and acted for
us, not merely as the Son of God who established God's
right and our own..., but also as the Son of Man who
was sanctified, who sanctified Himself. Far too often
the matter has been conceived and represented as though
His humiliation to death...for our justification...were
His own act, but our exaltation to fellowship with God
as the corresponding counter-movement, and therefore
our sanctification, were left to us, to be accomplished
by us. "All this I did for thee; What wilt thou do
for me?" The New Testament does not speak this way....
As we are not asked to justify ourselves, we are not
asked to sanctify ourselves. Our sanctification
1. Barth's doctrine here is a helpful corrective to the
tendency in Evangelical protestantism to regard conversion
as a completed state.
2. Barth's teaching at this point may be criticised, but it
is clear that he is resisting the Church's pride in
regard to its own works and holiness, and insisting that
it look only to Christ.
452
consists in our participation in His sanctification
as grounded ±1 the efficacy and revelation in the
grace of Jesus Christ. (C.D. IV/2, pp. 518-9)
There can "be no going back on this position, yet three
questions must be asked as to the adequacy of Barth's
doctrine fully to ground it.
1. To what extent in Barth is the sinner*s conversion
already present in Christ? What is the conversion in
Christ in which we are engaged? Clearly, Christ does not
turn from sin to righteousness, but it was argued above
in Chapter VII that Christ converted human nature to God in
that, from His birth and culminating on the cross and in the
face of severe temptation, He presented our humanity without
spot to God. The fallen human nature which He assumed He
presented to God as fully holy. It has been noted that
Barth gives this very little emphasis, and therefore it is
difficult to see in Barth that there is in Christ a conversion
of human nature as radical as the sinner needs. Barth does,
as has been seen,give great emphasis to Christ's obedience
and His bringing human nature into conformity with God, but
the decisive thing is missing: the obedience as won in the
face of temptation by faith and by the power of the Spirit.
To the extent that this struggle and victory in our flesh
through the Spirit is neglected in his theology, to that
extent Barth is unable to show that there is in Christ the
conversion of human nature which the sinner needs.
2. If Barth undervalues the struggle against sin in
the conversion of human nature as it took place in Jesus
Christ, does he not also undervalue the struggle against sin
which takes place in the sinner's conversion? Christian
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tradition points to the reality of the struggle which the
sinner encounters as he comes to grips with his conversion.
John Bunyan in his Pilgrim's Progress draws a vivid des¬
cription of the conflicting currents in the experience of a
man beginning on his Christian discipleship. Repentance is
at first difficult and painful. It involves the abandonment
of the life which the sinner loved and cherished. It means
that he wills to leave his past behind and begins to will
the will of God. It means hating what before he loved and
loving what before he hated. A completely new motivation
comes into operation: where before he loved himself and did
everything for himself, he now loves God and seeks to do all
things for God. He takes pleasure in the will of God.
Formerly he did all things for his own safety, now he dares,
denies and hates himself for God's sake. McLeod Campbell
argues that before he was a God to himself, now God naturally
takes the place in his heart which self did:
This is the condition of one who has repented, that
without any effort - as the free working of his own
mind - he gives to God that place which self occupied
before. [Responsibility for the Gift of Eternal Life,
kQ)
Bernard of Clairvaux drew attention to the alteration of
man's loving. According to him, a man first loves himself
for his own sake, and then begins to love God for God's
benefits towards him. From there he goes on to love God
for God's own sake and finally he loves himself only for
God's sake.1 Bernard is not describing an ordo salutis.
but rather the movement in which a man gives up self-love
1. Bernard of Clairvaux, On Loving God, ed. H. Martin
(S.C.M., London, 1959), Chap. 15.
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for the love of God. Though this movement is joyful and
grounded in God's love for him, it is accompanied by the
pull to turn back. It is accomplished against temptation
and requires the definite will to flee from evil and to
embrace the will of God.
Barth does not ignore this dimension of conversion but
he gives it very little consideration. The reader misses
in the Dogmatics the element in conversion in which a man
deliberately 'renounces' the devil, the world and the carnal
desires of the flesh and binds himself 'obediently to keep
God's holy will.'1 Barth's incompleteness here - and it
is no more than an incompleteness - may be traced back to his
weak conception of Christ's holiness in our flesh. Because
he speaks so little of Jesus' struggle for holiness in His
flesh, he is unable to say much about the struggle for holi¬
ness in those who participate in Him. Unless the sinner
sees and knows Jesus hungering and thirsting after righteous¬
ness, how can he similarly hunger and thirst? Unless he
participates in the Jesus who hated sin and sorrowed over
sinners, how can he hate his sin and lament his being a
sinner? Unless he participates in the Jesus who, by faith
and the Spirit of the Father, put sin behind Him and obeyed
the Word of God, how can he turn from sin and, through faith
and the same Spirit, hold to the Word?
3. Granted that our conversion is real only as we partici¬
pate in Christ, and that it must be referred to Him, is it
not true that because conversion has taken place in Him our
conversion cannot be a 'small' thing but must be a great
1. Anglican Book of Common Prayer, Order for Baptism.
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thing? If it is a small thing, is not this because the
conversion in Him which reaches out to us has been blocked?
If He has converted human nature to God, and if through His
Spirit every barrier between Him and us has been removed,
does it not follow that our conversion must, in the proper
course of things, be a deep, great and obvious happening?
In this context it must also be asked whether Barth
is not mistaken in saying that 'in [Christ's] birth, from
above, the mystery and miracle of Christmas,...we are born
again.1 In view of the argument of Chapter VII, it is not
in His incarnation but in His resurrection that 'we have
been born anew to a living hope* (I Pet. 1: 3). In His
resurrection Christ communicates the conversion of human
nature which He began in His birth and perfected on His cross.
If it is clear that it is as this life-giving Spirit that
He recreates us, all suggestion of Christomenism will be
overcome, since it will be clear that he converts men only
as He gives them what is His.
These questions amount to a plea for a stronger doctrine
of the Spirit as the Spirit in whom all that is Christ's is
ours. We have no conversion or holiness apart from partici¬
pation in Christ, but through His Spirit He gives us an
unreserved share in the holiness which is His. The only
reason our conversion is small is that we do not receive the
Spirit in all His fullness. Should we not, therefore,
carry through with radical seriousness Barth's often repeated
prayer: 'Veni Creator Spiritus'? If we do this, the logic of
Barth's own position will lead us to the correction of his
theology in which we speak not of our small conversion and
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weak participation but of the greatness of the conversion
which the Lord has wrought among us. We will be unable
to rest content with a small conversion but will cry out
for the Spirit and for a richer participation in Him in
whom our conversion is already perfect.
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CHAPTER XII
THE VOCATION OF MAN
Barth's understanding of the vocation goes far beyond
the common view that man is called to his salvation. Just
as Jesus Christ does not exist for Himself, so the Christian
is not called to salvation without being initiated into
service. The Christian is turned from serving himself to
serving the living God. Barth's account of vocation is
particularly rich in insight into the dynamic, active
character of the life into which the Christian is called.
Jesus Christ is the light of life, and all men are set
in His light. This is true whether they will it or not.
His light not only shines around the man of sin: it pene¬
trates him and shines within him. This is the event of his
calling, his klesis.1 Not all men are called. In fact,
2
all men as such are uncalled. Prior to his actual calling,
man is called in Jesus Christ (cf. his Justification and
sanctification). Calling has its root in election,^ and,
as election was realised in the history of Jesus Christ, so
is calling. Thus, a man's personal calling is his partici¬
pation in the prior calling of all men as already actualised
in the life of Jeuus Christ. Though most men have not yet
received their call in their life histories.
There is no man whose history is not decided in the
history of Jesus Christ, in the sense that whatever
may or may not take place in it whatever way will do
so in relation to and according to the standard of the
1. C.D. IV/3, p. 482.
2. ibid.. p. 483.
3. ibid.. p. 484.
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fact that in Jesus Christ he, too, is justified,
sanctified and called. (C.D. IV/3, p. 486.)
Jesus Christ has, therefore, altered the situation of
every man. It is on this basis that a man's specific
calling in the Holy Spirit comes to him.
Barth now proceeds to elucidate the actual event of
1
vocation. Vocation is a specific action of God. It is
an act of Jesus Christ on earth and in time and is therefore
2
different from every other act. " In the sphere of Christ's
time and history, as He proceeds on His way to His goal, He
sends out His creative call, and in it 'there comes into
3
being that which was not but which was destined to be.'
Within His call, man's time is fulfilled and a new history
begins - his salvation. His call is a spiritual event in
the New Testament sense, an event which necessarily includes
A
the external and the physical. Since it is the call of
the living Jesus Christ, it must not be conceived abstractly,
nor must it be thought of as merely an inner event which by¬
passes the actual man.
The Holy Spirit is at work in this spiritual event, but
everything depends on its being seen that He is the Spirit of
Jesus Christ. Unless it is recognised that the objective,
living Jesus Christ is the acting Subject in this calling of
specific men, there will be a temptation to regard the
5
subjective experience of vocation as something man can control.
1. ibid., P. 497.
2. ibid., P. 497.
3. ibid., P. 500.
4. ibid.. P. 500.
5. ibid.. P. 504.
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Barth now turns to the nature of the alteration'1' which
happens as Jesus Christ encounters man. Here also, every¬
thing depends on seeing that it is the one and total Jesus
Christ who encounters the whole man. He claims the whole
man completely. There can be no steps to salvation, no
2
ordo salutis. Jesus is man's salvation, and the idea of
steps required to appropriate this salvation questions the
perfection of Jesus. Where man's entering into salvation
is conceived of as taking place in a ladder of salvation,
man's work inevitably begins to crowd Jesus out. In Barth's
perceptive words, the call of Jesus is abstracted from Jesus
Himself and
the relevant and important thing is no longer God's
active dealing with man, but in isolation and
independence the active dealing of man with God.
CC.D. IV/3, p. 507)
In our human perception, of course, the event of vocation is
3
fragmentary, but this in no way justifies a doctrinal
concept of a progressive call, which necessarily gives sin a
4
place and so relativises it and to that extent excuses it.
Against this Barth points out:
To say vocation is to speak of the one total address to
man of the living Jesus Christ and therefore not of a
mere part, a mere beginning, but of what takes place
in this address in its unity and totality.
(C.D. IV/3, p. 507)
Thus, all the concepts legitimately relating to vocation apply
not to a part or stage of vocation, but to the whole, speaking
1. ibid.. p. 504.
2. ibid.. p. 505.
ibid.. p. 507.
4. ibid.. p. 508.
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of it from a particular angle.''"
This is true of the concept: 'illumination', which
means that 'the light of life carries through its work in a
2
particular man to its conclusion.' It indicates that this
particular man is enlightened, and that he can now see where
before he was blind. It also indicates an advance from
ignorance to knowledge, and in Barth's dynamic concept of
Christian knowledge, this means a new creation. 'In making
Himself known, God acts on the whole man....Illumination and
therefore vocation is the total alteration of the one whom
it befalls.'4
The concept of 'awakening' belongs along-side that of
illumination, and is often used in pietist
circles in preference to it. It adds nothing material to the
concept of illumination and is rarely used in the New Testament,
but it does give strong emphasis to the contrast between the
two states of man and the transition from the one to the
5
other.
Since Jesus Christ is the active Subject in vocation,
some misconceptions must be cleared out of the way. The old
distinction between vocatio immediata and vocatio mediata is
uninstructive because in the New Testament Jesus Christ always
£
calls a man immediately and directly. Again, the distinction
between vocatio externa and vocatio interna must be rejected
7
because it divides where Jesus Christ does not. More
1. ibid.. p. 508.
2. ibid.. p. 508.
3. ibid.. pp. 509-10.
4. ibid., p. 510.
5. ibid., p. 513.
6. ibid.. pp. 514-6.
7. ibid., pp. 516-7.
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instructive, however, is the distinction between vocatio
unica and vocatio continua. provided, that it is remembered
that these belong together.1 The one event of vocation is
once and for all and 'yet also a sequence of new and further
callings.'2 The One who calls is faithful and wills to
bring His work to completion. We cannot oppose those who
speak of calling as a specific event at a specific time in
a man's life, provided we see it only as a beginning. God
begins His good work in order to complete it.
The entire character of vocation is determined by the
One who calls. If we recognise this, we will readily admit
the ambiguous nature of our human side of this calling, but
will also agree that the incomparability of Jesus Christ dis¬
tinguishes His call from all other events. In Him vocation
is real in the fullest possible sense and it is meaningless
apart from Him. The statements concerning immediate vocation,
effectual calling, and the once and continued calling of Jesus
Zi
Christ have meaning only as a description of His call. But,
because He calls, our calling is an unquestionably real
happening in our lives.
What is the purpose of vocation? Vocation is a great
5
mystery, no less a mystery than the Christmas miracle.
Those called of God are born of God. They are called in
order that they might be Christians.
This is by no means self-evident. If being a Christian
1. ibid.. p. 517.
2. ibid.. p. 517.
3. ibid., p. 518.
4. ibid.. p. 520.
5. ibid., p. 521.
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depends on calling, * every supposed...Christian would have
to test whether and how far, in what he regards as his
Christianity, there is a completely non-traditional element.11
Yet, as we have it in the New Testament, the term Christian
seems to mean one called to discipleship through the
2
ministry of disciples. It does, then, mean something non-
traditional. It is not membership of a Christian culture
■3
which makes a man a Christian. Rather, a Christian is 'one
who belongs to Jesus Christ in a special way':
[the existence of Christians] among all other men is
determined...by their faith in Him, by their liberating
and yet also binding and active knowledge that all men
and therefore they themselves belong to Him.
(C.D. IV/3, P. 526)
How do men belong to Jesus Christ in this special sense?
Certainly not by belonging to Christian tradition, nor
through allegiance to Christ as 'the central supporting and
l±
symbolical figure' of that tradition. The Christian
confession is that Christ is Lord. 'We have a lord when we
acquire and maintain him as such in virtue of his lordly
power.He has chosen us, not we Him. To be a Christian,
then, is not a matter of our affirming Christian tradition or
choosing Christ in His symbolical value, but of finding Him as
Lord. How does He place men under His Lordship? Certainly
not by compulsion.^ His power contrasts with that of nature,
death, human lords, and demonically gifted individuals, i.e..
1. ibid.. P. 523.
2. ibid.. P. 525.
3. ibid.. P- 526.
4. ibid.. P. 526.
5. ibid.. P. 528.
6. ibid.. P. 528.
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the power which compells submission. Christ uses power,
but it is not the blind power which is insensitive to its
subjects and suppresses them, nor is it the overwhelming
power of the numinous. His power does not dominate so as
to defeat and subjugate, but creates free recognition of
Himself.1 Thus, Jesus' 'seizure of power' differs from all
others in that 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
2
liberty.' This power is the power of His Word, in which
He 'makes Himself known as the One He is for all and there¬
fore specifically for [""the Christian], thus liberating him
to know Him.Jesus thereby overcomes anxiety and gives
confidence.
In this confidence in which there is no anxiety, He
calls with liberating and creative force, summoning
non-being into being, giving Himself unreservedly to
the one whom He calls, delivering Himself up to him,
enabling him to hear self-evidently and without
argument like the first disciples, and on no other
basis than the obviously all-sufficient basis of
His call. (C.D. IV/3, p. 530)
The called man leaves behind his anxious existence in which
he lived as though Jesus were not the One He is for all men
and therefore for himself, and makes use of the freedom
bestowed on him, living 'on the clear assumption that Jesus
4
Christ is the One He is for all men and therefore for him.'
In this way, 'the vocation of man is the special enduement
of grace which distinguishes...him from all others.'^
Barth has thus shown that the sole ground of Christian
1. ibid.. p. 529.
2. ibid.. p. 529.
3. ibid., p. 529.
ibid., p. 530.
5. ibid.. p. 530.
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existence is vocation, and that this takes place as Jesus
reveals Himself as the One He is, i«e., makes Himself known
in His Word. Vocation depends on nothing in man himself, in
his freedom or his faith. On the contrary, it is Jesus
Christ who overcomes man's reluctance and inability to use
the freedom given him. In a certain sense it might be said
that Barth's understanding of 'effectual calling' is a
doctrine of irresistible grace, but Barth steers clear from
what came to be meant by that doctrine. The roots of the
problem go back to Calvin. For Calvin (as for Barth) calling
depends on election, but Calvin believed that election takes
place in God's secret decree, and so he can say that 'the
special election which otherwise would remain hidden in God,
he [God] at length manifests by his calling.'"1" Thus for
Calvin it is not in the first instance Jesus Christ who
makes Himself known in effectual calling. It is the secret
election of God which is manifested. Despite Calvin's
fundamental thesis that the Christian's entire life is
contained in Christ, he here leaves the way open for Christ
to become no more than the instrument of the revelation of
God's secret election. Indeed, Calvin speaks not so much
of Christ calling men to Himself as of God's secret election
of grace. The impersonality latent in this doctrine becomes
clear in the Westminster Confession where God's grace is
thought of as working on man with a kind of irresistible
power. When the Confession speaks of men being 'enlightened',
coming 'most freely, being made willing by His grace,' and
1. Calvin, Institute. Ill, 24, 1.
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being 'quickened and renewed', it has in mind that this
happens by '[God's] almighty power determining them to what
is good.'1 This power is further specified as the Holy
2
Spirit. But the Confession cannot guarantee the gracious-
ness of this power because it refrains from speaking of Jesus
Christ calling men to Himself, thus making known the election
of God. It leaves room for the power of God and the Spirit
to be something other than the gracious drawing of Christ
to Himself. It can only assert and not demonstrate the
graciousness of the irresistible power of God's grace.
Barth's doctrine penetrates much deeper and gives good
ground for believing that the power with which God works in
calling man is entirely gracious, being nothing other than
the grace of Jesus Christ Himself. Because Barth makes it
clear that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of all men, he can
also make it clear that He does not merely mediate knowledge
of God's secret election, but also gives men knowledge of Him¬
self in whom all men and therefore this particular man are
called. Though it will be necessary later to ask some
questions concerning this account of effectual calling, this
will be done only in the context of Barth's own understanding
of the grace of God.
Vocation means a new existence, but it is 'a human form'
■3of existence. The old creation is not destroyed, and a
Christian must continually receive afresh his freedom. But
West, Conf.. Chap. X, 1.
2. ibid.. Chap. X, 2.
5. C.D. IV/3, p. 530.
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Christians are also children of God. They exist in close
proximity with Jesus Christ. He is Son of God by nature,
they only by adoption, nevertheless they are genuinely sons
of God.1
as men who live in fellowship with Jesus Christ,
Christians are also sons of God. Earth describes this
fellowship with rich insight. The simplest description of
2
this fellowship is that of discipleship. This term
indicates both the distinctive order in this fellowship and
also its perfection. The Christian 'lives his own life in
a fellowship with [Jesus'] life which is not ordered by
himself but by Him.' Jesus has the right of lordship
4
because the Christian is His property. As Jesus calls
him, the Christian is led to the insight thaic he belongs to
Him, that he is handed over to the One who offered Himself
up for him, and so he freely gives himself over to this Lord.
'In this self-understanding to which he is awakened by his
vocation, the super- and sub-ordination in his fellowship
5
with the One who calls him...can only be...self-evident.'
The fellowship between Christ and His disciple is closer still.
Jesus has the superiority but it is precisely in this
priority that He establishes the perfection of the fellow¬
ship, which on the disciple's side consists in his free
obedience.
1. ibid.. p. 533.
2. ibid.. p. 535.
3. ibid., p. 536.
4. ibid., p. 536.
5. ibid.. p. 537.
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It is the power of the Word of Jesus Christ which impre¬
sses upon man His right of ownership... awakening
and impelling him to a spontaneous recognition and
acceptance of this right, in which he gives himself
to the discipleship of Jesus Christ, becoming
obedient in his freedom and free in his obedience,
(C.D, IV/3, P. 538)
The power of Jesus' Word is that of the Holy Spirit, and thus
it is the freedom of God to be present as God in a man's
innermost being, there making man free to be man:
...without ceasing to be Lord or forfeiting His trans¬
cendence, but rather in its exercise, He gives and
imparts Himself to him, entering into him as his Lord
in all His majesty and setting up His throne within
him. Thus His control...becomes the most truly
distinctive feature of this man, the centre and basis
of his human existence, the axiom of his first thinking
and utterance, the origin of his freest volition and
action, in short the principle of his spontaneous being.
(C.D. IV/3, p. 538)
An even more precise description of this intimate fellowship
is possible. Fellowship does not dissolve into identity,
and there is no merging of one into the other: 'both become
and are genuinely what they are,'1 but the perfection of
this fellowship demands that we speak of nothing less than
union.2
Union with Christ is not the 'climax'-^ of Christian
4
fellowship and discipleship, but its ground and presupposition.
It is the reality of union which is being unfolded in the
disciple's fellowship with Him.
Barth first speaks of the union of Christ with the
Christian. From Christ's standpoint, it means that, as the
1. ibid., p. 539.
2. ibid., p. 540.
3. ibid.. p. 548.
4. ibid., p. 541.
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One in whom alone, without assistance from any other, the
world has been reconciled to God, He does not will to be
alone.1 He now moves forward from His resurrection to
His final parousia as the Proclaimer of the act of God
accomplished in Him, but 'He does not go alone, but wills
to be what He is and do what He does in companywith others
2
whom He calls for this purpose.' He does this 'really
and totally', 'giving Himself to them and making them His
own.
From the Christians' standpoint this union of Christ
with the Christian means that, though they contribute nothing
to Christ's finished work, they are not 'ordained for pure
passivity', but, as surely as He does not will to tread
alone His way as Proclaimer of the Kingdom, so surely they
for their part must be with Him as His 'companions...and
4
witnesses*•
This fellowship of Christ with the Christian would not
be complete without the reciprocal movement from below
5
upwards. 'His action has its correspondence...in an
action of the Christian.'^
'That Christ links Himself wLth the Christian settles
7
the fact that the latter, too, does not go alone.' He
follows Christ, and, 'both as a whole and in detail this
1. ibid.. P. 541.
2. ibid.. P. 542.
3. ibid.. p., 542.
4, ibid.. p. 542,
5, ibid.. P« 543.
6, ibid.. P- 544.
7. ibid,, P. 544.
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will always be the venture of a free decision and leap.*1
It is not a leap in the dark, because 'if there is any action
which is well-grounded and therefore assured in respect of
2
its goal, it is the...obedience of the Christian.' He
does the one thing he can do.
The decision or leap of faith...consists in the fact
that he takes himself seriously as the man he is and
recognises himself to be in Jesus Christ instead of
immediately forgetting his true self (who and what he
is in Christ), like the man who looks at himself in a
mirror and then goes on his way (Jas. 1: 23f.)• It
consists in the fact that he begins to act on this
basis, i.e., on the basis of Jesus Christ and as the
man he is in Him. (C.D. IV/3, p. 544).
Not only is the Christian not alone but he also cleaves
to Christ and cannot part from Him. The criterion of the
genuineness of his faith consists in 'allowing Him alone to
be what He alone is...' As he recognises Christ he also
recognises himself and his own truest life in Him. In this
freedom he can only follow Christ.
In the freedom given [Christians] as those they are,
they have only one option, namely to believe in Him,
to obey Him and to confess Him, and in so doing, in
making this movement, to unite themselves with Him
as He in His turning to them, in calling them and
making Himself known to them, unites Himself with
them. (C.D. IV/3, p. 545)
It was observed in the introduction to this study that
modern man seeks a secure starting point for his project or
venture in life. He tries to make himself and his self-
•.
knowledge his starting point, his launching place. He
believes that having chosen himself as his starting point
he can guarantee his future as the realisation of his
1. ibid., p. 544.
2. ibid., p. 544.
3. ibid., p. 545.
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subjectivity. His goal is the fulfillment of the self which
he has chosen. It was seen that this venture is in fact an
adventure, a foolish venture which necessarily ends in self-
loss. Barth's account of the goal of vocation exactly
answers this problem. Since the Lord has turned to us
and united Himself with us, we are free to know ourselves in
Him and free to choose Him, and therefore ourselves in Him,
as the one necessary starting point of all our thinking,
speaking and acting. We do not go out into the dark, or
make an arbitrary leap, but we do the one thing we can do -
know ourselves in Christ and act forth on that basis. Only
by self-deception can we do otherwise. We move out securely,
yet also in genuine venture, toward the goal promised and
guaranteed in the starting point, i.e., the fulfillment of our
being and our subjectivity in Christ.
This is important for this study, and it is worth
drawing attention to the following aspects of Barth's
position: 1. In the fellowship with Christ which is grounded
in union with Him, man knows himself as he is, and therefore
has a secure and uncapricious starting point on which to act.
Since this is his being in Christ it is not a basis which
he creates yet it is not alien to him. It is given to him
as his own truest and freest being. 2. This starting point,
being the reconciliation of the world with God, is also the
future toward which he moves. It guarantees the significance
of his acts as a Christian. 3. No-one can undertake this
venture for another. Each man must live it for himself. 'It
will always be a venture in which no man can wait for or rely
on others, as though they could represent him or make the leap
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for him.'1 This both makes it urgent that a man make the
leap of faith and also gives each man who makes this venture
the glory of having realised the future which the Lord
places before him. He must go each step of the way by
faith, and in a certain sense each step is strange to him,
but by going out in the daring of faith he enters into a
future which can be his only by this daring. He does not
go alone, depending on his own initiative and resources, but
2
in company with Christ his Counterpart, and therefore he
knows that he will never be left in the lurch. Thus, as he
moves out toward the future he moves certainly toward the
goal. 4. Barth has shown that (a) man has an immanent but
also transcendent starting point which (b) guarantees his
future and (c) provides him with the resources whereby he
himself can realise that goal. These three points answer
modern man's desire for (a) a starting point in his subject¬
ivity which (b) promises him a future which is the fulfilment
of that subjectivity and (c) which also enables him to grasp
the energy needed to work toward that projected goal. But
the self-realisation modern man seeks ends in self-alienation.
Man finds he has 'created' for himself only emptiness, love-
lessness and loneliness. In complete contrast to this Barth
speaks of man's starting point as his fellowship with Christ.
Where modern man fears the Other and chooses himself, thus
realising self-alienation, the Christian chooses the One
who is Other and yet the very ground of his being, and thus
1. ibid., p. 544.
2. ibid., p. 544.
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realises a life in reciprocal fulfillment with the Other.
He realises himself not in isolation but in the fellowship
which answers and completes him as himself. 5. Nothing
can alter the fact that Christ has turned toward man and
united Himself with him, but this does not mean that man
does not exercise his subjectivity and choose Christ. Earth
says that the Christian 'chooses [Christ] as the starting
point and therefore the goal of his thinking, speech,
volition and action.There is only one thing for which
the Christian is free, but this does not alter the fact
that the Christian actually makes this choice, turning to
Christ as Christ has turned to him. Indeed, Christ fulfills
his own union with man as men freely unite themselves with
Him. Though some questions remain concerning Earth's
concept of freedom, there is no doubt that he allows man's
response to Christ an essential place.
Earth follows his discussion of union with Christ with
three chapters treating that life in detail. For the
purpose of this study, only a few points need be noted.
1. Christ calls a man not only or even primarily that
he may be saved but that he may become His servant. He
enjoys his salvation as he serves Christ as His witness in
the world. Barth rejects any notion of the Christian as
co-worker with Christ, but he goes further here than else¬
where in the Dogmatics in saying that the Christian co-
p
operates with Him. When service is rendered, 'two very
different active subjects are obviously at work together in
1. C.D. IV/3, p. 544.
2. ibid.. p. 600; cf. C.D. IV/l, p. 113.
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different ways, but with a clear differentiation of
function.'1 In his own place, the Christian is no less
free than his Lord, but he performs an action in which he
2
assists the action of Jesus Christ. Christ lives in all
3
men, including the Christian, as the Saviour of the world,
and any suggestion of co-operation in this respect would
A
only wickedly question the adequacy of His work. Yet
there is 'another form' in which Christ lives not in all men
5
but in the Christian alone. As He proclaims His Word of
salvation, He does not will to be alone, but summons
Christians to be His heralds. He calls them to this work,
living in them in this service, and it is proper to speak
of their co-operation in His prophetic office. They par-
7
take in the ministerium Verbi divini.
2. Barth asks why Christ wills to use men in this way
when it would seem that He could proclaim His message more
efficiently without their clumsy witness. They are not
indispensible to Him and it is they who need His assistance
O
and not He theirs. Why then does He burden Himself with
them? Barth answers that it is a 'special demonstration of
His mercy' that Christ calls men to this task.
1. ibid.. P. 601
2. ibid., P. 603
3. ibid., P. 604
4. ibid.. P. 605
5. ibid., P» 605
6. ibid., P. 607
7. ibid., P« 607
8. ibid., P- 607
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Superfluous in this glorious sense, they live only
by the fact that Christ permits and commands their
ministering co-operation which He might very well
despise....[Their word of witness] can and should be
the sign which accompanies and confirms His self-
revelation: no more, but also no less.
(C.D. IV/3, p. 608).
Christ's mercy extends so far that He makes Christians signs
of His reconciling work, and hence their witness becomes
necessary to Him.
3. If the Christian is the man who follows Christ as
witness, as so is a sign of the reconciliation of the world
completed in Christ, and if, by His grace, he is necessary
to Him in this sense, his life must include both affliction
and liberation. He suffers affliction because, as he
witnesses to Christ, he encounters the world's hostility to
Christ. The world cannot bear to be told that in Christ
reconciliation has taken place: it does not want to know
that Christ's salvation applies to it. The Christian
cannot escape this affliction, and he should see it as a
good and not an evil thing, since in it he takes part in
Christ's warfare and victory. Earth's discussion here
gives further evidence of the necessary place of the human
subject in his theology. The human subject, on the basis
of Christ's finished work to which it can add nothing,
accompanies Christ in His progress through the unbelieving
world and actually plays a part in the history of salvation.
Christ brings His salvation to men only through those who
are already His disciples. He is united with them, and as
they suffer the world's opposition, He conducts His struggle
with it, waging His battle through their active service.
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Barth's concern for human subjectivity is given further
scope in his discussion of the Christian's liberation.
Christ is not the means toward the end of Christian
liberation, but is this end Himself. Fellowship with Him
is the ratio and telos of the Christian's life. The
Christian's liberation is real only as he lives out Christ's
purpose for him. He enjoys his liberation as he proclaims
Christ the liberator to others. Barth does not mean that
Christ uses the Christian as a means toward the conversion
of others - he rejects this notion as firmly as he rejects
that of the Christian using Christ. Rather, he means that
Christ gives the Christian a share in the liberation which
He has for all men. The man who has received this
liberation (and he alone) can witness effectively to others.1
Because he is united with Christ, others meet in his witness
the self-witness of Christ, and because he is not identical
with Christ others meet in him a sign and demonstration of
the liberation of Christ. Thus, the active subjectivity of
the Christian is a necessary part of Christ's prophetic self-
witness to the world.
Assessment of Earth's Understanding of the Calling of Man
Just as the strength of Barth*s doctrine of man's
sanctification rests on participatlo Christi, so his doctrine
of man's vocation depends on unio cum Christd. For him man
is effectually called on the grounds of his union with Christ,
and, as the Spirit of Christ enlightens him as to his being
1. ibid., pp. 661-2.
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in Christ, he makes use of this self-knowledge, spontan¬
eously doing the one thing he is free to do, i.e., act out
his being in Christ as Christ's servant. In this, Jesus
Christ claims His property, but He does so only by enlighten¬
ing man as to man he really is, and thus by calling him to
act in accordance with his self-knowledge, and therefore in
freedom.
It has, however, been argued in this study,1 that man
without the Holy Spirit and faith is separated from Christ:
•anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not
belong to him.* (Rom. 8: 9). This is not to deny that the
sinner is sustained in being by Christ, nor that Christ has
died for his sins and is raised for his justification, but
it is to say that the man not yet baptised by the Spirit
into Christ is estranged from Christ. Thus, as the Spirit
of Christ comes to a man, He does not enlighten him as to
his being already in Christ, but as to his alienation from
Him.
Having said this it must immediately be added that the
Spirit, as the Spirit of Christ, enlightens man as to the
being of Christ for him. Proceeding from Christ's incar¬
nation, baptism, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension to
the Father, He enlightens the sinner as to Christ's union
with fallen humanity, His purification of it, and His
elevation of it to God. The Spirit therefore enlightens man
as to the being of Christ for him in which He is the Way from
sin to God. He enlightens men to know Christ who is the
narrow Way which leads to life. Thus, the Spirit brings men
1. Chapter III, pp. I4lff.
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to know that, precisely in their alienation from Christ,
Christ is their Way from sin to God. The Spirit enlightens
the sinner as to the amazing fact that, although he is
alienated from Christ and not united with Him, Christ, by
virtue of His purification of sinful human nature, unites
him with Himself as he treads this Way. As Christ baptises
him with His Spirit he goes Through the narrow door and
treads the narrow Way.1
In Chapter III the problem was noted that if Earth*s
notion is rejected of man being united with Christ apart
from his act of faith it becomes very difficult to under-
2
stand how man can be united with Him at all. If man needs
to have faith in Christ in order to be united with Him and
yet can have faith in Him only if He is united with Him, an
impasse is reached. But this doctrine of Christ the Way
solves it. Christ, as the Way from sin to God, is also the
Way from the sinner to Himself. In a strange and glorious
3
way, Christ is the Way to Himself. The sinner cannot make
a single step toward Christ without Christ. Apart from
Christ he cannot even confess his sin. But since Christ has
purified sinful human nature, He gives Himself to him as the
living Wray in whom is confession and repentance. He calls
1. It is correct to say both that as the sinner treads this
Way he is united with Christ and that as he is united
with Christ he treads this Way since man's baptism with
the Spirit of Christ and His obedience of faith take
place together. Neither one precedes the other, and
neither happens without the other.
2. Chapter III, pp. 144-5.
3. This point is made forcibly by McLeod Campbell in his
sermon on Matthew 7: 13> Sermons and Lectures (R.B.Lusk,
Greenock, 1832), pp. 43-5.
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him to confession and baptism, inviting him to receive Him
and to live in Him. As the sinner treads this Way,
following His command to repent and believe, Christ
baptises him with His Spirit, thus incorporating him into
Himself. Thus, the sinner who was alienated from Christ
comes to be united with Him. It is entirely the work of
Christ but it involves the faith and obedience of man.
If this picture is basically correct, Barth's account
of Christ calling men to Himself on the basis of His
revelation of Himself in the Word needs alteration, though
only slight alteration. It remains true that Christ
reveals Himself to sinners as the One He is, and that He
thereby brings them to self-knowledge. But the self-
knowledge which he awakens in them is not that of knowing
themselves as already in Him, but that of knowing themselves
as the ones to whom He gives Himself. As He reveals Himself
in His Word to them, they both know themselves as sinners
and Himself as their Way from sin to life. They can refuse
to accept this self-knowledge, as is often seen in the New
Testament. Barth's notion that there can be no ineffectual
calling cannot be sustained. Since men are not already
united with Christ before their calling, they can reject
His call. On the other hand, Earth1s notion of the
spontaneous freedom with which men answer Christ's calling
must be strengthened because, as Christ reveals Himself
as the Way, men know Him as their Way, as the One who has
given Himself wholly for them. Knowing themselves as
these ones, they freely and gladly turn to follow Him who
is their own truest life. They act spontaneously on the
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basis of genuine self-knowledge. They give themselves to
Him who gave Himself for them. It is not that they follow
Him because they realise that they are already given to Him,
as Barth suggests, but that they give themselves to Him
because they realise that He calls them, both in their
being and in their knowledge and act, calling them to
Himself who is their Way and their Life,
This correction of Barth leads to an enrichment of his
conception of the grace of Jesus Christ in His calling. It
means that Jesus Christ loves men so completely that He will
not unite them with Himself without their response. Though
He has bought them at the cost of His own blood, He does not
take possession of them without their answering response of
love to Him. He is so wholly gracious in His love that
He will possess a man only with that man's response to Him.
(To say this in no way endangers the doctrine that Christ
1
has bought the right to ownership of all men and that He
will exercise that right in raising all men from the dead.
It means that He seals men as His own only as they allow
themselves to be possessed by Him.) In His perfect grace,
Jesus Christ makes Himself the starting point for sinners
even in their estrangement. In the power of His Word and
Spirit, He enters them, becoming their Way, becoming the
very path on which to go through the gates of new life.
Where before they had nothing on which to stand, now they
find themselves grounded in Him. This happens only together
with their trust and obedience to His Word, only as they
1. II Pet. 2: 1
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follow in the Way, since He graciously desires their self-
giving to Him. Just as He gave Himself wholly for them,
so He desires them to give themselves wholly, in being and
in act, to Him.
It is worth noting that for Calvin a man is incorporate
into Christ only through the work of the Spirit and that this
takes place only together with his faith.1 He says:
... so long as we are without Christ and separated from
him, nothing which he suffered and did for the
salvation of the human race is of the least benefit
to us. To communicate to us the blessings which he
received from the Father, he must become ours and dwell
in us. Accordingly, he is called our Head, and the
first-born among many brethren, while, on the other
hand, we are said to be ingrafted into him and clothed
with him, all which he possess being, as I have said,
nothing to us, until we become one with him. And
although it is true that we obtain this by faith,...the
very nature of the case teaches us to ascend higher, and
to inquire into the secret efficacy of the Spirit, to
which it is owing that we enjoy Christ and all his
blessings. (Institute, III, 1,1)
Men are 'ingrafted* into Christ, incorporated into Him, only
with faith and the operation of the Spirit. By holding
this, Calvin is able to give man's response the full dignity
that it has for the grace of Christ. He sees that, although
Christ has died for all men, He unites men with Himself only
as they respond to Him in trust and obedience.
The Gospels provide rich insight into the grace of Jesus
in calling men to Himself. The Jews were Jesus' own people.
They belonged to Him by right and yet they resisted His call.
2
They refused to repent, be baptised and to follow Him. 'He
1. P. van Buren, Christ in Our Place (Oliver and Boyd,
Edinburgh, 1957), p. 97: 'Our incorporation into Christ
is the work of the Holy Spirit, by whose power "we are
introduced to the enjoyment of Christ".' Also, p. 102:
'For Calvin,...faith is the conditio sine qua non of
salvation.'
2. Lk. 7: 29-30.
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came to his own home, and his own people received him not.'
(Jn. 1: 11). Jerusalem was the city of the great King,
and Jesus called its people to Himself, yet they rejected
Him. He wept over the city: '0 Jerusalem, Jerusalem,...
How often would I have gathered your children together as a
hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not!'
(Matt. 23: 37). Jesus' call was based on right of owner¬
ship yet it was not effectual. Though they were in His
presence, and He revealed their sins and their desolation
for what they were (Matt. 23), they refused to accept this
knowledge and be baptised into repentance. The same thing
is seen at a more intimate level in the story of the rich
young ruler. He came to Jesus asking what he should do to
inherit eternal life. With the insight of love, Jesus saw
that there was one thing lacking, and He did not withhold
from him this knowledge. Yet the young man would not accept
this knowledge, this knowledge which penetrated right to the
centre of his being. The most instructive case is that of
Judas. His calling differed in no respect from that of the
other eleven apostles, Jesus showed him especial love on
the night of the betrayal by handing him the sop of bread
which symbolised His giving Himself for him, yet he turned
aside from his 'ministry and apostleship.' (Acts 1: 25). In
all these instances, and many others, Jesus' calling and
drawing of love met with no positive response from the hearers.
Refusing to enter the narrow gate which leads to life, they
had no part in the coming Kingdom.
Where Jesus* calling was effectual, it met with a
positive response on the part of the hearers. In His
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presence, their self-knowledge was carried through to the
point where they acknowledged Him as their Lord. Jesus
showed great insight of loving concern for the Samaritan
woman at the well, and treated her so firmly and tenderly
that she could confess her sins, acknowledge Him and bring
others to Him through her witness. The writer of the Gospel
draws particular attention to Jesus* awakening the woman to
self-knowledge. Throughout, Jesus took the initiative, yet
He led in such a way that at each stage she was increased in
self-knowledge. In the story of the calling of Zacheas,
Jesus saw his need as a despised tax-collector and bestowed
on him the great honour of choosing to dine at his house.
In the light of such compassionate understanding, Zacheas
spontaneously repented, completely altering his way of life.
In encounter after encounter Jesus* love preceded a man,
penetrated into his inner life, and led him through to the
point of confessing Jesus as the Christ. As Jesus revealed
Himself as the One He is, they knew themselves as the people
they were, repented and followed Him.
These observations from the Gospels go no further than
showing that, where the self-knowledge Jesus created was
not rejected, He led those He encountered through to acknow¬
ledging themselves as His. It was only after Pentecost
that Jesus could baptise men into Himself. According to
I Corinthians 12: 3 it is only by the Holy Spirit that a man
is able to confess Jesus as Lord. It is by the same Sprii^it
that he is baptised into the body of Christ (v. 13).
Similarly, Romans 8: 1-17 draws a definite distinction between
those who are in Christ Jesus (v. 1) and walk by the Spirit,
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and those who are in the flesh: 'All who are led by the
Spirit of God are sons of God* (v. 14), but 'anyone who does
not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him' (v. 9).
In Acts, baptism in the Spirit and membership of the Christian
community, the body of Christ, are closely connected.
It is thus clear that Jesus Christ in His grace values
man's response and baptises men into Himself only as He calls
forth that response. The value of this response to Him may
be illustrated by means of a passage of Mosaic law which may
reasonably be interpreted as indicating the response between
Christ and man. According to Exodus 21: 1-6, when an
Israelite bought a Hebrew slave, the slave was to serve his
master for six years and then go out free (hlnnam). but if
the slave
plainly says 'I love my master, my wife and my children;
I will not go out free,' then the master shall bring
him to God, and he shall bring him to the door or
the doorpost; and his master shall bore his ear
through with an awl; and he shall serve him for life.
(Ex. 21: 5-6)
Though the master had bought the slave, he did not become his
for life without his free expression of love. This seems
to parallel Christ. He bought all men with His own blood
and has right of ownership. But He does not 'bore their
ears', seal them as His own, without their free profession
of love to Him. It is not that the slaves bring anything
to their Master, or that He needs their response, but that
He is so gracious that He will not seal them without their
acknowledgement of Him as the Lord they love. Because of
His pure grace, His perfect courtesy, He cannot possess
them without their plain words: 'I love my master...I will
not go out free.'
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It is at this point that Jesus victory over sinners
shines out strongly. That Jesus is Victor means in this
context that He wins men for Himself by His grace, His
courtesy. He wins His enemies by love; He conquers
the ungracious by grace. We sinners are thoroughly
ungracious, yet, with wise patience, He is continually
gracious to us, thus bringing us to repent and to follow
Him.1 The essence of this wise patience is His love for
His enemies (Matt. 5: 43f.; Lk. 6: 27, 35; Rom. 5: 10,
12: 14, 17-21), such that He converts His enemies into His
p
friends. As we persecute Him (cf. Saul, Acts 9: 4), He
pursues us with relentless grace, persisting in love to
us until we love Him.
The perfect courtesy by which Jesus wins His victory
over His enemies is well illustrated in George Herbert's
short poem, Love:
Love bade me welcome; yet my soul drew back,
Guilty of dust and sin.
But quick-eyed love, observing me grow slack
From my first entrance in,
Drew near to me, sweetly questioning,
"If I lacked anything."
"A guest," I answered, "worthy to be here."
Love said, "You shall be he."
"I, the unkind, the ungrateful? Ah, my dear,
I cannot look on Thee."
Love took my hand, and smiling, did reply,
"Who made the eyes but I?"
"Truth, Lord, but I have marred them: let my shame
Go where it doth deserve."
"And know you not," says Love, "who bore the blame?"
"My dear, then I will serve."
"You must sit down," says Love, "and taste my meat."
So I did sit and eat.
1. Cf. Barth, Credo, trans. J.S. McNab (Hodder and Stoughton,
T936), p. 201. Also, C.D. II/l, pp. 406-39.
2. It is a severe weakness of the Dogmatics that Barth does
not give centrality to Jesus' power as this conquering of
enmity by love.
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This is a poem and not a piece of theology, yet as such it
is particularly suited to express the perfect graciousness
of the power which Jesus exercises in calling a man to Him¬
self. Herbert indicates the sensitivity to the sinner with
which Jesus answers all the soul's rebellion, fear, shame
and embarrassment. As He bids him welcome, He gently and
surely penetrates to the root of his reluctance: shame.
He answers bjr revealing Himself as the One who has borne
the blame. Thus, He does not seize power, but wins the
sinner by the powerful arguments of His love. The poem
celebrates the victory of this love. It is the love which,
simply by loving, overcomes man's unkindness and ingratitude
and brings him through to the astonished gratitude of the
concluding lines.
Barth does not give great insight into this victory of
the grace of Christ in His calling men to Himself. He
does speak of Christ's power as different from all other
power, but he fails to point to Christ's winning of the
response of His enemies through the power of His love.
In order to give this intensification of Barth's
understanding of the power of Christ's grace in His calling
firm dogmatic foundation, some observations about the nature
of the 'word of the cross' (I Cor. 1: 18) will be helpful.
The resurrected Christ calls men through the word of the
cross. He appeals to men from the point where He was fully
identified with the sin of those He calls. As this
crucified One, He has no power over men. He is in their
hands. He can only appeal to men: 'Is it nothing to you
all you who pass by.' (Lam. 1: 12). But as He reveals
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Himself as this crucified One He also reveals Himself as
identified with man's true condition. He awakens men to
see that in His cross their sinful being is being destroyed,
and that He is sorrowing in love for them. He opens their
eyes to see that He has bound Himself in love to their
intolerable condition. As this happens, the word of the
cross becomes supremely powerful, because in it they are
called out of their sin and called to their true life. They
know that in Christ their sinful being was destroyed and that
in Him they are new creatures. Thus, in calling them to
Himself, the crucified One calls them to their own true
and proper being in Him. The miracle happens that HLs
love creates in them the courage to come to Him: they
realise that there is 'no condemnation' in Him, and there¬
fore they dare to give their sinful, alienated lives into
His hands and to step forth living their new lives in Him.
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CHAPTER XIII
THE FIRST STEP OF CONVERSION: BAPTISM
Barth's final teaching on baptism is particularly-
important for this study. He argues that baptism with water
should not be regarded as a sacrament, as Christ's action,
but as man's. It should be administered only on the
specific request of the candidate. Since the grace of God
in Jesus Christ aims at man's free obedience to Him, baptism
with water should be allowed to be the glorious thing which
it is: man's thankful response to grace. Far from meaning
anything Pelagian by this, Barth wishes to allow the
Reformers' emphasis on the work of the Spirit to come to
fruition. Through baptism with the Spirit, man actively
obeys God, claiming nothing for himself and receiving all
from Christ.
Most of the themes of the Dogmatics praised earlier in
this study find a fulfillment here. God's work and man's
work are sharply distinguished, not in order to separate
God and man, but in order to allow genuine obedience and
fellowship:
What God does in Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit
is exclusively His action. Similarly, what man can
and should do in the face of the divine action is
wholly his own human action. Let us be grateful
that there is a necessary and firm connexion between
God's action and ours, between ours and His.
(C.D. IV/4, p. 72)
Man's action is not valued for its own sake, but because of
its place in the fellowship between God and man. Man's
obedience in baptism is 'the human step at which all that
God willed from eternity and did in time was primarily aiming.'1
1. CLD. IV/4, p. 151.
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Barth here breaks through the slight tendency to Christo-
monism noticed in his doctrine of election. Further, in
this fellowship between God and man, the work of the Spirit
is allowed great scope. In the light of the baptism with
the Spirit, Barth is able to say that 'to belittle what is
done to man in [Christ] is to belittle Him.'1 Although it
will later be suggested that Barth still undervalues the
creative work of the Spirit, this criticism will be made
only in order to strengthen this thesis.
One observation is necessary before proceeding to a
summary of the teaching of Barth's fragment on.baptism.
Barth thinks of baptism with the Spirit as the Spirit's
regenerating work. In this, he is in basic agreement with
Calvin:
Therefore, as we have said that salvation is perfected
in the person of Christ, so, in order to make us
partakers of it, he baptises us "with the Holy Spirit
and with fire" (Luke 3: 16), enlightening us into the
faith of his Gospel, and so regenerating us to be
new creatures. (Institute, III, 1, 1)
(Barth, however, does not go so far as Calvin in allowing
this regeneration actually to be a new creation and baptism
into Christ.) This understanding of baptism with the Holy
Spirit contrasts with that of Edward Irving, who presents
powerful arguments for regarding it as a work beyond and
greater than that of regeneration. The exact meaning of
baptism with the Spirit is a matter of controversy, but for
the purpose of this study it needs only to be said that,
though this baptism will be taken in this chapter to mean
1. ibid., p. 34.
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regeneration, Irving*s point that in it what was wrought in
Christ becomes ours will be at the basis of the discussion."^
Baptism with the Holy Spirit
The theme of this short volume is the freedom of men to
convert to God. In Jesus Christ God has turned to man, and
in the baptism with the Holy Spirit they are liberated and
freely turn to Him. Water baptism is the first step of
2
this new obedience.
The book begins with the assumption that there is such
a thing as human faithfulness corresponding to the faithful-
•3
ness of God. Such a fact is astonishing. The change
from faithlessness to faithfulness is impossible with men.
4
But what is impossible with men is possible with God. In
the history of Jesus Christ man was changed from being a
5
covenant-breaker to being God's faithful covenant partner.
His history takes place extra nos, entirely without our
assistance, but it is a history which is also pro nobis and
whose goal is realised in nobis. Jesus Christ takes man*s
place and intercedes for him there, thus beginning a history
which sets up a contradiction within the very heart of man
£
against his own faithlessness. Through His history what
was impossible with men now becomes their only possibility.
1. see below, pp. 492-3.
2. C.D. IV/4, p. 43.
3. ibid., p. 1.
4. t PP • I--2.
5. ibid., pp. 13f.
6. ibid., pp. 22f.
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In the fulfillment of divine possibility man is liberated
to 'become what he was not...before and consequently to do
what he did not...do before.'1
Man's liberation is entirely God's achievement. But
2
this work is the work of intercession. In making a new
beginning for man God does not obtrude on man, push him out
of the way and do violence to him. Man the covenant-breaker
is destroyed in this intercession, a new man and a new heart
is posited, but God does this in Jesus Christ. It is in
the humanity - the fallen humanity He shares with other men -
of Jesus Christ that the old is destroyed and the new set in
its place. As God's intercession it is for all men, as
done in our humanity it is done in our place and on our behalf.
Taking place in Him it is not forced on us, but it is done
for us. This intercession reaches its goal when men are
awakened by the Holy Spirit to believe that the conversion
of man which took place in Him is not held back from them
but is given to them. They recognise His history as theirs.
In Him they are liberated to 'confirm' God's judgment of
them, both the negative rejection of them as sinners and the
positive acceptance of them as justified. They actually
answer and confirm God's judgment. The fact that they do
this in Jesus Christ alone makes it certain that they do it.
Man's liberation is entirely God's work, but the divine
1. ibid., p. 5.
2. ibid.. p. 22.
3« ibid.. p. 160. 'in their human work and word, in the
baptism which [baptiser and baptised] perform together,
they can and should accept, confirm and repeat it fi.e.,
the divine Yes addressed to the community].'
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change which comes over man happens in genuine intercourse
between God and man. There is nothing mechanical in this
change since God in His freedom takes man seriously as His
partner. A Christomonist interpretation of this change
gives no place to human freedom, to the man who is the goal
of Christ's work.1 Similarly, an anthropomonist
construction must be rejected because it takes no account
of the divine Other to whom man responds, and therefore it
?
cannot speak convincingly of obedience and trust. Both
these accounts of the conversion of men dissolve into a
monism the mystery which confronts us here - they impose on
it a false notion of the unity of God and man. They
conjure away the interaction between God and man. Indeed,
to anticipate for a moment the shape of Barth's account of
water baptism, it could be said that the whole discussion is
concerned with this interaction: God calls forth man's
response, and in that response man calls on Him - water
baptism is both response to God and prayer to Him. God
hears this prayer and responds by giving the Holy Spirit.
Clearly, the intercourse between God and man is an essential
element in the foundation of the Christian life.
We may speak of this new beginning for man only in the
4
strength of two related presuppositions. First, the history
of Jesus Christ is not enclosed within itself: it is pro nobis.
Through His resurrection from the dead, He has power to affect
1. ibid., p. 19.
2. ibid., pp. 19f.
3. ibid.. p. 20.
4. iti^^9, p. 23*
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all other men: His history accomplished extra nos triumphs
over death and so, without loosing its concrete particularity,
reaches all other men. Second, looking at this beginning
from man's side, the power at work in this change is the
Holy Spirit, the self-witness of the resurrected Christ
imparting Himself in the heart of the believer.
These two presuppositions are equivalent to the fact
that Jesus Christ baptises men with the Holy Spirit.1 The
divine change which comes over men is their baptism with the
Holy Spirit. Barth notes that he is using this term in
a broader sense than it has in the New Testament, but he
2
believes his use of it is legitimate. He wishes to speak
of the whole movement of man's turning to faithfulness as
his baptism with the Spirit, whereas the New Testament seems
to mean by the term a specific moment in that turning.
1• ibid., p. 30•
2. ibid.. pp. 30f.
3. Cf. J.D.G. Dunn, Baptism in the Spirit (S.C.M., London,1^70), Dunn regards baptism with the Spirit as 'the
decisive and climactic experience in conversion-
initiation. * (p. 4). It comes at the completion of the
process of conversion. He argues that, in Luke's Gospel,
there is a part in conversion assigned to man and a part
which God does - 'in conversion one believes, commits one¬
self to Christ, receives the Spirit from Christ. Man's
act in conversion is to repent, to turn, to believe.
God's act is to give the Spirit on believing.' (p. 96)
But Dunn's distinction between man's act and God's is
very different from Barth's. He disputes the place of
the Spirit in man's coming to conversion and turning, and
regards faith as a condition of receiving the Spirit
(p. 228). This tends to lead back to justification by
works, since repentance is notgLven by God (as it is in
the New Testament, e.g.. Acts 6: 31) and the human act
becomes the fulfilledcondition for receiving the Spirit.
In keeping with this position Dunn thinks that Barth is
'confused as to whether water baptism is the human response
to the divine initiative of Spirit baptism, or Spirit
baptism the divine response to the human petition of water
baptism.' (p. 94) Dunn argues the latter position. He
(Contd.
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Barth lists five points which indicate the nature of
this baptism.
1. Jesus Christ alone acts as the author and finisher of
faith. A man does not become a Christian by his own
decision;1 Jesus Christ alone makes a man a Christian.
2. But the foundation of the Christian life is a form of
the grace of God which actually reconciles the world to
2
God and this means that specific men are really turned to
God: man is not unaffected by this reconciliation, but
because the reconciliation is genuine, the whole man is
claimed in the grace which comes to him.
3. Since the whole man is claimed - God is wholly gracious -
grace demands gratitude.-^ Barth underlines the demand of
gratitude, contradictory though it may seem, because God
surrounds man with His goodness and gives him the freedom
with which to respond. In being set in the ambience of
God, he is set on his own feet and of his own volition walks
L
according to the Spirit.
Here man is taken seriously, and finds that he is taken
seriously, as the creature which is different from God,
Contd.) is quite right to say that Barth holds both
positions, but this is not a confusion on Earth's part
since Barth holds that the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of
Jesus Christ carries through the entire movement of
conversion, and thus the Holy Spirit both moves man to
respond to God and, in this response, to cry out for the
Spirit. In arguing this, Barth avoids the danger of
giving man's repentance and faith any suggestion of a
'justifying status'. Barth can thus maintain that Jesus
Christ is the author of faith (p. 31). A constant theme
in this part of the Dogmatics is that the Spirit brings
us to cry out for the Spirit - Veni Creator Spiritus!
1. CHD. IV/4, pp. 32f.
2. ibid.. p. 33.
3. ibid., p. 35.
4. ibid., p. 36.
494
which, for all its dependence is autonomous before
Him, which is of age. Here he is empowered for his
own act, and invited, commanded and encouraged to
perform it. (C.D. IV/4, p» 35)
In contrast to 'the death of God' theologies published about
the time as this volume (1967), Barth does not understand
man's coming of age to mean his turning away from God,
standing on the ground he creates for himself, but rather
as his turning to God who sets him on his own feet.
4. Being thus established in fellowship with God as His
partner, man's isolation from his fellow-men is broken and
he is set within a new life of 'distinctive fellow-humanity'.1
No longer bound in proud isolation, he is a free and there¬
fore responsible member of the people of God. In the
preceding third point Barth stressed the Christian's freedom,
in this point he stresses the responsibility this freedom
entails. It is not simply the responsibility which belongs
to the freedom to renounce and to pledge, it is the mutual
responsiveness of the children of God. In becoming a
Christian, a man freely becomes a member of this community:
he becomes a 'companion, fellow and brother of these others,
2
bound to them for better or for worse.' Most theologies at
this point use the language of initiation into Christ. Barth
thinks rather of the Spirit awakening men to take hold of
the life which is already theirs in Christ, and thus of
their liberation to take that step whereby they become
members of Christ's community. Though this conception
will be criticised below, it does have the value of taking
1. ibid., p. 36.
2. ibid.. p. 37.
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seriously the fact that Christ lives among the men He makes
free to serve Him and therefore each other. It gives great
stress to the fellowship of the community, and to the fact
that Christ is present in the mutual responsiveness of its
members. He lives in the charismata of the community.1
5. This distinctive fellow humanity is only the beginning
of a new creation. The baptism with the Holy Spirit bears
fruit within the love of the community and even more
importantly it is the constantly renewed beginning of a life
which hastens toward Jesus Christ who apprehends them as
they long to see Him face to face.
These five points unfold what it means that Jesus Christ
is the author and finisher of faith. Man's turning to faith¬
fulness is entirely His work. But as He baptises man with
His Holy Spirit He brings His work to its goal, i.e.. man's
free turning to God and his walking in the Spirit and on his
own feet. We may note that these five points progress from
the movement of God toward man to the freedom bestowed on
man and conclude wkth man's movement toward God. They
describe the realisation of the goal of God's intercession
for man.
Baptism with Water
The first section of this book, the discussion of
baptism with the Spirit, enquires into the divine origin of
the foundation of the Christian life. Barth now enquires
1. ibid.. p. 38.
2. ibid.. p. 38.
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into the basis, goal and meaning of the human act of
response, baptism with water. Baptism with the Spirit is
entirely God's act, baptism with water entirely man's.
But while there is no confusion between the two acts, water
baptism corresponds to Spirit baptism.
The basis of water baptism is the command of the
resurrected Christ, who has Himself been baptised by John
in the Jordan. Water baptism is a work of obedience.
Jesus' baptism shows us the nature of this obedience.
In His baptism He (1) freely and unconditionally submitted
Himself to the Lordship of God; (2) He no less freely and
unconditionally associated Himself with sinful men; and
(3) undertook to do in the service of God and man what He
alone could do for men and what as man He alone could
do for God.1 His baptism was free commitment to service.
It was not only the sign of this service, but also the first
step of its accomplishment, since in humbly submitting to
John's baptism He was actually taking the first step of
service in the mission which He thereby undertook.
This achievement of Jesus liberates men to follow Him.
As the first step of the service for which He frees them,
they submit to water baptism. It signifies free submission
to service and as a free and obedient act is the first step
of that service.
But what does the Christian community have in view when
it administers the same act of washing with water to which
1. ibid., p. 54.
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its Lord submitted?"1" When Jesus was baptised, He looked
forward to the act of God, in fact to baptism with the Holy
2
Spirit. Jesus looked for confirmation of His baptism from
heaven. Christian baptism cannot claim to be superior to
that of its Lord:^ even after Pentecost baptism looks for¬
ward to the act of God - it, too, looks forward 'to its
4
fulfilment in the future baptism with the Holy Spirit.1
Barth insists that baptism is not baptism into Jesus Christ,
into the acts of God (how could we take part in the acts of
God?), but that it is baptism with a view toward Jesus Christ,
looking toward Him, hoping in Him and allowing Him to be its
theme and content. We cannot seat ourselves next to God's
throne and from there try to effect salvation. Barth speaks
of this in a way which recalls the request of James and John
to sit on Jesus* right and left hands in the coming kingdom.
Such pride stands in contradiction to baptism as service.
Baptism takes place with empty hands, a humble, obedient act
of hope in Jesus Christ which looks forward to 'the divine
act of salvation and revelation.'5
The meaning of baptism is the conversion of man. It is
the fully human act of obedience to Jesus Christ and hope in
Him. Put another way, baptism as obedience and hope is
7
prayer to Jesus Christ. As prayer to the risen Christ who
commands this obedience and who is its goal, it is prayer
1. ibid. pp. 68-9.
2. ibid. p. 70.
3. ibid. p. 70.
4. ibid. P • 71 •
5. ibid. p. 73.
6. ibid. p. 134.
7. ibid. pp. 210ff.
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which is heard, and thus Barth dares to call baptism a
saving human work.1 'Whoever calls on the name of the
Lord shall be saved.' (Acts 2: 21).
The meaning of water baptism is 'the meaning of [the]
human action, the action taken by men who are obedient to
2
Jesus Christ and who hope in Him. The dignity of baptism
is endangered when baptism is thought of as an 'immanent
divine work*. The sacramental interpretation of baptism
must resolutely be rejected because either what men 'will
and do is completely overshadowed and obscured by the
immanent divine work and word', or, what 'men will and do
becomes as such the will and accomplishment of divine work
and word.... Either way Christian baptism is treated
docetically. * There is 'no free human answer to the sfct
4
and call of the free God.' Also, baptism becomes 'identical
with its basis and goal', and therefore 'a strangely
5
competitive duplication of the history of Jesus Christ...' .
Properly understood, baptism is not itself a mystery, but it
•responds to a mystery, the sacrament of the history of
Jesus Christ.'^
In opposing the doctrine of a hidden divine work in
baptism, Barth is clearing the way for a positive account
of baptism, a non-docetic account.
1. ibid.. P. 210.
2. ibid., P. 101.
3. ibid., P. 101.
4. ibid., P. 102.
5. ibid., P. 102.
6. ibid.» P. 102.
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Three formal statements about the meaning of baptism
define the human action. First, its technical admini¬
stration is an act of obedience, not a capricious or self-
willed event. It is a concrete act, a 'decision' which
'replies' to the divine work of cleansing and renewal."'"
Second, baptism has a social character, involving both
candidate and. community in witness to the world. Third,
baptism has to do with the freedom of candidate and community
as both respond to the Lord's freedom. 'Just because a
first step is to be taken which does justice to the free,
fatherly turning of God to them, the act of baptism must
have for all concerned the character of a genuine human
2
decision.' It is a venture for both candidate and
community, since neither have any guarantee within themselves
concerning 'the future into which they take this first, bold,
•3
serious and binding step.' Yet this venture may be made
with confidence because God is their stronghold.
The material definition of baptism carries us further
into the content of the human response. It is, as we have
seen, an act of obedience and hope. This is conversion,
since it means leaving the old way of self-will and anxiety
for the new way of obedience and trust. Jesus Christ is
allowed to command and promise.
We must speak more precisely. In baptism both candidate
and community commit themselves. Conversion demands the
concrete act of baptism because it answers the concrete act
of God. Those who were baptised by John in the specific
1. ibid., p. 130.
2. ibid.. p. 132.
3. ibid., p. 133.
500
act in the Jordan 'justified God.Unlike the Pharisees
who rejected the will of God for them, and were content
with interior repentance, they associated themselves
publicly and visibly with the publicans and sinners who
could only justify God's judgment and look to His free mercy.
As conversion to this God, the God who justifies sinners,
it is radical conversion.
We must speak more precisely still. We must have 'a
clear picture of the free and responsible human act which
2
takes place.' First, a man obeys the command of Jesus
■3
Christ in 'the freedom which has been made his own in Him.
Second, as this act of obedience, a specific renunciation
4
and pledge is given. This pledge and renunciation can be
given only in response to the 'renunciation and pledge of God
5
Himself in Jesus Christ.'-^ Man confirms God's No and Yes
in baptism. God alone pronounces the No against sin, but
in baptism a man buries the old man crucified with Christ.
Similarly, God alone speaks the victorious Yes to man, but
in baptism a man 'can and should accept, answer, confirm and
repeat it.' ^
Baptism, then, is the twofold answer of renunciation and
7
pledge to the divine salvation of man. It is the human
decision made, not by deciding between two paths, like
Hercules at the cross roads, but in the will and desire to
1. ibid.. PP . I41f.
2. ibid., P. 153.
3. ibid., P. 154.
4. ibid., P. 158.
5. ibid., P. 158.
6. ibid.. P. 160.
7. ibid.. P. 162.
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witness to the way opened up for men. It is the only
possible way for them, but genuine human decision is
involved because man is taken seriously as God's partner
and man takes his place as this partner. Barth says:
in that which takes place in the sphere of the covenant
of grace, we find dialogue and dealings between two who
stand in clear encounter, God on the one side and man
on the other...so that, while these men can only follow
what God says and does, they are all active subjects for
their part, and they can and should follow with their
own speech and action on the basis of their own
responsible decision. (C.D. IV/4, p. 163)
Because infant baptism does not give to baptism the
dignity of the free response of the human subject, it is only
half a sacrament.
Barth takes up one final problem. Baptism is an act
of hope in Jesus Christ, and, with its orientation toward
witness in society, it looks toward the future. It is a
great and marvellous venture, or, rather, it is the first
step of such a venture. But are not the steps which follow
baptism uncertain? And does not this throw doubt on the
human act of baptism itself? There is an answer: 'the meaning
of baptism consists...in the fact that the community and its
candidates let Jesus Christ be the future of their action...'"1"
This does not mean sitting back and doing nothing, living by
cheap grace. No - Jesus Christ brings men into active
fellowship with Himself. It means prayer to Him. Baptism
is a saving human work only to the extent that it is prayer
2
to the resurrected Christ. In this prayer the Church does
not manipulate God but the people
1. ibid., p. 207.
2. ibid., p. 210.
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let God be God [and] they let Him be their God, who
has called them and to whom they may call in return,
who hears them and who is heard as they may hear Him,
and hearing, obey him. (C.D. IV/4, p. 210)
It is an act both humble and bold. Claiming nothing for
itself, it gains all. As such, it is a saving human actioni
(I Pet. 3: 21).
Baptism into Christ's Vicarious Humanity
In assessing the value of this remarkable document for
the meaning of man's turning to God, the following points
of approval may be made.
1. By speaking of the Spirit of the Lord Jesus, and
refusing to tie Him to man's act, Barth allows God to be
God in His grace to man. All suggestion that Christ's
completed act is distant from men in their present situation
and that it needs their act to fill the vacuum is obviated.
The Spirit of Christ comes to men in their present and, in
His sovereignty, brings men to participate in the conversion
accomplished in Christ. Barth thus avoids the solitariness
of an anthropomonist interpretation of conversion in which
the human subject acts without the divine Subject.
2. By speaking of the Spirit as he does, Barth also
obviates the suggestion of Christomonism which was noted
earlier in his treatment of man's awakening to conversion.
Because the Spirit is allowed to be the free, sovereign
Spirit of Christ our Contemporary, He brings man freely to
be man. It becomes clear in a way in which it was not
earlier in the Dogmatics that 'to belittle what is done to
man in Christ is to belittle Him.* Barth thus avoids the
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solitariness of a Christomonism in which the divine Subject
acts without the answer of the human subject. The
sacramentalism which by-passes the act of man is avoided.
3. By speaking of Christ baptising men with His Spirit
as he does, Barth liberates the doctrine of Christ's
vicarious humanity from all suggestion that Christ performed
repentance instead of us, and allows it to become a doctrine
of genuine participation in Him. It has recently been
argued with great conviction that Jesus Christ is Himself
our response to God. Just as at the Lord's table, it is not
in the first instance ourselves that we offer, but the cup
of salvation which He puts into our hands, so in baptism we
plead not our response but Jesus, who is our baptism and
our Amen to God's judgment of grace. As Barth puts it:
'It is in His baptism in the Jordan that we are baptised with
the Holy Spirit and with fire.' It may seem that because
this is so, it is faithlessness to see our response to God
as the goal of God's grace.
Far from being a Sacrament of our faith and our
repentance, or conversion, Baptism is the Sacrament
in which we are baptised out of ourselves and into
Christ. We are unable to repent as we would, but
He gives us repentance and remission of sins. We are
baptised into Him who, bearing our sins and guilt and
bringing in Himself the perfect submission of man to
God, confessed the sins of the world and bore the divine
judgment on it. It is in Him alone that we are
baptised into true repentance, for in Him we acquiesce in
the divine judgment of our sin and accept the forgiveness
of His grace. (Church of Scotland Interim Report on
Baptism, May 1^60. p. 689)
Also, 'we can stand before God and claim Christ as our
response.' This may gladly be affirmed, and, without
detracting from it, but rather by strengthening it, be
developed to say that, because He is our response, we
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respond in Him. He gives His response into our hands. As
He gives the cup of salvation into our hands so that we
offer it, and in offering it, offer and present ourselves,
so He gives His baptism into our hands so that we perform it.
He was baptised in our place in order that we should be
baptised: our response is the purpose and goal of His
response. The beautiful doctrine that 'in Him alone we are
baptised into true repentance, for in Him we are brought to
acquiesce in the divine judgment of our sin and to accept the
forgiveness of His grace* must be strengthened also to say
(as unfortunately the Church of Scotland Report does not)
that in Christ we actually do acquiesce in that judgment,
judging ourselves in Him, and accept forgiveness, taking
hold of it in Him.
4. By speaking of baptism with the Spirit as he does,
Barth allows the human response to be essential to man's
full salvation. The Spirit represents to men Christ in
His perfected work, and brings them freely to call on God
in response to His Word. 'Whoever calls on the name of the
Lord shall be saved.' Thus, God Himself responds to man's
response to Him, and so, without merit but simply as prayer¬
ful obedience, man's act becomes a saving act. Since the
meaning of baptism consists in this prayer, Barth allows
God to act in man's act with a reality and a certainty
which neither sacramentalist (and therefore Christomist)
nor anabaptist (and therefore anthropomonist) interpre¬
tations of baptism are able.
5. If man's act in baptism is this empty act of prayer
which receives all from God, Barth*s placing the doctrine of
505
baptism within the sphere of ethics, as man's obedient
response, is a great liberation for the Church, Baptism
does not cease to be a saving event in which the living
Christ is savingly at work, but baptism is liberated to be
the answer of man to God's fatherly heart. Baptism becomes
the obedience of man, and therefore the freedom of His
children before Him, in which God and the Son have the
response from man which from all eternity They have waited.
And His children have that act whereby they can show forth
their love to Him.
All of these points concern the personal .relationship
between God and man in the Spirit. Earlier in this study
it was suggested that Barth should consider further the
intercourse between God's Spirit and man's spirit, but
here, in the final fragment of the Dogmatics, he has given
this interaction extended treatment. Nevertheless, he
still undervalues the creative work of the Spirit. Barth
denies that in baptism with the Spirit men are baptised into
Christ. This denial follows from his argument that the
being of all men was ontologically converted in Christ's
death and resurrection. In view of earlier discussions in
this study, it is more correct to say that the Spirit, who
proceeds from the ontological conversion which took place
in Christ, baptises men into that ontological change. If
this is so, man's act in baptism with water, when it is the
obedient act of prayer called forth by the Spirit and which
calls out for baptism with the Spirit, has even greater
meaning as man's conversion than Barth allows. It is a
saving human act not only in the sense that in it men begin
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actively to live their new life, but also in the sense that
the Spirit brings about in them an ontological change.
In baptism there really is a baptism into the death of
Christ to sin, and a rising to newness of life. Barth's
hesitation about the radicalness of Biblical passages where
this is argued (e.g., Rom. 6: 1-11) is overcome.
This leads us to a final point. If greater creative
work is allowed to the Spirit in His intercourse with the
human spirit, it becomes possible to give a richer account
of the concreteness and the content of the human act of
conversion. As Barth says, in baptism with water man makes
a public self-commitment to Christ and makes his first step
along the road of that self-commitment. He becomes a
soldier of the cross, engaged to confess Christ crucified.
As he takes up the life of the cross, he corresponds to
Christ who went to the cross for him. But the idea of
correspondence is adequate to convey only the formal shape
of the new life which he enters. If, however, the Spirit
is allowed to bring about an ontological change in men as
they call on the Lord in water baptism, men will be seen as
being initiated not only into a life of correspondence to
Christ crucified, but also a life of suffering service.
Their correspondence to Christ will have real content. It
will be a real sharing in Christ's own baptism.
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CONCLUSION
In pursuing the question of man's turning to God, it
has been found that Barth is basically correct to say that
this takes place in Jesus Christ. As the One in whom God
has turned to man, He is also the One in whom man has
turned to God. This turning is not locked up in Himself,
as though His person were intrinsically private and cut off
from others, but, through His Spirit, He communicates Himself
and the turning He accomplished to sinners, and thus brings
them actively to participate in His turning to God.
This means that all that the sinner needs is in Christ.
He does not first have to repent (as though this were
possible) before Christ is his Saviour. On the contrary,
Christ's repentance makes it possible for him to repent;
His forgiveness is the ground of his repentance. In this
way, gospel precedes law and is its content. The Christian
message is wholly good news for the sinner.
Barth's treatment of these evangelical themes is, however,
marred by a slight tendency to Christomonism. Though it
would be quite unfair to call him a Christomonist, his
failure fully to develop his doctrine of the triune God,
and especially that of the Spirit, prevents him from allowing
all that is in Christ wholly to reach individual men. His
failure to give due weight to the origin of divine election
in the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ prevents him from
celebrating the goal of God's election in His sons who elect
Him; and his failure to give the Spirit His proper place
in Christ's election of God and conversion of human nature
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circumscribes the completeness with which Christ communicates
His conversion of man to individual men.
Again, this study found itself in wholehearted agree¬
ment with Barth that the free, uncaused and utterly gracious
turning of God to the men who had turned away from Him
aims at their corresponding free turning back to Himself.
On the basis of His turning to man simply for man's sake,
He seeks man's turning to Him for His sake, 'for nothing'.
This turning was fulfilled in the cross of Christ, and it
was vindicated in His resurrection in such a way that sinners
are granted the new being in which to turn to Him for their
own part. But it was found that Barth does not allow his
own vision to come to its full realisation. By holding
that all men have their being in Christ's salvation prior
to their personal, active sharing in Him, he does not allow
man's turning to God to have its full significance as his free
act of correspondence to God's free turning to him. There is
a sense in which he is turned to God without his free act.
Similarly, Earth's talk about the impossibility of sin, and
his denial that the tempter is the spiritual creature who
chose against God's grace, has the serious effect of
securing man's turning to God to some extent at least
independently of his own personal act, and to that extent
of robbing God's free grace of its goal in man's corresponding
free turning to Him. In making these criticisms of Barth
there was no desire to exalt man's act for its own sake.
On the contrary, it was felt that only by speaking of Jesus'
achieving the ontological impossibility of sin in face of
the very real possibility of not choosing God (as represented
509
in Satan) could content be.given to Barth's claim that God's
grace aims at man's free decision for Him. Nor was there
any desire to think of man exercising the freedom of choice
of a Hercules at the cross-roads, a notion which Barth
abhors because it would mean that God sets both good and
evil before man. On the contrary it was argued that
theology must witness more definitely than does Barth to the
interaction of God's Spirit with man's spirit, and especially
to Pentecost as the goal of God's self-giving to man on earth
and thus of God's giving Himself actually to indwell man and
to bring him freely to give himself to God. The Spirit
awakens men not to neutral freedom of choice, but to that
responsibility in which they refuse evil and choose good.
It was also found necessary to argue for a third
strengthening of Barth's understanding of conversion. God's
free turning to man aims at man's free turning to Him on that
basis. This is the meaning of the covenant, the fellowship
of God with man and man with God in which God loves man as
Himself and man loves God and his neighbour. Man broke
this fellowship, but Jesus Christ fulfilled it by giving
Himself for sinners on the cross. Through His Spirit, who
is the essence of this fellowship, He brings men to share
in the free being together of God and man in Him. The
Church would benefit greatly by listening to this uncompro¬
mising witness to God's satisfaction of His love for man in
Christ and to our satisfaction in Him. In particular, all
ideas of the satisfaction of the law as the condition of
God's love for man, and of man's worthiness (whether in his
repentance or in his faith) as a condition of salvation,
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would be exposed as limitations of the gospel. But Barth's
account needs to be given greater content. The work of
the Scottish theologians, Edward Irving, Thomas Erskine and
McLeod Campbell was found helpful in this task. With their
aid, Christ's obedient repentance for sinners was seen as
His loving His brethren as Himself, as His loving them to
the point where He embodied His Father's yearning and
sorrowing love for sinners. This personal, spiritual sorrow
was seen as filling out with rich content Barth's account of
Christ's judgment in our place. Further, the Spirit was
seen to be the strength in which Christ accomplished this
loving of His brethren as Himself. By the Spirit He both
bore the sins of others as His own and also gives these
others His righteousness. Since it is by the Spirit that
He does this, He does not include them in Himself without
bringing them actively to share in Him. By the Spirit
Christ brings them: to share in His repentance for sin, thus
giving them access to genuine repentance of their own. This
understanding of the Spirit enriches the content of conversion
not only in relation to justification, but also in relation
to man's act of turning and his vocation. Christ took up
fallen human nature. By the Spirit He prosecuted an awe¬
some battle against the world, the flesh and the devil,
triumphed over them, and presented our humanity spotless
before the Creator. By the same Spirit He now brings
sinners to a similar conflict in which they actually turn
from sin to God. Again, in man's vocation, Christ does not
call man on the basis of his being already in Christ, but on
the basis of HLs power to enlighten them by His Spirit to know
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themselves as those for whom He gave Himself. In this way,
He does not unite them with Himself merely by virtue of His
objective work for them, only by His calling them with the
drawing of His infinite love, tenderness and courtesy.
These modifications and developments of Barth give his
theology a more thoroughly evangelical thrust. It becomes
clearer that the entire being of God aims at man. The
Spirit comes into closer engagement with individual men.
Since this Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, Barth's doctrine
of our conversion in Christ is enriched in meaning. All
that is His is ours, but in such a way that we share in Him
only as He makes us willing to live in Him. He does not
overshadow our decision, but makes it necessary to Him. As
He shares Himself with us, doing so through the Spirit who
enters into gracious engagement with our spirit, He liberates
our subjectivity into the freedom it could not find in itself.
He gives us the courage to repent of our attempt to base
ourselves on ourselves, and to trust Him. In this courage,
we turn to Him who has turned to us.
It is hard to say how much Barth himself would be in
sympathy with the proposals made in this study, but in at
least three respects they should meet with his approval.
First, Barth himself recognised that his theology needed to
pay more attention to the Spirit. Second, this necessarily
involves a turning toward man, something he saw as much
needed in contemporary theology. And, finally, he had no
wish to create a school of theologians who merely repeated
what he had said. It is hoped that this study goes some
way toward saying the things which must be said about man if
we pray with genuine seriousness the prayer so often found
in the Dogmatics;'Yeni Creator Spiritus.1
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